Court Information

Date: August 18, 2017

In the Matter of: the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8

Between:

• The Corporation of the City of Brampton (prosecutor)
• and
• Michael E. Robinson (defendant)

Court: Ontario Court of Justice, Brampton, Ontario

Judge: Quon J.P.

Trial Held: May 5, 2017

Judgment Rendered: August 18, 2017

Charge

"Disobey sign", contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act

Counsel

• M. Baiocco, prosecutor for the City of Brampton
• Michael Robinson, unrepresented

Reasons for Judgment

Cases Considered or Referred To

• Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727
• Blue Mountain Resorts Ltd. v. Bok, 2013 ONCA 75, [2013] O.J. No. 520
• Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P. 2d 500 (Supreme Court of California)
• Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., [1926] O.J. No. 4
• Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031
• Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), [2002] O.J. No. 283
• People v. McGuire, 80 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 145 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Court of Appeals of California, 1978)
• R. v. Dockman, [1996] O.J. No. 4548 (ON CA)
• R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27, [2013] O.J. No. 253
• R. v. Plummer, [2006] O.J. No. 4530
• R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, [2014] E.W.H.C. 560 (High Court of England and Wales)
• Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27

Statutes, Regulations, Bylaws, and Rules Cited

• Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, ss. 1(1), 143, and 182(2)
• Signs Regulation (Highway Traffic Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615, s. 23
• California Vehicle Code, ss. 665.5, 22102, 22103, 22104, and 22105
• Brampton Bylaw #93-93, Schedule 11
• Brampton Bylaw #181-2004, s. 1
• Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F
• Road Traffic Act 1988 (U.K.), 1988, c. 52
• Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 27

Authorities or Reference Material Referred to or Considered

• Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook – instructions and diagrams on methods of turning your vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction (U-turns, three-point turns)
• Sullivan, R. Statutory Interpretation (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law Inc., 1997)

Exhibits Entered

Exhibit "1" – Copy of Google Map showing aerial view of Sunforest Drive, north of Bovaird Drive, in the City of Brampton, in which the defendant had marked a driveway with a blue "X" to indicate which private driveway is #6 Sunforest Drive and the driveway he had made a left turn into to do his three-point turn maneuver. The defendant had also placed red lines on the aerial map to indicate the paths his vehicle had travelled in making that three-point turn. (1 page)

1. BACKGROUND

[1] To be a "U-Turn" or not to be a "U-Turn", that is the question for this provincial offences trial. Specifically, it has to be decided whether a motorist who turns left into a private driveway and then reverses back out of the driveway to complete a three-point turn for the purpose of going in the opposite direction, has violated a posted "No U-Turn" traffic sign. In other words, for the motorist to be in violation of that "No U-Turn" sign, it would have to be found that the motorist's turns and driving maneuvers when taken together would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. However, because Ontario's Highway Traffic Act does not specifically define what turns or driving maneuvers made by a motor vehicle, or in what circumstances, would or would not constitute a U-Turn, then an appropriate legal test has to be first adopted that can be used for determining whether a particular driving maneuver, or a combination of turns and driving maneuvers, made by a motor vehicle in particular circumstances would constitute a "U-Turn maneuver" whenever such a maneuver is prohibited. In finding a proper test for determining which turns or driving maneuvers and in which circumstances those turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, the test must foster the purpose or aims underlying this public welfare legislation, which had been enacted to regulate motorists and the operation of motor vehicles on public roads, so as to ensure the safety of all who use public roads. Moreover, this public safety purpose is reflected and facilitated by municipalities or other authorized bodies through the erection or posting of traffic signs, which prohibit motorists from doing certain turns, maneuvers, or actions on public roads. As well, traffic signs are also utilized for the purpose of reducing congestion on roadways and to ensure efficient traffic flow.

