T. R. Lofchik

The accused applied to quash a production order and exclude hospital medical records and blood alcohol test results obtained following a fatal motor vehicle collision.

The defence argued that police improperly obtained the records through a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code rather than a search warrant and that the Information to Obtain was insufficient and misleading.

The court held that the statutory standard for a production order was constitutionally valid and materially equivalent to the search warrant standard, and that the issuing justice could reasonably have been satisfied that the statutory prerequisites were met.

Any inaccuracies or omissions in the Information to Obtain were found to be inconsequential and not misleading.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for non-earner benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer argued that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because the benefit had been denied in 2008.

The court held that the insurer’s OCF‑9 constituted a clear refusal of benefits and that the limitation period began running from that denial.

A subsequent change in the law regarding eligibility for non‑earner benefits did not invalidate the earlier denial or revive the limitation period.

Claims for mental distress, bad faith, and negligent misrepresentation were also dismissed due to lack of evidentiary support.

Following an unsuccessful motion by the defendant seeking to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on the basis of res judicata, the court determined the appropriate costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The motion involved complex legal issues including the doctrine of res judicata, conflict of laws, and analysis of a United States declaratory judgment forming the basis of the defendant’s argument.

The plaintiff sought substantial partial indemnity costs reflecting extensive research, including evidence from U.S. counsel regarding American law.

The court found the claimed hours excessive for a one‑day motion but accepted that the issues were complex and important.

The court fixed reasonable partial indemnity costs and allowed the claimed disbursements.

The plaintiff, operating as Carey Industries, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from carrying on business under the name 'Steve's Welding & Sandblasting Inc.' The plaintiff had previously operated under the trade name 'Steve's Welding & Sandblasting' for nearly 30 years before changing its name.

The individual defendant, a former owner and employee of the plaintiff, incorporated the competing business shortly after his departure.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found a serious issue to be tried regarding passing off, noting the identical trade name and evidence of actual customer confusion.

The court concluded the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm to its goodwill and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay an Ontario action on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel, and abuse of process, relying on a Minnesota default declaratory judgment obtained after the plaintiff declined to attorn to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court.

The Ontario court found that the Minnesota judgment did not determine the dispute on the merits and that the defendant failed to disclose the pending Ontario proceedings when seeking default judgment.

Applying the principles governing recognition of foreign judgments, the court held there was no real and substantial connection between the dispute and Minnesota sufficient under Canadian conflict of laws rules.

The court further concluded that the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel did not apply, and even if they did, discretion should be exercised to refuse their application to avoid injustice and the appearance of forum shopping.

The moving defendants, a lawyer and law firm acting for a mortgagee in a mortgage enforcement proceeding, brought a motion under Rule 21.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the amended statement of claim alleging improper withholding of surplus proceeds following a power of sale.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyers attempted to extort a release by withholding trust funds and sought damages for abuse of process, negligence, and breach of ethical duties.

The court held that opposing counsel owe no duty of care or fiduciary duty to an adverse party and that alleged breaches of professional or ethical duties are owed to the court and the governing law society, not to opposing litigants.

As a result, the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action and were frivolous and vexatious.

The impugned portions of the claim against the lawyer and law firm were struck.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order requiring the corporate defendant to pay interim legal fees and disbursements of the plaintiffs in an oppression remedy action under s. 249(4) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge had ordered payment of all past and future legal fees to create a level playing field between minority shareholders and the corporation that had funded the defence.

The court held that the motion judge properly applied the governing test from Alles v. Maurice regarding merit of the claim and the complainants’ financial inability to pursue the action without assistance.

However, the court found a serious question regarding the correctness of awarding 100% reimbursement of past fees and unlimited future costs, noting that prior authorities typically limit interim cost awards to specific stages or purposes.

Because conflicting approaches existed and the issue was of broader importance for oppression remedy litigation, leave to appeal was granted and the underlying order was stayed pending appeal.

Property owners brought an application seeking a declaration that they could enforce obligations under a private road maintenance agreement and compel mediation or arbitration regarding disputes about maintenance.

The respondents argued there was no privity of contract because the applicants were not parties to the same agreement.

The court held that the developer’s scheme of entering identical agreements with each purchaser, combined with an enurement clause binding successors and assigns, demonstrated an intention that the purchasers benefit from and enforce the obligations relating to road maintenance.

Alternatively, the court found the circumstances satisfied the third‑party beneficiary test articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applicants were declared entitled to rely on the agreement and to require mediation or arbitration concerning road maintenance disputes.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against her.

The plaintiff had advanced $250,000 to a co-defendant for investment purposes and alleged losses after the funds were traded and lost.

The moving defendant was a joint holder of a bank account through which some of the funds briefly passed, but there was no evidence she participated in the transfers, trading activity, or received any benefit from the funds.

The court applied the summary judgment framework under Rule 20.04 and the “full appreciation test” from Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch.

Finding no evidence supporting liability or a viable tracing claim, and determining the Fraudulent Conveyances Act claim was premature, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action against the moving defendant.

The accused brought a constitutional application challenging the exclusion of common-law spouses from the spousal incompetency rule in s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the related common law.

The court considered whether the distinction between married spouses and common-law partners violated s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying evolving equality jurisprudence following Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., the court held that denying common-law partners the protections afforded to married spouses constituted discrimination based on marital status.

