William Chalmers

The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against a bankrupt property maintenance company for injuries sustained in a slip and fall.

They subsequently brought an action against the company's insurer under s. 132 of the Insurance Act.

The insurer argued it was not liable because the insured failed to provide notice of the claim.

The Court of Appeal held that notice provided by a co-defendant property owner was effective under the policy's liability conditions, which allowed notice to be given 'by or for' the insured.

Alternatively, the court found the plaintiffs were entitled to relief from forfeiture under s. 129 of the Insurance Act, as the failure to give timely notice constituted imperfect compliance and the insurer suffered no prejudice.

The appellant, a roofing contractor, appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay over $900,000 to the respondent condominium corporation in a third-party action.

The main action involved a unit owner who successfully sued the condominium corporation for continuous roof leaks.

The Court of Appeal found that while the contractor was liable for breach of contract, it was not liable for negligent misstatement because the condominium corporation had unreasonably ignored expert reports in favour of the contractor's cheaper solution.

The Court of Appeal reassessed damages, finding the condominium corporation primarily responsible for the delay in fixing the roof, and reduced the damages awarded against the contractor to $50,913.97.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred by charging the jury on both the 'but for' and 'material contribution' tests for causation.

The Court of Appeal agreed that charging on both tests was an error of law, as only one test applies.

However, the court found no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the trial judge's explanation of 'material contribution' effectively amounted to a further instruction on the 'but for' test.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's guidance on the quantum of damages was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that the respondent insurer was required to defend and indemnify a driver involved in an accident while driving a rented vehicle.

The respondent denied coverage on the basis that the rental company failed to identify the specific vehicle in its monthly fleet report.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the plain language of the fleet endorsement only required the rental company to report the number of leased vehicles in its fleet, not the particulars of each vehicle.

The landlord sued the tenant in negligence after a fire started in the tenant's unit, causing property damage.

The parties brought a motion by special case to determine if the landlord's subrogated insurer was precluded from maintaining the claim.

The motion judge allowed the claim to proceed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Offer to Lease required the tenant to contribute to the cost of insurance, the risk of fire loss passed to the landlord, precluding the subrogated claim.

The appellants purchased a fan manufactured by the respondent and installed it in their home.

Thirteen years later, the fan overheated and caused a fire, resulting in agreed damages of $179,000.

The trial judge dismissed the appellants' negligence action, finding no breach of a duty to warn.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, noting the appellants led no evidence regarding the standard of care for warnings in 1985, nor did they establish they would have acted differently had a warning been provided.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them negligent for failing to provide a required railing, which was determined to be a proximate cause of the respondent's accident.

The trial judge also allocated 33.3% contributory negligence to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusions on causation and contributory negligence were fully supported by the evidence and within his discretion.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Michigan and required emergency medical services.

She held both a standard Ontario automobile policy with the respondent and a travel insurance policy with the appellant.

The appellant paid the medical expenses and sought reimbursement from the respondent.

The motion judge found both policies provided primary coverage and applied s. 268(6) of the Insurance Act to make the travel insurance primary.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the clear language of the travel insurance policy made it excess insurance.

Therefore, s. 268(6) did not apply, and the automobile insurer was required to provide primary coverage and reimburse the travel insurer.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review.

The respondents argued the application was moot because they had sought approval of a second site plan.

The Divisional Court rejected the mootness argument and held it had jurisdiction under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay the application.

The court ordered the application for judicial review stayed pending the final disposition of the appeal of the second site plan to the Mining and Lands Commissioner, noting that if the second site plan is approved, the application will become moot.

The appellant, CGU Insurance Company of Canada, appealed a judgment finding its policy to be a primary policy.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court, refining the determination to classify the CGU policy as a primary policy with an excess coverage clause.

The court confirmed that a primary policy with excess coverage ranks ahead of a true umbrella policy, such as the Lombard policy.

The court also rejected arguments regarding standing and the appropriateness of proceeding by application.

The appeal was dismissed with a minor variation to the judgment's wording.