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Motion to strike granted as claims regarding removal from cabinet and caucus are non-justiciable.
The plaintiff, a former Member of Parliament and cabinet minister, sued the prime minister, his senior advisors, and others for conspiracy, defamation, and other torts following her removal from cabinet and the Conservative Party caucus.
The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim.
The court granted the motion, finding that the decisions to remove the plaintiff from cabinet and caucus were protected by Crown prerogative and parliamentary privilege, respectively, and were therefore not justiciable.
The court also held that communications between the prime minister and his advisors were protected by absolute privilege, and that the Conservative Party of Canada, as an unincorporated association, lacked the capacity to be sued.
Court orders further disclosure and permits counterclaim amendment; summary judgment motion dismissed.
The defendant brought a motion seeking further and better disclosure from the plaintiff, directions regarding a prior production order, and leave to amend its defence and counterclaim to include a defamation claim against the plaintiff and an additional party.
The plaintiff brought a competing motion seeking to strike the defence for non-compliance with a previous order, additional production including distribution agreements and accounting authorizations, and summary judgment dismissing the counterclaim.
The court ordered additional disclosure from the plaintiff subject to confidentiality but declined to require certain disproportionate productions, including telephone and email purchase requests.
Requests by the plaintiff for distribution agreements and direct communication with the defendant’s accountants were dismissed as unnecessary or premature.
Leave to amend the defence and counterclaim was granted and the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion was dismissed without prejudice pending completion of disclosure and discoveries.
Certiorari denied; evidence supported treating RFP procurement as bids under Competition Act.
Multiple applicants charged with bid‑rigging under s. 47(2) of the Competition Act and conspiracy under s. 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code sought certiorari to quash their committal for trial following a preliminary inquiry.
They argued that the government Requests for Proposals used to procure information technology services merely created standing offers or pre‑qualification lists and therefore could not constitute “calls for bids or tenders” within the meaning of the Competition Act.
The court reviewed the Contract A/Contract B tendering framework and relevant procurement jurisprudence, emphasizing that the existence of a bidding contract depends on the parties’ intention to create binding rights and obligations.
It held that there was some evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the RFP process created contractual relations sufficient to constitute bids or tenders, even though the government retained discretion not to award work.
The application to quash the committal was therefore dismissed.
Foreign affiants ordered cross‑examined by video conference rather than in‑person.
The plaintiff brought a motion seeking an order compelling foreign affiants of the defendants to attend in Ottawa or London, England for cross‑examination on affidavits filed in support of a forum non conveniens motion.
The defendants opposed the request and proposed that the cross‑examinations occur by video conference from Iraq, noting that they had not attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court.
Applying Rule 34.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the governing “just and convenient” test for examinations of persons residing outside Ontario, the court held there is no presumption for or against video conferencing.
Considering proportionality, travel costs, logistical challenges, and modern availability of technology, the court determined that video conferencing was the most appropriate method.
The motion was dismissed and the cross‑examinations were ordered to proceed by video conference, with arrangements and initial costs divided between the parties.
Interlocutory injunction enforcing distribution agreement refused for lack of irreparable harm.
The defendant manufacturer brought a motion seeking relief from an earlier consent arrangement requiring it to maintain an exclusive distribution agreement with the plaintiff distributor pending further court order.
The court interpreted the earlier arrangement as permitting the matter to be brought back before the court and considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction to maintain the agreement until trial.
Applying the test from R.J.R. MacDonald v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that although there were triable issues regarding the duration and alleged breaches of the agreement, the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm and the balance of convenience did not favour injunctive relief.
The court emphasized that enforcing exclusive distribution agreements through injunctions can require ongoing judicial supervision of deteriorating commercial relationships.
The request for an interlocutory injunction was refused, though the agreement was temporarily maintained for 60 days to allow the distributor to transition its business.
Appeal from refusal to enforce letters rogatory dismissed; necessity and unavailability of evidence not established.
The appellant appealed an order refusing to enforce letters rogatory from California that would have required the respondents to be examined under oath in Ontario.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the appellant failed to establish the necessity of the examinations or that the evidence was not otherwise obtainable.
Motions by both parties to introduce fresh evidence were dismissed, as the evidence was peripheral and not capable of affecting the outcome.
The appeal was dismissed with costs.