Court File and Parties
Date: October 1, 2025
Metro North Toronto Region
Between:
His Majesty the King
— and —
Robert Freedland
Counsel:
- Mr. Mutton, Counsel for the Crown
- Ms. Chowdhury, for Mr. Freedland
Before: Justice M. Waby
Overview
Robert Freedland is the respondent to an Application brought by the Crown pursuant to section 117.05 of the Criminal Code.
[1] The Crown seeks an order forfeiting certain firearms and ammunition seized from Mr. Freedland on January 20, 2017 and re-seized on November 3, 2023. The items seized are: a Mossberg shotgun, SKS1 rifle, Scorpio shotgun and magazines.
[2] The Crown also seeks an Order that the Respondent be prohibited from possessing any weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance, or of any such thing, for a period of five years. Finally, the Crown seeks additional ancillary orders.
[3] Mr. Freedland brought an application before me alleging an abuse of process and seeking a stay of proceedings with respect to this 117.05 hearing on 17th January, 2025.
[4] In the alternative, Mr. Freedland sought two Orders from this Court at that time:
i. to summons the jurors from his original trial in 2018 in order that he may cross-examine them at this disposition hearing regarding his allegation of obstruction of justice
ii. to appoint an assistant Crown Attorney to the carriage of these proceedings who was not assigned to the Toronto region (an "Out of Town" Crown).
[5] On 17th January, 2025, I provided written reasons on Mr. Freedland's applications, R. v. Freedland, 2025 ONCJ 29. I denied his application for a stay of proceedings and denied his application for an order to summons his jurors for the purpose of cross-examination at this hearing.
[6] I did order that an "out of town" Crown Attorney be assigned carriage of these proceedings and assistant Crown Attorney Mr. Mutton was duly assigned. Subsequently, Mr. Freedland retained Ms. Chowdhury as his counsel to represent him on these proceedings.
[7] On consent, the Crown's 117.05 Application Record, comprising 1574 pages of varied and extensive materials was entered as an exhibit in its entirety.
[8] Mr. Freedland opposes all of the Crown's applications and seeks the return of his firearms and ammunition.
Summary
[9] Given the particular history of this matter a brief summary is of assistance. In January of 2017 Police searched the Respondent's residences and that of a Mr. Garvin James. In the latter search police found a recently purchased Mossberg Shotgun. It was registered to the Respondent. Two further firearms, a SKS rifle and a Scorpio Tactical Shotgun were found at the Respondent's property in Kaladar, Ontario. These firearms were seized pending his trial and then re-seized as part of this application on September 26th, 2023, by the Toronto Police Service. The Crown seeks forfeiture of them.
[10] Mr. James and the Respondent were subsequently charged with 10 counts of conspiracy to commit the indictable offence of kidnapping. The Respondent's preliminary hearing took place in the summer of 2017. At some point during this hearing, the parties came to resolution on what offences the Respondent would be committed to trial in the Superior Court of Justice. A simplified three count indictment was later placed before the court, it did not include any firearms offences.
[11] During the Respondent's jury trial Mr. James testified the Applicant purchased the Mossberg shotgun and ammunition. They were then allegedly given to Mr. James to use in the kidnapping of 10 lawyers targeted by the Respondent. The Respondent was found guilty of one count of counselling to commit extortion.
[12] On May 3rd, 2023, the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial, R. v. Freedland, 2023 ONCA 386. On July 28, 2023, the Crown stayed the proceedings. On September 22nd, 2023, the Toronto Police Service commenced this proceeding. There is presently no indictment before any court in the Province of Ontario and the Respondent is not currently charged with any Criminal Code offence.
Legal Framework Under Section 117.05
[13] It is important to emphasise that these 117.05 proceedings are not intended to be a re-litigation of the merits, or lack thereof, of Mr. Freedland's previous trial. These proceedings are not a criminal trial.
[14] The SCC in R. v. Zeolkowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378 and the relevant statutes make it clear that the firearm disposition process and its related regime do not equate with a person being accused of a criminal offence. Nor do the provisions affect the Respondent's liberty interests. The 117.05 process is one focused principally on issues of safety not punitive sanctions.
[15] Public safety applications under s. 117.05 are brought where the police, with or without a warrant, have seized firearms on the basis that it is not desirable in the interests of public safety for a person to possess the firearms.
[16] The Criminal Code then directs the court to hold a hearing as to whether it is desirable in the interests of public safety for the Respondent to possess "any weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance, or any such thing".
