Court File and Parties

Date: September 11, 2025

In the Matter of:

The Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8
The Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33

Between:

The Corporation of the City of Brampton, Prosecutor
Rimpaldeep Singh, Defendant

Ontario Court of Justice Brampton, Ontario

Before: Quon J.P.

Ruling on Prosecution Motion to Amend The Two Informations and Reasons for Judgment

Charges

Section 200(1)(a) H.T.A. – "fail to remain"
Section 200(1)(a) H.T.A. – "fail to remain"

Ex parte Trial held: July 22, 2025

Ruling on Motion and Judgment rendered: September 11, 2025

Counsel

J. De Falco, Prosecutor
Rimpaldeep Singh (failed to appear for trial and trial proceeded on an ex parte basis)

Cases Considered or Referred To

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited

Exhibits Entered

Exhibit "1" - Two still photographs of Daniel Viveiros' brother, Daniel Viveiros' mother (first photograph) and of Daniel Viveiros (second photograph) taken from a body-worn camera on March 15, 2024, when a Peel Regional Police Officer attended Daniel Viveiros' residence (2 pages).

Exhibit "2" - Photograph of the driver's licence of the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, taken by Officer Tyson Riley on May 19, 2024, at 4:06 a.m., when Officer Riley obtained the driver's licence from the driver of a black-coloured Chrysler 300 with licence plate number "CZWD900" (1 page).

Exhibit "3" - Certified document from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Ministry of Transportation dated July 22, 2025, of a licence plate search of "CZWD900", which indicates that Rimpaldeep Singh had been the registered owner of a 2012 black-coloured Chrysler motor vehicle with licence plate number "CZWD900" and V.I.N 2C3CCAAG9CH108255 on March 14, 2024. The address for Rimpaldeep Singh is indicated as "121 CHURCHILL AVE, S STE MARIE, ON P6C 2P9" (4 pages).

Exhibit "4" - Certified document from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Ministry of Transportation dated July 22, 2025, of a V.I.N. search of 2C3CCAAG9CH108255, which indicates that Rimpaldeep Singh is the registered owner of a 2012 black-coloured Chrysler motor vehicle with V.I.N 2C3CCAAG9CH108255 on March 14, 2024. The address for Rimpaldeep Singh is indicated as "121 CHURCHILL AVE, S STE MARIE, ON P6C 2P9" (2 pages).

Exhibit "5" - Certified document from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Ministry of Transportation dated July 22, 2025, of Rimpaldeep Singh's driving abstract, entered as evidence for the purposes of proving the date of birth, address, and category of licence only of Rimpaldeep Singh, and indicates that Rimpaldeep Singh has driver's licence number R4445-00009-80725 and is classified as a G2 licence holder and that his date of birth is July 25, 1998 (4 pages).

1. INTRODUCTION

[1] The Provincial Offences Court has broad powers to amend an information containing regulatory charges at any time during the trial. These statutory powers are provided for under s. 34 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 ("P.O.A."). This amendment power arises from the modern principle that substance trumps over form and that charges should not be automatically dismissed or quashed because of an error or omission in the legal process, but instead they should be considered or adjudicated on their merits. However, an application to amend an information should only be granted when the proposed amendment will not cause prejudice to the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and that it will also not be unjust in the circumstances regarding the merits of the case for the court to make the amendment.

[2] For the present matter, which is in the context of an ex parte trial of regulatory offences laid under Ontario's Highway Traffic Act, in which five prosecution witnesses had testified, the prosecution had brought an application under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. to amend the "dates" and "locations" of the two "fail to remain" offences set out in two separate Part III informations during the prosecution's closing submissions, to comport with the evidence adduced at trial. Ergo, the key issue to decide is whether it would be unfair to the defendant for the court to amend the two statements of the two offences set out in their respective informations to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial when the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had not been present to respond or make submissions in respect to the prosecution's motion to amend the two informations. Moreover, in regards to what type of averments which set out or describe the offence in an information that could be amended without causing prejudice, it has been expressed under s. 34(3) of the P.O.A. and also held by various courts, that the variation between the information and the evidence disclosed at trial of the "time" when an offence has occurred or a variation of the location or "place" of where the offence has occurred is in principle not material, unless they are essential elements of the offence that are required to be proven by the prosecution.

[3] The ex parte trial of the two Part III "fail to remain" charges laid against the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, under s. 200(1)(a) of Ontario's Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8 ("H.T.A."), was held on July 22, 2025, on an ex parte basis as the defendant did not appear for trial. Moreover, the defendant has never made an appearance in the Provincial Offences Court in Brampton on any previous court dates even though he had been personally served with two summonses by the Peel Regional Police on May 19, 2024, to initially appear in court on September 26, 2024, to answer to those two "fail to remain" charges. The defendant's ex parte trial held on July 22, 2025, had been set down and scheduled on May 27, 2025, which is a little more than 12 months after he had been personally served with two summonses and commanded to first appear in court to answer to the two "fail to remain" charges.

[4] The trial of these two "fail to remain" offences did not turn into a straightforward ex parte trial as the question to be decided is whether the prosecution's application during closing submissions to amend the two informations under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A., should be granted so that the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences would comport with the actual evidence given at trial. Both the two summonses served on the defendant and the two informations which had commenced on June 10, 2024 and September 18, 2024, respectively, for the two "fail to remain" offences had stated that the offences had occurred on May 19, 2024, at 4:06 a.m., on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton. However, the evidence adduced at trial had disclosed that one of the "fail to remain" offences involving the defendant had actually occurred on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in Brampton while the second "fail to remain" offence involving the defendant had in fact occurred on April 16, 2024, in the area of Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton. None of the evidence adduced at trial had disclosed that a "fail to remain" offence involving the defendant had occurred on May 19, 2024, on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton at approximately 4:06 a.m. On the other hand, the evidence disclosed at trial did indicate that the defendant had been stopped and investigated on May 19, 2024, on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton at approximately 4:06 a.m. and that he had been subsequently served with the two summonses to appear in the Provincial Offences Court for those two "fail to remain" offences that had occurred on earlier dates and that had been investigated by police officers of the Peel Regional Police prior to May 19, 2024. Moreover, the evidence at trial also indicated that Officer Riley of the Peel Regional Police had charged the defendant on May 19, 2024, with committing the regulatory offences of "driving while under suspension" and for "owner operate motor vehicle on a highway without insurance". However, the "driving while under suspension" and the "owner operate motor vehicle on a highway without insurance" charges were subsequently withdrawn by the prosecution on the day of trial.

[5] Furthermore, five witnesses had testified in the ex parte trial held on July 22, 2025, and their uncontradicted testimony had established that there were actually four separate motor vehicle accidents or collisions that had occurred on two separate dates, which had involved a 2012 black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had been owned and registered in the defendant's name, and in which the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had unlawfully failed to remain or immediately return to the scene of those four accidents. The two dates when the two "fail to remain" offences had actually occurred had been established by the witnesses' testimony for the dates of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024.

Factual Background

Summary of Proceedings

[16] The evidence presented at the Part III ex parte trial held on July 22, 2025, for the two "fail to remain" charges indicated that the defendant had been involved in four separate motor vehicle accidents or collisions with other motor vehicles or with a tree, and that had also damaged the landscaping on a residential property, and that he had also failed to remain at the scene of these four accidents or collisions and had intentionally left the scene of all four accident locations without exchanging information with the drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the motor vehicle collisions with the defendant's Chrysler 300 motor vehicle or with the property owner of the property that had been damaged by the defendant's Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900.

[17] In addition, two Part III informations had been filed with the Provincial Offences Court in Brampton and were commenced on June 10, 2024 and September 18, 2024, respectively, and the two summonses were confirmed by a judicial officer of the Ontario Court of Justice on June 10, 2024 and September 18, 2024, respectively, for the defendant to appear in the Brampton Provincial Offences Court on September 26, 2024, for both of the "fail to remain" charges. The defendant did not appear on September 26, 2024, nor did the defendant appear on the following scheduled ex parte trial dates of December 10, 2024, February 4, 2025, and May 27, 2025. Then on May 27, 2025, the defendant's two "fail to remain" charges were set down again for an ex parte trial to be held on July 22, 2025.

[18] The ex parte trial of the two "fail to remain" charges did commence on July 22, 2025. At the trial, five witnesses testified for the prosecution. They are, in the order that they testified:

Daniel Viveiros, a witness who had been in a motor vehicle eastbound on Sandalwood Parkway East and stopped for a red light when the defendant's Chrysler 300 motor vehicle collided with the rear end of Viveiros' motor vehicle;
Officer Dene Lepine, the Peel Regional Police Officer who investigated the fail to remain incidents that had occurred on April 16, 2024;
Tristan Sodoma, who heard the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle crash into a tree and then observed the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle drive over a neighbour's lawn after it had damaged the landscaping of a residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024, and then took a video of the licence plate on the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle using his cellphone and who then called 9-1-1 and then provided that video and licence plate number to the 9-1-1 operator;
Officer Zeljko Kukolic, a police officer from the Peel Regional Police Service, who personally served two summons on the defendant on May 19, 2024, for the two "fail to remain" charges;
Officer Tyson Riley, a police officer from the Peel Regional Police Service, who had taken a photograph of the defendant's driver's licence on May 19, 2024, and who had also charged the defendant with "driving while under suspension" and for "owner operate motor vehicle on a highway without insurance" on May 19, 2024 at approximately 4:06 a.m. at Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton.

[19] Furthermore, during closing submissions, the prosecution after being asked what evidence had been adduced at trial that had related to the two "fail to remain" charges for the date of May 14, 2025, then brought an application under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. to amend the dates and the locations of the two "fail to remain" charges on the two informations to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial and had submitted that there would be no prejudice to the defendant in amending the two informations, as the defendant did not appear for trial.

[20] After the prosecution's motion to amend the two informations and final submissions were completed, ruling on the prosecution's motions and judgment on the two "fail to remain" charges, if necessary, had then been reserved and adjourned to November 6, 2025, for judgment. However, the reasons on the motion and for judgment on the two "fail to remain" offences were ready to be released on September 11, 2025.

Summary of Testimony

[21] The following is a summary of the testimony given by the five prosecution witnesses who testified in the ex parte trial:

(1) Daniel Viveiros

[22] Daniel Viveiros testified in person in the courtroom. He said that in March of 2024, he had been driving his mother's 2024 Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle eastbound on Sandalwood Parkway East and had been on his way to his cousin's house. He also said that it had been raining. He then said that he had been stopped at a red light at a street that had contained the name with "Sun" in it. While he was waiting for the red light to change he said that he was rear-ended by a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Viveiros then said that he had put on his four-ways, but the driver of the Chrysler motor vehicle took off. In addition, he said that the whole rear bumper and the exhaust on his mother's Subaru motor vehicle had been damaged and that the trunk lid had to be replaced. As for his injuries, Viveiros said that he had to seek treatment from a chiropractor for soreness to his neck and back and that he had to undergo this treatment for a couple of months.

