SCC 1999

The appellant First Nation passed assessment and taxation by-laws pursuant to the Indian Act and assessed taxes against the respondent, a provincial Crown agent operating a utility on the reserve.

The respondent refused to pay, arguing immunity under s. 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-laws imposed taxes rather than regulatory charges, as they were designed to raise revenue for general local purposes and were not connected to a regulatory scheme.

Consequently, s. 125 rendered the by-laws constitutionally inapplicable to the respondent.

The appellant's barge sank while chartered to the respondent.

The appellant's insurers paid out the loss and initiated a subrogated negligence action against the respondent.

The respondent sought to rely on a waiver of subrogation clause in the appellant's insurance policy, which explicitly extended coverage to charterers.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondent, as a third-party beneficiary, could rely on the waiver of subrogation clause to defend against the action.

The Court applied the principled exception to the privity of contract doctrine, finding that the parties intended to extend the benefit to the charterer and that the charterer was performing the very activities contemplated in the contract.

The Minister of Health and Community Services sought to extend an order granting him custody of the appellant's three children.

The appellant, an indigent parent, was denied legal aid for the custody hearing because the provincial guidelines did not cover custody applications.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the state's removal of a child from parental custody constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity of the parent, engaging the right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant's right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by counsel, and the government's failure to provide state-funded counsel violated section 7.

The infringement was not saved by section 1.

The claimant, a female forest firefighter, was dismissed after failing a newly implemented aerobic fitness test.

The test had a disproportionately negative effect on women.

The arbitrator found adverse effect discrimination and reinstated her, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, replacing the conventional bifurcated approach to discrimination with a unified three-step test for bona fide occupational requirements (BFOR).

The Court found the government failed to establish that the aerobic standard was reasonably necessary to identify those able to perform the job safely and efficiently, and failed to show it could not accommodate the claimant without undue hardship.

The appellant union's members were locked out by the respondent employer.

Union members distributed leaflets outside the premises of four non-employer respondents who sold the employer's products.

The union members did not trespass or block vehicles.

The respondents obtained an injunction against the union, arguing the leafleting was prohibited secondary picketing under s. 104(2) of the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 104(2) must be interpreted in light of s. 5(4) of the Act and the Charter to prohibit only persuasion that is coercive, intimidating, threatening, or intended to cause undue influence, and therefore does not prohibit peaceful leafleting.

During a labour dispute, members of the appellant union distributed leaflets at secondary KMart stores urging a consumer boycott.

The Labour Relations Board ordered the union to refrain from this activity, finding it constituted prohibited picketing under the Labour Relations Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the statutory definition of picketing, which encompassed peaceful consumer leafleting, infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court found the infringement could not be justified under s. 1 because the blanket prohibition on leafleting was overly broad and did not minimally impair the right.

The definition of picketing was struck down, with the declaration of invalidity suspended for six months.

An RCMP officer challenged the constitutionality of legislation excluding RCMP members from the federal public sector labour relations regime, alleging infringements of freedom of association, freedom of expression, and equality rights under the Charter.

The majority held that s. 2(d) protects the formation of independent employee associations and lawful collective activity, but does not require Parliament to include RCMP members within a particular statutory labour relations scheme.

The majority further held that the exclusions did not infringe s. 2(b) or s. 15(1), emphasizing that the Charter generally imposes no positive obligation of legislative inclusion absent exceptional circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent concluding that the exclusion had an anti-associational purpose and failed s. 1 justification.

The appellants, farmers in financial difficulty, obtained a stay of proceedings under the federal Farm Debt Review Act.

While the stay was in effect, the respondent creditor obtained an order granting leave to commence foreclosure proceedings under the provincial Family Farm Protection Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the leave application under the provincial Act was a proceeding prohibited by the federal stay.

The operational incompatibility between the two statutes triggered the doctrine of federal paramountcy, rendering the provincial leave order invalid and a nullity.

The appellant taxpayer entered into debenture agreements to borrow New Zealand dollars at a high interest rate, and simultaneously entered into a forward exchange contract to convert the funds to US dollars for use in its business, while hedging the exchange rate risk.

The taxpayer deducted the high interest payments under s. 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act and reported the resulting foreign exchange gain on capital account.