[2] In the present case, Michael Robinson ("the defendant") has been charged with disobeying a traffic sign, contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8. The defendant allegedly made a U-Turn maneuver which had been prohibited by three validly erected and clearly posted "No U-Turn" traffic signs located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive. This particular road is located in the City of Brampton, and as such, the erection of the three "No U-Turn" signs had been legally authorized by Schedule 11 of Brampton Bylaw #93-93. That specific bylaw expressly prohibits motorists travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive between Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street from doing a "U-Turn" maneuver in order to change direction and proceed southbound on Sunforest Drive. And, because there is a school on the eastside of Sunforest Drive just north of Bovaird Drive, then there would be throughout a school day many pedestrians in that area, as well as numerous vehicles dropping off students in that area where the "No U-Turn" signs are situated.

[3] For the circumstances of the present case, the defendant, who was by himself, had been driving a 2004 Dodge Caravan SUV motor vehicle on September 13, 2015, at 1:45 p.m., and proceeding northbound on Sunforest Drive, just north of the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive in the City of Brampton. At this point, Officer Orgill of the Peel Regional Police, who had been there specifically to monitor traffic and to enforce the "No U-Turn" prohibition, had observed the Dodge Caravan SUV motor vehicle drive pass the first "No U-Turn" sign located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive. He then observed the left turn signal light on the Dodge Caravan motor vehicle come on, after which he had observed the Dodge motor vehicle make a left turn to go west across the southbound lane of Sunforest Drive and drive into a private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive, which had been located on the westside of Sunforest Drive. He then observed the Dodge vehicle come to a stop partly on the driveway and then reverse backwards onto Sunforest Drive, and then proceed forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive towards the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive. Officer Orgill also testified that the Dodge Caravan vehicle had not completely left the roadway, nor had it been driven completely onto the private driveway because he had observed the front wheels of the vehicle stop on the westside sidewalk while its rear wheels were still on the roadway and its rear had been overhanging the private driveway over the public roadway, which contradicts the defendant's testimony that the defendant's motor vehicle had been completely on private property and wholly off the public roadway.

[4] Moreover, Officer Orgill had been in a low-profile police cruiser facing southbound on the west side of Sunforest Drive. The cruiser was parked a few houses north of the private driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive, from where Officer Orgill said he had a clear view of the event.

[5] Officer Orgill also testified that Sunforest Drive is a highway with one lane northbound and one lane southbound in the area where the U-Turns are prohibited. Orgill also said that the defendant's Dodge Caravan motor vehicle had not completely left the roadway, as the motor vehicle's front wheels had stopped on the sidewalk on the westside of Sunforest Drive while its rear wheels were still on the roadway, before the vehicle had reversed completely back onto the roadway. Officer Orgill also said the distance between the west curb and the westside sidewalk is about five feet. However, the defendant said there is a grass boulevard on the westside that is about 8 to 10 feet wide that is situated between the west curb of Sunforest Drive and that westside sidewalk. The defendant also said that the distance between the west curb and the sidewalk is longer than the length of his motor vehicle. However, no evidence had been adduced at trial indicating where the property line that would separate the west boundary of the public roadway from the private property located at #6 Sunforest Drive had been actually located or where it would be in relation to the west curb.

[6] Now, in regards to the "disobey sign" charge, the defendant contends that he did not complete a "U-Turn" maneuver with his motor vehicle nor did he disobey the "No U-Turn" signs posted on Sunforest Drive. Instead, the defendant admits that he had been driving northbound on Sunforest Drive, just north of Bovaird Drive, when he signaled to make a left turn and then made a left turn, when it had been safe to do so, into a private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive that is on the westside of the roadway. He then said he drove onto the private driveway past the sidewalk and the west curb of the roadway, about 15 feet past the curb. He further contends that at the point on the private driveway, where he had stopped the forward movement of his motor vehicle just before he reversed it out of the private driveway back onto Sunforest Drive to complete his three-point turn, he had been wholly on private property and completely off the public roadway known as Sunforest Drive. However, the defendant never provided evidence of where the private property lines actually commenced or where the boundaries of the public property that would comprise the public roadway would end. He also said he did not know who lived at #6 Sunforest Drive, nor did he provide any evidence that he had a specific purpose for being on that property, except for the purpose of making a three-point turn, so that he could go southbound on Sunforest Drive. Moreover, after stopping momentarily on the private driveway, the defendant then said he had reversed his motor vehicle back onto the public roadway when it had been safe to do so, in order to complete a three-point turn. He then said he proceeded forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive so that he could pick up his wife, who works at the Walmart store situated in a shopping plaza, which is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Sunforest Drive and Bovaird Drive in the City of Brampton.