[23] Furthermore, Viveiros said he had been in the left lane at the time of the collision and had moved his mother's motor vehicle to the left shoulder so that he could exchange information with the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. However, instead of stopping and speaking with Viveiros, Viveiros said the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle took the opportunity when Viveiros had moved his car to the left shoulder to drive around Viveiros' Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle and then sped off down Sandalwood Parkway eastbound. Viveiros then said that he and another motorist then followed the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, which had been travelling at a fast speed. Viveiros also said the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle appeared to be lost and drove into a side street that dead-ended and where the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle eventually ended up back where Viveiros had been located. Viveiros said he then attempted to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving that location, but Viveiros said that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then drove into the front of Viveiros' motor vehicle and damaged the front of the Subaru motor vehicle, and then drove off again. Viveiros then said that the other motorist who had also been following the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then provided Viveiros with the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, which Viveiros then provided to the Peel Regional Police when he attended the police station located at the arena shortly after the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had collided with his vehicle a second time. Viveiros had also testified that the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that he had received from the other motorist, who had also followed the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, was "CZWD900".

[24] Viveiros also said the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle's windows were darkly tinted and that he had only saw one guy driving. He also said he did not get the best look of the driver, but did observe facial hair on the male driver.

[25] When shown the two still photographs (entered as Exhibit #1), Viveiros identified them as photographs of his mother, his brother, himself, and their house and identified the time stamps on the two photographs as March 15, 2024. He also said that he recalls that he had provided a statement to the police officer who had attended his house the next day after the day when the collision with the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had occurred.

[26] Moreover, Viveiros testified that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle never came back to where Viveiros was located after the two collisions had occurred between the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and his mother's Subaru motor vehicle.

[27] In addition, after Daniel Viveiros was recalled to the witness stand and shown the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh entered as Exhibit #2, Viveiros testified that the person he had observed driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had struck his mother's motor vehicle had appeared to have the same hair style as the person in that photograph and seemed like the person he had observed in the car.

(2) Officer Dene Lepine

[28] Officer Dene Lepine had testified in the trial in person. Officer Dene Lepine said that he had been assigned to investigate two "fail to remain" incidents that had occurred on April 16, 2024, that were close in time to each other and that had occurred approximately one kilometer apart from each other, and which he had been informed had involved a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number "CZWD900" that had occurred in the City of Brampton. Officer Lepine also said that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had first collided with a motor vehicle exiting a shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton and then drove northbound on Pertosa Drive where it then drove over a lawn of a residential property, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping of that property, which was located in the area of Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton.

[29] After interviewing witnesses and obtaining a description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and the name of the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900, and after obtaining the photograph of the driver's licence of the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from the Ministry of Transportation database, Officer Lepine testified that the description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle he had been provided with, by the motorist involved in the collision with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza, had matched the appearance and likeness of the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle.

[30] Officer Lepine also testified that before the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had driven over the lawn and damaged the landscaping of the residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent, the same black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had collided minutes earlier with another motor vehicle while the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had been exiting from a shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton. Officer Lepine also said he had been assigned to investigate the motor vehicle collision that occurred on April 16, 2024, at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive and the accident at the residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent. Officer Lepine further testified that a Mr. Ayan, the driver of the other motor vehicle involved in the collision with the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive, had described the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle as a South-Asian male person with a twisted moustache and who had spoken in the Punjabi language with Mr. Ayan briefly, without exchanging insurance information and driver's licences, and then got into his motor vehicle and drove away from the shopping plaza. In addition, Officer Lepine said that Mr. Ayan had then called 9-1-1 about the hit-and-run accident and had provided the 9-1-1 operator with the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with Mr. Ayan. While speaking with Mr. Ayan at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive, Officer Lepine said that he had received a call from his dispatcher that another hit-and-run collision had just occurred a few minutes north of his location on Pertosa Drive involving a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, so Officer Lepine then attended the location of that second hit-and-run location in the area of Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent and spoke with Tristan Sodoma, a witness of that second hit-and-run collision. Furthermore, Officer Lepine said that the damage caused to the landscaping on the residential property was approximately $300.

[31] Officer Lepine also testified that the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900, which had been identified as Rimpaldeep Singh, also had the same type of moustache in his driver's licence photograph as the moustache on the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had been described to him by the other motorist that had been involved in the collision with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza. Officer Lepine then said that Rimpaldeep Singh's driver's licence photo, entered as Exhibit #2, had also showed a twisted moustache on Rimpaldeep Singh's face.

[32] Furthermore, Officer Lepine testified that the evidence from his investigation had revealed that the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 did not remain at the scene of the accidents or immediately return to the scene of the two accidents on April 16, 2024, respectively, and that he had formed the opinion that he had reasonable grounds to believe that Rimpaldeep Singh, the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, had been the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle in regards to the two accidents on April 16, 2024, and that Rimpaldeep Singh had committed the offence of "fail to remain" on April 16, 2024.

[33] Officer Lepine then said that on May 19, 2024, the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had been stopped at approximately 4:06 a.m. on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton. He then said that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had been identified as Rimpaldeep Singh and that Rimpaldeep Singh had been served with the two summonses for the two "fail to remain" offences by Officer Zeljko Kukolic.

(3) Tristan Sodoma

[34] Tristan Sodoma testified in person at the trial and said that he had been with friends sitting in a garage when he heard a loud screech and then a loud bang. He then said he stepped outside and observed a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle driving over a lawn after it had damaged the landscaping of a neighbour's property. In addition he said the residential property is located on the corner just before Olympia Crescent on Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton. He also said this had happened in April. He also said that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then drove around the corner. Sodoma then said he had called 9-1-1 and told the 9-1-1 operator about the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle driving over the neighbour's lawn and damaging the landscaping and then provided the 9-1-1- operator with the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle.

[35] However, Sodoma then said that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had appeared again in the area of where he had been standing and then said that it had appeared to Sodoma that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle was lost, but then the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle drove off again on Pertosa Drive. Sodoma then said he had called 9-1-1 again to inform the police that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle was in the area again. Sodoma also said he had taken a video of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with his cellphone and had also sent that video recording of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle to the police. Furthermore, Sodoma said that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle did not remain at the scene of the accident nor did it immediately return to the scene of the accident. In addition, Sodoma said that the homeowner of the property that had been damaged by the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then came out of their house and Sodoma said that he then told the home owner that Sodoma had already called 9-1-1.

(4) Officer Zeljko Kukolic

[36] Officer Zeljko Kukolic testified in person at the trial and said that he had been with his training officer on May 19, 2024, when they had attended the area of Rutherford Road South and Queen Street East in the City of Brampton, sometime after they had been dispatched by a call received at 3:40 a.m. Officer Kukolic also said that he had used his police vehicle to block in the black-coloured 2012 Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number "CZWD900" by parking behind the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, so that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle could not be driven off. Furthermore, Officer Kukolic said he had observed one male person inside the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and then observed the male person exit the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Officer Kukolic then said he had made a demand from the male person for his driver's licence, ownership for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, and for proof of insurance for that vehicle. Officer Kukolic then said that the male person had provided Officer Kukolic with his photo Ontario driver's licence which indicated the name of Rimpaldeep Singh and with driver's licence number R44450000980725. Officer Kukolic also said the driver's licence set out Rimpaldeep Singh's date of birth as July 25, 1998, and that the address on the licence stated 121 Churchill Avenue, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. In addition, Officer Kukolic said that the male person was also the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle.

[37] Officer Kukolic had also testified that he had conducted queries and checks on the Peel Regional Police information system, which he said had indicated that Rimpaldeep Singh had been wanted for three separate "fail to remain" offences that had occurred earlier. Moreover, Officer Kukolic then said he had contacted the Officer-In-Charge and said that there had been reasonable and probable grounds to charge Rimpaldeep Singh with committing the offence of "fail to remain".

[38] Furthermore, Officer Kukolic then said that he had issued two "fail to remain" charges in respect to Rimpaldeep Singh and then personally served the two summonses on Rimpaldeep Singh for the two "fail to remain" offences under s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A. on April 19, 2024, at approximately 4:06 a.m. at the traffic stop on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton. He then said he issued a towing slip for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. After being shown Exhibit #2, the driver's licence photograph of the defendant, Officer Kukolic testified that the person in the photograph had been the person who he had served with the two "fail to remain" summonses.

[39] However, it should be noted that the two summonses, that had been served by Officer Kukolic on Rimpaldeep Singh, had stated that the two "fail to remain offences" had both occurred on May 19, 2024, at 4:06 a.m. on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton and not on the dates or locations of March 14, 2024, at the location of eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and on April 16, 2024, at the area of Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton, as had been described by the other witnesses who had testified in the ex parte trial.

(5) Officer Tyson Riley

[40] Officer Tyson Riley testified in person at the trial and said that on May 19, 2024, at approximately 4:06 a.m., he had observed one male person inside the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and that he had also directed the male person to exit the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Officer Riley then said he had also made a demand from the male person for his driver's licence, ownership for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, and for proof of insurance for that vehicle. Officer Riley then said that the male person had provided to Officer Riley his photo Ontario driver's licence which indicated the name of Rimpaldeep Singh. Officer Riley also said he had charged Rimpaldeep Singh with two provincial offences charges of "driving while under suspension" and for "owner operate motor vehicle on a highway without insurance". In addition, Officer Riley said that on the date of trial for those two charges that he had laid against Rimpaldeep Singh, the two charges had been withdrawn by the prosecution. Officer Riley also said the driver's licence had set out Rimpaldeep Singh's date of birth as "July 25, 1998" and that the address on the licence stated "121 Churchill Avenue, Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario".

Exhibits Entered

[41] The following is a summary of two key exhibits entered in the trial:

(1) The Two Still Photographs Entered As Exhibit #1

[42] The two still photographs of Daniel Viveiros, Daniel Viveiros' brother, and Daniel Viveiros' mother, dated March 15, 2024 respectively were taken from the videotape recording from a Peel Regional Police Officer's body-worn camera that had been recorded on March 15, 2024, and which had been a recording of the police officer's attendance at Daniel Viveiros' residence. Daniel Viveiros testified that he had recognized his brother and his mother and his residence in the first photograph and himself in the second photograph that had appeared on the two still photographs taken from that video recording. Viveiros also testified that a police officer had attended his residence the day after the collision had occurred with the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and that Viveiros had provided a statement to that police officer. This exhibit with Daniel Viveiros' uncontradicted testimony establishes that the collision between the Viveiros motor vehicle and the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 had occurred on March 14, 2024.

(2) The photograph of the driver's licence of Rimpaldeep Singh entered as Exhibit #2

[43] Officer Tyson Riley testified that he had taken a photograph of the driver's licence of Rimpaldeep Singh that had been entered as Exhibit #2 with his cellphone on May 19, 2024, at approximately 4:06 a.m., during the traffic stop of Rimpaldeep Singh, who had been seated in the driver's seat of a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton. The photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh in Exhibit #2 shows a twisted moustache on Rimpaldeep Singh.

(3) Certified Ministry of Transportation Documents Entered As Exhibits #3 and #4

[44] The two certified Ministry of Transportation documents entered as Exhibits #3 and #4 indicate that on March 14, 2024, the registered owner of the 2012 black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 is Rimpaldeep Singh.

2. APPLICABLE LAW

[45] The offence of "fail to remain" is contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, and provides that where an accident occurs on a highway, every person in charge of a vehicle or street car that is directly or indirectly involved in that accident shall remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident. And, if the defendant is convicted of committing the two "fail to remain" offences on the two informations, then under s. 200(2) the defendant is liable to a fine of not less than $400 and not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and in addition, the person's licence or permit may be suspended for a period of not more than two years:

Duty of person in charge of vehicle in case of accident

200(1) Where an accident occurs on a highway, every person in charge of a vehicle or street car that is directly or indirectly involved in the accident shall,

(a) remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident;

(b) render all possible assistance; and

(c) upon request, give in writing to anyone sustaining loss or injury or to any police officer or to any witness his or her name, address, driver's licence number and jurisdiction of issuance, motor vehicle liability insurance policy insurer and policy number, name and address of the registered owner of the vehicle and the vehicle permit number.

