Peter Keen

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with murder, sought to relitigate a pre-trial ruling that found his police statement voluntary.

The original trial judge retired before the trial commenced, and the accused argued the new trial judge was not bound by the previous ruling under the Criminal Code.

The court held that the situation was analogous to rulings made by a case management judge or after a mistrial, where previous rulings remain binding unless it is in the interests of justice to relitigate.

Finding no new evidence or change in circumstances, the court dismissed the application and upheld the voluntariness ruling.

The accused applied pre‑trial for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code and, in the alternative, leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b).

The applications were based on historical publicity relating to the accused’s prior murder conviction more than 25 years earlier in the same district.

The court held that dated and limited media coverage did not establish a reasonable likelihood that the accused could not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury in the local venue.

The accused also failed to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality across the jury district.

Both the change of venue and challenge for cause applications were dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, brought a pre-trial application challenging the representativeness of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll under ss. 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

They argued the state failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain source lists and deliver jury notices to on-reserve First Nations residents.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework in Kokopenace, the court reviewed the state's efforts, including the creation of an Aboriginal Jury Coordinator position, pilot projects offering compensation to bands for lists and delivery, and follow-ups on returned mail.

The court found that the state made reasonable efforts and provided a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate, dismissing the application.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the offence through evidence of the accused's erratic driving, a roadside stop, and breathalyzer readings of 147 and 133 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

However, the defence raised evidence of dissociative fugue and dissociative amnesia, supported by expert psychiatric testimony.

The court found that while the accused committed the physical act of driving, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the accused possessed the mens rea required for conviction, as the evidence suggested the accused may have been in a dissociative fugue state during the incident and was unaware of his actions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found in a vehicle stuck in snow in a private driveway with signs of impairment.

The defence conceded that all technical requirements of both charges were met and raised the defence of necessity, arguing the accused drove while impaired to locate and assist an intoxicated co-worker who had left the cabin in cold weather.

The court found no air of reality to the necessity defence, as there was no imminent peril, reasonable alternatives existed (such as walking), and the harm of impaired driving outweighed any speculative harm to the co-worker.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference with a minor, breaking and entering, and three counts of failure to comply with undertaking conditions.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on the sexual assault charge.

The central issue was consent.

The complainant, a 15-year-old girl, was highly intoxicated and largely unconscious when the accused engaged in sexual intercourse with her, including anal intercourse.

The accused admitted the sexual contact occurred but claimed the complainant consented.

The court found the complainant incapable of consenting due to her extreme intoxication and unconsciousness, and that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

A youth charged with sexual assault and criminal negligence causing death pleaded guilty to both offences.

The Crown sought an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing the offences were sufficiently serious.

The court considered psychiatric evidence, a pre-sentence report, victim impact statements, and the youth's background.

The court rejected the Crown's application for an adult sentence, finding that the presumption of diminished moral responsibility had not been rebutted and that a youth sentence was appropriate and sufficient for accountability.

The accused was charged with breach of recognizance for failing to comply with a condition not to communicate directly or indirectly with staff of the Ignace School.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of an IP address obtained from Facebook as proof that threatening messages were sent from the accused's residence.

The central issue was the admissibility of the IP address evidence, which was initially challenged as hearsay.

The court initially found the Crown had not established necessity and reliability on the voir dire.

However, after the Crown obtained an affidavit from a Facebook records custodian confirming the IP address was stored electronically and contemporaneously with the message, the court found the evidence admissible as a business record under the Canada Evidence Act and common law.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The respondent argued the appeal was not properly constituted because the notice of appeal had not been served within the required time.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal where service of the notice of appeal occurred after the prescribed period and the Crown sought retroactive validation of the service.

Applying authorities governing extension of time and service requirements, the court held that service out of time could not be ratified nunc pro tunc and that proper service is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.

As the Crown had not obtained an order extending time prior to service and failed to justify the delay under the applicable factors, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Following earlier reasons concerning forfeiture of firearms and related items seized during a criminal investigation, defence counsel sought clarification and correction of the disposition of certain exhibits.

The issues included replacement of seized dynamite, correction of exhibit classifications in the forfeiture schedule, return of items characterized as silencers or flash suppressors, and return of auxiliary equipment and personal property.

The court held that although generally functus officio after issuing its reasons, it retained jurisdiction to correct accidental slips or omissions in the schedule.

The court amended the schedule to correct the classification of certain items held in trust but declined to order the return or replacement of dynamite or most silencers due to insufficient evidentiary foundation.

Orders were made confirming the return of auxiliary firearm accessories and other seized non‑forfeited property.

The court determined a forfeiture application under section 491(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following firearms convictions.

It held forfeiture was warranted for most seized firearms and for ammunition that was actually in improperly loaded firearms.

The court rejected a broad constitutional challenge to mandatory forfeiture on these facts, while recognizing that property-right concerns and due process principles can constrain application in proper cases.

It found no basis to forfeit ammunition that was merely readily available to unloaded firearms where both were stored in a locked room compliant with the storage regulation.

A disposition order issued in accordance with Schedule 1, with substantial forfeiture but targeted exemptions and transfers.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child.

The case turned primarily on the credibility of the complainant, who alleged multiple acts of penetration and sexual touching while staying overnight at a residence where the accused lived.

Despite several inconsistencies between the complainant’s trial testimony and earlier statements to police and at the preliminary inquiry, the court found the inconsistencies did not undermine the essential allegation of sexual assault.

The judge relied on principles governing the assessment of child witnesses and accepted corroborative evidence of prior inappropriate conduct and surrounding circumstances.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code and the sexual interference charge was stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with eleven counts of assault, sexual assault, pointing a firearm, and unlawful confinement spanning from 1986 to 1994, all allegedly committed against the same victim.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, with limited corroborating medical evidence.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court applied the R. v. W(D) test and found that while the complainant's evidence was presented, the Crown failed to prove each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the accused's testimony equally believable and noted significant gaps in corroborating evidence, including incomplete medical records and the passage of time affecting memory.

All charges resulted in acquittals.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs. per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The charges arose from a motor vehicle stop on January 17, 2011 in Sioux Lookout, Ontario.

The court found the accused guilty on both charges based on evidence of impaired driving indicators and breath sample analysis showing blood alcohol levels of 129 mgs. and 125 mgs. per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court rejected the accused's explanations for her behaviour and found no Charter breach regarding detention or the taking of breath samples.