[7] What's more, the defendant submits that doing a left turn into a private driveway in order to do a three-point turn, so that he could change the direction he had been travelling from a northbound to southbound direction, had not been illegal or prohibited under the Highway Traffic Act. Moreover, he submits that this driving maneuver, known as a "three-point turn", is a legal driving maneuver that is illustrated, explained, and recognized in the Official Ministry of Transportation's Driver's Handbook, as a method for turning around a motor vehicle so as to go in the opposite direction (see how to do a three-point turn at "The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook"). But more significant, the defendant suggests that if the municipality did not want him to turn left into the private driveway located on the westside of Sunforest Drive for the purpose of making a three-point turn, then the municipality should have erected "No Left-Turn" signs instead on Sunforest Drive to prohibit his particular turn or driving maneuvers.

[8] The defendant also argues that there is no clearly defined definition contained in the Highway Traffic Act that sets out the type of driving maneuvers that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited, which means that his left turn into a private driveway, as well as his three-point turn, viewed together or separately, do not constitute a U-Turn. In addition, the defendant also argues that because his motor vehicle had actually left the public roadway and had been driven wholly onto private property, then his vehicle's actions on the private property were no longer regulated by the Highway Traffic Act, and that when his vehicle had re-entered onto the public roadway his vehicle's maneuver was now a new driving maneuver and no longer part of the original action or maneuver that had begun or commenced when his vehicle had turned left into the private driveway. In other words, there had been an intervening event between his first maneuver, consisting of driving northbound on Sunforest Drive and then turning left turn into the private driveway from the public roadway, and his second maneuver, consisting of reversing his vehicle back out onto the public roadway from the private driveway and then proceeding forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive, such that his vehicle's two maneuvers could no longer be considered to be one continuous movement commonly referred to as a "U-Turn", but were in fact two separate and distinct driving maneuvers. As such, the defendant contends that in regards to the turns or driving maneuvers comprising these two separate driving maneuvers, either viewed together, or separately, they could not in any way be considered to be one continuous movement made by his motor vehicle on a highway that would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver.

[9] Furthermore, the defendant submits that his left turn into a private driveway, as a driving maneuver, is no different or no less safe than when a motorist makes a left-turn maneuver from the parking lot of the school located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive in order for that motorist to go southbound on Sunforest Drive.

[10] On the other hand, the prosecution argues that a U-Turn is committed when the motor vehicle does a turn or driving maneuver which results in it turning around to go in the opposite direction from the direction which it had been originally travelling. And, that this outcome is what had ultimately occurred with the defendant's motor vehicle, which had been travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive when it had gone pass the first "No U-Turn" sign, signalled to make a left turn, and then turned left across the southbound lane of Sunforest Drive and drove onto a private driveway where the rear wheels were still on the public roadway and the rear part of the vehicle was still overhanging the public roadway. The defendant's motor vehicle then reversed back out of the private driveway right away and then proceeded forward to go southbound on Sunforest Drive. Consequently, submits the prosecution, those turns and driving maneuvers made in combination by the defendant's motor vehicle would constitute a "U-Turn maneuver" that was in violation of the posted "No U-Turn" signs.

[11] Moreover, since the Highway Traffic Act does not provide for a specific definition of what turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver when it is prohibited by a "No U-Turn" traffic sign, although it does provide for a general description of a "U-Turn" maneuver under s. 143 of Highway Traffic Act, as a "turn … so as to proceed in the opposite direction"; and since a "three-point" turn is also not specifically defined or even mentioned in the Highway Traffic Act; and since the driving maneuvers known commonly as a "U-Turn" and a "three-point" turn are both methods for turning a motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction; and since provisions in public welfare legislation are to be interpreted broadly so as to promote its purpose or goals, then a broad and purposive interpretation of what turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver had to be utilized. As such, the turns and driving maneuvers of the defendant's motor vehicle on September 13, 2015, on Sunforest Drive, which consist of making a left turn into a private driveway momentarily to complete a three-point turn for the purpose of turning around in order to proceed in the opposite direction from which he had been originally travelling, would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act.

