Sharpe

The appellant insurer appealed a jury trial judgment, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing two motions for a mistrial due to plaintiff's counsel's conduct during cross-examination and closing address.

The appellant also challenged the award of 2% per month interest on overdue payments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave clear and appropriate instructions to the jury to cure any prejudice.

The Court also upheld the 2% interest rate, noting that the 2010 Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule preserved the substantive right to the former interest rate for accidents occurring before its effective date.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal claim.

The motion judge had found that the appellant was an independent contractor, not an employee, and that the respondents were entitled to terminate the contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or fact in the motion judge's careful and thorough reasons.

The moving parties, a group of affiliated companies, sought leave to appeal a judgment setting aside an ex parte CCAA Initial Order.

The respondents, creditors of a Singapore subsidiary, successfully argued before the application judge that the CCAA court lacked jurisdiction over the subsidiary.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal held he had jurisdiction to hear the leave motion but refused leave, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the real debtors were Singapore companies with little connection to Canada and that the evidence did not support the initial ex parte findings of insolvency and intertwined finances.

The appellants appealed multiple orders and judgments made during a commercial trial that spanned 50 days but was never decided on the merits.

The trial judge had permitted the respondents to add new defendants and causes of action mid-trial, granted an ex parte Mareva injunction, issued 19 directions for massive document production, and found the appellants in contempt for failing to fully comply, ultimately striking their pleadings and granting partial default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's conduct—including interjections, adverse credibility findings mid-trial, and disproportionate production orders—created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The judgments and orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The appellant appealed a 5-year sentence for a drug offence.

The trial judge found the appellant was a trusted courier and not part of a criminal organization.

The co-accused, an active drug trafficker with a criminal record, received a 4-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the 5-year sentence offended the parity principle, noting the appellant was a youthful first offender.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 42 months.

The Crown appealed a sentence where the trial judge set aside a notice of prior conviction under s. 255 of the Criminal Code, relying on a provincial appellate decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada subsequently reversed that decision, meaning the trial judge erred by failing to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 days.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and imposed the 120-day sentence, but stayed it because the respondent had already served a full 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant was convicted of marijuana production and firearms offences based on circumstantial evidence found at a house he co-owned.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapplied the rule in Hodge's Case by requiring alternative explanations to be based on 'proven facts' rather than available inferences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Court also found the firearms convictions unreasonable, as the evidence did not exclude the possibility that another person involved in the grow operation hid the handgun without the appellant's knowledge.

The appeal was allowed, with a new trial ordered for the grow operation charges and acquittals entered for the firearms charges.

The respondent, a former CEO and director of the appellant corporation, was removed from his position by shareholders.

He filed a claim for enhanced severance, a bonus, and a share appreciation rights (SAR) cancellation award under his management services agreement.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached his fiduciary duties by establishing the bonus and SAR cancellation awards for his own benefit, but still awarded him the enhanced severance, finding the breach did not constitute a default under the agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the corporation's appeal, holding that the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement ignored s. 134(3) of the Business Corporations Act and led to a commercially absurd result.

The respondent's breach of fiduciary duty constituted a default disentitling him to the enhanced severance.

The appellant died prior to the appeal and no order to continue was obtained.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal without prejudice to the estate's right to take appropriate steps to revive it.

The Attorney General of Canada moved for a stay pending appeal of a judgment declaring provisions of the Canada Elections Act that restricted non-resident citizens from voting unconstitutional.

The application judge had found the five-year non-residency limit violated section 3 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the risk of irreparable harm was balanced between the parties, and the balance of convenience favoured refusing the stay to allow newly enfranchised non-resident citizens to vote in upcoming federal by-elections.

The appellants, selling shareholders in a family business, appealed the dismissal of their action for breach of fiduciary duty and oppression against the non-selling shareholders and the corporation's professional advisors.

The trial judge had utilized a 'hybrid' trial model following a failed summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants were precluded from challenging the hybrid trial model as they had not appealed the initial trial management order.

Furthermore, the Court upheld the trial judge's finding that no fiduciary duty was owed during the share redemption negotiations, as the relationship between the parties was highly adversarial and marked by distrust.

The substantial indemnity costs award of nearly $2.5 million was also upheld.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after the victim was beaten to death with a baseball bat in the appellant's home.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding joint involvement, the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness, the W.(D.) instruction, and post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that while the trial judge could have given a joint party liability instruction, the failure to do so did not result in a miscarriage of justice and was cured by the proviso.

The court also found the Vetrovec, W.(D.), and post-offence conduct instructions were sufficient.

The sentence appeal regarding the 13-year parole ineligibility period was also dismissed.

The appellants were arrested in an undercover drug trafficking operation and experienced a delay of nearly two and a half years before trial.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, which was dismissed by the application judge.

On appeal, the appellants argued the judge erred in allocating periods of delay and failing to penalize the Crown for tactical decisions.

The Court of Appeal adjusted the delay calculations but found the total delay still fell within the Morin guidelines.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The plaintiffs sued the quarry owner (Miller Group) and the blasting operator (Sernoskies) for damages caused by a fly rock incident.

The plaintiffs and the operator entered into a Pierringer settlement agreement, releasing the operator and restricting claims against the owner to several liability.

The owner cross-claimed against the operator, alleging an implied indemnity agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the owner's cross-claim and its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the owner's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to address the threshold issue of whether an implied indemnity agreement existed, which could eliminate the owner's liability entirely.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellant failed to pay security for costs into court as required by a previous order.

The Court of Appeal found a proper basis for the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent due to unfounded public allegations against respondent's counsel.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the accused on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the accused's actions were involuntary and occurred while in an automatistic state caused by a series of small strokes, characterizing it as non-mental disorder automatism.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to presume the automatism was caused by a mental disorder, by treating the medical classification of a brain disease as determinative of the legal classification of a mind disease, and by improperly assessing the continuing danger factor.

A new trial was ordered to determine whether the automatism should result in a verdict of not guilty or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant was convicted of causing a disturbance after yelling obscenities at police officers who were arresting his girlfriend and father on his rural property.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge found that his conduct contributed to raising tension at the scene.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the lower courts erred in law by failing to apply the governing principle that a disturbance requires an overtly manifested interference with the ordinary and customary use of a public place.

Emotional upset or raising tension is insufficient.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for manslaughter.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the jury charge regarding party liability for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated August 23, 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent disposition was issued on February 18, 2014, and the appellant was successfully living in the community in approved housing.