SCC 1994

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that inculpatory statements made to undercover police officers after his release from custody were obtained in violation of his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the appellant was not detained at the time the statements were made.

The Court further held that the police trickery used was not likely to shock the community or render the statements involuntary.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that a marked departure from normal behavior was required to prove the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which held that any degree of impairment is sufficient to prove the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada issued additional reasons regarding the proper procedure for directed verdicts of acquittal.

The Court modified the common law rule, holding that where a trial judge determines there is no evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict, the judge should withdraw the case from the jury and enter an acquittal directly, rather than directing the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.

This change avoids unnecessary delay, reduces jury frustration, and preserves the division of responsibilities between judge and jury.

The appellant parity committee sought to inspect the respondents' premises and documents under s. 22(e) of the Act respecting Collective Agreement Decrees to verify compliance with a decree.

The respondents refused, arguing the inspectors needed a search warrant.

The respondents were convicted of obstructing an inspection, but the Court of Appeal acquitted them, finding s. 22(e) violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the inspection powers constitute a search or seizure under s. 8, they are reasonable in the context of administrative inspections in a regulated industrial sector where expectations of privacy are lower.

The respondent's refugee claim was rejected and a deportation order was issued.

After exhausting immigration review and Federal Court appellate processes, the respondent brought a constitutional challenge in the Ontario Court (General Division).

The motions court judge stayed the application, finding the Federal Court was the appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the motions court judge properly exercised his discretion to stay the proceedings, as Parliament had created a comprehensive scheme of review in the Federal Court.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which had allowed an appeal from their acquittals and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons of Seaton J.A. in the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial turned on the reliability of witnesses and inferences to be drawn from their evidence, neither of which raised a question of law.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the Court of Appeal set aside, and the acquittals entered at trial were restored.

The appellants appealed decisions granting interlocutory impounding orders for commercial documents seized during tax investigations.

The respondents had challenged the constitutionality of the search provisions under the Charter and sought to have the documents sealed pending a final determination.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the three-part test for interlocutory relief.

The Court found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm due to the continuing violation of privacy interests in the respondents' homes and offices, and that the balance of convenience favoured the respondents as the impounding orders would not paralyze the enforcement of taxation laws.

The appellants acquired the debt of a failing company from a non-taxable provincial board.

The debt included significant accrued interest, payment of which had been suspended for two years.

Upon transfer, the appellants received partial payment of this interest, included it in their income, and claimed a deduction under s. 20(14)(b) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister disallowed the deduction because the tax-exempt board had not included the interest in its income under s. 20(14)(a).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transaction met the plain meaning of s. 20(14) and was not a sham.

The Court ruled that a transferee's right to a deduction under s. 20(14)(b) is not conditional on the transferor including the amount in income under s. 20(14)(a).

The appellant challenged a Court of Appeal order setting aside his acquittal on a charge of second degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge's slip in the recharge to the jury constituted a serious misdirection and that it could not be said with the requisite certainty that the verdict would inevitably have been the same absent the error.

On the disclosure issue, the court held that full disclosure had been made before the second trial and that an appellate court had no jurisdiction to grant a stay where no such application had been brought at trial.

The court further held that ordering a new trial in the circumstances did not amount to an abuse of process.

The appellant, a status Indian and member of the Hiawatha Band, was convicted of fishing out of season contrary to the Ontario Fishery Regulations.

He appealed, arguing that he had an existing treaty right to fish under section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the lower courts' findings that the 1923 Treaty, which contained a broad 'basket clause', validly extinguished the Band's fishing rights in the Otonabee River area.

The Court found no ambiguity in the treaty and concluded that the signatories understood its terms.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual assault and was declared a dangerous offender based partly on pre-trial psychiatric assessments.

He appealed, arguing that the admission of the psychiatric evidence violated his rights against self-incrimination under s. 7 of the Charter and his right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that dangerous offender proceedings are part of the sentencing process where the offender's guilt has already been established, and therefore the use of the psychiatric evidence did not violate the principle against self-incrimination.