[12] In addition, there is no requirement set out in the Highway Traffic Act that the U-Turn maneuver when prohibited has to be completed in one continuous forward movement or that a U-Turn maneuver when prohibited could not include a turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle would turn left into a private driveway to momentarily make a three-point turn so that the motor vehicle could then proceed in the opposite direction from the direction it had been travelling. Moreover, there is also no legal requirement that the U-Turn maneuver has to be completed wholly on the public roadway to constitute a U-Turn. As such, a motor vehicle that drives off a public roadway and is completely and momentarily on private property or off a public roadway momentarily to complete a three-point turn, would still be considered to be a turn or driving maneuver that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited, since the purpose of the motor vehicle's turn and combination of driving maneuvers had been so that it could go in the opposite direction from the original direction it had been travelling, which is the very purpose for why a motor vehicle would make a U-Turn on a highway.

[13] Accordingly, because the purpose of the defendant's left turn into a private driveway momentarily at #6 Sunforest Drive had been to make a three-point turn in order to go in the opposite direction, then the defendant's turns and driving maneuvers taken as a whole would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, and as such, the defendant has contravened the posted "No U-Turn" sign and committed the offence beyond a reasonable doubt of "disobey sign" under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

[14] The trial of this regulatory charge was held on May 5, 2017. After final submissions were made by the prosecution and the defendant, judgment was reserved and adjourned to August 17, 2017, for the judgment to be rendered. These therefore are the written reasons for judgment:

2. THE CHARGE

[15] As stated in the Certificate of Offence numbered 31604168187B that was issued on September 13, 2015, the defendant, Michael Robinson, has been charged with a Part I regulatory offence of disobeying a sign, contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8:

Michael E. Robinson

On the day of 2015 – 09 –13 1:45 P.M.

At Sunforest Drive

Brampton

Did commit the offence of: Disobey sign

Contrary to HTA, Sect. 182(2)

3. ISSUES

[16] The following are the issues that have arisen in this proceeding that need to be resolved:

(a) To constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, does the turn or driving maneuvers in question have to be completed in one continuous forward movement or can a U-Turn maneuver be comprised of several driving maneuvers of stops and reversals?

(b) Would a motor vehicle making a left turn into a private driveway for the purpose of executing a three-point turn so as to go in the opposite direction be a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act?

(c) Would a turn or driving maneuver, which involves a motor vehicle turning left into a private driveway so as to completely leave the public roadway momentarily and then immediately returns back onto the public roadway in order to complete a three-point turn maneuver, so as to proceed in the opposite direction, constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act?

(d) Does the turns or driving maneuvers that constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act require that they be completed wholly on a public roadway?

(e) Would a turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle is driven wholly onto private property to complete a three-point turn in order to proceed in the opposite direction constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act?

(f) Was the defendant's motor vehicle wholly on private property or was it still partly between the lateral property lines or boundaries of the public roadway when it made a turn or driving maneuver to go in the opposite direction?

4. ANALYSIS AND DECISION

(A) Did The Defendant Make A U-Turn Maneuver on Sunforest Drive?

[17] The defendant has been charged with the offence of "disobey sign" under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, by allegedly making a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive, which had been prohibited by three "No U-Turn" signs erected on the eastside of Sunforest Drive that are for northbound motorists.

[18] The three "No U-Turn" signs had been legally authorized, erected and posted under the authority of Schedule 11 of Bylaw #93-93, which had been amended by Bylaw #181-2004 that had been enacted on June 28, 2004:

The council of the Corporation of the City of Brampton hereby ENACTS as follows:

1. By-law 93-93, as amended, is hereby further amended as follows:

(1) by deleting from Schedule 11 thereto the following items:

U-TURNS

COLUMN 1 HIGHWAY	COLUMN 2 BETWEEN
Heart Lake Road	Sandalwood Parkway and a point 130 metres north of Sandalwood Parkway
Nasmith Street	Bovaird Drive and Newport Street/Nuffield Street
Sandalwood Parkway East	A point 15 metres west of Richvale Drive and a point 15 metres east of Richvale Drive
Sunforest Drive	Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street

