SCC 1999

The appellant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible for various offences and was conditionally discharged by the Review Board.

He challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter, as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for breaking and entering.

The Review Board repeatedly granted him conditional discharges, denying an absolute discharge because it could not conclude he was not a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code regime governing persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, arguing that s. 672.54 violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter by creating an improper burden, vagueness, overbreadth, and discriminatory treatment.

The Court held that Part XX.1 created an individualized assessment-and-treatment regime directed to public safety and fairness, not punishment, and that an NCR accused must receive the least onerous and least restrictive disposition compatible with the statutory objectives.

The majority interpreted s. 672.54 to require an absolute discharge unless the court or Review Board positively finds a significant threat to the safety of the public.

The Court further held that the regime did not discriminate against mentally disordered accused, but instead promoted substantive equality through individualized treatment.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellants were sexually abused by an employee of the respondent Boys' and Girls' Club.

The abuse primarily occurred at the employee's home outside of working hours.

The appellants sought damages against the Club, arguing it was vicariously liable for the employee's intentional torts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the connection between the employer's enterprise and the employee's wrongful acts was not sufficiently strong to justify imposing no-fault vicarious liability.

The matter was remitted to trial to determine if the Club was directly liable in negligence.

The appellant Foundation, a non-profit organization, operated residential care facilities for emotionally troubled children.

The Foundation hired an employee who sexually abused the respondent child while in the Foundation's care.

The respondent sued the Foundation for vicarious liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an employer can be vicariously liable for an employee's unauthorized intentional torts, including sexual abuse, if the employer's enterprise and empowerment of the employee materially increased the risk of the harm.

The Court found the Foundation vicariously liable because the opportunity for intimate private control and the parental relationship required by the employment created the special environment that nurtured the abuse.

The Court also declined to create an exemption for non-profit organizations.

The appellant mother applied to vary spousal and child support after one child moved out.

The motions judge maintained total child support at $1,500 for the remaining child and increased spousal support to $1,300 due to inflation and the respondent's increased income.

The Court of Appeal reduced both awards.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the motions judge's order, holding that appellate courts must defer to a trial judge's support orders absent an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of evidence, or an award that is clearly wrong.

The accused was charged with sexual offences and made an initial confession to police that was later ruled inadmissible.

During a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, the accused made a 'protected statement' confirming the earlier confession.

At trial, the accused testified and denied the offences.

The Crown cross-examined him on the protected statement to challenge his credibility under s. 672.21(3)(f) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the protected statement was inadmissible because it was derived from the prior involuntary confession.

The Court concluded that s. 672.21(3)(f) cannot be interpreted to permit the use of an involuntary confession, as doing so would violate section 7 of the Charter.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident and subsequently made three statements to police regarding the incident.

She was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident under the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the statements under s. 24(1) of the Charter, finding they were compelled by the provincial Motor Vehicle Act and their admission would violate the principle against self-incrimination under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that statements made under the statutory compulsion of the Motor Vehicle Act are inadmissible in criminal proceedings against the declarant.

The Court established that a statement is compelled if the driver honestly and reasonably believes they are required by law to report the accident.

The accused admitted killing his spouse but argued he acted in an automatistic dissociative state allegedly triggered by insulting words.

The Court clarified a general two-step framework for automatism, requiring the defence to establish a proper evidentiary foundation and then requiring the trial judge to determine whether the condition is mental disorder or non-mental disorder automatism by reference to internal cause, continuing danger, and policy factors.

The majority held that the alleged condition was properly treated as a disease of the mind and that only mental disorder automatism should have gone to the jury.

The Court also held that disclosure of the defence psychiatric report caused no miscarriage of justice and that provocation may still mitigate sentence after reducing murder to manslaughter.

Both the conviction appeal and the Crown sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellants challenged findings that the Indian Act provision restricting band election voting to members ordinarily resident on the reserve violated the equality rights of off-reserve band members.

The Court held that off-reserve band member status is an analogous ground under s. 15(1), and that the complete denial of voting rights in band governance perpetuated disadvantage and denied substantive equality.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because a total exclusion of non-residents was not minimally impairing.

The Court declared the impugned words in s. 77(1) invalid in their general application, suspended the declaration for 18 months, and denied an immediate constitutional exemption.

