Peter Keen

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the accused following his guilty plea to possession of weapons dangerous to the public peace and three counts of uttering threats.

The accused initially opposed the application but changed his position mid-hearing and consented to being declared a dangerous offender.

The court found that the accused's conduct, which began as an apparent suicide attempt but escalated into threatening behaviour toward police officers, constituted a predicate offence under the Criminal Code.

The court considered the accused's extensive criminal history including 34 prior convictions, pattern of threats, and psychiatric assessments indicating high risk of future offending.

The court declared the accused a dangerous offender and imposed a 6-year determinate sentence plus a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Following a judge-alone sexual assault trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented to admitted sexual touching.

The court applied the W. (D.) framework, scrutinized inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, and considered deleted WhatsApp messages, a torn bra, missing glasses, and post-incident communications.

Although the complainant had deleted some messages and denied doing so, the court found the corroborative features of her account more consistent with a non-consensual assault than with the accused’s version.

The Crown proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, both causing bodily harm.

The Crown and defence agreed that the only issue was whether the Crown could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the motor vehicle.

The accused was found in the front seat of a vehicle that had collided with a tree.

Two other occupants were also in the vehicle.

The court found that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver and entered an acquittal on both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, failure to provide a breath sample, criminal harassment, breach of undertaking, and assault.

The accused pleaded guilty to failure to provide a breath sample and breach of undertaking.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge.

At trial, the court found the accused guilty of assault but acquitted on the criminal harassment charge.

The court found that while the accused threw a water bottle at the complainant during a custody dispute, the subsequent confrontation at a hotel parking lot did not constitute criminal harassment directed at the complainant, as the actions were directed at third parties and the complainant had no direct knowledge of the confrontation.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

At trial, the accused successfully raised the defence of non-mental disorder automatism, specifically dissociative fugue.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by requiring the Crown to disprove the automatism defence beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than requiring the accused to prove it on a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal was overturned, and a conviction was entered for impaired driving, with a stay on the over 80 charge.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application against the respondent, an Indigenous man convicted of sexual assault.

The respondent had a lengthy criminal record involving 18 violent offences over nearly 30 years.

The court considered Gladue factors but found the respondent's severe childhood trauma did not mitigate the high risk of future violent and sexual re-offending.

The court declared the respondent a dangerous offender based on a pattern of persistent aggressive behaviour and imposed an indeterminate sentence, finding that lesser measures would not adequately protect the public.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant testified that she did not consent to sexual intercourse with the accused, who was her former partner.

The accused claimed the sexual intercourse was consensual.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence that she did not consent, finding that she repeatedly expressed her unwillingness, remained silent and passive throughout the encounter, and immediately reported the incident to her family and police.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable and inconsistent, noting his admission of making false statements to police and his evasive responses during cross-examination.

DNA evidence confirmed the accused's presence.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, and attempting to choke, suffocate, or strangle the complainant during a sexual assault.

The case turned on credibility between the complainant and the accused.

The court applied the framework from R. v. W.(D.) and rejected the accused’s account as internally and externally inconsistent and incompatible with the medical evidence.

Extensive medical and expert evidence established severe strangulation injuries, including ligature marks, petechiae, and subconjunctival hemorrhaging, consistent with the complainant’s testimony that she was strangled while sexually assaulted.

The court found the complainant credible and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed aggravated sexual assault that endangered her life.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the death of Frank Lawson (aka Kwandibens) after initially being charged with second-degree murder.

The incident occurred during a drinking party in a remote First Nations community when the accused, carrying a paring knife for cutting moose meat, stabbed the deceased once in the chest after being pushed to the ground.

The accused immediately expressed remorse, called emergency services, and confessed to police.

The court imposed a sentence of six years imprisonment less time served (approximately twelve months on an enhanced basis), resulting in a net sentence of five years, applying Gladue considerations regarding the accused's history of abuse, substance abuse issues, and the systemic factors affecting Aboriginal offenders in remote communities.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with murder, sought to relitigate a pre-trial ruling that found his police statement voluntary.

