Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

She was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of her running vehicle after an argument with her boyfriend.

The trial judge found she failed to rebut the presumption of operation and that there was a realistic risk she would set the vehicle in motion.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge engaged in speculative reasoning and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inferences were reasonable, grounded in the evidence, and that the reasons for judgment were adequate.

The accused brought an application to sever charges of sexual assault and assault from charges of assault, mischief, and criminal harassment, all involving the same complainant.

The accused argued that trying the counts together would cause prejudice by inviting propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the charges were factually and legally intertwined, the evidence was not complex, and a limiting instruction to the jury would adequately address any risk of prejudice.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

The offender was convicted of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after accelerating to 117 km/h in a 70 km/h zone and colliding with a left-turning vehicle.

The collision caused catastrophic, permanent traumatic brain injuries to a teenage passenger and serious injuries to the driver.

The Crown sought three years' imprisonment, while the defence sought six months.

The court weighed the profound impact on the victims against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, and the fact that the victim driver's unsafe left turn contributed to the collision.

The offender was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment and a three-year driving prohibition.

The accused, a taxicab driver, was charged with second degree murder after running over an intoxicated passenger with his minivan.

The incident was captured on a residential surveillance camera.

The accused testified that he accidentally struck the victim while looking for oncoming traffic.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as irreconcilable with the video footage and internally illogical.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally drove his vehicle at the victim in anger and possessed the requisite mens rea for murder.

The accused was found guilty of second degree murder.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against a child, brought a pre-trial application to determine whether a letter written by the complainant and retrieved from the trash by her mother constituted a 'record' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The letter was provided to the police and subsequently given to the defence as part of Crown disclosure.

The court held that the admissibility regime under s. 278.92 only applies to records in the accused's possession or control obtained outside of Crown disclosure or a successful Mills application.

Consequently, the letter did not qualify as a 'record' under this regime, and its admissibility would be governed by common law rules of evidence.

T.C. was found guilty of six charges, including sexual assault, incest, and mischief, against his younger sister, V.C., which occurred from V.C.'s age four to sixteen-seventeen.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust, prolonged abuse, the use of weapons, and the severe psychological trauma inflicted upon the victim.

Mitigating factors included T.C.'s lack of a criminal record and a low assessed risk of re-offence.

The court imposed a total sentence of eight years of incarceration, to be served concurrently, along with ancillary orders including a mandatory DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, and restrictions on employment involving minors.

The Crown brought an application to admit the notes, diagrams, and Exhibit List prepared by a deceased police officer under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The officer had served as the Exhibit Officer during the execution of a search warrant in a child exploitation investigation.

The court found that necessity was established due to the officer's death and that threshold reliability was met given the administrative nature of the task, the officer's conscientious work habits, and the corroborative checks performed by other officers.

The application was granted and the evidence was ruled admissible.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 13-year-old complainant.

This decision addresses sentencing, including the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences, the fit and proportionate sentence, and the application of the Kienapple rule.

The court found the one-year mandatory minimum sentences for these offences unconstitutional, imposed a 15-month imprisonment sentence for sexual interference, and stayed the other convictions.

The defendant, Vladimir Hussain-Marca, was found guilty of break and enter and robbery following a home invasion.

The court adopted a joint sentencing submission from the Crown and Defence, imposing a three-year custodial term (less pre-sentence credit), 18 months probation, a 20-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The court considered aggravating factors such as planning, violence, and dwelling house violation, alongside mitigating factors including the defendant's youth, first-time offender status, remorse, and strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court also commented on the harsh conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, which were implicitly accounted for in the joint submission.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of prior disreputable conduct and ante mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased in a murder trial where the accused allegedly beat his roommate to death.

The court ruled that statements by the deceased expressing a desire to move out and fear of the accused were admissible under the present state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

However, a statement attributing a 'hard punch' to the accused was excluded for lacking threshold reliability.

The court also admitted most of the circumstantial evidence of the accused's prior physical abuse of the deceased to show context and animus, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect, but excluded observations of bruising that could not be directly linked to the accused.