The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, arguing the interest deduction should be limited to the lower rate applicable to US dollars based on the economic realities of the transaction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the taxpayer's legal relationships must be respected and that the borrowed New Zealand dollars were directly used to earn income.

The Court allowed the appeal, permitting the full interest deduction, and dismissed the Minister's cross-appeal, holding the foreign exchange gain was on capital account.

The appellant's driver's licence was cancelled because he suffered from homonymous hemianopia, which reduced his peripheral vision below the Superintendent's absolute standard of 120 degrees.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of physical disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Meiorin test and held that the blanket refusal to issue a licence without the possibility of individual assessment constituted discrimination.

The Superintendent failed to prove that accommodating the appellant through an individualized assessment would cause undue hardship.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, challenging the trial judge's approach to dealing with DNA evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conduct of the voir dire or his charge to the jury, which were deemed fair and balanced.

The Court substantially agreed with the reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The appellant, co-owner of a bar, was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house after nude dancers allowed patrons to touch their breasts and buttocks in a cubicle.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the acts were not indecent.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge did not err in law in his assessment of the standard of tolerance regarding the nature of the touching and the circumstances in the cubicle.

The respondents on an application for leave to appeal sought to include the costs of expert evidence and related travel expenses as disbursements in their bill of costs after the leave application was dismissed.

The Registrar disallowed these expenses, ruling they were not covered by Part II of Schedule B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondents brought a motion to review the Registrar's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that expert fees are not specifically authorized as disbursements under the Rules and can only be allowed if expressly authorized by the Court under Rule 58.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for compensation by the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec and the Commission des affaires sociales.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Commission's decisions were patently unreasonable because the evidence clearly showed the appellant met the definition of 'spouses' under the Automobile Insurance Act.

The Court ordered the payment of compensation and additional indemnity with interest.

The respondent brought a motion for the recusal of Bastarache J. on the basis of an apprehension of bias arising from his past experience and writings as counsel and law professor.

The judge dismissed the motion, applying the test for apprehension of bias and finding no evidence that his past beliefs or opinions would prevent him from deciding the case on the evidence with an open mind.

The respondents brought a motion to strike portions of the appellants' factum, record book, and book of authorities on the basis that they improperly introduced fresh evidence.

The appellants argued the challenged material constituted 'legislative facts' subject to judicial notice rather than 'adjudicative facts'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the motion in part, striking out an affidavit, recent correspondence, and newspaper clippings that were improperly included without a fresh evidence application, but permitting extracts from the appellants' Court of Appeal factum to remain as they formed part of the record below.

The appellant, an egg producer, intentionally exceeded its production quota and was assessed an over-quota levy by the provincial marketing board.

The appellant deducted the levy as a business expense under the Income Tax Act.

The Minister disallowed the deduction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the levy was deductible as a current business expense under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act, as it was incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income.

The Court ruled that the income tax system does not distinguish among levies, fines, and penalties, and that public policy considerations should not be used by courts to disallow deductions that are otherwise permitted by the clear language of the Act, leaving such policy choices to Parliament.

Criminal appeal addressing whether the extortion offence encompasses demands for sexual favours obtained by threats to expose compromising photographs.

The Court held that the word “anything” in the extortion provision is broad enough to include sexual favours, notwithstanding the provision’s location in the property offences part of the Code.

The Court further held that the sexual assault conviction involving one complainant could be sustained on separate incidents of non-consensual sexual activity, and that the Kienapple principle did not preclude both extortion and sexual assault convictions because they arose from different factual transactions.

The Court also found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and no reversible error in the trial judge’s treatment of reasonable doubt.

The appeal concerned the constitutionality of the Criminal Code regime governing production of private records in sexual offence proceedings.

The Court held that the challenge was not premature and that Parliament could enact a legislative response different from the common law framework in O’Connor, provided constitutional standards were met.

The majority concluded that the impugned provisions appropriately reconciled the accused’s right to make full answer and defence with complainants’ privacy and equality rights, including in relation to records held by the Crown.

The appeal was allowed and the legislation was upheld as constitutional.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder, challenging the admissibility of the murder weapon found after statements he made following prolonged detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal of Quebec.