(2) by adding to Schedule 11 thereto the following items:

U-TURNS

COLUMN 1 HIGHWAY	COLUMN 2 BETWEEN
Heart Lake Road	Sandalwood Parkway East and a point 130 metres north of Sandalwood Parkway East
Nasmith Street	Bovaird Drive East and Newport Street/Nuffield Street
Sandalwood Parkway East	A point 15 metres west of Richvale Drive North/Richvale Drive South and a point 15 metres east of Richvale Drive North/Richvale Drive South
Sunforest Drive	Bovaird Drive East and Cashel Street

[19] Hence, the three erected signs on the eastside of Sunforest Drive prohibited the defendant from making a "U-Turn" maneuver while traveling northbound on Sunforest Drive to go southbound on Sunforest Drive between Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street in the City of Brampton.

[20] Section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act provides that every driver or operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions or directions indicated on any sign so erected:

182(2) Every driver or operator of a vehicle or street car shall obey the instructions or directions indicated on any sign so erected.

[21] The actual look of the "No U-Turn" signs erected on Sunforest Drive, as well as its dimensions, layout, description, markings, and graphic illustrations are prescribed and illustrated by the Figure and provisions contained in s. 23 of the Signs Regulation (Highway Traffic Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615:

No U Turn Sign

23. A no U Turn sign shall,

(a) be rectangular in shape and shall be not less than 60 centimetres in height and not less than 60 centimetres in width; and

(b) bear the markings and have the dimensions as prescribed and illustrated in the following Figure:

Text alternative: Illustration of a sign with a "No U-turn" symbol consisting of a curving u-shaped black arrow inside a red circle with an interdictory stroke, on white retro-reflective background with a black border. Indicated size (60 x 60 cm). This text alternative is provided for convenience only and does not form part of the official law.

[22] Therefore, in order to prove that the defendant has committed the offence set out in s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act of disobeying a traffic sign, the prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's motor vehicle had made a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive, which would have disobeyed the instructions and directions indicated on the three "No U-Turn" signs located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive.

(1) Is There A Definition In The Highway Traffic Act Of What A "U-Turn" Maneuver Entails?

[23] Deciding whether the particular turns or driving maneuvers, which had been made by the defendant's motor vehicle to facilitate going southbound on Sunforest Drive after it had been originally travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive, in the circumstances, would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, is not a simple determination, since there is no definition of what a U-Turn maneuver entails that has been provided in the definitions section contained in s. 1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act or that has been provided in any other part of that Act. Moreover, the only provision that is contained in the Highway Traffic Act which actually provides a description of what a U-Turn is equated to is found in s. 143. In s. 143, a "U-Turn" is described or equated to a driving maneuver upon a highway in which the driver or operator of a vehicle "turn[s] the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction":

U-turns prohibited

143. No driver or operator of a vehicle upon a highway shall turn the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction when,

(a) upon a curve where traffic approaching the vehicle from either direction cannot be seen by the driver of the vehicle within a distance of 150 metres;

(b) on a railway crossing or within 30 metres of a railway crossing;

(c) upon an approach to or near the crest of a grade where the vehicle cannot be seen by the driver of another vehicle approaching from either direction within 150 metres; or

(d) within 150 metres of a bridge, viaduct or tunnel where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 143.

[24] But more importantly, nowhere in the Highway Traffic Act does it indicate that a U-Turn maneuver has to be completed in one continuous forward movement or whether it could be completed in several turns or maneuvers that includes stops and reversals of the motor vehicle, nor does it specify that the U-Turn maneuver has to be completed wholly on the travelled portion of public roadway or whether a turn or a set of driving maneuvers would still be considered to be a U-turn maneuver if it is completed partly using private property or the non-travelled portion of the public roadway.

[25] Furthermore, the actual offence of making a "prohibited U-Turn" prescribed in s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act is limited in scope and application, since it only refers to four special situations where making a U-Turn on a highway is illegal. Section 143, however, does not refer to the situation when a "U-Turn" maneuver is prohibited by a posted "No-U-Turn" traffic sign.

