Sam Weinstock

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of fentanyl and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and weapons-related offences.

The narcotics and weapons were found in her bedroom during a search warrant execution.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding she possessed the narcotics, suggesting a reasonable alternative inference that another individual in the room possessed them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the principles of circumstantial evidence and reasonably concluded the alternative theory was implausible.

The trial judge's credibility findings regarding the other individual's testimony were entitled to deference.

The accused, charged with drug and firearm offences, brought a Charter motion challenging the validity of tracking and search warrants based on information from a confidential informant.

The court found that the police affiants engaged in deliberate deception by including false information and omitting material facts in the warrant applications, subverting the prior authorization process.

The court held that this egregious misconduct constituted an abuse of process violating section 7 of the Charter, warranting a stay of proceedings.

Alternatively, the court found the arrest unlawful and the search incident to arrest unreasonable, excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The applicant brought a second motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The total delay was calculated at 30 months and 19 days, but after subtracting defence delay, the net delay was 29.5 months, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court trials.

The court found that while the defence took meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings, the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, particularly given the complexities of disclosure involving a confidential informant.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with firearms and drug trafficking offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time was infringed.

The anticipated delay was 27.5 months, which is below the 30-month ceiling for Superior Court trials established in Jordan.

The applicant argued the Crown failed to conduct a diligent prosecution by delaying severance and the preferring of a direct indictment.

The court found that while the Crown's communication and timing on certain procedural steps were problematic, the overall delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required for a multi-accused case.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused, a trucking dispatcher, was found guilty of importing 50 kilograms of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The Crown sought 13 to 15 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 9 to 12 years.

The court considered the significant quantity of cocaine, the accused's role in directing an unknowing driver, and his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the accused to 12 years for importing and 9 years for conspiracy, to be served concurrently, less 104 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a net sentence of 11 years and 261 days.

The accused, a head dispatcher for a trucking company, was charged with importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine after 50 bricks of cocaine were found hidden in a shipment of plastic resin at the Canadian border.

The accused denied knowledge of the conspiracy, claiming he was unaware the shipment had been diverted to avoid a police search in Texas and that a co-worker had arranged the falsified customs documents.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as not credible, finding that his actions—including maintaining a cover story, rerouting the shipment, and sending falsified documents—provided overwhelming circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and participation.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the police violated his Charter rights during the execution of a search warrant at his home.

The police used a forced entry without knocking, handcuffed the appellant, and delayed his access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal found no breaches of s. 8 (search and seizure) or s. 9 (arbitrary detention), as the forced entry and handcuffing were justified for officer safety and to prevent the destruction of evidence.

However, the Court found two breaches of s. 10(b) (right to counsel) due to the police questioning the appellant before he could consult a lawyer and failing to facilitate contact with his counsel of choice.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the Court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not causally connected to the discovery of the drugs and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

During a trial for possession for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown applied to admit expert opinion evidence from a police officer regarding whether the accused's possession of Oxycodone and fentanyl patches was for the purpose of trafficking.

The court ruled the evidence inadmissible.

The officer's opinion on the Oxycodone lacked probative value because he conceded the quantity was equally consistent with legitimate prescription use as with trafficking.

Regarding the fentanyl, the court found the officer lacked the necessary medical knowledge and experience with prescription patterns to provide a reliable expert opinion, noting that a doctor or pharmacist would be the appropriate expert.

The accused, charged with importing heroin, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained from a cell phone, alleging a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found the accused had standing to challenge the search.

However, the court held that the search warrant was validly issued, as the Information to Obtain contained sufficient evidence even if the text messages obtained during a prior search incident to arrest were excised.

Alternatively, the court found that even if a s. 8 breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and necessary for adjudicating serious charges.