The respondent patient sued the appellant doctor for medical malpractice after he allegedly misdiagnosed her breast cancer.

The action was commenced outside the standard two-year limitation period.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the running of time was postponed under s. 6(4)(b) of the Limitation Act.

The Court held that the provision requires a subjective/objective approach, postponing the limitation period until a reasonable person would conclude that the plaintiff could reasonably bring an action in light of their own serious, significant, and compelling circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the action to proceed.

The appellant, whose first language was French, was charged with first degree murder.

After his first trial ended in a mistrial and his second trial conviction was overturned, he applied for a third trial before a judge and jury who speak both official languages.

The pre-trial judge dismissed the application under s. 530(4) of the Criminal Code, and the appellant was convicted in English.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that language rights must be interpreted purposively and substantively.

The Court found that the trial judge erred in focusing on the appellant's ability to speak English, as language rights are distinct from trial fairness.

A violation of s. 530 constitutes a substantial wrong, precluding the application of the curative proviso, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant brought a motion for a rehearing of a custody appeal, arguing that the respondents failed to serve an intervener from the court below with the application for leave to appeal and notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, finding that the intervener did not qualify as a 'party' requiring service under the applicable rules.

Furthermore, the applicant was aware of the lack of service prior to the original hearing and failed to demonstrate any potential failure of justice that would justify a rehearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed two appeals concerning the bankruptcy of Nolisair International Inc. and Sécurité Saglac (1992) Inc. The Court adopted the dissenting reasons of Fish J.A. from the Quebec Court of Appeal, setting aside the appellate judgments and restoring the Superior Court decisions regarding the provincial Crown's deemed trust for deductions at source.

The Crown appealed as of right from a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, which had allowed the accused's appeal from her manslaughter conviction and ordered a new trial based on errors in the jury charge regarding self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing substantially with the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, and confirmed the order for a new trial.

A plant operated by the respondents discharged chlorine into adjacent waters, killing fish.

The authorities obtained a search warrant under s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code to search for evidence of negligence that would negate a defence of due diligence to strict liability environmental offences.

The respondents successfully applied to quash the warrants in the lower courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the broad wording of s. 487(1) authorizes the issuance of warrants to search for and seize evidence of negligence in the investigation of strict liability offences.

The aboriginal appellant pled guilty to manslaughter for the killing of her common law husband and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge did not give special consideration to her aboriginal background under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, noting she lived off-reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 718.2(e) applies to all aboriginal offenders wherever they reside and requires sentencing judges to consider unique systemic or background factors and appropriate restorative sanctions.

Although the trial judge erred in his approach, the appeal was dismissed because the three-year sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the fact that the appellant had already been granted parole.

The accused arrived at Pearson International Airport and was suspected by customs officers of having ingested narcotics.

He was detained in a 'drug loo facility' until he passed 84 pellets of heroin.

He was convicted at trial, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding violations of his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the detention and 'bedpan vigil' were authorized by s. 98 of the Customs Act and did not violate the accused's rights under s. 7 or s. 8 of the Charter.

The respondent invited tenders for a construction project and awarded the contract to the lowest bidder, whose bid was non-compliant.

The tender documents included a privilege clause stating that the lowest or any tender would not necessarily be accepted.

The appellant, who submitted the lowest compliant bid, sued for breach of contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a Contract A arose upon the submission of the tender, and it contained an implied term that only compliant bids would be accepted.

The privilege clause did not override this implied term, though it did allow the owner to choose a compliant bid other than the lowest one.

The appeal was allowed and damages awarded to the appellant.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis resin following a reverse sting operation in which the RCMP offered to sell them a large quantity of hashish.

The appellants sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the police conduct was illegal and constituted an abuse of process.

They also sought disclosure of legal advice the RCMP received from the Department of Justice, which the Crown claimed supported the police's good faith belief in the operation's legality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police are not immune from criminal liability and that their conduct in offering to sell narcotics was illegal.

Furthermore, by asserting good faith reliance on the legal advice, the RCMP waived solicitor-client privilege.

The Court ordered disclosure of the relevant legal advice and directed a new trial limited to the issue of whether a stay of proceedings should be granted.