Interpretation, dooring

(1.1) For the purposes of subsection (1), a motor vehicle is deemed to be involved in an accident if any door of the motor vehicle that is open or opening comes into contact with a cyclist, a bicycle or a moving vehicle, even if the motor vehicle is stationary, stopped or parked.

Penalty

(2) Every person who contravenes this section is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not less than $400 and not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months, or to both, and in addition the person's licence or permit may be suspended for a period of not more than two years.

3. ISSUES

[46] The following issues have arisen for the determination of whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the two offences of "fail to remain", contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A.:

(a) Whether the prosecution's application to amend the two informations under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. with respect to the date and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial may be made without prejudice or injustice?

(b) On the evidence adduced at trial, has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with the rear of the Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros on March 14, 2024, eastbound on Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and then a few minutes later collided with the front of the same Subaru motor vehicle?

(c) On the evidence adduced at trial, has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had driven on the lawn of a residential property and then struck a tree and damaged the landscaping of that property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent, in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024?

(d) If the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with the rear of the Subaru motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros on March 14, 2024, eastbound on Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and then a few minutes later collided with the front of the same Subaru motor vehicle, then has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the two collisions involving the Viveiros motor vehicle, contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A.?

(e) If the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had driven over the lawn of the residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent, in the City of Brampton and then struck a tree and damaged the landscaping on that property on April 16, 2024, then has the prosecution proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of that accident involving damaging the landscaping of that residential property, contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A.?

4. ANALYSIS AND DECISION

(A) SHOULD THE CROWN'S APPLICATION UNDER S. 34(2) OF THE P.O.A. TO AMEND THE TWO INFORMATIONS BE GRANTED?

[47] The defendant has been charged for committing two H.T.A. offences. The offences are both "fail to remain" offences, contrary to s. 200(1)(a). Albeit the charges set out in the two informations state that the two "fail to remain" offences had occurred on May 19, 2024, on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton at 4:06 a.m., the evidence adduced in the ex parte trial indicate that the two offences were actually committed on different dates and at different locations in the City of Brampton. Specifically, on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton for one of the "fail to remain" offences and on April 16, 2024 in the area of Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton for the other "fail to remain" offence. As a result of the variation or error in respect to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences on the two informations, the prosecution brought an application during its closing submission to amend the two informations under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. so that the averments for the two "fail to remain" charges on the two informations would comport with the evidence disclosed at trial.

[48] Moreover, both "fail to remain" offences are strict liability offences in which the prosecution only has the legal burden to prove that the defendant has committed the actus reus of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not have to prove any mens rea or fault element in respect to the defendant. Ergo, if the prosecution proves that the defendant committed the actus reus of both offences beyond a reasonable doubt, then to avoid being convicted of the two offences, the defendant has the legal burden to prove on a balance of probabilities the defence of due diligence by establishing that he took all reasonable care in the circumstances to avoid committing the two offences or that he had an honest but mistaken belief in facts which, if true, would render the act innocent.

[49] However, in order to decide this case, it will first have to be decided if the prosecution's application to amend the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences set out in the two informations should be granted under s. 34(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, in order that they would comport with the evidence disclosed in the ex parte trial. If the application for the proposed amendments is not granted then the two "fail to remain" charges contained in the two respective informations will not be made out by the prosecution and the defendant will be found not guilty of committing the two "fail to remain" charges, since the prosecution has not adduced evidence at trial that the two "fail to remain" offences had indeed occurred on May 19, 2024, at 4:06 a.m., on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton.

[50] On the other hand, if the prosecution's motion under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. to amend the wording or averments of the two charges on the two respective informations is granted, then it will have to be determined if the prosecution has proven that the defendant has committed beyond a reasonable doubt the two "fail to remain" charges as amended on their respective informations, that is based on the evidence adduced at trial.

[51] Normally, if the prosecution has met their burden in proving the actus reus of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will have to be determined if the defendant has made out the defence of due diligence on a balance of probabilities in order that he would not to be convicted of the two respective charges. As such, if the defendant is able to prove that he had taken all reasonable care in the circumstances to prevent or avoid committing the two "fail to remain" offences on the respective informations or that he had an honest but mistaken belief in facts, if true, would render the defendant's acts or omissions innocent, then he would be acquitted of those two offences: R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353. However, as the evidence in respect to the two "fail to remain" charges had been adduced only by the prosecution's witnesses in the context of an ex parte trial, then there would generally be no evidence of due diligence adduced by the defendant except that which would have been adduced by the prosecution's witnesses.

(1) An Application To Amend An Information May Be Brought At Any Time Of The Proceedings

[52] To reiterate, s. 34(1) of the P.O.A. provides that the court may at any stage of the proceeding amend the information as may be necessary.

[53] In R. v. Singh, 2018 ONCA 506, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, at paras. 1 and 3 to 13, held that the court may amend the information "at any stage of the proceedings" pursuant to s. 34(1) of the P.O.A., which would also include at the time of the first appearance for an accused. Moreover, the Court of Appeal also held that under s. 36 of the P.O.A., a motion to quash the information can be brought without leave of the court, but only before the defendant has pleaded, which would of course include the first appearance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that a motion to quash could have been brought before the justice of the peace on the first appearance date, and that the justice of the peace could have proceeded to address the issue of amendment as required. The Court of Appeal also held that quashing the information without considering whether to amend it in accordance with the requirements in ss. 34 and 36 of the P.O.A. had resulted in a miscarriage of justice, because it had prevented the charge being considered on its merits.

(2) In The Context Of An Ex Parte Trial, Would It Be Unjust To Amend The Information When The Defendant Had Not Been Present To Make Submissions Or To Reply To The Prosecution's Motion To Amend The Two Informations?

[54] The prosecution brought the motion to amend the two informations to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial in regards to the date and the location of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. The motion to amend the two informations was raised during the closing submissions stage of the ex parte trial. As such, would it be unjust to make the proposed amendments to the two informations when the defendant had not been present to make submissions or to reply to the prosecution's motion to amend the two informations?

[55] In considering this question, it should be emphasized that the defendant did not appear for the trial held on July 22, 2025, nor did he appear in the Brampton Provincial Offences Court on September 26, 2024, for his first appearance date, after he had been personally served on May 19, 2024, with two summonses in respect to the two "fail to remain" offences by Officer Kukolic of the Peel Regional Police, commanding him to appear in the Brampton Provincial Offences Court to answer to the two charges. Moreover, the defendant has not appeared in court for any of the set date appearances or for previous ex parte trial dates before the defendant's two charges were set down for the July 22, 2025 ex parte trial on May 27, 2025. And, by virtue of s. 54(1) of the P.O.A. this court was legally permitted to proceed on an ex parte basis to adjudicate the case in the absence of the defendant as if he had actually appeared for trial and to determine whether the defendant had committed the two "fail to remain" offences:

Conviction in the absence of the defendant

54(1) Where a defendant does not appear at the time and place appointed for a hearing and it is proved by the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, that a summons was served, a notice of trial was given under Part I or II, an undertaking to appear was given or a recognizance to appear was entered into, as the case may be, or where the defendant does not appear upon the resumption of a hearing that has been adjourned, the court may,

(a) proceed to hear and determine the proceeding in the absence of the defendant; or

(b) adjourn the hearing and, if it thinks fit, issue a summons to appear or issue a warrant in the prescribed form for the arrest of the defendant.

Proceeding arising from failure to appear

(2) Where the court proceeds under clause (1)(a) or adjourns the hearing under clause (1)(b) without issuing a summons or warrant, no proceeding arising out of the failure of the defendant to appear at the time and place appointed for the hearing or for the resumption of the hearing shall be instituted, or if instituted shall be proceeded with, except with the consent of the Attorney General or his or her agent.

[56] Consequently, the defendant's inability to make submissions or to reply to the prosecution's motion to amend the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, on the two informations is a result of the defendant's failure to attend court to answer to his two charges. However, despite the defendant's failure to appear for his trial, this court as a neutral arbiter is nevertheless legally required and bound to ensure that the ex parte trial is conducted fairly and that evidence is properly admitted and relevant, and that the rules of evidence and the Charter of Rights are properly adhered to, and that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove that the defendant has committed the two "fail to remain" offences beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, in determining whether granting the proposed amendments to be made in respect to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences to the two informations, respectively, to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial would be unjust in the circumstances, the merits of the case and any injustice to the other motorists involved in the collisions with the defendant's Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and with society in general would also have to be considered. But it would not be unjust for the court to grant the prosecution's motion to amend the two informations based on the fact that the defendant had not been present at trial to make submissions or to respond to the motion to amend the informations, since the defendant has chosen not to participate in these proceedings.

(3) The Power To Amend An Information To Conform With The Evidence Disclosed At Trial Is Set Out In S. 34(2) Of The P.O.A.

[57] In their motion under s. 34(2) of the P.O.A. to amend the "dates" and "locations" of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, in the two informations, the prosecution submits that the amendments would comport with the evidence that has been adduced at trial. Furthermore, s. 34(3) of the P.O.A. provides that the variation between the information and the evidence disclosed at trial of the "time" and "place" of the alleged offences is not material, if it is proved that the respective informations had been laid within the prescribed period of limitation and where there is not an issue as to the jurisdiction of the court.

[58] Moreover, in R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 30, Wilson J. for the Supreme Court of Canada, at paras. 18 to 23, reiterated the general proposition that an information or indictment must provide an accused with enough information to enable him or her to defend the charge. To be sufficient, Wilson J. further noted that an information or indictment must describe the offence so as to "lift it from the general to the particular". However, also recognizing there has been a change or evolution in the treatment of insufficient indictments, Wilson J. specifically emphasized that since the Supreme Court's decision in Brodie v. The King, [1936] S.C.R. 188, there has been an increased tendency for the courts, including the Supreme Court, to reject insufficiency arguments which had been based on overly technical grounds, since this narrow reasoning by the courts had been an unnecessary holdover from earlier times. More importantly, Wilson J. explained that the earlier authorities had called for a greater degree of specificity than it seems to be required today, since there are now also more extensive corrective measures available to the Crown in the present Criminal Code. However, Wilson J. also noted that the courts will not hesitate in appropriate circumstances to quash an information that is insufficient and that cannot be cured by the provision of particulars.

(4) Whether Amendments Which Substitute One Charge With A Different Charge Should Be Distinguished From Amendments Which Modifies Specific Details Of The Existing Charge In Determining Whether The Proposed Amendment Should Be Made To An Information

[59] Moreover, Doherty J.A. in R. v. Irwin, [1998] O.J. No. 627, 38 O.R. (3d) 689, at paras. 6 to 14, held that the broad powers of amendment at the trial and appellate stages serve two important goals: (1) first, they promote the determination of criminal cases on their merits and (2) second, wide powers of amendment avoid a multiplicity of proceedings. Furthermore, Doherty J.A. reiterated that amendment powers in the Criminal Code are broad and designed to facilitate adjudication on the merits and avoid results predicated on deficiencies in the charging documents.

