Sarah Margaret Boulby

Following a motion for interim custody where a shared parenting regime was ordered, the respondent sought costs of $38,966 on a full recovery basis.

The applicant opposed, arguing for no costs or costs reserved to the trial judge.

The court found the respondent was the more successful party but declined to apply Family Law Rule 18 as her offer to settle was not strictly met.

Applying the factors in Family Law Rule 24(11) and the objectives of costs, the court awarded the respondent costs on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $17,500 for fees plus HST and disbursements.

Following a family law trial involving divorce, custody, access, travel permissions, and support issues, the court determined the applicant was overwhelmingly the successful party.

The applicant obtained divorce, sole custody, a non-removal order, travel authorization, and a restraining order, while the respondent’s claims were entirely dismissed.

Although the applicant did not succeed on spousal support, retroactive child support, or a request relating to a religious divorce, the court found the balance of success strongly favoured her.

The court fixed costs in the applicant’s favour.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, and spousal support following the breakdown of the parties' marriage.

The respondent father, who resides in Dubai, sought sole or joint custody and opposed the support claims.

The court found the father to be controlling, abusive, and a flight risk, noting his refusal to grant a Muslim 'Talaq' divorce and his threats to take the child to Pakistan.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother, ordered graduated and restricted access for the father conditional on surrendering his passports, and imputed a grossed-up income of $239,200 to the father for child support purposes.

The mother's claim for spousal support was dismissed due to the short marriage and her stable income.

On a motion for interim spousal support arising from a lengthy unmarried cohabitation, the court found a prima facie case that the claimant was a spouse within the meaning of the Family Law Act and had entitlement to support.

The court held that interim support could rest on both a compensatory element and, more importantly, a non-compensatory needs basis measured against the parties' highly extravagant lifestyle and the payor's substantial means.

The court further held that support should presumptively commence when notice of the claim was given and ordered retroactive interim support from April 26, 2012.

After considering gross-up principles under the Child Support Guidelines and the discretionary use of the SSAG in a high-income case, the court fixed interim support at $25,000 per month until trial.

On a motion to change a prior support order, the applicant sought orders requiring the respondent to contribute to the post‑secondary educational expenses of the parties’ adult children, including a master’s program in the United States.

The court held that the daughter pursuing a master’s degree remained a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act, as she had not withdrawn from parental charge and her educational plan was rational and consistent with the family’s expectations regarding higher education.

The court also found no material change in circumstances justifying variation of the base child support previously agreed to by the parties.

The respondent was required to contribute proportionately to the children’s educational expenses under the existing order, including the U.S. graduate program, and base support was reduced only by the applicant’s consent.

The respondent’s request for retroactive variation of support based on alleged income changes was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a prior costs order requiring payment of approximately $32,974.57 following earlier child support litigation.

The applicant alleged that the respondent had a special fee arrangement with his law firm which was not disclosed to the court and would have affected the costs determination.

The court applied the stringent test for setting aside an order based on newly discovered facts, as articulated in West v. West.

The court found the evidence did not establish the existence of a special fee arrangement but rather a payment mechanism involving internal fee credits used to satisfy legal accounts.

As the arrangement did not reduce or forgive the respondent’s fees and did not exist when the costs order was made, the applicant failed to demonstrate that the original order would have been different or that a miscarriage of justice would occur.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that declined to determine whether Ontario or Georgia law applied to child and spousal support, deferring the issue to the trial judge.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, noting that both parties had requested the determination, the jurisprudence on the applicable law was unsettled, and deferring the issue would leave the moving party in procedural limbo while preparing for trial under two different legal regimes.

The applicant moved for leave to appeal a motion judge's decision declining to determine whether Ontario or Georgia law applied to child and spousal support issues, reserving it for the trial judge.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of deferring the issue, as both parties requested an advance determination and the respondent had already appealed the jurisdiction finding to the Court of Appeal.

Following an unsuccessful jurisdictional motion brought by certain respondents seeking dismissal of part of a claim, the court addressed costs.

The motion was dismissed and another respondent was entirely successful.

Applying the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality and the reasonable expectations of the parties, the court fixed costs in favour of the successful party.

Costs were awarded inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

Following an appeal, the court issued a costs endorsement.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs, and the court ordered the appellant to pay the respondent costs of the appeal in the agreed amount of $12,500, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant wife appealed a trial decision ordering her to pay an equalization payment of $117,514.50 and costs to the respondent husband.

The primary issue was the division of the husband's pension, specifically whether the wife was entitled to a share of the pension's growth during their five-and-a-half-year pre-marital cohabitation period based on unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no unjust enrichment as the relationship did not constitute a joint family venture and the wife had not suffered a corresponding deprivation.

The Court also rejected arguments regarding the application of new pension valuation legislation, unequal division of net family property, instalment payments, trial fairness, and costs.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a Superior Court decision that varied an arbitrator's award regarding child and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the appeal judge's decision, finding that the arbitrator erred in his application of the D.B.S. factors for retroactive child support, misunderstood the tax implications of retroactive lump sum spousal support, and failed to properly analyze whether post-separation income increases were related to the marriage.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought costs after the respondent withdrew her answer in a family law application concerning the validity of a separation agreement and referral of child support issues to mediation/arbitration.

The applicant argued that under rule 12(3) of the Family Law Rules he was entitled to near full recovery of legal fees exceeding $22,000.

The court held that rule 12(3) entitles a party to costs thrown away by a withdrawal but does not automatically require full indemnity recovery.

Considering proportionality, the limited procedural steps taken, and the absence of unreasonable conduct, the court fixed costs at a reduced all‑inclusive amount.

Payment of the costs award was deferred until specified milestones relating to the mediation/arbitration of the child support dispute.

Costs decision following a family law motion seeking to compel disclosure and other relief relating to financial statements and property issues potentially involving third parties.

The court found the moving party’s motion to compel disclosure was largely premature, unnecessary, and overreaching because disclosure timelines had not been fixed, pleadings were incomplete, and some disclosure required cooperation from non-parties.

The court also noted the moving party accepted the responding party’s valuation date during the motion.

Finding that the responding party attempted to avoid the motion and was the successful party, the court awarded partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario noted that the appeal was settled on the terms of a filed consent order.

The appeal concerned whether an Ontario court had jurisdiction under the Divorce Act to make and later vary spousal support orders following a foreign divorce.

The court held that the 1990 consent order increasing spousal support was made without jurisdiction because only the court that granted the divorce could then grant corollary relief under s. 4, and the parties' consent could not cure that defect.

It further held that the 1998 variation order was also without jurisdiction because a null order cannot be varied and Canadian courts have no jurisdiction under the Act to vary foreign support orders.

The appeal was allowed, the variation order was set aside insofar as it related to spousal support, and no costs were awarded.

The appellant wife appealed an interim order restraining her from sending scurrilous letters to third parties about her husband, and a sealing order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that such letters can constitute harassment under section 46 of the Family Law Act.

The court held that while the order infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, it was justified under section 1 as a proportionate measure given its narrow scope and limited duration.

The sealing order was also upheld.