The court further concluded that the infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter because excluding common-law spouses was not rationally connected to the objective of protecting conjugal confidences and marital harmony.

The appropriate remedy was to read common-law spouses into s. 4 of the Canada Evidence Act and the common law spousal incompetence rule.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to introduce evidence from several witnesses that would disclose prior criminal conduct and other discreditable acts by the accused in a murder prosecution.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, the relationship between the accused and witnesses, and consciousness of guilt, including allegations that the accused plotted to eliminate a key witness.

The court applied the established rule that evidence of disreputable conduct is presumptively inadmissible unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.

The court held that most of the proposed evidence formed part of the narrative explaining the motive and relationships surrounding the alleged homicide and was therefore admissible with limiting instructions.

Certain evidence, including alleged assaults on a spouse, buried firearms, and an ante‑mortem statement attributed to the deceased, was excluded as marginally relevant and of questionable probative value.

The Crown sought a ruling that statements made by the accused to police during two interviews in 2006 were voluntary and admissible at trial.

The defence argued the statements were induced by promises of protection for the accused’s family and that the failure to provide Charter cautions violated ss. 7 and 10(b).

The court held the accused was not detained in relation to the investigation and that the interviews were investigative in nature while he was incarcerated on unrelated matters.

Applying the legal detention test, the court found no inducements or promises of favour tied to providing information.

The statements were therefore found to be voluntary and admissible.

Following a trial involving a dispute over a claimed leasehold interest and alleged obligations to improve leased premises, the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed and the defendants succeeded on a counterclaim for rent arrears in the amount of $120,000 plus prejudgment interest.

The successful defendants sought recovery of legal costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court assessed the reasonableness of the claimed fees and disbursements.

The court reduced amounts relating to certain research, an unsuccessful motion for possession, and certain disbursements.

Costs were fixed at $33,900 in fees plus $2,681.43 in disbursements inclusive of tax.

Following dismissal of the plaintiff’s $4.5 million action alleging that corporate sponsors of a soccer association owed a duty to ensure adequate insurance coverage for players, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought substantial partial indemnity costs following a Rule 21 motion that terminated the claim at an early stage.

The court held that while the defendants were entitled to significant costs, the hours claimed by counsel were excessive and involved duplication of work.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the requested amounts and fixed reasonable costs payable to the successful defendants.

Following the dismissal of an action against an insurer on summary judgment, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiffs had advanced a novel negligence claim alleging the insurer owed a duty of care to ensure adequate insurance coverage for a sports association member who became quadriplegic while playing soccer.

After the action against the insurer was dismissed, the insurer sought costs.

Applying the factors in rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the amounts claimed due to duplication of effort and excessive time entries but held that the successful defendant was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs alleged they had entered into a four-year lease of rural property to operate a horse boarding and breeding business and claimed the landlords were obliged to repair and complete the barn and related facilities before rent became payable.

They sought damages for lost profits after the property allegedly remained unusable.

The defendants denied any such agreement, asserting that only limited draft leases existed and that the only executed lease concerned the residential portion of the property.

The court found no agreement requiring the defendants to complete repairs and held that the draft leases, which imposed repair obligations on the tenants and contemplated shorter terms, were the best evidence of the parties’ intentions.

The plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed, possession was ordered to the defendant companies, and judgment was granted on the counterclaim for unpaid rent relating to the house lease.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of claims alleging that it negligently provided inadequate insurance coverage for members of a sports association.

The plaintiffs argued that the insurer owed a duty to advise that the policy limits were insufficient and should have refused to offer the policy.

The court held that where an experienced broker represents the insured, the insurer owes no direct advisory duty to the insured beyond issuing the policy requested through the broker.

As the evidentiary record showed no direct advisory relationship and the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence supporting the alleged duty, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendants, corporate sponsors of a soccer organization, brought a motion under rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike a negligence claim arising from a catastrophic soccer injury.

The plaintiff alleged the sponsors had a duty of care to ensure that the organization maintained adequate insurance coverage for players.

The court held that mere financial sponsorship and advertising relationships do not create a proximate relationship giving rise to a duty of care to participants.

The pleadings failed to establish reliance, proximity, or control over the event or insurance arrangements.

The statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was struck.

An extradition judge considered whether the evidence contained in the certified record of the case established conduct that would justify committal for trial in Canada under s. 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The requesting state alleged that the respondent arranged for the arson of a furniture store to collect insurance proceeds and later filed an insurance claim.

Applying the evidentiary framework from Ferras, the court held that extradition evidence may be disregarded only if manifestly unreliable or defective and that weaknesses in accomplice testimony did not meet that threshold.

The court found sufficient evidence for committal on the parallel Canadian offences of arson for fraudulent purpose, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and attempted fraud, but not fraud or obstruction of justice.

The respondent was ordered committed into custody to await surrender on the supported offences.

An application was brought seeking a declaration interpreting a municipal zoning by-law to determine whether an existing church could expand its use onto an adjacent parcel of agricultural land once the parcels were merged.

The municipality argued that the by-law permitted only “existing churches” on lands where such uses existed at the time the by-law was passed, thereby preventing expansion onto new lots.

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, the court examined the wording, purpose, and scheme of the by-law.

The court held that the exemption for “existing churches” applied to the building rather than to a specific lot and that the by-law did not expressly restrict expansion onto adjoining lands.

A declaration was granted permitting the merged lands to be used for church purposes.