Sharmila Clark

The applicant, a self-represented racialized person, alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, and ethnic origin after his invitation to an oral interview for a caseworker position was rescinded.

The respondent claimed the invitation was sent in error because the applicant had failed the data entry component of the written assessment.

Following a summary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success as there was no evidence connecting the rescinded invitation to a prohibited ground of discrimination, nor any evidence that the respondent's decision-maker was aware of the applicant's race.

The applicant filed an application alleging employment discrimination based on race, colour, and ethnic origin.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed two pre-hearing requests.

The respondent's request for a summary hearing was denied without reasons, pursuant to Rule 19.5A.

The applicant's request for an order requiring the respondent to produce computer skills testing modules on a compact disc was also denied, as the respondent established it did not own or have access to the third-party evaluation tool.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of race, colour, and ethnic origin after being informed he failed a data entry test during the hiring process for a caseworker position.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal declined to dismiss the application, finding that key evidence regarding the test results was in the respondent's possession and could not be evaluated at the summary hearing stage.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the respondent, a 25-year employee, was constructively dismissed and entitled to a 26-month notice period.

The appellant solely challenged the motion judge's findings regarding the respondent's efforts to mitigate her damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the respondent's treatment was humiliating, that her decision not to apply for a job 50 km away was reasonable, and that her attendance at her brother's murder trial did not impermissibly hinder her job search.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment alleging constructive dismissal after the employer reorganized its transportation department and reassigned her from an operational engineering role to a largely administrative position while maintaining the same salary and title.

The court applied the constructive dismissal framework from Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission and assessed whether a reasonable person would view the changes as substantially altering essential terms of employment.

It found that the reassignment fundamentally changed the nature and quality of the plaintiff’s duties from technical operational work to administrative functions, effectively eliminating the role she had performed for decades.

The court concluded that the employer’s unilateral change amounted to constructive dismissal.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded 26 months’ reasonable notice and rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiff failed to mitigate.

The applicant alleged that the respondent reprised against him by failing to grant him interviews for three positions he applied for after settling a previous human rights application.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed at a summary hearing.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's proposed evidence relied entirely on communications covered by settlement privilege.

Without this inadmissible evidence, the application was based on pure speculation.

The Tribunal concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success and dismissed it.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that rejected his claim that s. 43(1)(c) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The impugned section limits loss of earnings benefits to two years for workers injured at age 63 or older.

The Divisional Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding that the provision did not discriminate on the basis of age as it did not create a disadvantage based on prejudice or stereotyping.

The court further held that even if the provision violated s. 15(1), it would be saved under s. 1 of the Charter.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of religion regarding her transfer to a different library branch.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the matter had been appropriately dealt with through a grievance settlement negotiated by the applicant's union.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the applicant had neither signed the Minutes of Settlement nor implicitly accepted its terms, as the benefits were unilaterally imposed by the employer.

The applicant filed an application alleging employment discrimination on the basis of creed.

The applicant's union requested to intervene to address its actions regarding the allegations.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matter was settled and dealt with in another proceeding.

The Tribunal scheduled a preliminary hearing to determine the respondent's request for dismissal.

The applicant, a former police officer, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment that led to her early retirement.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed as untimely under section 34(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal found that the last incident of discrimination occurred when the applicant retired, which was more than three years before the application was filed.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that the union's decision not to pursue her grievance constituted a new incident.

Furthermore, the Tribunal held that waiting for the conclusion of a grievance process did not constitute a good faith reason for the delay under section 34(2).

The application was dismissed as untimely.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal.

The respondent sought early dismissal on the basis that the allegations had been the subject of previous OHRC complaints and union grievances.

The Tribunal dismissed the portions of the application that overlapped with the prior OHRC complaint under s. 53(8) of the Code, and the portions that had been resolved through grievance settlements under s. 45.1.

The Tribunal permitted the applicant to amend the application to include a new allegation of reprisal.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability following his termination in 2003.