The appellant, Anna Trubashnik, appealed her conviction for public mischief, arguing errors by the trial judge and seeking to admit fresh evidence, specifically a videotaped police interview and medical evidence.

The court applied the R. v. Palmer test for fresh evidence, relaxing the due diligence requirement for criminal cases.

It found the videotaped statement, which revealed the appellant's state of mind and doubts about the alleged robbery, to be relevant, credible, and potentially outcome-determinative.

The appeal was granted, and a new trial was ordered to allow the trial judge to consider this fresh evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of assault and two counts of uttering threats arising from incidents involving his spouse.

He argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant’s credibility, failed to address inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly applied the test in R. v. W.(D.), and should have drawn an adverse inference from the Crown’s failure to call a witness.

The summary conviction appeal court held that credibility findings are entitled to substantial deference absent palpable and overriding error and that the trial judge reasonably accepted the complainant’s detailed evidence, which was partially corroborated by police observations.

The court further held that the Crown had no obligation to call the witness and that any variance in offence dates was immaterial and caused no prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused applied for a stay of drug trafficking charges under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial date was approximately 27.25 months.

Applying the framework from Morin, the court analyzed each contested period and concluded that only 12 months constituted Crown or institutional delay, which fell within acceptable institutional delay guidelines.

The court also found that the prejudice claimed by the accused was limited and largely attributable to the stress of being charged rather than the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of excess blood alcohol where the trial judge excluded breathalyzer readings after finding a breach of the accused’s s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons for excluding the evidence were inadequate and prevented meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge also erred in law by failing to apply the tripartite framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter established in Grant.

While the finding of a s. 10(b) breach was open on the evidence, the exclusion analysis was legally deficient.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for impaired care and control and excess blood alcohol arising from a six‑day trial.

He challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings, alleged a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and argued that his vehicle was inoperable such that he lacked care and control.

The court held that credibility findings by the trial judge were entitled to deference and disclosed no palpable or overriding error.

The appellant had not raised a s. 11(b) issue at trial and provided no evidentiary basis for such a claim.

The evidence supported the finding that the appellant had care and control of an operable vehicle while impaired.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting intoxilyzer results after finding breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge had concluded the investigating officer unlawfully arrested the accused but admitted the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after applying the Grant framework.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to decide whether roadside sobriety tests occurred, by considering irrelevant factors in the s. 24(2) analysis, and by ruling on the impaired driving charge before determining the Charter application.

The summary conviction appeal court held the trial judge properly applied the Grant factors and was entitled to admit the breath evidence.

No reversible error was found.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for dangerous driving under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing the trial judge erred in finding identity beyond a reasonable doubt and provided inadequate reasons.

The appellant contended the trial judge improperly relied on the contents of a telephone statement to establish identity and that the circumstantial evidence permitted other reasonable inferences.

The appeal court held there was sufficient independent evidence on a balance of probabilities to admit the statement and that, when combined with other circumstantial evidence, the only rational inference was that the appellant was the driver involved in the incident.

The court also found the trial judge’s reasoning was apparent from the record and adequate for appellate review.

During a criminal trial for firearms-related offences, the accused challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police statement on the basis that it was involuntary.

The voir dire focused on whether police made threats or inducements suggesting that other detainees would be released if the accused accepted responsibility for a firearm.

The court applied the voluntariness test from R. v. Oickle and assessed conflicting testimony from the accused and a police officer regarding their interaction in the holding cells.

Due to minimal police notes, the absence of recordings of the critical interaction, and gaps in the evidentiary record, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary.

The statement was ruled inadmissible, effectively preventing the prosecution from continuing.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife during a period of marital breakdown.

The complainant alleged that the accused forced himself upon her, while the accused testified that the sexual encounter was consensual and initiated by the complainant.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, the trial judge found inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her 9-1-1 call and initial statements to police.

The court concluded it could not resolve the conflicting evidence, leaving a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.