(5) Making Amendments To An Information Does Not Constitute The Laying Of A New Information Even If The Amendments Charge A New Offence

[60] In addition, courts have had to also consider whether making amendments to an information would constitute the laying of a new information, which in theory could then make the information be laid outside of a limitation period.

[61] In R. v. Zarrinkamar, 2016 BCSC 1272, [2016] B.C.J. No. 1476, the British Columbia Supreme Court held, at para. 1, that in light of the late amendment of the traffic violation notice so as to essentially change the nature of the charge without providing an adequate explanation of what was happening to the accused, and in apparently laying a new charge in effect outside of the limitation period, is a justification for granting the accused's appeal and entering an acquittal for the accused.

[62] On the other hand, in Her Majesty the Queen v. Bidawi, 2018 ONCA 698, 142 O.R. (3d) 520, Fairburn J.A. for the Ontario Court of Appeal, at paras. 18 to 19, 29 to 36, and 47 to 67, took a different course when he had to consider whether the proposed amendment to the criminal information at issue had created a new offence. Fairburn J.A. held that amending the criminal information in question did not constitute the laying of a new information. More importantly, Fairburn J.A. concluded that the limitation period provision for commencing summary conviction proceedings under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code does not bar amendments that substitute one offence for another in summary conviction proceedings. Fairburn J.A. also noted that the power to amend an information or count within an information is a broad one and provided that there is no irreparable prejudice to the accused, and the fairness of the trial will not be adversely impacted, the trial judge may exercise her or his power in favour of making an amendment. In regards to the issue of prejudice in deciding whether an amendment to an information should be made, Fairburn J.A. reiterated that "prejudice to the accused" remains the "litmus test" against which to assess any potential amendment to an information, and that the wide power to amend includes the ability to substitute one charge for another. As such, Fairburn J.A. further explained that the essential inquiry should be into the impact of any potential amendment on the accused, not on how the amendment will impact the charge. In short, Fairburn J.A. also reiterated that when no prejudice would result from the change, then why should it matter how the change to the charge is described. Moreover, Fairburn J.A. also echoed that there had been a significant evolution of the law in regards to the predominant factors upon which decisions to amend had rested upon, from a time when decisions to amend were much more likely to turn on technicalities to a "golden rule" governing informations and indictments that had emerged, where the "extreme technicality of the old procedure" had given way to a focus on prejudice and that the previous focus on technicalities had given way to a practical exploration of whether the accused had been "reasonably informed of the transaction alleged against him". In addition, Fairburn J.A. also indicated that the emphasis on "substance and not petty formalities" are equally applicable to the desirability of a broad amending power. Furthermore, Fairburn J.A. commented that a broad amending power, one which avoids technicalities, and instead, focuses upon prejudice is even further justified in the age of full disclosure. Fairburn J.A. also noted that while there was a day when the information was the central document providing the accused with notice of what the state alleged, that is no longer the case, since today, the accused also receives full disclosure of the Crown's case, which is a valuable source of material from which the accused can obtain information about what is alleged. And, on whether the amendments in question had substituted new offences, Fairburn J.A. concluded that even though the amendments had the effect of instituting new summary conviction proceedings, the amendments did not institute any proceedings as they were just amendments to an existing information. Fairburn J.A. also rejected the position that allowing for the substitution of a new offence by way of amendment, after the limitation period for a summary conviction proceeding has expired, would allow the Crown to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. In other words, Fairburn J.A. reasoned that an amendment to an information or count within an information cannot constitute the institution of proceedings because it does not constitute the laying of an information, regardless of the nature of the amendment, even if it substitutes one offence for another. In short, Fairburn J.A. held that an amendment simply amends the previously laid information and that these amendments did not have the effect of instituting new summary conviction proceedings as they were just amendments.

[63] Ergo, for the case at bar, the proposed changes to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, does not create a new charge nor does it substitute the existing charges with a different charge, but the proposed amendments would only change the dates and locations of the existing two "fail to remain" charges in question, so as to conform with the evidence disclosed at trial. In other words, the proposed amendments would not change the nature or substance of the two "fail to remain" charges to an entirely different type of offence, since the amended charges would still remain as "fail to remain" charges, but with different dates and locations of when and where the two offences are alleged to have arisen.

(6) Can The Proposed Amendments Be Made To The Two Respective Informations During The Prosecution's Closing Submission Stage Of The Trial?

[64] First, it should be noted that s. 34(1) of the P.O.A. permits the court to amend the information "at any stage of the proceeding".

[65] However, is it now too late in the proceeding to make those proposed amendments without prejudice and injustice to the defendant, considering there may be the manifestation of prejudice the later in the proceeding that an amendment under s. 34 of the P.O.A. is sought? At paras. 27 to 30 in Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Rahnmet Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 5418 (Ont. C.J.), Bubba J.P. had recognized and adopted the principle of a "presumption of prejudice" to an accused the later in the proceeding in which an application to amend the information is brought.

[66] However, with the greatest of respect to Bubba J.P.'s decision in Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Rahnmet Inc., which referred to a "presumption of prejudice" to the accused the later in the proceeding when an application to amend an information is brought under s. 34 of the P.O.A., it is questionable whether there is such a presumption of prejudice set out in s. 34 of the P.O.A, considering that this presumptive prejudice would seem to contradict the legislative intent of s. 34, which provides that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceeding. For that reason, an amendment may be made at any stage of the proceedings, including during the late stages of the proceeding, as long as the factors under s. 34(4) have been considered, which involves considering the evidence taken on the trial, if any; the circumstances of the case; whether the accused has been misled or prejudiced in their defence by the variance, error, or omission; and having regard to the merits of the case, whether the proposed amendment could be made without injustice being done. Furthermore, it appears that Bubba J.P. had based his conclusion on this notion of the existence of presumed prejudice after the expiry of a limitation period based on decisions rendered in civil proceedings where the plaintiffs were seeking to have other persons added to the statement of claim as defendants or to have amendments made to the pleadings in a statement of claim. Civil proceedings involving claims for damages and civil remedies do not necessarily have the same public welfare interest objective that is central to a regulatory prosecution.

[67] However, unlike in a civil proceeding where there may be a presumption of prejudice to a party in a civil proceeding in granting an amendment to a statement of claim the later in time that the amendment is sought to be made in that proceeding, especially where a limitation period has expired, this notion that there is a presumption of prejudice for the purpose of determining an application under s. 34 of the P.O.A. for an amendment to an information based on when the application to amend is brought should not automatically exist or be relied upon, since the statutory provisions contained in s. 34 provide that an amendment to the information can be made at any time during the regulatory proceeding, as long as the court has properly considered the s. 34(4) factors, especially whether the accused in a regulatory proceeding would be misled or prejudiced by the variance, error, or omission in making full answer and defence, or based on the merits of the case, whether there would be injustice.

[68] Moreover, Pelletier J. had also held in R. v. Larizza, [2006] O.J. No. 5335 (Ont. C.J.), that in respect to the general rule concerning amendments of certificates and informations, there is a bias in favour of amending which would also contradict the notion that there is a presumption of prejudice.

[69] But more importantly, in respect to applications brought to amend after a limitation period has expired, it has been noted by Wake J. in R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction Co., [2008] O.J. No. 4004 (Ont. C.J.), at paras. 20 and 28 to 30, that courts have allowed an amendment even after the expiry of a limitation period, where in complex corporate structures of a corporate holding company it would not be unexpected that a minor error or mistake could occur in describing the correct legal name of a corporate entity.

[70] Ergo, the prosecution's application to amend the two informations, respectively, can be brought at the closing arguments stage of the trial, since amendments to an information may be made by the court "at any stage of the proceeding" to ensure that technical objectives do not impede the arrival of a verdict on the merits, unless there is clear prejudice to the defendant's opportunity and ability to mount a full defence, to meet the charge, or to have a fair trial, and whether the defence would have been conducted differently that cannot be assuaged by any measure.

(7) What Does "On Or About" Mean In Reference To The Date Of The Offence In The Charge?

[71] In the case at bar, the two "fail to remain" informations state that the two offences had occurred "on or about" May 19, 2024. As such, would the proposed amendments of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024 to the dates of the two offences as disclosed by the evidence at trial, be captured by or fall with the timeframe described by the phrase "on or about" of the stated date of May 19, 2024, that is set out in the two "fail to remain" charges? Especially, considering that triers of fact in an assault case have indeed concluded that an accused person had committed the offence of assault, even though the time of the offence had been established by evidence at the trial that the assault had occurred several weeks earlier than on the stated date of the offence in the indictment, which infers that the triers of fact in that case may have found that the proximate date of the offence had been captured by the timeframe described as "on or about" of that stated date.

[72] In R. v. Smiley, [1995] O.J. No. 697, 80 O.A.C. 238, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held, at paras. 1 to 4, that the direction of "on or about" means "a period surrounding" that had been given to the jury by the trial judge was not wrong. Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that it had been left to the jury to determine for itself whether the accused had committed the assault and whether that happened on a date which, in the jury's view, was proximate to December 2, 1992, which was the offence date stated or referred to in the indictment. At trial, the complainant had agreed with the suggestion that the choking incident had occurred on November 19, 1992, rather than on December 2, 1992. More importantly, the Court of Appeal commented that they do not know on what date the jury had concluded that the assault had occurred, but that the Court of Appeal did have certainty as to the crucial issue, that the jury had found the appellant had been the perpetrator of the choking incident.

[73] Ergo, the dates disclosed at trial of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024, in respect to the charges that the two "fail to remain" offences had occurred "on or about" May 19, 2024, could potentially be captured by the period surrounding May 19, 2024, where it has been proven that the defendant had been the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 involved in the collisions with the Viveiros motor vehicle and in damaging the landscaping of the residential property with regard to the two "fail to remain" offences, unless the time when the two "fail to remain" offences have occurred is an essential element of the offence.

(8) Is The Time When The Two "Fail To Remain" Offences Have Occurred An Essential Element Of The Offence?

[74] To repeat, by virtue of s. 34(3)(a) of the P.O.A., a variance between the information and the evidence taken on the trial is not material with respect to the "time" when the two "fail to remain" offences are alleged to have been committed, if it is proved that the two informations had been laid within the prescribed limitation period.

[75] However, Wilson J. for the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. B. (G.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 30, at paras. 24 to 42, also indicated that the jurisprudence does not describe what degree of particularity that the "time of the offence" must be spelled out in order to constitute adequate information. Wilson J. also noted that the usual practice in alleging the "time of the offence" had been to state the day on which, or a particular time period during which, the offence was committed. In addition, after reviewing judgments on whether time is an essential element to be proven, Wilson J. concluded that what constitutes reasonable or adequate information with respect to the act or omission to be proven against the accused will of necessity vary from case to case. Wilson J. also explained that the factual matters which underlie some offences permit greater descriptive precision than in the case of other offences. Accordingly, Wilson J. emphasized that a significant factor in any assessment of the reasonableness of the information furnished is the nature and legal character of the offence charged. Furthermore, Wilson J. indicated that in general an information or indictment will not be quashed just because the exact time of the offence is not specified; rather, the matter will continue on to trial on the merits. However, Wilson held that while it is important to provide an accused with sufficient information to enable him or her to identify the transaction and prepare a defence, particularity as to the exact time of the alleged offence is not in the usual course necessary for this purpose. But, Wilson J. also reasoned that there may be cases where it would indeed be necessary to provide the exact time of the alleged offence. In addition, Wilson J. held that prior to statutory codification in the Criminal Code, the common law had provided that the date of the offence need not be proven unless it is an essential element of the offence and that a date specified in an indictment had never been held to be a material matter. Hence, Wilson J. held that the Crown need not prove the alleged date unless time is an essential element of the offence or unless there is a specified prescription period. Moreover, Wilson further held that it is of no consequence if the date specified in the information differs from that arising from the evidence, unless the time of the offence is critical and the accused may be misled by the variance and therefore prejudiced in his or her defence. Wilson J. also indicated that the date of the offence need not be proven in order for a conviction to result unless time is an essential element of the offence. In addition, Wilson J. emphasized that it is more accurate to say that the Crown must prove all the essential elements, but that the Crown need not prove elements which are, at most, incidental to the offence. Wilson J. also added that what the Crown must prove will, however, of necessity vary with the nature of the offence charged and the surrounding circumstances and that time may be an essential element of the offence in some circumstances.