[17] If the justice hearing the application is satisfied that the Respondent possessing firearms or other weapons is not desirable in the interests of the safety of the Respondent, or any other person, the justice shall (a) order the seized items be forfeited to the Crown, and (b), where the circumstances warrant, order that the Respondent be prohibited from possessing any of the above items for no more than five years.
[18] At the hearing of the application, the justice shall hear all relevant evidence. All relevant evidence includes hearsay evidence. Any frailties in the evidence are a matter of weight, though when considering hearsay evidence "the judge must scrutinize the evidence to ensure that it is credible and trustworthy" R. v. Zeolkowski, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1378.
[19] The onus of proof in a hearing under s. 117.05 lies with the Crown, on a balance of probabilities, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that it is not desirable for the Respondent to possess firearms. The question is about the sufficiency of the evidence respecting the forfeiture and prohibition as of the date of the forfeiture hearing, not the date that the forfeiture application was commenced, R. v. Kuleczka, 2023 ONSC 3876 at para. 24.
[20] The purpose of s. 117.05 has been said to be "the protection of the public from the destructive force of firearms in the hands of persons not equipped morally, mentally, or emotionally to handle them". Criminal convictions are not required for the court to assess dangerous conduct. Section 117.05 is not offence-based. Rather it is aimed at preventing harm from the use of firearms and other dangerous objects.
[21] In determining what constitutes not desirable, "an identifiable threat of serious or significant harm likely to be caused by firearms and other dangerous objects to the safety of specified individuals" would be sufficient, but it is not a requirement that the Crown prove the likelihood of whether the person will use the firearm(s) in question, R. v. Kuleczka.
[22] The test is "whether there are legitimate concerns the person lacks the responsibility and discipline the law requires of gun owners". The Crown, therefore, must prove on a balance of probabilities that there is a legitimate concern that the Respondent lacks the responsibility and discipline required of a gun owner.
[23] The Courts have acknowledged this is not an onerous standard. R. v. Kuleczka at para. 24. As expressed by Blacklock J. of the Ontario Court of Justice, the basic question to be asked by the application judge is:
Am I satisfied, after reviewing the evidence in its totality, that it is more likely than not that there are in fact legitimate concerns indicating that the Respondent currently lacks the responsibility and discipline required of a gun owner?
R. v. Bokhari, 2009 ONCJ 691 at para. 12, R. v. Davidson, 2011 ONSC 249 at paras. 32-35.
Evidence and Analysis
[24] Evidence and Analysis
[25] In addition to the Crown's written materials, which largely comprise transcripts and documentary evidence from the original trial, the Crown also called viva voce evidence from now retired Staff Sgt. Lori Kranenberg who was the former OIC of the trial against the Respondent. Mr. Freedland also testified at these proceedings.
[26] Mr. Mutton submits that the Applications sought from this court should be granted for three reasons:
i. The Respondent harbours long-standing and irrational grievances against the justice system and its participants and these grievances have reached an unhealthy and obsessive level;
ii. Both the documentary evidence and the evidence of the Respondent at these proceedings discloses a reckless behaviour and a reckless attitude on the part of Mr. Freedland with respect to firearms and their responsible and safe ownership and use;
iii. Given the evidential threshold at a 117.05 hearing as distinct from that at a criminal trial, the materials from the Respondent's trial are credible and trustworthy and support an inference of criminality on the part of the Respondent and, the Crown argues, at the very least support an inference that the Respondent's criminal involvement was greater than he acknowledges.
[27] Ms. Chowdhury submits that the concerns that the Respondent has with respect to the integrity of the justice system and some of its participants does not meet the relatively low threshold contemplated by 117.05.
[28] Ms. Chowdhury submits that an individual is entitled to possess views that are critical or cynical of aspects of our justice system without being penalised for them. On behalf of Mr. Freedland, she argues that the Respondent has always adopted legal ways of communicating these views or frustrations.
[29] In line with the clearly expressed views of Mr. Freedland, she also submits that these proceedings are essentially an attempt to relitigate the Respondent's prior allegations of criminality. Ms. Chowdhury particularly urges this court to disregard or place negligible weight on any of the evidence attributed to Mr. James in the Crown's materials given what she submits are substantial credibility concerns.
