Robert Sinding

The accused, Barry Mandamin, applied to remove the Kenora Crown Attorney's Office from prosecuting his charges due to an alleged conflict of interest.

This arose because his former defence counsel accepted employment with the Kenora Crown Attorney's Office shortly before his trial.

The court applied the principles from *MacDonald Estate v. Martin* and found that the Crown failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of institutional safeguards to rebut the strong inference of disclosure of confidential information.

Given the early stage of proceedings and the high potential for misuse of confidential information, the application was granted, and the prosecution was ordered to be conducted by a Crown Attorney's Office from outside the District of Kenora.

The appellant, Zachary Leonard, appealed a decision where a reviewing judge, upon a breach of a conditional sentence, collapsed consecutive conditional sentences and ordered a custodial sentence that exceeded the maximum allowable for summary conviction offences.

The Superior Court of Justice considered whether consecutive conditional sentences merge for the purpose of reviewing a breach and if the reviewing judge exceeded her jurisdiction.

The court found that conditional sentences do not merge for breach review purposes and that the reviewing judge erred in principle by imposing a custodial sentence of 207 days, which exceeded the 180-day maximum for summary conviction offences under the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence adjusted, and the appellant ordered released to resume his conditional sentence.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the respondent, an Indigenous man convicted of sexual assault.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record involving 18 violent offences over nearly 30 years.

The court considered Gladue factors but found the respondent's severe childhood trauma did not mitigate the high risk of future violent and sexual re-offending.

The court declared the respondent a dangerous offender based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that lesser measures would not adequately protect the public.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his former common-law partner's granddaughter.

The complainant, who was a child at the time of the alleged offences, testified to multiple incidents of inappropriate touching.

The accused testified and denied all allegations.

Applying the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility, the court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to significant memory gaps regarding the alleged incidents and subsequent disclosures.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code arising from a video recording showing an embrace and kiss between the accused and an underage complainant.

The trial judge rejected defences of mistaken belief in age, non‑sexual conduct, and lack of identity.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge made no error regarding the mistaken belief defence or identification evidence, but erred in law in concluding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the kiss was of a sexual nature.

Applying the objective test in R. v. Chase, the court held the interaction could reasonably be interpreted as a non‑sexual greeting in the circumstances.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assaulting a peace officer contrary to s. 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged findings that the police officer had been invited into the residence, had no legal obligation to state the purpose of attendance before entry, and was lawfully executing his duties when arresting individuals for trespassing.

The appellant also argued that the Trespass to Property Act did not apply on reserve lands and that the officer’s authority ended once consent to remain was withdrawn.

The court held that the officer had been invited into the home, that no legal requirement existed to disclose the purpose of attendance before entry, and that the Trespass to Property Act applied as provincial legislation of general application.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or legal error, the court dismissed the appeal.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

He possessed 535 images and 31 pornographic digital movies depicting the sexual abuse of pre-pubescent children.

The Crown sought a reformatory term while the defence sought the 45-day minimum sentence to be served intermittently.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by two years probation, a 10-year Section 161 order, DNA sampling, and 20-year Sexual Offender Information Registry placement.

The court found that the minimum sentence was inappropriate given the gravity of the offence and the accused's lack of insight into the seriousness of his conduct.

The accused was charged with luring a child for a sexual purpose contrary to section 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown amended the charge during trial to section 172.1(1)(b).

The accused communicated with two young complainants via Facebook and text messages, sending sexually explicit messages and a photograph of his genitals.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, having proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally communicated by computer with persons he knew to be under the age of fourteen for the specific purpose of facilitating the commission of a sexual offence.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple offences involving child pornography possession and distribution, possession of stolen photographs of children, sexual interference with his young niece, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day for the child pornography charges (joint submission), followed by two and a half years consecutive for sexual interference (with credit for pre-trial custody), with concurrent sentences on the remaining charges.

Ancillary orders included DNA sampling, firearm prohibition, sex offender registry compliance, and restrictions on contact with minors.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether their trial should be heard by a judge rather than a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the statute recognizes complex cases may be heard by a judge, it does not require it, making the decision a matter of discretion.

The court found no reviewable error in the lower courts' decisions.

The applicant sought an adjournment of her Employment Standards Act review hearing because she suffered an anxiety attack and was unable to attend.

The responding employer opposed the adjournment, noting it had flown a witness from the USA and was ready to proceed.

The Board granted the adjournment, noting the applicant's history of anxiety, but directed her to provide a medical note confirming her incapacity and ordered the parties to exchange documents prior to the rescheduled hearing.

The applicant employee sought a review of an Employment Standards Officer's decision not to issue an Order to Pay against the employer.

The employee claimed unpaid wages based on an alleged promised salary increase, unpaid banked time, and mileage reimbursement.

The Board dismissed the claim for the salary increase, finding insufficient evidence of a firm promise.

The Board allowed the claim for 11.5 hours of unpaid banked time based on the employer's own records.

The claim for mileage was dismissed as it is excluded from the statutory definition of wages.

The employer was ordered to pay $177.79 for the banked time.

The applicant, a worker co-chair of the joint health and safety committee, appealed an inspector's decision not to issue an order against the employer under section 53 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The employer had shut down an Acid Drying Tower due to operational issues but did not report this as a 'failure' to the committee.

The Board dismissed the appeal, finding that while reporting requirements should be interpreted broadly, a 'failure' under section 53 only requires reporting if it presents a risk to worker health and safety.

Since the tower's operational problem posed no immediate safety risk until it was opened for repairs—at which point other safety regulations applied—the employer was not obliged to report it under section 53.

The applicant appealed an Employment Standards Officer's denial of her claim for unpaid commissions.

The employer failed to appear at the hearing and had previously failed to produce records.

Based on the applicant's uncontradicted and credible testimony regarding her commission structure and past earnings, the Board found she was entitled to $1,400.00 in unpaid commissions for the period of April 1, 1997 to September 17, 1997.

The Order to Pay was amended accordingly.

The applicant appealed an Employment Standards Officer's assessment regarding unpaid wages and overtime.

The applicant argued that her time cards were altered, she did not receive 15-minute unpaid breaks, and a room and board refund should not be considered wages.

The Board found that the time cards were altered and the applicant did not receive breaks, adding hours to her assessment.

However, the Board agreed with the Officer that the room and board refund fell within the definition of wages.

The employer was ordered to pay the applicant $275.48 in unpaid wages and vacation pay.

The employer appealed an Order to Pay under the Employment Standards Act.

The employer's counsel sent a letter the day before the hearing requesting an adjournment, claiming they were unaware of the hearing date.

However, no one appeared on behalf of the employer at the hearing to speak to the adjournment request.

The Board noted that notice of the hearing had been sent a month prior to both the employer and its counsel.

Given the length of time the matter had been ongoing and the failure to appear, the Board denied the adjournment request, dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the Order to Pay.