[76] Additionally, in R. v. S.M., 2017 ONCA 878, [2017] O.J. No. 5989, at paras. 7 to 21, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reaffirmed that, as a general rule, the Crown is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged offence occurred within the timeframe set down in the indictment. In addition, the Court of Appeal found in the case before them that there is nothing inherent in the nature of the charges brought against the accused that would make the time at which those offences occurred an essential element of the offence, such as where the evidence would have raised the possibility that if the acts were committed at a certain time, that they were no longer criminal because of the age of the complainant. Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that the conduct that had been alleged in the case had remained criminal regardless of when it had occurred. In addition, the Court of Appeal held that the Crown did not have to prove that the alleged offences had occurred within the timeframe alleged in the indictment and that the trial judge erred in law in requiring the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offences had occurred within the timeframe alleged in the indictment. The Court of Appeal also found that the accused was not prejudiced in the relevant sense by a finding that the assaults occurred outside of the timeframe alleged in the indictment, since the accused had clear notice of the legal and factual nature of the allegations and the factual context in which they were said to have occurred. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal also noted that there had been no prejudice to the accused's ability to raise a defence, as it was not a case in which an accused had advanced an alibi-like defence in response to the timeframe alleged by the Crown in the indictment and where the Crown would argue for a conviction based on events outside of the timeframe. Moreover, the Court of Appeal held that the accused's defence did not turn on the timeframe in the indictment, but had turned on the reliability of the complainant's evidence. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reasoned that neither the substance of the accused's argument that the complainant's evidence was unreliable nor that the potential force of that argument, had been affected by the amendment to the indictment in respect to the timeframe of the alleged assaults.

[77] Ergo, as a general rule, the prosecution is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged offence had occurred within the timeframe set out in an information, unless time is an essential element of the offence or it is crucial to the defence. Hence, if the date specified in the information differs from that arising from the evidence it would be of no consequence, unless the time of the offence is critical and the accused may be misled by the variance and therefore prejudiced in his or her defence. Accordingly, when a court is faced with circumstances in which the time of the offence cannot be determined with precision or the information conflicts with the evidence, the first question that must be asked is whether time is either an essential element of the offence or crucial to the defence. Where time is either an essential element of the offence or crucial to the defence, the trier of fact must then determine whether the time of the offence has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, where time is not an essential element of the offence nor crucial to the defence, a conviction may result even although the time of the offence is not proven, provided that the rest of the prosecution's case is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

(a) Situations or circumstances when the "time" of the offence would be an essential element of the offence

[78] To recap, time is generally not an essential element requiring strict proof, but that it could become so depending on the circumstances. Wilson J. in R. v. B. (G.), at paras. 39 to 42, provided examples of situations or circumstances when a proposed amendment to the time or date of the offence on an information or indictment would be an essential element of the offence: namely, (1) on a theft charge on whether the goods were taken before the permission was withdrawn or after the permission was withdrawn; (2) on a charge of operating a plane without the proper authorization, whether the specified act had been authorized while holding a valid certificate during a particular period of time; or (3) when an accused defends the charge by providing evidence of an alibi for the date or time period alleged.

[79] Furthermore, in R. v. K.M., [2008] O.J. No. 198 (Ont. S.C.J.), Hill J. at para. 132, accepted the principle that the time of the offence is not ordinarily an essential element which the Crown must prove to secure a conviction. However, Hill J. also recognized that it is not an invariable rule, since proof of the time of the offence may be essential to avoid prejudice to the defence that is not reparable by some other measure. Hill J. also provided examples of situations where the time of the offence may be essential to avoid prejudice to the defence, such as: (1) consideration of the stage of the proceeding and/or manner in which the case has been conducted; (2) alibi defence; (3) the age of the complainant is itself an essential element of the offence; (4) jurisdiction over the defendant as either a young person or an adult; or (5) where age is relevant to a statutory defence for the accused.

[80] In addition, in R. v. Russell, 2015 ONSC 2090, [2015] O.J. No 1600, Skarica J. did find, at paras. 17 and 18, that time was an essential element of the offence for the matter in question, in that the complainant at the time of the offence must be under 18 years of age. However, Skarica J. also found that in regards to the sexual assault regarding the complainant as an adult, that time was not an essential element of the offence.

[81] Accordingly, for the case at bar, the "time" and date of the two "fail to remain" offences are not essential elements of the offence, as s. 34(3) of the P.O.A. provides that the "time" and "place" of when and where the two "fail to remain" offences arose are not essential elements of the offence, unless the proposed changes to the "time" and "place" of the two "fail to remain" charges in the two informations would cause the amended charges to be charges that would fall outside a limitation period or that they would make the charges void; or unless the "time" of the offence is critical and that the amendments would cause an unfair trial; and that the defendant may be misled by the variance and therefore prejudiced in his defence; or that it would raise a jurisdiction issue for the Brampton Provincial Offences Court or for the two charges. And, as the evidence at trial disclosed, none of those circumstances would arise if the proposed changes or amendments to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" charges on the two informations were to be made. Undoubtedly, since the defendant did not appear for trial, there is no evidence disclosed at trial that would suggest that the defendant may have been misled by the variance in the time and place of the two offences or prejudiced in his defence, or that the trial would be unfair.

[82] Furthermore, by virtue of s. 76(1) of the P.O.A., the general limitation period for laying a Part III "fail to remain" charge or information is 6 months from the date of the offence.

[83] As well, s. 200 of the H.T.A. does not set out a longer limitation period for commencing a Part III "fail to remain" proceeding. Ergo, the limitation period for a fail to remain offence occurring on March 14, 2024 and occurring on April 16, 2024 would be respectively September 13, 2024 and October 15, 2024. The two informations in the case at bar were commenced on June 10, 2024 (#999-24-8424) and September 18, 2024 (#999-24-9020), respectively.

[84] The prosecution applied to amend Information #999-24-8424, which had been commenced on June 10, 2024, so that the date of offence would be amended from May 19, 2024 to March 14, 2024, which would set the limitation period for that amended information as September 13, 2024, and which would still put the commencement date of that particular information of June 10, 2024, within the new limitation period expiring on September 13, 2024.

[85] And, as for Information #999-24-9020, the prosecution applied to amend that information which had been commenced on September 18, 2024, so that the date of offence would be amended from May 19, 2024 to April 16, 2024, which would set the limitation period as October 15, 2024 for that amended information, and which would still put the commencement date of that particular information of September 18, 2024, within the new limitation period expiring on October 15, 2024.

[86] Consequently, the two proposed changes to the date of the two offences from May 19, 2024, to the dates of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024, are approximately 2 months and one month, respectively, from the original stated date of the two "fail to remain" offences of May 19, 2024. Therefore, the proposed amendments to the date of the two "fail to remain" offences would not fall outside a limitation period for the two specific informations, so that an amendment to the original stated dates on the two informations could be made without running afoul of any limitation period for the two separate "fail to remain" offences. Moreover, such amendments would also need to be made to the dates of the two "fail to remain" charges on the two separate informations to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial, since the proposed dates of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024, refer to separate "fail to remain" offences involving different parties and are significantly different in scope of time, so that they would not in essence be captured by or fall within the "on or about" time period surrounding the date of May 19, 2024.

(9) Is The "Place" Where The Two "Fail To Remain" Offences Have Occurred An Essential Element Of The Offence?

[87] To reiterate, under the common law and by virtue of s. 34(3)(b) of the P.O.A., a variance between the two informations of where the "places" or locations of the two "fail to remain" offences are alleged to have arisen and the evidence taken on the trial is not material, except when there is an issue as to the jurisdiction of the court.

[88] In R. v. WHYNOTT, [1975] N.S.J. No. 373, 12 N.S.R.(2d) 231, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, at paras. 92 to 102, and 108 to 111, held that in the situation before them the place of the offence was neither vital nor relevant.

[89] Ergo, for the case at bar, the "time" and date, as well as the "place" or location of the two "fail to remain" offences are not essential elements of the offence, as s. 34(3) of the P.O.A. provides that the "time" and "place" of when and where the two offences arose is not an essential element of the offence, unless the proposed changes to the "time" and "place" of the two "fail to remain" charges in the two informations would cause the amended charges to be charges that would fall outside a limitation period or that they would make the charges void; or unless the "time" of the offence is critical or crucial for the defence and the accused may be misled by the variance and prejudiced in his or her defence; or that the amendments to the information would cause an unfair trial; or that it would raise a jurisdiction issue for the Brampton Provincial Offences Court or for the two charges. And as the defendant did not appear for trial and as the evidence at trial had disclosed, none of those circumstances would arise if the proposed changes or amendments to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" charges on the two information were to be made.

(10) Discussion Of The S. 34(4) Factors

[90] To decide whether the prosecution's application should be granted to amend the dates and places of the two "fail to remain" charges on the two informations, the four factors set out in s. 34(4) of the P.O.A. have to be considered, namely:

The evidence taken on the trial, if any;
The circumstances of the case;
Whether the defendant has been misled or prejudiced in the defendant's defence by a variance, error or omission; and
Whether, having regard to the merits of the case, the proposed amendment can be made without injustice being done.

[91] It is also important while considering the four factors enumerated in s. 34(4) to take into account the overall philosophy of the Provincial Offences Act, which is to ensure that technical objections do not impede the arrival of a verdict on the merits and that the P.O.A. itself has provided a broad curative power to amend informations or certificates at any time during the proceeding.

(a) Has Any Evidence Been Adduced At Trial?

[92] First of all, an ex parte trial was held and evidence has been adduced at trial through only prosecution witnesses. Ergo, because there is evidence that has been disclosed at trial in respect to the defendant failing to remain or immediately return to the scene of accidents that occurred on March 14, 2024 at eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and April 16, 2024 at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton, then amendments to the two informations in respect to the dates and places of the offences could be granted so that the two "fail to remain" charges would conform to the evidence disclosed at trial, unless the defendant would be misled or prejudiced by the proposed amendments, or that based on the merits of the case it would cause injustice.

(b) What Are The Circumstances In This Case?

[93] For the circumstances of the case at bar, the uncontradicted evidence indicates that there were 4 collisions that involved a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900, which is owned by the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh. The driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had also fled the scene of all 4 collisions. Daniel Viveiros who was involved in 2 of the of 4 collisions with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle was injured and had to undertake medical treatment, physiotherapy, and chiropractic treatment, and still suffers some lingering discomfort from the accident involving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Moreover, the Subaru motor vehicle being driven by Viveiros was struck twice by the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, once in the rear at eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and then in the front when Viveiros gave chase to the fleeing Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and when Viveiros had tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then struck the front of Viveiros' motor vehicle, and once again, fled the scene of the second collision. The Viveiros motor vehicle had also received $3000 worth of damage from the two collisions.