[30] It is also the submission of Ms. Chowdhury that former Staff Sgt. Kranenberg has a long-standing animus towards the Respondent and her viva voce testimony reinforced this hostility. I do not accept this characterisation of her evidence. Ms. Chowdhury submits that with the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the Respondent would not repeat his mistakes of the past and that his possession of firearms does not give presently rise to a public safety concern.
[31] It is clear from the materials that I have reviewed that Mr. Freedland has profound concerns he is the victim of a conspiracy by a number of state actors. This list includes Crown Attorneys from the Toronto region as well as judges who have presided over his matters and a number of police officers and court clerks. He has similarly strong views with respect to lawyers involved in previous real estate transactions with which he was involved.
[32] As Mr. Mutton submitted, it is legitimate and reasonable for an individual to be cynical of institutions. However, Mr. Freedland appears to be unusually unfortunate in his claims to have been the victim of conspiracies by both the civil and criminal justice systems in unrelated proceedings.
[33] I accept that no medical evidence is before the court as to any diagnosis with respect to the Respondent and the Court and counsel are not medical practitioners. No-one involved in these proceedings is qualified to attach any medical label to the Respondent. Nevertheless, although he is clearly intelligent and articulate, it is readily apparent that Mr. Freedland has an unhealthy fixation on his perceived injustices and the irrational basis for them. This is manifest in the various materials that the Respondent has filed before the court in this, and other proceedings, as well as through his own testimony.
[34] Mr. Freedland maintains these convictions to the present day. They include an unwavering belief in criminal justice participants conspiring against him through the manipulation and abuse of various legal and procedural processes. While I am certain Mr. Freedland will robustly disagree with my assessment, there is no rational basis on any of the materials before me to support such claims. At the very least, this alone raises obvious concerns about such person possessing the emotional stability, perspective and responsibility required of a licensed gun owner.
[35] Nevertheless, I do appreciate the Respondent's concern at these proceedings being used as a proxy for his discontinued criminal charges. While the evidential standards applicable to a criminal trial and at proceedings under 117.05 are not the same, it is neither necessary, nor in my view appropriate for this court to draw inferences as to any criminal wrongdoing on the part of the Respondent.
[36] To do so in my view would be to import into these proceedings considerations that are not warranted. It is not the purpose of these proceedings to infer guilt of criminal offences through the application of lower evidential thresholds. While the evidence from the Respondent's trial is relevant and admissible in these proceedings, using it for the purpose of inferring guilt or a level of criminal responsibility regarding the original allegations is not in my view appropriate.
[37] Despite Mr. Mutton's submissions, I do not intend to draw any adverse inferences as to alleged criminality on the part of the Respondent based on the charges at his criminal trial. Mr. Freedland's conviction was overturned and the Crown elected to stay those charges. I am of the view that it is not appropriate for some form of double jeopardy to flow from these proceedings in that regard.
[38] Of greater concern and more immediate relevance is the evidence before this Court with respect to the Respondent's approach to the handling and security of firearms and his continuing perspective on that.
[39] It is clear and uncontested that following his purchase of a shotgun and ammunition, that the Respondent was content to permit Mr. James later that day to drive off with this newly purchased shotgun and ammunition in the boot of his car. Mr. James was not licensed to possess firearms or ammunition and the Respondent's shotgun was subsequently recovered by police after Mr. James' arrest, unsecured and lying under his bed at his home.
[40] In his testimony at these proceedings, Mr. Freedland consistently sought to downplay the significance of him abandoning the firearm into the care and control of Mr. James. This included his evidence that he wasn't concerned about Mr. James leaving with the shotgun since it was only intended to be for a day and that he and Mr. James had planned to get together the following day. Mr. Freedland also sought to portray himself as helpless in the face of Mr. James driving off with the weapon.
[41] It is accepted that Mr. Freedland did not know the actual address of Mr. James and that they did not in fact meet up the next day but approximately 2 weeks passed before police recovered the firearm in an unrelated arrest of Mr. James. It is also accepted that Mr. James was not licensed to possess firearms and Mr. Freedland reluctantly acknowledged this. However, the Respondent frequently sought to provide justifications for his baseless view that Mr. James' prior self-reported military and security sector experience provided some justification to conclude Mr. James was qualified and entitled to handle firearms.
[42] The Respondent was very clear in his evidence at this disposition hearing that while he regretted the consequences that flowed from leaving his firearm in the care of Mr. James he did not, and still does not, believe he really did anything unreasonable or unsafe. I do not share that view. At best the Respondent made a series of reckless assumptions based on unchallenged information he was given.
