Frederic Huard

This endorsement addresses the scope of the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) involvement in a family law matter.

The OCL sought to expand its order to include a section 112 clinical assessment for both children, not just the older child, citing identified parenting issues and the high-conflict nature of the case.

The respondent mother opposed the expansion for the younger child, arguing he was not the subject of current litigation and that the court lacked jurisdiction without a formal motion to vary.

The court found that a Motion to Vary involving both children was already pending, initiated by the mother in 2020 with the father's response addressing both children.

Additionally, the court affirmed its authority under section 112(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to request such a report on its own initiative.

The court ordered the OCL's involvement to be expanded to include a section 112 report for both children, deeming it necessary to determine a parenting arrangement in their best interests.

The parties sought costs following a motion and cross-motion regarding parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The applicant mother sought $8,398.27 in costs, while the respondent father sought $18,146.03.

The court found that success was divided, with the father being only slightly more successful but having engaged in some unreasonable litigation conduct.

Considering all circumstances, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The respondent brought a motion to set aside a final order granted at an uncontested trial for divorce and corollary relief.

The respondent had retained counsel after being served, but his counsel failed to file an Answer or attend the trial due to personal circumstances, including the illness and death of her mother.

The court applied Rule 25(19) of the Family Law Rules and the factors for setting aside a default order, finding that the respondent had a plausible explanation, moved promptly upon learning of the order, had an arguable case on the merits, and would suffer significant prejudice if the order stood.

The motion was granted and the order was set aside.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support and contribution to special expenses.

The parties had previously executed a comprehensive separation agreement that terminated spousal support on January 1, 2017.

The applicant argued the agreement was unfair and failed to meet the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The court dismissed the motion for temporary spousal support, finding insufficient evidence to conduct a stage II Miglin analysis on an interim basis, noting the applicant's current income and that her financial difficulties largely stemmed from a failed business venture.

The applicant sought costs after successfully defending a motion brought by the respondent regarding an alleged final agreement.

The applicant claimed up to $36,764.57 in full recovery costs.

The respondent argued the applicant should be sanctioned for improperly submitting documents to the judge after the hearing had concluded.

The court found the applicant was presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party.

While noting the applicant's post-hearing communications were improper, the court declined to impose a sanction because the late documents were not considered.

Finding the applicant's docketed time excessive, the court awarded a lump sum of $20,000 inclusive of fees, HST, and disbursements.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that the parties had entered into a binding partial agreement on December 22, 2016, concerning the transfer of the applicant's interest in a maple grove company located in Quebec.

The applicant opposed, arguing that essential terms of the agreement were not settled.

The court found that while some terms like price and payment were discussed, other crucial issues, including security for payments, indemnification for company expenses, and the resolution of a third-party claim, remained unresolved.

The court concluded that the parties had only reached an agreement in principle, not a binding contract, as all essential terms were not agreed upon.

Consequently, the respondent's motion was dismissed.

The court also issued orders for further financial disclosure from both parties.