Ranjan Das

The appellant commenced an action in 1998 relating to a property transaction in Venezuela.

By 2014, the action had not proceeded to trial.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay, finding the 16-year delay to be inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial, particularly given that two principal defendants had died.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the delay met the test for dismissal and that the civil justice system will no longer tolerate such inordinate and inexplicable delay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

At a contested status hearing, the plaintiff was required to show cause why its commercial lease dispute action should not be dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14(13).

The court applied the conjunctive test from Khan, finding the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The action was allowed to continue, and the registrar was ordered not to dismiss the action without further order of the court.

The moving defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The action, commenced in 1998, alleged a fraudulent conveyance of property in Venezuela.

Over 16 years, the plaintiff failed to answer undertakings, delayed serving expert reports, and failed to set the matter down for trial in a timely manner.

During this time, two key defendants died and another suffered serious health issues.

The court found the delay to be inordinate and inexcusable, and that the defendants suffered actual prejudice.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed against the moving defendants.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondents sought costs.

One respondent failed to bring a costs outline to the hearing as required by Rule 57.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and subsequently claimed an amount three times higher than initially estimated.

The court penalized this non-compliance by awarding costs limited to the amount the appellant had estimated in its own costs outline.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion for leave to amend its Statement of Defence and to commence a cross-claim and counterclaim.

The proposed amendments alleged that a settlement agreement between the plaintiff and other defendants constituted a breach of a prior agreement.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the Master correctly concluded the proposed amendments were not tenable in law based on a review of the settlement agreement.

The moving parties sought costs following two motions attacking an amended statement of defence and counterclaim.

Success was divided on the motion to strike portions of the defence, resulting in no costs for that motion.

However, the moving parties were completely successful in having the counterclaim struck out, although with leave to amend.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01(1), including the $4,000,000 damages claim, the respondents’ conduct in ignoring a judicial warning and amending pleadings late while maintaining offending allegations, and reputational implications for the lawyer defendants.

Costs of $5,000 all inclusive were awarded for the successful motion to strike the counterclaim.

The plaintiff and defendants by counterclaim brought a motion to strike portions of an Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on the basis that certain allegations were irrelevant, frivolous, or disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court struck paragraphs relating to a separate incident and repetitive descriptions of the parties’ physical attributes.

Allegations concerning the prior relationship between the parties and statements about the plaintiff’s employment with his lawyer were permitted to remain because they responded to issues raised in the statement of claim.

The court held that lawyers acting for a party do not owe a duty of care to opposing parties, and therefore claims against the plaintiff’s counsel and her law firm in their professional capacity could not stand.

The counterclaim was struck out with leave to amend.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the defendants’ counterclaim alleging malicious prosecution, unlawful interference with economic relations, and various claims for damages arising from an earlier injunction and the termination of a referral relationship.

The court held that the defendants failed to establish the elements required for malicious prosecution, particularly malice, and that the inclusion of parties in civil litigation was insufficient to ground such a claim.

Claims for intentional or unlawful interference with economic relations also failed because the evidence did not demonstrate an intention by the plaintiffs to cause economic harm.

The court further found that damages related to the interim injunction should be pursued through enforcement of the undertaking for damages rather than by counterclaim.

Partial summary judgment was granted dismissing most of the counterclaim, with leave granted to amend the counterclaim to seek damages tied specifically to the injunction period.

Following dismissal of a motion brought by a defendant, the court addressed the costs of the motion.

The responding parties sought partial indemnity costs, including a substantial claim by certain defendants who had not delivered a costs outline at the hearing as required by Rule 57.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that failure to provide a costs outline does not automatically bar recovery of costs because s.131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act preserves judicial discretion.

However, the absence of a timely costs outline and the excessive amount claimed justified a significant reduction.

The court fixed costs payable to one set of defendants at $4,000 and to the plaintiff at $2,500.

The defendants brought a motion seeking production of the plaintiff’s former counsel’s litigation file, including time dockets, and an order requiring the plaintiff’s witnesses to re-attend cross-examinations in relation to a pending motion alleging that the action had previously been settled.

The defendants argued that references in the plaintiff’s affidavits waived privilege over the lawyer’s file.