[43] The same day that he purchased a shotgun and ammunition Mr. Freedland allowed someone he knew, or should have known, was unlicensed to drive off with them to an unknown address. It does not in any way mitigate this obvious risk to claim that the 'plan' was to collect the shotgun the following day. At no point should Mr. Freedland have surrendered the firearm into the care of Mr. James as he did.
[44] This recklessness was then compounded by the fact that some two weeks elapsed and at no point did Mr. Freedland take any steps to ameliorate the situation or recover the firearm. The Respondent clearly remains of the view that he did nothing wrong and is essentially a victim of circumstances and of Mr. James.
[45] Despite his claim to the contrary, I have little faith that Mr. Freedland would act differently today in similar circumstances, and it is my assessment of risk at the present time which must inform my assessment in these proceedings.
[46] In his evidence, the Respondent testified to being a casual and infrequent user of firearms since he originally acquired his licence yet in his evidence he also spoke at some length and with some passion about his need to possess firearms on his extensive rural property. It was the Respondent's evidence he needed access to firearms not only to protect himself from wild animals but also from concerns he expressed about encountering other armed individuals.
[47] These included those the Respondent believes may be involved in criminal activity on or near his property, namely the illegal cultivation of drugs. The Respondent seems to consider it both unremarkable and necessary that he be allowed to arm himself against such a contingency. As the Crown points out, among the profound concerns this evidence raises, Canada is not its southern neighbour, there is no right to bear arms in our country nor the right to seek to possess firearms in order to speculatively defend oneself.
[48] The right to possess firearms is a very considerable privilege and one that is necessarily closely and appropriately regulated in our society. This sense of responsibility was manifest in the evidence of Staff Sgt. Kranenberg whose evidence did not exhibit any animus to the Respondent personally but rather reflected her profound concern at the behaviour and attitude of Mr. Freedland being consistent with responsible gun ownership. That is a concern I share.
[49] Statutory expectations around the storage, handling, transportation, and use of firearms and ammunition place clear and reasonable obligations on those given the privilege of possessing them. Those in possession of a licence to possess firearms, let alone firearms themselves are rightly expected to fully understand and comply with all such obligations.
[50] I am more than satisfied that the Respondent exhibited and continues to exhibit a dangerously cavalier attitude to the responsibilities of licenced gun ownership. He continues to downplay his former actions with respect to his shotgun and seeks to justify his conduct.
[51] This approach is compounded by the fact that while the Respondent rejects that he can fairly be labelled an 'obsessive' he is adamant that state actors conspired against him and he continues to hold this unjustifiable view with considerable conviction. Unfortunately, I anticipate the Respondent will almost certainly add the conclusions of this court to his list of imagined grievances.
[52] The test I am to apply in these proceedings is whether the Crown has established on a balance of probabilities that there is a legitimate concern that the Respondent lacks the responsibility and discipline required of a gun owner.
[53] For the foregoing reasons, in answer to Blacklock J's question, I am amply satisfied, after reviewing the evidence in its totality, that it is more likely than not that there are in fact very legitimate concerns indicating that the Respondent currently lacks the responsibility and discipline required of a gun owner.
Orders
[54] The following Orders sought by the Crown are granted:
i. Pursuant to section 117.05(4)(a) of the Criminal Code, the seized items will be forfeit to the Crown or be otherwise disposed of;
ii. Pursuant to section 117.05(4)(b) of the Criminal Code, the Respondent is prohibited from possessing any weapon, prohibited device, firearm part, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance, for a period of five years;
iii. Pursuant to section 114 of the Criminal Code, the Respondent will surrender to a peace officer, firearms officer, or Chief Firearms Officer within 7 days:
(a) any thing in his possession which is now prohibited on the date of the commencement of this Order, and,
(b) every authorization, licence and registration certificate relating to any thing the possession of which is prohibited by this order that is held by the Respondent on the commencement of this order;
iv. Pursuant to section 115 of the Criminal Code, that any such thing that is prohibited by this Order that is in the possession of the Respondent be forfeited to the Crown and disposed of as the Attorney General directs; and
v. Pursuant to section 116 of the Criminal Code, any authorization, licence or registration certificate relating to any thing the possession of which is prohibited by this order, that is held by the Respondent on the commencement of the order is revoked.
Released: 1st October, 2025
Signed: Justice M. Waby