The respondent brought a preliminary request to dismiss the application for delay, as it was filed more than one year after the alleged discrimination.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's delay in filing the application until 2006, after his grievance arbitration was resolved unsatisfactorily, was not incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed for delay.

The applicant filed human rights applications against three police services, alleging discrimination and reprisal based on false statements made in 2003 about his mental stability.

The respondents requested that the applications be dismissed for delay.

The Tribunal found that the core incidents occurred between 2003 and 2005, well outside the one-year time limit under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal rejected the applicant's argument that the ongoing effects of the 2003 statements constituted a series of incidents.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the applicant's generalized fear of reprisal did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, and dismissed the applications.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and harassment in employment on the basis of citizenship, ethnic origin, and other grounds, culminating in his termination in 2004.

The respondents sought early dismissal on the basis of delay, prior settlement, and that the substance was dealt with in a prior arbitration.

The Tribunal found that raising the 2003 discipline was an abuse of process due to a prior settlement, and that failing to raise the discrimination allegations during the arbitration and waiting three years to file the application constituted an abuse of process and a delay not incurred in good faith.

The application was dismissed.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint alleging workplace reprisal, the respondents requested the exclusion of the Commission's proposed expert witness on racism.

The Tribunal applied the Mohan criteria and excluded the expert evidence, finding that testimony regarding the reluctance of racialized persons to complain and the history of police-minority relations was irrelevant to the reprisal complaint.

Furthermore, evidence regarding police culture and the treatment of complainants was deemed to be within the Tribunal's own expertise and therefore unnecessary.

The applicant, a 9-1-1 Communications Operator, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability (depression) and marital status, claiming she was subjected to a poisoned work environment that forced her resignation.

She had requested a transfer to straight day shifts to accommodate her depression and to align with her spouse's new shift schedule.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no medical evidence that her depression required accommodation or prevented her from performing her duties.

The Tribunal also found no differential treatment based on marital status and concluded her resignation was a personal choice rather than the result of a poisoned work environment.

The complainant, a civilian employee of the Toronto Police Services Board of Afghan descent, alleged he was subjected to a poisoned work environment following a discriminatory telephone message left by a colleague the day after September 11, 2001.

He also alleged historical discrimination dating back to 1994 and that the employer failed to adequately investigate his complaints.

The Tribunal found that the colleague who left the message discriminated against the complainant.

While the employer's initial investigation into the message was not discriminatory, the Tribunal found the employer breached the Code by failing to take adequate steps to quell workplace speculation that the complainant was a terrorist suspect, and by failing to investigate his allegations of historical discrimination.

In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint alleging discrimination and harassment based on ethnic origin, the Tribunal addressed case management issues, an amendment to the complaint, and the admissibility of an expert witness.

The Tribunal granted the applicant's request to amend the complaint to add the ground of creed, finding no prejudice to the respondents.

However, the Tribunal excluded the Commission's proposed expert witness on racism and Islamophobia, applying the Mohan criteria.

The Tribunal found the proposed evidence was within the adjudicator's knowledge and that the expert had improperly formed conclusions on the ultimate issues to be decided.

Several police officers sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Police Services Board granting the Chief of Police an extension of time to serve notices of disciplinary hearings under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The officers argued that the Board breached procedural fairness by failing to provide full disclosure of the investigative brief, denying an oral hearing, and providing inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Board's procedure met the minimal requirements of fairness for an administrative, pre-charge decision and that the Board's decision to allow the delay was reasonable given the unprecedented complexity of the underlying criminal investigation.

The applicants, police officers facing criminal charges, brought a motion for a publication ban and a sealing order regarding a confidential report by the Chief of Police.

The report was filed in support of an application for leave to serve notices of hearing under the Police Services Act.

The applicants argued that media access to the report would prejudice their right to a fair trial and risk witness tainting.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to the administration of justice, as the report was general in nature and alternative measures like challenges for cause were available.