[94] Then on April 16, 2024, the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900, which is owned by the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was also involved in two separate hit-and-run collisions. The first hit-and-run accident had occurred at the shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton and the second hit-and-run accident had occurred a few kilometers north at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton. For the second hit-and-run accident, the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had driven over the lawn of a residential property, struck a tree, and had caused $300 damage to the property's landscaping. The driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle also did not remain at the scene of the two collisions on April 16, 2024, but had fled from both scenes.

(c) Has The Variance, Error, Or Omission Misled Or Prejudiced The Defendant?

[95] In respect to whether the defendant at bar would be prejudiced by the proposed amendments to the two informations, the burden of proof lies upon the moving party to show the absence of prejudice, as well as an absence of injustice: Deaville v. Boegeman, [1984] O.J. No. 3403, at para. 20.

[96] But more importantly, prejudice within the meaning of s. 34(4) of the P.O.A. refers to whether the proposed amendment would undermine or adversely or negatively affect the defendant's opportunity and ability to mount a full defence, to meet the charge, or to have a fair trial, and whether the defence would have been conducted differently (see R. v. Irwin, [1998] O.J. No. 627 and R. v. McConnell, [2005] O.J. No. 1613). This view of prejudice within the meaning of s. 34(4) of the P.O.A. was also confirmed by Healey J. at para. 21 in York (Municipality) v. Talabe, [2011] O.J. No. 654 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[97] In the case at bar, the defendant did not appear for trial, nor did he make an appearance on any previous court dates. As a result, no issue on whether the proposed amendments to the two informations would undermine or adversely or negatively affect the defendant's opportunity and ability to mount a full defence, or to meet the charge, or to have a fair trial, nor an issue of whether the defence would have been conducted differently, has arisen from the evidence or circumstances adduced at trial.

[98] Accordingly, it cannot be inferred from the evidence or circumstances disclosed at trial that the defendant would have been misled by the error or variation between the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences set out in the two informations with the evidence disclosed at trial of the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences.

(11) Is There "Presumed Prejudice" To The Defendants Just Because The Application For The Proposed Amendment Had Been Brought By The Prosecution At The Closing Arguments Stage Of The Trial?

[99] Now, with the greatest of respect to Bubba J.P.'s decision in Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Rahnmet Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 5418 (O.C.J.), which referred to a "presumption of prejudice" to the accused the later in the proceeding when an application to amend an information is brought under s. 34 of the P.O.A., it is questionable whether there is such a presumption of prejudice set out in s. 34 of the P.O.A, considering that this presumptive prejudice would seem to contradict the legislative intent of s. 34, which provides that an amendment can be made at any stage of the proceeding. For that reason, an amendment may be made at any stage of the proceedings, including during the late stages of the proceeding, as long as the factors under s. 34(4) have been considered, which involves considering the evidence taken on the trial, if any; the circumstances of the case; whether the accused has been misled or prejudiced in their defence by the variance, error, or omission; and having regard to the merits of the case, whether the proposed amendment could be made without injustice being done. Furthermore, it appears that Bubba J.P. had based his conclusion on this notion of the existence of presumed prejudice after the expiry of a limitation period based on decisions rendered in civil proceedings where the plaintiffs were seeking to have other persons added to the statement of claim as defendants or to have amendments made to the pleadings in a statement of claim. Civil proceedings involving claims for damages and civil remedies do not necessarily have the same public welfare interest objective that is central to a regulatory prosecution.

[100] However, unlike in a civil proceeding where there may be a presumption of prejudice to a party in a civil proceeding in granting an amendment to a statement of claim the later in time that the amendment is sought to be made in that proceeding, especially where a limitation period has expired, this notion that there is a presumption of prejudice for the purpose of determining an application under s. 34 of the P.O.A. for an amendment to an information based on when the application to amend is brought should not automatically exist or be relied upon, since the statutory provisions contained in s. 34 provide that an amendment to the information can be made at any time during the regulatory proceeding, as long as the court has properly considered the s. 34(4) factors, especially whether the accused in a regulatory proceeding would be misled or prejudiced by the variance, error, or omission in making full answer and defence, or based on the merits of the case, whether there would be injustice.

[101] Moreover, Pelletier J. had also held in R. v. Larizza, [2006] O.J. No. 5335 (O.C.J.), that in respect to the general rule concerning amendments of certificates and informations, there is a bias in favour of amending which would also contradict the notion that there is a presumption of prejudice.

[102] But more importantly, in respect to applications brought to amend after a limitation period has expired, it has been noted by Wake J. in R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction Co., [2008] O.J. No. 4004 (O.C.J.), at paras. 20 and 28 to 30, that courts have allowed an amendment even after the expiry of a limitation period, where in complex corporate structures of a corporate holding company it would not be unexpected that a minor error or mistake could occur in describing the correct legal name of a corporate entity.

(12) In Regards To The Defendant's Ability To Make Full Answer And Defence, Can The Proposed Amendments Be Done Without Causing Irreparable Prejudice To The Defendant?

[103] The "litmus test" for determining whether an amendment to an information may be made is whether there will be prejudice to the defendant's ability to make full answer or defence. The proposed amendments to change the date of the respective "fail to remain" offences from May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m. to March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024 on the two informations, and to also change the location of the two "fail to remain" offences from Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton to eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and to Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton, respectively, does not create a new charge, nor does it substitute the existing charges with new charges. The amendments are to simply correct an error or variation on the two informations in respect to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences in order to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial.

[104] Moreover, since the "time of the offence" and the "place of the offence" are not material or essential elements of the offence that need to be proven according to s. 34(3) of the P.O.A., nor can it be concluded that the "time" of the two "fail to remain" offences would be of consequence or critical where the defendant may be misled by the variance and prejudiced in his defence, then the proposed amendments can be made without prejudice to the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence. In addition, as it applies to amending the dates of the two "fail to remain" offences, the defendant did not appear for trial so there is no issue that has been raised about an alibi defence from any of the evidence disclosed at trial by the prosecution's witnesses or that the charges with the proposed amended dates would fall inevitably outside a limitation period.

[105] Additionally, the two "fail to remain" charges were commenced by informations dated on June 10, 2024 and September 18, 2024. For the two "fail to remain" offences, the limitation period to commence a PART III proceeding is 6 months from the date of the offence and is set out in s. 76(1) of the P.O.A., unless a different limitation period is set out for the "fail to remain" offence in the H.T.A. The H.T.A. does not set out a different limitation period to commence a "fail to remain" proceeding. Therefore, for the proposed changes of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024 for the offence dates, the limitation period to commence the individual "fail to remain" offences would be September 13, 2024 and October 16, 2024, respectively. The prosecution had applied to change Information #999-24-8424 that had originally commenced on June 10, 2024, with the date of the "fail to remain" offence to state "March 14, 2024" instead of May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m., which would still make that particular amended charge fall within the new limitation period of September 13, 2024. And, for Information #999-24-9020 that had originally commenced on September 18, 2024, the prosecution had applied to change the date of that particular "fail to remain" offence to state "April 16, 2024" instead of May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m., which would still make that particular amended charge fall within the new limitation period of October 16, 2024.

[106] In respect to amending the place or location of the two "fail to remain" offences on the two informations, respectively, the proposed amendments would only change the name of the streets of the locations of where the offences arose. The proposed changes of the locations of the two "fail to remain" offences would still remain within the City of Brampton and still remain in the jurisdiction of the Brampton Provincial Offences Court. Therefore, the proposed amendments to the locations of the two "fail to remain" offences would not affect the jurisdiction of the present court.

[107] In addition, the prosecution's disclosure which would generally be comprised of officers' notes, witnesses' statements, Ministry of Transportation documents, videos and photographs, and other evidence, would have disclosed to the defendant the prosecution's anticipated evidence for trial and would have disclosed to the defendant the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences that now form the content for the prosecution's motion to change the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences set out in the two informations. So, if the defendant had chosen to attend court and participate in these proceedings he would have been given that disclosure of the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences which he had been charged with committing, and as such, he would not have been surprised by the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences that would be adduced at trial, which also now form the substance of the prosecution's motion to change the dates and locations of the two offences on the two informations.

[108] As a consequence, there is no apparent prejudice to the defendant's ability to make full answer or defence that can be inferred from the evidence or circumstances disclosed at trial.

(13) Having Regard To The Merits Of The Case, Can The Proposed Amendments Be Done Without Injustice To The Defendant?

[109] In York (Regional Municipality) v. Winlow, 2009 ONCA 643, 99 O.R. (3d) 337, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held at paras. 80 to 84, that in deciding whether an amendment can be done without injustice as prescribed by s. 34(4)(d) of the P.O.A., an amendment should not be granted if it would be unfair having regard to the merits of the case, since the concept of injustice under that requirement in 34(4)(d) is of a wide scope and would involve a general notion of unfairness.

[110] For the present case, in regards to the merits of the case, the uncontradicted evidence from the prosecution's witnesses shows that the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 had been involved in four separate collisions over a period of 4 weeks and that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had failed to remain or return immediately to the scene of the four collisions to exchange information with the other motorists or with the homeowner of the residential property that had landscaping damage. And, as such, there would be an injustice, however, to those other motorists and to the homeowner of the residential property, and to society in general if the proposed amendments of the dates and places of the two "fail to remain" offences were not made to the two informations, respectively. Especially, when considering the evidence disclosed at trial of the deliberate actions of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle in colliding with the Viveiros motor vehicle twice, deliberately fleeing the scene of the four collisions, and in not remaining at the scene of the four collisions which had occurred over a four-week period, and in not appearing in court to answer to the two "fail to remain" charges.

[111] And, to reiterate, the proposed amendments to the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences on the two informations, respectively, would not expose the defendant to a different charge other than to the two "fail to remain" charges the defendant would have been defending against if the defendant would have appeared for trial. In short, it would not be an injustice or be unfair to the defendant to grant the prosecution's motion and amend the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences, respectively, on the two informations, since the defendant would have been provided the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences in the prosecution's disclosure before the scheduled trial date, if the defendant would have attended and appeared in court to answer to the two charges.

[112] Ergo, balancing of the equities and public interest do weigh in favor in granting the prosecution's application to amend the dates and locations of the two "fail to remain" offences on the two informations to comport with the evidence disclosed at trial.

[113] As such, for Information #999-24-8424, the existing date of the "fail to remain" offence of May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m. will be changed to March 14, 2024, and the existing place of the offence will be changed from Rutherford Road South to eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and that such amendments will be endorsed on the information.

[114] In addition, for Information #999-24-9020, the existing date of the "fail to remain" offence of May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m. will be changed to April 16, 2024, and the existing place of the offence will be changed from Rutherford Road South to Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent and that such amendments will be endorsed on the information.

(B) HAS THE PROSECUTION PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED THE TWO "FAIL TO REMAIN" OFFENCES?

[115] As the prosecution's motion to amend the two informations has been granted, the next question to determine is whether the prosecution has fulfilled its burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the two "fail to remain" offences set out in the two amended informations.

