Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The accused, a spokesperson for the 'Farfadaas' group, was charged with mischief and counselling to commit mischief in relation to the 'Freedom Convoy' protests in downtown Ottawa in early 2022.

The court found that the prolonged occupation, noise, and disruption significantly interfered with the lawful use and enjoyment of property by Ottawa residents and businesses, constituting mischief under s. 430 of the Criminal Code.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error, finding that police inaction did not amount to permission.

The accused was found guilty of mischief, as his actions and communications actively encouraged and supported the illegal occupation.

The accused, a police officer charged with breach of trust and fabricating evidence, brought a motion to compel the Crown to call a fellow officer as a witness.

The Crown refused to call the officer, citing concerns about his reliability due to inconsistencies in his statements.

The court declined to order the Crown to call the witness, affirming the Crown's discretion.

However, given the witness's materiality and allegations that his statement was improperly influenced by an investigating detective, the court exercised its exceptional discretion to call the officer as the court's own witness, permitting both parties to cross-examine him with certain restrictions.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, failing to comply with a demand, and dangerous driving.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his speed and that the arresting officer lacked lawful grounds to make a Drug Recognition Evaluation demand.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that the modified objective test for dangerous driving was met.

The court also upheld the lawfulness of the demands made by the officers.

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit non-expert recognition evidence from the father and stepmother of one of the accused, who viewed video surveillance of the suspects.

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible as the witnesses did not definitively identify the accused and their evidence was tainted by police.

The court held that the witnesses' long knowledge of the accused and their observations regarding clothing and physical characteristics were relevant to identification, and the evidence was admissible, with its weight to be determined by the jury.

The applicant brought a pretrial motion seeking to stay charges or exclude firearm evidence, alleging his Charter rights were violated during his arrest.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant and that racial profiling played a role in the decision.

Consequently, the applicant's ss. 8 and 10(a) Charter rights were violated.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the firearm would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence, though it found the applicant's police statement was voluntary.

The applicant, a Black woman, was referred to secondary inspection upon arriving at Toronto Pearson International Airport from Aruba.

Border services officers discovered cocaine hidden in lotion bottles in her luggage.

The applicant brought a pretrial motion alleging she was racially profiled and that her rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter were violated.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of conscious or unconscious racial bias in the officer's decision to refer her to secondary inspection.

The court also held that the routine questioning and search at the border did not violate her Charter rights, and that her statements to the officers were voluntary.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and other offences, brought an application for directions on whether he must apply under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to adduce text messages and letters from the complainant at trial.

The court analyzed whether the communications constituted 'records' under s. 278.1 in which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court ruled that threatening messages and an email recanting the allegations did not require a hearing, while messages of a sexual nature and love letters did constitute records requiring a s. 278.93 hearing.

The accused was charged with robbery and wounding following a home invasion where two brothers were assaulted and stabbed.

The central issue at trial was identity.

The victims identified the accused, whom they had known from their neighbourhood years prior, both during the incident and in subsequent photo lineups.

Despite defence arguments regarding the reliability of the recognition evidence, the passage of time, and flaws in the photo lineup procedures, the court found the identification evidence credible and reliable.

The accused was found guilty of all charges.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 424 grams of cocaine and 28 grams of crack cocaine in his bedroom.

The Crown sought 4 to 5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 2 years.

The court considered the offender's lack of a criminal record, medical issues, and restrictive bail conditions as mitigating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3.5 years imprisonment.

The applicant, jointly charged with two co-accused for importing cocaine, brought an application for an adjournment of the trial due to his counsel's unavailability, or alternatively, for severance from his co-accused or severance of one count.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the request for an adjournment, finding that the applicant's right to counsel of choice did not override the co-accused's right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The court also dismissed the severance applications, concluding that the factors, including the risk of inconsistent verdicts and the legal nexus between the counts, strongly favoured a joint trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to theft of electricity under $5,000, admitting to stealing $4,999 worth of hydro by occasionally disconnecting the meter at his business.

The Crown sought to prove the theft exceeded $5,000 by relying on circumstantial evidence of average historical use compared to actual billings.

The court found that the variables involved in calculating the exact amount stolen were too numerous to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court accepted the guilty plea for theft under $5,000.

Howard Smith was convicted of robbery after a jury trial, following an incident where he and a co-accused robbed a victim in a motel room.

While the co-accused perpetrated the choking and forcible confinement, Smith was convicted solely of robbery.