[26] In any event, the defendant is not charged with committing the offence of making a prohibited U-Turn under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act, but is charged with disobeying a traffic sign under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, which happens to be a "No U-Turn" sign.

[27] Consequently, because the defendant is charged with committing the "disobey sign" offence under s. 182(2), the situations in which making a turn or driving maneuver that would be in disobedience of the "No U-Turn" signs would encompass more circumstances than just the 4 special situations set out in s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act.

(a) Is there a definition for the expression "U-Turn" in the Regulations enacted under the Highway Traffic Act?

[28] Similarly, there is also no definition, list of circumstances, or list of criterion for the type of turns or driving maneuvers that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver contained or provided under s. 23 of the Signs Regulation (Highway Traffic Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615, which is the statutory provision that sets out the dimensions, layout, description, markings, and the graphical illustration of the prohibited turn or maneuver for the "No U-Turn" traffic sign.

(2) Should The Types Of Turns Or Driving Maneuvers And The Types Of Circumstances That Would Constitute A "U-Turn" Be Interpreted Broadly So As To Include A Combination Of A Left Turn, A Three-Point Turn Which Comprise Of Stops And Reversal Maneuvers, And The Use Of A Driveway?

[29] To determine if the defendant's motor vehicle had made a U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act in contravention of the three "No U-Turn" signs that prohibit U-Turn maneuvers on Sunforest Drive, an appropriate test has to be adopted for making such a determination, since the Highway Traffic Act does not specifically define or expressly provide for what types of turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances such turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a U-Turn maneuver. Adopting the appropriate legal test for determining whether a particular turn or driving maneuver or set of circumstances in which particular turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver is critical for deciding if the prosecution has proven that the defendant has committed the "disobey sign" offence under s. 182(2), considering that the specific type of turns or driving maneuvers that the defendant's motor vehicle had engaged in for the purpose of going in the opposite direction on Sunforest Drive were not in the circumstances accomplished in one continuous forward movement nor wholly on Sunforest Drive.

(a) Public Welfare Legislation Is To Be Generously Interpreted In A Manner That Is In Keeping With The Purposes And Objectives Of The Legislative Scheme

[30] In Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), 58 O.R. (3d) 37 (O.C.A.), at para. 16, Sharpe J.A. had not only reinforced the notion that narrow or technical interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's public welfare objectives were to be avoided, but that he had also emphasized that the generous approach to be used for the interpretation of public welfare statutes does not, however, call for a limitless interpretation of their provisions:

The OHSA is a remedial public welfare statute intended to guarantee a minimum level of protection for the health and safety of workers. When interpreting legislation of this kind, it is important to bear in mind certain guiding principles. Protective legislation designed to promote public health and safety is to be generously interpreted in a manner that is in keeping with the purpose and objectives of the legislative scheme. Narrow or technical interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's public welfare objectives are to be avoided.

[31] Similarly, in Blue Mountain Resorts Ltd. v. Bok, 2013 ONCA 75, [2013] O.J. No. 520, the Court of Appeal for Ontario, at paras. 24, 26, and 27, held that interpreting legislation broadly to accord with the purpose of the legislation does not on the other hand call for a limitless interpretation of their provisions, which could extend the reach of the legislation far beyond what was intended by the legislature:

Public welfare legislation is often drafted in very broad, general terms, precisely because it is remedial and designed to promote public safety and to prevent harm in a wide variety of circumstances. For that reason, such legislation is to be interpreted liberally in a manner that will give effect to its broad purpose and objective: R. v. Timminco Ltd. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 21 (C.A.), at para. 22.

This generous approach to the interpretation of public welfare statutes does not call for a limitless interpretation of their provisions, however.

One of the problems with what is otherwise an understandable approach to the interpretation of public welfare legislation is that broad language, taken at face value, can sometimes lead to the adoption of overly broad definitions. This can extend the reach of the legislation far beyond what was intended by the legislature and afford the regulating ministry a greatly expanded mandate far beyond what is needed to give effect to the purposes of the legislation.