[116] Ergo, the key questions that have to be decided is whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had collided with the Subaru motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and then collided with the front of the Viveiros motor vehicle when Viveiros had tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, and whether the prosecution has also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had also been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 on April 16, 2024, that had driven over the lawn of a residential property and damaged the landscaping on the property and struck a tree located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent.

[117] The prosecution submits that it has indeed proven that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 on both dates of March 14, 2024 and April 16, 2024, was the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, based on the totality of the evidence and which is based on reasonable inferences from the circumstantial evidence adduced at trial.

(1) Use of circumstantial evidence as proof of the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle

[118] In R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] S.C.J. No 28, at paras. 33 to 35, Charron J. for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, noted that in order to convict, the trier-of-fact or the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only rational inference that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty. In short, Charron J. explained that a guilty verdict can only be rendered if guilt is the sole rational inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence. Charron J. also explained that the words "equally rational" and "as reasonable" were not used as measures of the comparative value or weight of a non-guilty inference, but to describe the quality of any inference, guilty or otherwise, which might be drawn from the circumstantial evidence.

[119] Furthermore, in R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 1000, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the trier of fact should guard against the risk of "filling in the blanks" by too quickly overlooking reasonable alternative inferences from circumstantial evidence. At para. 30, Cromwell J. for the Supreme Court of Canada, had explained that in a case in which proof of one or more elements of the offence depends exclusively or largely on circumstantial evidence, it would generally be helpful to caution the trier of fact or jury about being too ready to draw inferences of guilt. To guard against the risk of "filling in the blanks" by too quickly overlooking reasonable alternative inferences, Cromwell J. stressed that the trier of fact or jury should be informed that an inference of guilt drawn from circumstantial evidence should be the only reasonable inference that such evidence permits. Cromwell J. also provided an illustration of the concern about jumping to quickly to conclusions from circumstantial evidence by stating the following example: "If we look out the window and see that the road is wet, we may jump to the conclusion that it has been raining. But we may then notice that the sidewalks are dry or that there is a loud noise coming from the distance that could be street-cleaning equipment, and re-evaluate our premature conclusion. The observation that the road is wet, on its own, does not exclude other reasonable explanations than that it has been raining. The inferences that may be drawn from this observation must be considered in light of all of the evidence and the absence of evidence, assessed logically, and in light of human experience and common sense".

[120] In addition, in R. v. Hayatibahar, [2022] O.J. No. 2850 (Ont. S.C.J.), at paras. 31 to 33, Di Luca J. held that the Crown must prove that the accused's guilt is the only reasonable inference available on the evidence. Di Luca J. also noted that the consideration of circumstantial evidence requires the drawing of reasonable inferences based on logic, experience and common sense, and that speculation and conjecture are impermissible inferences from circumstantial evidence. In addition, Di Luca J. indicated that the analysis must be based on the totality of the evidence before the court and if a reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt on any essential element of the offence exists, then the accused is entitled to an acquittal or a conviction on a lesser and included offence. Furthermore, Di Luca J. explained that an inference inconsistent with guilt must be reasonable and not simply possible. Di Luca J. also confirmed that the Crown is not required to negative every possible inference conceivable and that an inference inconsistent with guilt does not need to arise from "proven facts" and can arise as a matter of logic and experience based on a consideration of all the evidence and the absence of evidence.

[121] Furthermore, in R. v. McIvor, [2021] M.J. No. 169 (Man. C.A.), at para. 35, the Manitoba Court of Appeal noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had set out the principles related to the determination of the reasonableness of a verdict in a case based on circumstantial evidence in R. v. Villaroman (at paras. 55 to 56). Moreover, the Manitoba Court of Appeal confirmed that where the Crown's case depends on circumstantial evidence, the question becomes whether the trier-of-fact, acting judicially, could reasonably be satisfied that the accused's guilt was the only reasonable conclusion available on the totality of the evidence. In addition, the Manitoba Court of Appeal adopted the Alberta Court of Appeal's summary of the governing principle on the use of circumstantial evidence in R. v. Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328, [2014] A.J. No. 1102 (at para 22), that circumstantial evidence does not have to totally exclude other conceivable inferences and that a verdict of guilt inferred from circumstantial evidence is not unreasonable simply because the alternatives do not raise a doubt in the jury's mind, and that it is still fundamentally for the trier-of-fact to decide if any proposed alternative way of looking at the case is reasonable enough to raise a doubt.

[122] Moreover, in R. v. Dipnarine, 2014 ABCA 328, [2014] A.J. No. 1102, at paras. 22 to 26, the Alberta Court of Appeal reiterated that the circumstantial evidence test is simply a category of analysis used to reach a conclusion regarding proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And, in respect to alternative inferences from circumstantial evidence, the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that alternative inferences must be reasonable and rational, not just possible, and that reasonable doubt can arise from the absence of evidence and that it would not be an error of law to give effect to such a doubt even if it does not have specific evidence backing it up. In addition, the Alberta Court of Appeal emphasized that the logic of the circumstantial evidence analysis is that if a trier-of-fact considers a postulated alternative interpretation of the circumstances taken as a whole to be unreasonable or irrational, then the trier-of-fact is not bound to give effect to that alternative just because it is impossible to exclude it entirely.

[123] Also, in R. v. Mattatal, [2019] Q.J. No. 5140 (Court of Quebec), at paras. 87 to 91, Meredith J.Q.C. applied the guidelines for the proper use of circumstantial evidence that had been set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28 and R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, which provide that in order to convict, a trier-of-fact must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the only "rational inference" that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the accused is guilty, and also, that an inference of guilt drawn from circumstantial evidence should be the only "reasonable inference" that such evidence permits.

[124] In addition, in Wild v. the Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 101, Martland J., for the majority of the Supreme Court, held that the onus of proof must rest with the Crown to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, but this proposition does not mean that the Crown must negative every possible conjecture, no matter how irrational or fanciful, which might be consistent with the innocence of the accused. On the issue of whether or not the accused was the driver of the motor vehicle at the material time, Martland J. held that the contention that the accused person may not have been driving at the time of the accident had been based on "conjecture" and is "fanciful" and that no other conclusion could have been reached on the evidence than the accused person was indeed driving at the material time.

(2) Other possible inferences from the circumstantial evidence that the defendant had not been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on March 14, 2024 or on April 16, 2024

[125] As the Supreme Court had indicated in R. v. Villaroman, the trier-of-fact is required to considered other possible inferences from the circumstantial evidence, or absence of evidence, in regard to the innocence of the driver. In the case at bar, there is no credible evidence adduced at trial that anyone else had been driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with the Viveiros' Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton on March 14, 2024, nor is there any evidence that someone else had been driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had driven over the lawn of a residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton and struck a tree and damaged the landscaping of that property on April 16, 2024.

[126] Accordingly, based on the credible testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, the prosecution has negatived the possibility, or an alternative theory, that someone else other than the defendant had been driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had been involved in the collisions or accidents that occurred in the City of Brampton on March 14, 2024 and on April 16, 2024.

(3) Conclusion On Amended Information #999-24-8424

(a) Conclusion on the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision with the Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East

[127] Daniel Viveiros had testified that after he had been rear-ended by the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, he and another motor vehicle had followed the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle after it had driven away on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and then turned onto a dead-end street, when the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle appeared again in front of Viveiros. Viveiros then said that he had tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, but the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle then drove into the front of Viveiros' motor vehicle and then drove off again. Viveiros then said that the other motorist, who had also followed Viveiros and the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, then provided Viveiros with the licence plate number of CZWD900 for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Viveiros then said he drove to the police station at the arena location and provided the licence plate for the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle to the Peel Regional Police. In addition, Viveiros testified that his mother's Subaru motor vehicle had sustained $3000 in damages. Moreover, Daniel Viveiros had testified that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had driven away after both collisions with the Viveiros' Subaru motor vehicle and did not remain at the scene of either of the two collisions or immediately return to the scenes of the two collisions. Moreover, Viveiros had also testified that the photograph of the defendant's driver's licence entered as Exhibit #2 appeared to be the person that he had observed driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with Viveiros because Viveiros testified that the person in the driver's licence photograph had the same hair style as the person he had observed driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided twice with his mother's Subaru motor vehicle.

[128] Furthermore, Exhibits #3 and #4, which are certified copies of documents from the Ministry of Transportation, also indicate that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been listed as the registered owner of that black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 on March 14, 2024, which supports the inference that he had been driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, that had collided twice with the motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros.

[129] Although the evidence of who had been driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision with Daniel Viveiros' Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton is based on circumstantial evidence, the only reasonable or rational inference from that circumstantial evidence is that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was the driver. There is no evidence adduced at trial that indicates that someone else had been driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had collided with the motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East on March 14, 2024, or that there were two of more people in the Chrysler motor vehicle when it had collided twice with the Viveiros motor vehicle.

[130] Ergo, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that when the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had collided with the rear of the Viveiros motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and then collided again with the front of the Viveiros motor vehicle when Viveiros had followed the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and had tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had been driven by the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh.

(b) Conclusion on whether the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision with the Viveiros Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident

[131] In the uncontradicted evidence of Daniel Viveiros, who had testified that the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had collided with both the rear of his mother's Subaru motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East and then collided with the front of his mother's Subaru motor vehicle after Viveiros gave chase and tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, had also testified that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had the same facial hair that appears on the male person that is shown in the driver's licence photograph entered as Exhibit #2, which is an image of the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh. In addition, Viveiros had testified that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had not stopped or remained at the scene of either the two collisions between the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and his mother's Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle, but had fled from both scenes when he had the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, as indicated by the Ministry of Transportation documents entered as Exhibits #3 and #4, the registered owner of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle is the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh.

[132] Therefore, based on the uncontradicted evidence from the prosecution's witnesses, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had collided with the Viveiros Subaru motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton on March 14, 2024, and that the defendant had also unlawfully failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident. Daniel Viveiros had testified that after the collision on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East, the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle did not stop and had just driven away east on Sandalwood Parkway East and then turned off on a side road, and that after Viveiros had given chase and tried to block the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from leaving the area, the defendant drove into the front of Viveiros' motor vehicle and then fled the scene again.

[133] Accordingly, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 on March 14, 2024, that had collided with the rear of the Viveiros motor vehicle on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton and that he had unlawfully failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident, contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A.

(4) Conclusion On Amended Information #999-24-9020

(a) Conclusion on the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that drove over the lawn of a residential property, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping on the property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent on April 16, 2024

[134] The identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that drove over the lawn of a residential property, struck a tree and damaged the landscaping on that property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024, can be inferred from the description of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that Officer Lepine had obtained from the motorist that had been involved in a separate collision with a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 at the shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton, which had just occurred a kilometer away and several minutes earlier.

[135] Officer Lepine had testified that he had been called on April 16, 2024, to attend and investigate a hit-and-run motor vehicle accident involving a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that had occurred at the shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton. Officer Lepine also said he had been informed that the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle was CZWD900, which had been told to the 9-1-1 operator. In addition, Officer Lepine also said that when he attended the shopping plaza located at 80 Pertosa Drive he had received a description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle from the other motorist who had collided with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza. Officer Lepine said that the description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle provided to him was that the driver was an East Asian male person with a twisted moustache and had also spoke the Punjabi language and that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had licence plate number CZWD900. While Officer Lepine was at the shopping plaza investigating the hit-and-run accident, he received a call from his dispatcher that a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 had just been involved in another accident a kilometer north and a few minutes away on Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton.

