Shelston

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support and contribution to special expenses.

The parties had previously executed a comprehensive separation agreement that terminated spousal support on January 1, 2017.

The applicant argued the agreement was unfair and failed to meet the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The court dismissed the motion for temporary spousal support, finding insufficient evidence to conduct a stage II Miglin analysis on an interim basis, noting the applicant's current income and that her financial difficulties largely stemmed from a failed business venture.

The father brought a motion to change seeking joint custody, equal parenting time with the youngest child, and variations to child and spousal support.

The mother sought sole custody, imputation of income to the father, and retroactive child support and section 7 expenses.

The court granted the mother sole custody of all children, finding the parents' high-conflict relationship precluded joint custody.

The court imputed an annual income of $60,000 to the father due to intentional underemployment and ordered him to pay table child support and his proportionate share of section 7 expenses.

The court also varied spousal support payable by the mother to the father based on a material change in circumstances and nullified an unauthorized transfer of the father's corporate shares.

Following a trial regarding spousal support and equalization, both parties sought costs of $50,000, claiming they were the more successful party based on their respective offers to settle.

The court found that the applicant was the more successful party overall, having succeeded on the primary and most time-consuming issue of spousal support, as well as life insurance, while the respondent succeeded on equalization.

Finding the respondent's position denying spousal support unreasonable, the court awarded the applicant costs of $30,000.

The applicant sought costs after successfully defending a motion brought by the respondent regarding an alleged final agreement.

The applicant claimed up to $36,764.57 in full recovery costs.

The respondent argued the applicant should be sanctioned for improperly submitting documents to the judge after the hearing had concluded.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party.

While noting the applicant's post-hearing communications were improper, the court declined to impose a sanction because the late documents were not considered.

Finding the applicant's docketed time excessive, the court awarded a lump sum of $20,000 inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.

Following a successful motion by the applicant father to return the child to a specific school catchment area, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant sought full or substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle and the respondent's unreasonable behaviour in unilaterally changing the child's school.

The court found the respondent acted unreasonably but not in bad faith.

Considering the respondent's limited ability to pay and the principle of proportionality, the court awarded the applicant $8,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant father sought costs following a successful motion regarding the children's school attendance.

He claimed costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to an offer to settle.

The respondent mother argued against a costs award, citing her limited financial means and reasonable behaviour.

The court found the applicant's docketed hours excessive but acknowledged his entitlement to costs based on his successful offer to settle.

Considering the mother's limited means and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed costs at $8,000, payable within 60 days of a final order in the ongoing family law proceedings.

Following the release of reasons for judgment in a family law matter, the parties requested clarifications and corrections regarding life insurance obligations and spousal support indexation.

The court corrected the name of the life insurer and the details of the respondent's death benefit.

The court also ordered that spousal support be indexed annually to the Consumer Price Index and permitted the respondent to apply in the future to reduce the required life insurance amount.

The applicant's request to vary the quantum of spousal support based on new evidence was dismissed.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion after the respondent mother unilaterally moved with their child to Plantagenet and changed the child's school without his consent.

The mother argued the move was within the 25-kilometer geographical restriction in their joint custody order and thus not a material change in circumstances.

The court rejected the mother's argument, finding that the move and school change constituted a major decision requiring joint consent under the order.

The court ordered the child to be returned to the original school's catchment area and registered there for the upcoming school year.

The court determined costs following a motion to change involving custody, child support, and section 7 expenses.

The father was awarded $2,500 for an earlier motion where he successfully sought the return of the child.

No costs were awarded for a consent order reached at a case conference.

On the main motion, the mother was the more successful party, having been granted sole custody and retroactive child support.

The court fixed the mother's costs at $11,300.

After offsetting the awards, the father was ordered to pay the mother a net amount of $8,800.

The applicant father and respondent mother both brought motions for temporary relief regarding their child.

The father, who had been convicted of sexually assaulting the mother, sought gradually increasing access, while the mother sought sole custody and to terminate any access.

The court found that the mother had previously consented to an order for supervised access and denied her request to appeal it.

Applying the principle that terminating access is a remedy of last resort, the court ordered temporary supervised access for the father for one hour twice a month.

The court also granted the mother temporary sole custody and dispensed with the father's consent for travel and schooling.