The original trial judge retired before the trial commenced, and the accused argued the new trial judge was not bound by the previous ruling under the Criminal Code.

The court held that the situation was analogous to rulings made by a case management judge or after a mistrial, where previous rulings remain binding unless it is in the interests of justice to relitigate.

Finding no new evidence or change in circumstances, the court dismissed the application and upheld the voluntariness ruling.

The accused applied pre‑trial for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code and, in the alternative, leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b).

The applications were based on historical publicity relating to the accused’s prior murder conviction more than 25 years earlier in the same district.

The court held that dated and limited media coverage did not establish a reasonable likelihood that the accused could not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury in the local venue.

The accused also failed to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality across the jury district.

Both the change of venue and challenge for cause applications were dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, brought a pre-trial application challenging the representativeness of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll under ss. 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

They argued the state failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain source lists and deliver jury notices to on-reserve First Nations residents.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework in Kokopenace, the court reviewed the state's efforts, including the creation of an Aboriginal Jury Coordinator position, pilot projects offering compensation to bands for lists and delivery, and follow-ups on returned mail.

The court found that the state made reasonable efforts and provided a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate, dismissing the application.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the offence through evidence of the accused's erratic driving, a roadside stop, and breathalyzer readings of 147 and 133 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

However, the defence raised evidence of dissociative fugue and dissociative amnesia, supported by expert psychiatric testimony.

The court found that while the accused committed the physical act of driving, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the accused possessed the mens rea required for conviction, as the evidence suggested the accused may have been in a dissociative fugue state during the incident and was unaware of his actions.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit and impaired driving contrary to sections 253(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's evidence established that the accused was found in a vehicle stuck in snow in a private driveway with signs of impairment.

The defence conceded that all technical requirements of both charges were met and raised the defence of necessity, arguing the accused drove while impaired to locate and assist an intoxicated co-worker who had left the cabin in cold weather.

The court found no air of reality to the necessity defence, as there was no imminent peril, reasonable alternatives existed (such as walking), and the harm of impaired driving outweighed any speculative harm to the co-worker.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assaulting a peace officer contrary to s. 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged findings that the police officer had been invited into the residence, had no legal obligation to state the purpose of attendance before entry, and was lawfully executing his duties when arresting individuals for trespassing.

The appellant also argued that the Trespass to Property Act did not apply on reserve lands and that the officer’s authority ended once consent to remain was withdrawn.

The court held that the officer had been invited into the home, that no legal requirement existed to disclose the purpose of attendance before entry, and that the Trespass to Property Act applied as provincial legislation of general application.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or legal error, the court dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference with a minor, breaking and entering, and three counts of failure to comply with undertaking conditions.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on the sexual assault charge.

The central issue was consent.

The complainant, a 15-year-old girl, was highly intoxicated and largely unconscious when the accused engaged in sexual intercourse with her, including anal intercourse.

The accused admitted the sexual contact occurred but claimed the complainant consented.

The court found the complainant incapable of consenting due to her extreme intoxication and unconsciousness, and that the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

Mid-trial, the co-accused obtained new counsel and pled guilty to manslaughter, agreeing to provide a statement and potentially testify against the applicant.

The applicant sought a mistrial, arguing the Crown's acceptance of the plea was a strategic abuse of process to secure testimony and that the new statement constituted late disclosure prejudicing his defence.

The court dismissed the application, finding no abuse of process in the Crown's plea negotiations and concluding that the applicant's ability to cross-examine the co-accused mitigated any prejudice from the late disclosure.

A mistrial was not necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

During a homicide trial, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine a witness on a prior videotaped statement to police after she claimed to have no memory of the events or the statement.

The Crown also sought to admit the statement for the truth of its contents under the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that despite the lack of an oath and the witness's intoxication, the videotaped nature of the statement and the opportunity for cross-examination provided sufficient threshold reliability.

The statement was admitted into evidence.