[136] In addition, Officer Lepine testified that he did a search on the Ministry of Transportation website for the name of the registered owner of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 and that he had obtained information that the motor vehicle was registered to Rimpaldeep Singh. The two certified documents from the Ministry of Transportation entered as Exhibits #3 and #4 also confirm that Rimpaldeep Singh was the registered owner of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 on March 14, 2024, which supports the inference that he had been driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on April 16, 2024, that had been involved in two hit-and-run accidents that occurred a kilometer apart on Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton.

[137] Officer Lepine also said that he had searched the Ministry of Transportation website and observed the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh and said that the photograph showed Rimpaldeep Singh having a twisted moustache, which had also matched the description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that he had received from the other motorist involved in the hit-and-run accident at the shopping plaza with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Furthermore, the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh taken by Officer Riley on May 19, 2024 at 4:06 a.m., at the traffic stop on Rutherford Road South in the City of Brampton and entered as Exhibit #2, also shows Rimpaldeep Singh having a twisted moustache.

[138] In addition, Tristan Sodoma had observed the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 driving on his neighbour's lawn and then drive off, returned briefly, and then drive off again down Pertosa Drive. Sodoma had also testified that he had taken a video of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and then called 9-1-1 and informed the 9-1-1 operator about the hit-and-run accident and provided the licence plate number for the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle to the 9-1-1 operator. Sodoma also said he called 9-1-1 a second time after the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle reappeared briefly in the area where Sodoma was standing, and Sodoma had also said that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle appeared to be lost, but then drove away again on Pertosa Drive and did not stop or remain at the scene of the accident. Sodoma also said that he had called the 9-1-1 operator a second time and told the operator that he had observed that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle was still in the area, but then it drove away again.

[139] And, even though the evidence of who had been driving the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had driven over the lawn, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping on that property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024, is based on circumstantial evidence, the only reasonable or rational inference from that circumstantial evidence is that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was the driver and that no one else had been the driver when the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had driven over the lawn of the residential property and damaged the landscaping of that property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024. Ergo, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that when the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had had driven over the lawn of the residential property and damaged the landscaping of that property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton on April 16, 2024, the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 had been driven by the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh.

[140] Ergo, this uncontradicted evidence from Tristan Sodoma who observed the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 driving over the lawn of his neighbour's residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton; Officer Lepine's testimony that he had been investigating the first hit-and-run accident on April 16, 2024, that had occurred at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton when he received a call from his dispatcher that a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 had just been involved in a second hit-and-run accident a kilometer north on Pertosa Drive, which was a few minutes from the shopping plaza; and the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh entered as Exhibit #2, which shows Rimpaldeep Singh with a twisted moustache and which matches the description of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that had been involved in the first hit-and-run accident at the shopping plaza. And, because both hit-and-run accidents had involved the same black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 and had occurred only a kilometer apart from each other on Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton and a few minutes apart, then the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, who matched the description of the driver in the first hit-and-run that had occurred at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive would have also been the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that Tristan Sodoma had observed driving on the lawn of his neighbour's residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent because of the short time period between both hit-and-run occurrences involving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle. Furthermore, there is no evidence adduced that there had been two or more people in the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the time of both hit-and-run accidents on April 16, 2024, or that someone else could have been driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on April 16, 2024. Therefore, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with licence plate number CZWD900 that drove over the lawn of a residential property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent and damaged the landscaping on April 16, 2024, was the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh.

(b) Conclusion on whether the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that drove over the lawn of a residential property, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping on the property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent on April 16, 2024, had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident

[141] Based on the uncontradicted evidence of Tristan Sodoma and Officer Lepine, the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle which had driven over the lawn of a residential house located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton and struck a tree and damaged the landscaping of that property on April 16, 2024, had unlawfully fail to remain at or immediately return to the scene of that accident. Tristan Sodoma had testified that the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had just drove away around the corner after driving over the lawn of his neighbour's residential property, but did reappear briefly a few minutes later and appeared to be lost, but then drove off again on Pertosa Drive and did not remain at the scene of the accident. Sodoma also testified that he had obtained the licence plate of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on the date that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had driven over his neighbour's lawn and damaged the landscaping, and that he had called 9-1-1 and provided that licence plate number to the Peel Regional Police. Furthermore, Tristan Sodoma also testified that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle did not remain or immediately return to the scene of the accident where his neighbour's lawn had been driven over by the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle and which had damaged the landscaping of that property, except for a brief moment when the driver appeared to be lost in the area of the accident while trying to flee the area.

[142] In addition, Officer Lepine had testified that while he had been investigating a hit-and-run accident involving a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza located 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton, he said he had received a call from his dispatcher that a black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had just been involved in running over a lawn of a residential property just a few minutes north of his location on Pertosa Drive and that the caller of the 9-1-1 call had provided the licence plate of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle to the 9-1-1 operator. Officer Lepine also testified that it was plate number CZWD900, and that Rimpaldeep Singh was the registered owner of that Chrysler 300 motor vehicle, which had been based on his search of the Ministry of Transportation database on April 16, 2024. Furthermore, Exhibits #3 and #4, which are certified copies of documents from the Ministry of Transportation, also indicate that Rimpaldeep Singh had been listed as the registered owner of that black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 on March 14, 2024.

[143] Moreover, the description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that Officer Lepine had obtained on April 16, 2024, from the motorist of the other motor vehicle involved in the collision with the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive in the City of Brampton just a few minutes and a kilometer from where Tristan Sodoma had observed a Chrysler 300 motor vehicle driving over the lawn of a residential property, was that the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle driver had a twisted moustache and was an East Indian male person who also spoke the Punjabi language. That description of the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision at the shopping plaza at 80 Pertosa Drive of having a twisted moustache matches the photograph of the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh that is shown on the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh entered as Exhibit #2, which also shows the defendant having a twisted moustache. In addition, Officer Lepine said that there had been approximately $300 of damage to the landscaping of that residential property that the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle had caused to it.

[144] As such, this uncontradicted evidence from Officer Lepine and the driver's licence photograph of Rimpaldeep Singh in Exhibit #2 in regards to the description of the driver of the black coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle bearing licence plate number CZWD900 and the short period of time between the collision occurring at 80 Pertosa Drive and the collision with a tree at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent a few kilometers away, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that it had been the same person driving the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle in both collisions that had occurred on April 16, 2024, and as such, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, was the driver of the Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that drove over the lawn of the residential property at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent and damaged the landscaping of that property on April 16, 2024.

[145] As a result, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 on April 16, 2024, that had driven over the lawn of the residential property, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping of that property, which is located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton, and that he had unlawfully failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of that accident, contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the H.T.A.

5. DISPOSITION

[146] Based on the totality of the evidence, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 that had struck the Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle driven by Daniel Viveiros on March 14, 2024, eastbound on Sandalwood Parkway East in the City of Brampton, and that he had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident. In addition, the prosecution has also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, had been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle with plate number CZWD900 that had also driven over the lawn of a residential house, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping on that property on April 16, 2024, located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent in the City of Brampton, and that he had had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of that accident.

[147] Consequently, the prosecution has met their legal burden of proving that the defendant, Rimpaldeep Singh, is guilty of committing both of the "fail to remain" offences, contrary to s. 200(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O 1990, c. H.8. As a result, convictions will be entered against Rimpaldeep Singh for both those offences set out respectively, in Information #999-24-8424 and Information #999-24-9020.

Dated at the City of Brampton on September 11, 2025.

QUON J.P.

Ontario Court of Justice

Court File and Parties

Charges

Counsel

Cases Considered or Referred To

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited

Exhibits Entered

1. INTRODUCTION

Factual Background

Summary of Proceedings

Summary of Testimony

(1) Daniel Viveiros

(2) Officer Dene Lepine

(3) Tristan Sodoma

(4) Officer Zeljko Kukolic

(5) Officer Tyson Riley

Exhibits Entered

(1) The Two Still Photographs Entered As Exhibit #1

(2) The photograph of the driver's licence of Rimpaldeep Singh entered as Exhibit #2

(3) Certified Ministry of Transportation Documents Entered As Exhibits #3 and #4

2. APPLICABLE LAW

3. ISSUES

4. ANALYSIS AND DECISION

(A) SHOULD THE CROWN'S APPLICATION UNDER S. 34(2) OF THE P.O.A. TO AMEND THE TWO INFORMATIONS BE GRANTED?

(1) An Application To Amend An Information May Be Brought At Any Time Of The Proceedings

(2) In The Context Of An Ex Parte Trial, Would It Be Unjust To Amend The Information When The Defendant Had Not Been Present To Make Submissions Or To Reply To The Prosecution's Motion To Amend The Two Informations?

(3) The Power To Amend An Information To Conform With The Evidence Disclosed At Trial Is Set Out In S. 34(2) Of The P.O.A.

(4) Whether Amendments Which Substitute One Charge With A Different Charge Should Be Distinguished From Amendments Which Modifies Specific Details Of The Existing Charge In Determining Whether The Proposed Amendment Should Be Made To An Information

(5) Making Amendments To An Information Does Not Constitute The Laying Of A New Information Even If The Amendments Charge A New Offence

(6) Can The Proposed Amendments Be Made To The Two Respective Informations During The Prosecution's Closing Submission Stage Of The Trial?

(7) What Does "On Or About" Mean In Reference To The Date Of The Offence In The Charge?

(8) Is The Time When The Two "Fail To Remain" Offences Have Occurred An Essential Element Of The Offence?

(a) Situations or circumstances when the "time" of the offence would be an essential element of the offence

(9) Is The "Place" Where The Two "Fail To Remain" Offences Have Occurred An Essential Element Of The Offence?

(10) Discussion Of The S. 34(4) Factors

(a) Has Any Evidence Been Adduced At Trial?

(b) What Are The Circumstances In This Case?

(c) Has The Variance, Error, Or Omission Misled Or Prejudiced The Defendant?

(11) Is There "Presumed Prejudice" To The Defendants Just Because The Application For The Proposed Amendment Had Been Brought By The Prosecution At The Closing Arguments Stage Of The Trial?

(12) In Regards To The Defendant's Ability To Make Full Answer And Defence, Can The Proposed Amendments Be Done Without Causing Irreparable Prejudice To The Defendant?

(13) Having Regard To The Merits Of The Case, Can The Proposed Amendments Be Done Without Injustice To The Defendant?

(B) HAS THE PROSECUTION PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS COMMITTED THE TWO "FAIL TO REMAIN" OFFENCES?

(1) Use of circumstantial evidence as proof of the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle

(2) Other possible inferences from the circumstantial evidence that the defendant had not been the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle on March 14, 2024 or on April 16, 2024

(3) Conclusion On Amended Information #999-24-8424

(a) Conclusion on the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision with the Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East

(b) Conclusion on whether the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle involved in the collision with the Viveiros Subaru Crosstrek motor vehicle on March 14, 2024, on eastbound Sandalwood Parkway East had failed to remain at or immediately return to the scene of the accident

(4) Conclusion On Amended Information #999-24-9020

(a) Conclusion on the identity of the driver of the black-coloured Chrysler 300 motor vehicle that drove over the lawn of a residential property, struck a tree, and damaged the landscaping on the property located at Pertosa Drive and Olympia Crescent on April 16, 2024

5. DISPOSITION

This Proceeding

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law