Sharon E. Hassan

On an interim family law motion, the applicant sought spousal support from a high-income self-employed respondent whose income flowed through a corporation.

The court undertook a detailed interim analysis of corporate income, added back portions of motor vehicle and entertainment expenses, deducted prior spousal support and grossed-up notional child support for children in the respondent’s care, and declined broader corporate adjustments better left to trial.

The court also drew an adverse inference from the applicant’s failure to file medical evidence supporting total inability to work and imputed modest income to her starting in 2014.

Interim spousal support was ordered retroactively to separation at varying monthly amounts for 2013, 2014, and prospectively for 2015, with credit for amounts already paid and arrears payable within ten days.

The applicant brought a motion for interim relief, which resulted in a final consent order for child support and the dismissal of her claims for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent to return to work.

The respondent sought costs, arguing he was entitled to the automatic cost consequences of Rule 18(14) based on his offers to settle.

The court found the respondent did not meet the burden under Rule 18(14) because his offers were either less favourable than the order or failed to comply with the timing requirements.

The court awarded the respondent costs for his partial success but reduced the amount due to his unreasonable failure to disclose a severance payment, fixing costs at $4,746 payable at the conclusion of the case.

The children's aid society appealed the dismissal of its child protection application regarding three children.

The respondent father brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there were no current protection concerns.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal lacked merit and that, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, proceeding with the appeal would be contrary to the best interests of the children and the administration of justice.

The applicant wife brought a motion for interim spousal support and an order directing the respondent husband to return to full-time employment and not retire during the course of the lawsuit.

The parties had previously signed a separation agreement resolving all issues, which was filed with the court.

The court treated the motion as an interim variation of a final spousal support order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate urgency, hardship, or that the continuation of the existing support order was incongruous and absurd.

The court also found no merit in ordering the respondent not to retire, noting that imputation of income could be addressed at trial.

Following a 154‑day child protection trial, the father sought full indemnity costs exceeding $3 million against the Children’s Aid Society and the mother.

The court found the mother had acted in bad faith by advancing false allegations that fueled prolonged litigation.

The court further concluded the Society breached its statutory duties by failing to conduct an objective investigation, withholding disclosure, and advocating for the mother rather than reassessing its case as contrary evidence emerged.

While rejecting costs against counsel for the children or the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the court held that the Society bore the greatest responsibility for the extraordinary length and expense of the proceedings.

Costs were fixed at just over $2 million, apportioned 70% to the Society and 30% to the mother.

Following an interim family law motion regarding custody and access, the court determined costs.

The applicant sought over $32,000 in full recovery costs after obtaining an interim joint custody order with a parenting schedule primarily placing the children with her and permitting one child to attend school in a new location.

The respondent argued for no costs due to divided success.

The court held the applicant achieved some success and was presumptively entitled to costs, but rejected allegations of bad faith and found both parties contributed to excessive costs through voluminous affidavit material and litigation conduct.

Applying the principle of reasonableness and proportionality under the Family Law Rules, the court found the amount claimed to be disproportionate and reduced costs substantially.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support.

The respondent had lost his employment and started unsuccessful business ventures, including purchasing an expensive motor home.

The court found the respondent intentionally under-employed and imputed an income of $90,000 based on his earning capacity.

The court also imputed income to the applicant based on full-time employment.

Interim child support of $1,293 per month and spousal support of $500 per month were ordered, with the respondent's equity in the matrimonial home standing as security.

The applicant child protection agency brought an application regarding three children, while the parents concurrently sought a divorce, custody, and property division.

Following a 154-day trial, the court dismissed the protection application, finding that the mother had made false allegations of domestic violence against the father and had a significant, unacknowledged alcohol problem.

The court awarded sole custody of the youngest child to the father, with restricted access for the mother, and ordered the mother to pay child support for all three children.

The court also determined that funds in the father's offshore account were held in a resulting trust and excluded from his net family property.

During a highly complex and lengthy child protection trial, the oldest child turned 18.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to vary the order appointing a lawyer for the child and to remove the OCL as his legal representative, arguing that the child was no longer a 'child' under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found that while the child aged out of the statutory provisions, fairness and due process required his continued legal representation.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order that the child's lawyer continue to represent him and that the OCL continue to fund the representation until the completion of the trial.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a motion for summary judgment.

The infant appellant suffered from a serious medical condition, which the appellants alleged was caused by a motor vehicle accident involving the mother while she was pregnant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding causation, as the appellants failed to provide expert medical opinion establishing that the accident probably caused or contributed to the condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a low back injury in a motor vehicle accident.

At trial, the defendant successfully moved for a finding that the plaintiff did not meet the threshold for permanent serious impairment under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The trial judge found the impairment was neither permanent nor serious.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held the trial judge erred in finding the impairment was not permanent, as there was no evidence the pain would completely resolve.

The Court also found the trial judge took an overly narrow approach to whether the impairment was serious by focusing only on the plaintiff's ability to resume employment and household duties, without considering the effect of continuing pain on her enjoyment of life.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant solicitor appealed an order dismissing a motion to oppose confirmation of an assessment officer's report.

The assessment officer found the parties were bound by a block fee retainer agreement and noted an adjustment was needed for extra days of examination, but failed to actually make that adjustment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the motions judge erred in confirming the assessment officer's report despite this failure.

The report was varied to show nothing due from the solicitor to the client.

No costs were awarded due to the confusing manner in which the solicitor drew the accounts.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a triable issue as to whether an agreement was reached, as the appellant had insisted on personal releases from other shareholders which were never provided, and subsequent correspondence from the respondent introduced new terms such as a non-competition clause.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment below set aside.