Sandra Chapnik

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Arbitrations, which upheld an Arbitrator's dismissal of his claim for statutory accident benefits and ordered him to pay arbitration expenses.

The applicant claimed he was injured on a TTC bus, but initially reported it as a subway accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Arbitrator's factual findings and costs order were supported by the evidence and not patently unreasonable.

The plaintiff's disability benefits were terminated by the defendant insurer after two years.

The plaintiff sued for specific performance and sought an interlocutory injunction to reinstate payments pending trial.

The defendant sought an adjournment of the motion, which the motions judge granted on the condition that the defendant continue paying benefits for three months without prejudice.

The defendant appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing the motion was brought in the wrong venue and the condition amounted to an improper mandatory injunction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a venue irregularity does not automatically invalidate an order absent prejudice, and the payment condition was a valid exercise of discretion to mitigate the prejudice of the adjournment, not a determination on the merits of the injunction.

The appellant tenant appealed a Tribunal order terminating his tenancy so the landlord's son could occupy the unit.

The tenant argued the Tribunal erred in interpreting the 'good faith' requirement under s. 51(1) of the Tenant Protection Act, asserting that the landlord's primary motive was economic since the tenant paid below-market rent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that 'good faith' only requires a genuine intention to have a family member occupy the unit, regardless of whether the choice of unit was driven by economic reasons.

The court also found the Tribunal properly exercised its discretion under s. 84(1) by postponing the eviction rather than refusing it.

The appellant husband appealed a spousal support order of $1,800 monthly for ten years, arguing the respondent wife had waived support in their marriage contract.

The motions judge found the waiver resulted in unconscionable circumstances under s. 33(4) of the Family Law Act, as the husband had required the wife to quit her job as an exotic dancer, leaving her in poverty while he maintained a wealthy lifestyle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge properly considered the wife's lack of employment prospects, her immigration status, and the unconscionable result of the contract, and did not err in ordering ten years of support.