Christopher Rutherford

The moving party brought an interim motion to suspend his obligation to maintain life insurance as security for spousal support and to suspend enforcement of the support order by the Family Responsibility Office, pending his Motion to Change.

The moving party argued he was in poor health and unable to pay the increased insurance premiums or support.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the moving party had not provided full financial disclosure, particularly regarding $1 million in proceeds from a property sale, and had not sought a stay of the underlying support order.

The moving party was ordered to maintain $500,000 in life insurance, with the responding party paying half the premium pending the final determination.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce a settlement reached between the parties regarding two motions to change.

Both parties agreed that a final settlement was reached, but disagreed on the specific wording to incorporate the terms into a final order.

The court reviewed the disputed clauses, including the sharing of section 7 expenses, the eligible dependant credit, and life insurance provisions, and ordered specific wording to reflect the settlement.

The applicant was awarded costs of $4,550.

The moving party sought to vary child and spousal support provisions contained in a Separation Agreement and a subsequent Amending Agreement.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to vary the agreements under section 17 of the Divorce Act or section 37 of the Family Law Act.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under the Divorce Act because the agreements were not incorporated into the Divorce Order.

Under the Family Law Act, the court found it had jurisdiction to vary child support but lacked jurisdiction to vary spousal support because the parties were already divorced when the Amending Agreement was signed.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff obtained damages for six months’ reasonable notice, the court addressed the appropriate costs award.

The defendant argued that costs should be limited or denied because the recovery was within the monetary jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court under Rule 57.05(1).

The court held that the total recovery exceeded the Small Claims Court limit and that, in any event, denial of costs is discretionary.

Considering the plaintiff’s success, the defendant’s failure to serve any offer to settle, and litigation conduct including late concessions on pension vesting, the court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to award costs to the plaintiff.

In additional reasons following a wrongful dismissal judgment, the court determined the appropriate rate for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for reasonable notice and pension losses.

The parties agreed on the quantum of damages and the method of calculating interest but disputed the applicable interest rate under the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff argued for a higher rate corresponding to the quarter when the cause of action arose, while the defendant argued the statutory rate applicable when the claim was issued should apply.

Exercising discretion under s. 130 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court held that applying an averaged interest rate over the relevant period better reflected fairness in the circumstances.

Prejudgment interest was therefore calculated using an average rate of 1.11%.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial, the court had previously determined that six months constituted reasonable notice.

Because the evidentiary record lacked detailed calculations at trial, the court directed counsel to provide calculations for damages including pay in lieu of notice, severance pay, mitigation income, pension losses during the notice period, and pre- and post‑judgment interest.

Counsel failed to provide the calculations by the original deadline.

The court ordered the parties to deliver written submissions addressing the damages calculations within specified timelines and page limits, with reference to relevant case law if necessary.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action seeking nine months’ reasonable notice following termination from a senior management role with a federally regulated employer.

The employer argued that statutory minimum notice under the Canada Labour Code was sufficient because the employee’s continuous service was only approximately 2.5 years.

The court applied the Bardal factors and found ambiguity in the employment agreement regarding recognition of prior service with predecessor employers.

The court credited the employee with partial recognition of prior service, treated him as a long‑term employee for notice purposes, and found he had reasonably mitigated his losses by securing alternate employment within three months.

A reasonable notice period of six months was awarded.