Following an order returning the parties' children to England under the Hague Convention, the successful applicant father sought costs of $32,000.

The respondent mother argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the father was presumptively entitled to costs and acted reasonably, while noting the mother breached the parties' agreement by retaining the children in Canada.

The court awarded the father costs of $21,920.93, inclusive of legal fees, disbursements, and travel expenses.

Following a successful application under the Hague Convention ordering the return of the parties' child to Brazil, the applicant father sought costs of $13,500.

The respondent mother argued costs should be limited to $3,500.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, finding the father's legal fees and disbursements, including a Voice of the Child Report, to be largely reasonable.

The court fixed costs payable by the mother to the father at $9,960.18 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following a trial where the mother obtained sole decision-making responsibility but the father successfully maintained the existing access schedule and defended against most financial claims, both parties sought costs.

The mother sought $7,500 and the father sought $15,000.

The court found that success was divided equally and neither party's offer to settle was better than the final judgment.

The court exercised its discretion to order that each party bear their own costs.

The moving party sought to vary child and spousal support provisions contained in a Separation Agreement and a subsequent Amending Agreement.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to vary the agreements under section 17 of the Divorce Act or section 37 of the Family Law Act.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act because the agreements were not incorporated into the Divorce Order.

Under the Family Law Act, the court found it had jurisdiction to vary child support but lacked jurisdiction to vary spousal support because the parties were already divorced when the Amending Agreement was signed.

Following the death of the children's mother, the maternal grandparents commenced proceedings against the children's biological father and step-father for custody, child support, and various property claims.

The parties settled all substantive issues but could not agree on costs.

The court determined it had jurisdiction to award costs despite the settlement because there was a sufficient evidentiary record.

The court found the applicants were successful on the support issues but unsuccessful on the property claims against the step-father, and awarded the applicants costs of $6,000 against the biological father and $10,200 against the step-father.

The applicant father sought the return of his two children to England under the Hague Convention.

The mother had moved to Canada with the children under a temporary relocation agreement but later refused to return them.

The court found that the children were habitually resident in England, the father had custody rights which he was exercising, and he did not consent or acquiesce to their permanent relocation.

The court rejected the mother's defences under Articles 12 and 13 of the Hague Convention, finding no grave risk of harm.

The application was granted and the children were ordered returned to England.

The applicant father sought the return of his 12-year-old child to Brazil under the Hague Convention, alleging wrongful retention by the respondent mother in Ontario.

The mother conceded the retention was wrongful but raised defences under Article 13, arguing a grave risk of harm and that the child objected to returning.

The court found insufficient evidence of a grave risk of physical or psychological harm.

While acknowledging the child was mature and objected to returning, the court concluded the child's reasons were not substantial enough to meet the exceptional circumstances required to override the mandatory return provisions.

The application was granted and the child was ordered returned to Brazil.

The parties separated after a 31-year marriage during which both had successful careers in the public service.

The applicant sought spousal support, equalization of net family property, and life insurance to secure support.

The court found the applicant entitled to both compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support, noting she assumed primary childcare responsibilities which allowed the respondent to advance to Deputy Minister.

The court determined the commencement date for support, valued the parties' pensions using standard mortality, and addressed post-separation income increases and double-dipping.

The respondent was ordered to pay a lump sum for retroactive support, ongoing periodic support, and to designate the applicant as beneficiary on life insurance policies.

The parties separated after a 12-year marriage with four children.

At trial, the remaining issues were the determination of each party's income for child support purposes, section 7 expenses, and security for support.

The court imputed an income of $24,000 to the applicant, finding she was intentionally underemployed having not worked since 2005.

The court rejected the applicant's request to impute an income of $250,000 to the respondent based on past income splitting with his father's company, setting his income at his actual salary of $103,268.

The court determined which extracurricular activities qualified as section 7 expenses and ordered the respondent to apply for life insurance to secure his child support obligations.

The appellant, a patient at a mental health centre, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

A teleconference was scheduled to set dates for factums and the appeal hearing, but the self-represented appellant failed to attend.

The court ordered deadlines for the filing of factums and scheduled a motion requested by the respondent for an Interim Treatment Order under section 19 of the Health Care Consent Act.