The Crown sought a 12-15 month custodial sentence, emphasizing the aggravating factor of the offense occurring in a "dwelling-house" (motel room) and the victim's traumatic impact.

The defense requested a suspended sentence, highlighting Smith's lack of prior criminal record, rehabilitative prospects, and the opportunistic nature of the crime.

The court balanced denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, imposing a sentence of 120 days in custody followed by 2 years' probation, along with a DNA order and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The defendant, Dellan McMorris, brought a motion for a directed verdict in a first-degree murder trial, arguing insufficient evidence regarding his identity as a perpetrator.

The court reviewed the legal framework for directed verdicts, which requires determining if a properly instructed jury, acting reasonably, could be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence presented by the Crown, including telephone records, witness testimony, and DNA evidence on a discarded hoodie.

The motion was dismissed, as the court found that a reasonable jury could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on inadmissible evidence.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence of the appellant's sexual relationship with the complainant after the complainant turned 18, which the trial judge ruled inadmissible under section 276 of the Criminal Code.

However, the trial judge subsequently relied on this post-majority relationship to reject the appellant's exculpatory police statement.

The Superior Court of Justice found this to be a reversible error, as the appellant was assured the evidence was inadmissible and had no opportunity to address it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm following a single-vehicle accident.

The investigating officer obtained a production order for the applicant's hospital medical records, including blood alcohol analysis, based on a sworn information.

The applicant brought a Charter motion arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights because the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the information contained significant omissions and relied on the officer's unsupported assumptions rather than objective facts.

The court concluded the search violated s. 8 and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the high expectation of privacy in medical records.

Following the ruling, the Crown stayed the proceedings.

The accused was charged with several firearms offences after taking a firearm and ammunition from a vehicle and delivering them to an acquaintance for safekeeping.

The defence argued that the accused acted under duress arising from threats of death or serious bodily harm by an abusive partner with a violent criminal history.

The court assessed the common law defence of duress using the framework from Supreme Court of Canada authorities and considered evidence of threats, fear, the accused’s circumstances including drug dependency and abuse, and whether a safe avenue of escape existed.

The court concluded that the threats were credible, temporally connected to the accused’s conduct, and reasonably believed by the accused.

Although alternatives may have existed objectively, the accused’s circumstances undermined the availability of a safe avenue of escape, and the proportionality requirement was satisfied.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.) and improperly restricted cross‑examination concerning alleged exculpatory statements made during the incident.

The appeal court held that although the trial judge’s articulation of the second branch of the W.(D.) test differed slightly from the classic formulation, the reasons as a whole demonstrated that the correct burden of proof was applied and the accused’s evidence was rejected in its entirety on credibility grounds.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice arising from the trial judge’s intervention regarding prior exculpatory statements and the requirement for assurance that the accused would testify.

Any potential confusion was addressed during the trial and did not prejudice the defence.

The convictions were therefore upheld.

The accused, a loss prevention officer at a retail warehouse store, was charged with two counts of theft over $5,000 under s. 334 of the Criminal Code following a coordinated diversion theft captured on store security footage.

The Crown alleged the accused orchestrated the diversion by sending other employees away from the store entrance to allow accomplices to remove merchandise.

The evidence against the accused was entirely circumstantial and relied heavily on video recordings and witness testimony describing the accused directing staff away from the entrance moments before merchandise exited.

The court found the Crown proved that a theft exceeding $5,000 occurred but held that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused participated in the theft.

Suspicion alone was insufficient to meet the criminal standard of proof.

The offender, a 63-year-old first-time offender with severe medical issues, was convicted of defrauding a factoring company of over $75,000 US by using a false identity and a shell corporation.

The Crown sought 18 months' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the significant aggravating factors of planning and deceit against the mitigating factors of the offender's poor health, genuine remorse, and lack of prior record.

The court imposed a 20-month conditional sentence with house arrest, followed by 12 months' probation, community service, and a DNA order, declining to order restitution due to the offender's inability to pay.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings unless the state funded his defence on a charge under the Excise Act.

The court found that a previous Rowbotham decision had already determined the accused’s indigency and inability to fund counsel, creating issue estoppel preventing relitigation of that question.

The court further concluded that despite the relative simplicity of the possession charge, the presence of statements evidence, a jointly charged co‑accused represented by counsel, and the potential for incarceration created a real risk that the accused could not receive a fair trial without legal representation.

A conditional stay was therefore warranted to permit the state an opportunity to provide publicly funded counsel.