The court held that the affidavits merely described the plaintiff’s settlement position and instructions to counsel and did not constitute a waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

While time dockets may in principle be producible subject to redactions for legal advice, the court found the additional dockets sought were not relevant to the issue of whether the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement.

The motion for production and continued cross-examinations was dismissed.

Following a lengthy condominium dispute trial involving claims of solicitor negligence, construction defects, and condominium governance issues, the court addressed the allocation of costs among multiple parties.

The plaintiff succeeded against the solicitor defendant but failed against several other defendants, including the condominium corporation and property management company.

Applying the principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court assessed reasonable expectations, proportionality, litigation conduct, and Rule 49 settlement offers.

The court issued a Sanderson order requiring the negligent solicitor defendant to pay the costs of the successful condominium defendant, while also apportioning part of the successful property manager’s costs between the plaintiff and the solicitor defendant.

Substantial costs awards were fixed reflecting the complexity and length of the litigation.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to remove and replace the administrator of a condominium corporation.

The applicant argued the motion judge erred in principle in applying the test for replacing an administrator under the Condominium Act.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting she had properly assessed the evidence and applied the correct test.

The court also found the matter did not transcend the interests of the parties.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following the release of an endorsement in this appeal, the parties sought clarification regarding paragraph two and the disposition of costs for the proceedings below and the motion for leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal clarified that paragraph two applied only to respondents who advanced claims against the appellant in the 2006 action.

The court remitted the issue of costs for the proceedings below to the motion judge, as other parties not involved in the appeal had participated and could be affected.

The court ordered no costs for the two earlier motions in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed an order striking his counterclaim in a 2008 action.

The respondents had previously brought a 2006 action against the appellant, which was settled.

The respondents then brought the 2008 action under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, advancing overlapping claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant's counterclaim did not attempt to relitigate the 2006 action, but rather sought to prevent the relitigation of the settled claims.

The order striking the counterclaim was set aside.

The respondent applied to enforce an arbitrator's award, which the appellant did not oppose.

Instead, the appellant brought a counter-application seeking to remit the matter to the arbitrator to deal with alleged contempt of a confidentiality order and for mandatory injunctive relief.

The application judge allowed the application and dismissed the counter-application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants, directors of a preservation society, appealed a non-party costs award of $105,852.14 made against them personally following an unsuccessful application regarding the use of church lands and trust funds.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge did not err in concluding the litigation was not public interest litigation, he erred in awarding costs personally against the directors.

The Court held that the directors did not stand to gain personally, were not acting to vindicate a private interest, and did not receive adequate warning that costs would be sought against them personally.

The appeal was allowed and the personal costs order was set aside.

The respondent sued the appellant lawyer and law firm for breach of trust, alleging they paid loan funds out of their trust account without her authorization.

The respondent had provided a collateral mortgage on her home as secondary security for a loan to a company owned by her children.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for breach of trust.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that because the respondent's mortgage was collateral and secondary, the loan funds were advanced to the primary borrower.

The law firm properly held the funds in trust for the primary borrower and paid them out on its instructions.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision forbidding the implementation of a finger scan system for checking employees in and out of the workplace.

The employer argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction and the decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the employer had conceded jurisdiction before the arbitrator and that the arbitrator's balancing of the employer's interests against the employees' privacy interests was not patently unreasonable.

The plaintiff, Tarion Warranty Corporation, brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision that denied its motion to strike the defendants' pleadings under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court found that Tarion had chosen to enter into a contractual relationship with the guarantors, exposing itself to contractual remedies.

Applying the high threshold for striking pleadings, the court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's reluctance to strike the claim at this stage.

The motion for leave to appeal was denied.

The appellant landlord appealed a jury award of punitive damages arising from its continuing failure to maintain and repair the respondent's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury properly identified an independent actionable wrong based on the landlord's highly reprehensible conduct.

The respondent's cross-appeal on costs was allowed, as the trial judge erred in failing to apply Rule 49.10 after the judgment exceeded the respondent's offer to settle.

The respondent was awarded substantial indemnity costs for the trial and costs of the appeal.