The Court also found no violation of the right to counsel.

The appellant's immovables were sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes and acquired by the respondent City.

The appellant brought an action to quash the tax by-laws and the sale.

While the action was pending, the City sold the immovables to a third party.

The courts eventually quashed the by-laws and the sale.

The appellant then brought a new action claiming damages and the monetary equivalent of the immovables, alleging a sale of another's property and unjust enrichment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the appellant had a valid claim for the recovery of a thing not due, the subsequent action for damages and monetary reimbursement was prescribed under the six-month limitation period in the Cities and Towns Act.

The appellant mother appealed an order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.

The child had been in the care of the respondent society for several years and had bonded with her foster family.

The Supreme Court of Canada admitted fresh evidence regarding the child's current situation and wishes.

The Court held that on a status review hearing under the Child and Family Services Act, the court must consider both whether the child continues to be in need of protection and the best interests of the child.

Finding that the child's psychological bonding with the foster family and her need for continuity of care outweighed the mother's interests, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Crown wardship order without access.

The appellants challenged a municipal tax sale of an island they had mistakenly occupied and improved, arguing the municipality had confused two islands and that no meaningful tax arrears existed on the occupied property.

The majority held that tax arrears on the registered parcel triggered the Municipal Tax Sales Act, 1984, that any assessment invalidity was insulated by s. 13(1)(a), and that the appellants' adverse possession claim failed because they were not abutting landowners within s. 9(5)(c).

The dissent would have applied a purposive interpretation to avoid an absurd and unjust result, concluding that the substantive trigger of tax arrears never truly arose.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appeal concerned whether the federal government remained constitutionally bound to ensure operation of passenger rail service on the Victoria to Nanaimo portion of the Vancouver Island railway, whether continuous-operation language in historic railway agreements had statutory force overriding general railway legislation, and whether an Order-in-Council discontinuing service on another portion of the line was ultra vires after a missed five-year reconsideration.

The majority held that Term 11 of the British Columbia Terms of Union imposed only a construction obligation, not an operational one, and that later political arrangements could not themselves attain constitutional status absent grounding in the constitutional text.

The majority further held that the Dunsmuir Agreement was ratified but not incorporated into federal legislation as a statutory obligation, and that a 1912 provincial enactment could not impose an operational statutory duty on a federally regulated railway.

On the administrative issue, the majority held that the continuation order did not lapse for want of timely reconsideration and remained capable of variation under s. 64 of the National Transportation Act, 1987.

The appeal was allowed, with two judges dissenting.

The accused, a pediatrician, was charged with sexually assaulting four teenage female patients.

At trial, the defence sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence that the perpetrator of such offences would belong to a narrow class of individuals (e.g., pedophiles or sexual psychopaths) and that the accused did not possess the characteristics of this class.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, establishing a four-part test for the admission of expert evidence: relevance, necessity in assisting the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified expert.

The Court held the psychiatric evidence was inadmissible as it lacked sufficient reliability and necessity to overcome the exclusionary rule against character evidence.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal which had reversed a trial judgment finding the respondents liable for copyright infringement of scratch cards.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the trial judge correctly stated and applied the criteria for infringement.

The Court of Appeal erred by adding a requirement that the infringing work must be a simple copy of the original.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal which had allowed a Crown appeal from his acquittal for perjury.

The appellant argued that the Crown's appeal did not involve a question of law and that his recantation of false testimony within the same hearing provided a defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that whether recantation can nullify a completed offence of perjury is a question of law.

The Court further held that once the trial judge found the accused intended to mislead the court and gave false testimony under oath, the offence was complete, and a later recantation could not negate the earlier intention to mislead.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that had overturned the accused's conviction for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in requiring a victim to offer some minimal word or gesture of objection and in equating a lack of resistance with consent.

The Court found there was sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting his niece.

During deliberations, the jury asked for an explanation of the guideline on evidence and reasonable doubt.

The trial judge's recharge suggested the jury had to choose between the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this either/or approach was incorrect as it excluded the third alternative: that the jury might not believe the accused but still have a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.