[32] Equally, the notion that legislation containing broad language may be given a restrictive interpretation in order to avoid absurdity in particular circumstances has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada as a principle of statutory interpretation: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, at pp. 1081-82; and Boma Manufacturing Ltd. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 727, at para. 109, per Iacobucci J.

[33] But more importantly, interpreting a statutory provision for a precise meaning does not simply require looking at the plain or literal meaning of each individual word within the statutory provision in isolation. As the Supreme Court held in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at pp. 40-41, courts should use the modern principled approach instead of the plain meaning approach, when they are required to interpret or construe the meaning of a particular statutory provision, which requires that the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of the legislators who enacted the statutory provision:

Although much has been written about the interpretation of legislation (see, e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation (1997); Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994) (hereinafter "Construction of Statutes"); Pierre-André Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)), Elmer Driedger in Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983) best encapsulates the approach upon which I prefer to rely. He recognizes that statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone. At p. 87 he states:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

[34] Moreover, s. 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, a statute that governs the interpretation of statutes and regulations enacted by the Ontario Legislature, expressly states that a fair, large, and liberal interpretation of Ontario statutes should be made to best ensure the attainment of the object of a statute:

Rule Of Liberal Interpretation

64(1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

Same

(2) Subsection (1) also applies to a regulation, in the context of the Act under which it is made and to the extent that the regulation is consistent with that Act.

[35] Furthermore, in her textbook, Statutory Interpretation (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law Inc., 1997), at pp. 54, 134, and 137, Professor Ruth Sullivan emphasized that interpreters of legislative text must identify and take into account the purpose of legislation and by analyzing the words to be interpreted in context, and that modern legislation is also written in a form that lends itself to purposive analysis:

The meaning of a legislative text is determined by analysing the words to be interpreted in context. Words are analysed in their immediate context by focusing on the specific provision in which the words appear and attempting to understand the reasons why the legislature has chosen this combination of words, this structure, this punctuation, and so on. Words are also analysed in larger contexts by comparing the wording of the provision to be interpreted with the wording of provisions elsewhere in the same or other Acts and by considering the role of the provision in the scheme to which it belongs.

To achieve a sound interpretation of a legislative text, interpreters must identify and take into account the purpose of legislation. This includes the purpose of the provision to be interpreted as well as larger units - parts, divisions, and the Act as a whole. Once identified, the purpose is relied on to help establish the meaning of the text. It is used as a standard against which proposed interpretations are tested: an interpretation that promotes the purpose is preferred over one that does not, while interpretations that would tend to defeat the purpose are avoided.

[36] In addition, the principles to follow for adopting the proper interpretation or construction of public welfare legislation have been outlined by Sharpe J.A. for the Court of Appeal in Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), [2002] O.J. No. 283, at paras. 16 to 20, which include generously interpreting protective legislation designed to promote public health and safety in a manner that is in keeping with the purposes and objectives of the legislative scheme; that narrow or technical interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's public welfare objectives are to be avoided; to interpret a legislative provision in its total context; to consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning; that the interpretation of the statutory provision should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning; and that penal legislation, even of the public welfare variety, must also be interpreted in a manner consistent with the procedural rights of the accused. Finally, Sharpe J.A. held that a balance must be struck to arrive at an interpretation that promotes the larger objects of the legislation and at the same time respects the procedural rights of the accused:

The OHSA is a remedial public welfare statute intended to guarantee a minimum level of protection for the health and safety of workers. When interpreting legislation of this kind, it is important to bear in mind certain guiding principles. Protective legislation designed to promote public health and safety is to be generously interpreted in a manner that is in keeping with the purposes and objectives of the legislative scheme. Narrow or technical interpretations that would interfere with or frustrate the attainment of the legislature's public welfare objectives are to be avoided.

This principle has been recognized and applied in several recent decisions of this court. In R. v. Timminco Ltd. (2001), 54 O.R. (3d) 21 (C.A.) at 27, Osborne A.C.J.O. stated:

The Occupational Health and Safety Act is a public welfare statute. The broad purpose of the statute is to maintain and promote a reasonable level of protection for the health and safety of workers in and about their workplace. It should be interpreted in a manner consistent with its broad purpose.

Laskin J.A. adopted the same principles when interpreting the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, s. 84.1 dealing with the hazard of "flying truck wheels" in Ontario (Minister of Transport) v. Ryder Truck Rental Canada Ltd. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 171 at 174:

The modern approach to statutory interpretation calls on the court to interpret a legislative provision in its total context. The court should consider and take into account all relevant and admissible indicators of legislative meaning. The court's interpretation should comply with the legislative text, promote the legislative purpose, reflect the legislature's intent, and produce a reasonable and just meaning [Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994), at p. 131.] The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this approach to statutory interpretation, most recently in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at p. 704, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 385, where Cory and Iacobucci JJ. wrote:

As this Court has frequently stated, the proper construction of a statutory provision flows from reading the words of the provision in their grammatical and ordinary sense and in their entire context, harmoniously with the scheme of the statute as a whole, the purpose of the statute, and the intention of Parliament. The purpose of the statute and the intention of Parliament, in particular, are to be determined on the basis of intrinsic and admissible extrinsic sources regarding the Act's legislative history and the context of its enactment ...

In Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board) v. Hamilton Health Sciences Corp. (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 83 at p. 87, Rosenberg J.A. adopted a similar approach when interpreting the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, S.O. 1997, c. 16, Sched. A:

The starting point for the interpretation of the statutory provisions involved in this appeal is s. 10 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.11.

10. Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of anything that the Legislature deems to be for the public good or to prevent or punish the doing of any thing that it deems to be contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.

(Emphasis added)

By its terms, s. 10 applies to penal statutes. Iacobucci J. considered the application of s. 10 in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193. He held that s. 10 directs the court to not only consider the plain meaning of the specific provisions in question, but the scheme of the Act as a whole, its object and the intention of the legislature.

It remains true, of course, that penal legislation, even of the public welfare variety, must also be interpreted in a manner consistent with the procedural rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to have full and fair notice of the charges and to make full answer and defense to those charges. In the end, a balance must be struck to arrive at an interpretation that promotes the larger objects of the legislation and at the same time respects the procedural rights of the accused.

(b) What Is The Legislative Goal Of The Highway Traffic Act?

[37] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has held at para. 38 in R. v. Plummer, [2006] O.J. No. 4530 (O.C.A.), that the scheme of the Highway Traffic Act has many purposes, but that it is first and foremost a collection of duties and obligations imposed on drivers in relation to the operation of vehicles, especially motor vehicles, to ensure the safety of motorists and others:

The Act has many purposes. It is first and foremost a collection of duties and obligations imposed on drivers in relation to operation of vehicles, especially motor vehicles, to ensure the safety of motorists and others. See Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., [1926] 3 D.L.R. 254 (Ont. C.A.). It also establishes a licensing scheme and gives to police officers (and other officers appointed for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act) powers to enforce this bundle of regulations, including the licensing scheme. However, the Act is only quasi-criminal legislation and strict limits have been placed on the powers of police and others to enforce the legislated duties and obligations by means more normally associated with criminal legislation.

[38] In addition, in Harris v. Yellow Cab Ltd., [1926] O.J. No. 4 (Ont. Supreme Ct. (App. Div.)), at para. 9, Hodgins J.A. held that the Highway Traffic Act deals with the operation of motor and other vehicles on a highway when driving, as well as protecting people from dangers to which they are exposed from the neglect of statutory provisions regarding motors and other vehicles when on the highway itself, and their equipment, and from the perils caused thereon by the operation of moving vehicles:

The Act clearly deals with the operation of motor and other vehicles on a highway, as is evident from the frequent use of the expressions "on a highway," "when driving," as well as from the fact that the various sections are directed to protecting people from dangers to which they are exposed from the neglect of statutory provisions regarding motors and other vehicles when on the highway itself, and their equipment, and from the perils caused thereon by the operation of moving vehicles.

(c) U-Turns Are Naturally Unsafe Driving Maneuvers

[39] The Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Dockman, [1996] O.J. No. 4548, at para. 7, has recognized that a U-Turn maneuver, as a driving maneuver, is a naturally unsafe or imprudent turn, even though the actual unsafeness of the particular turn or maneuver in question is not an element of the offence that the prosecution is required to prove for a charge of making a prohibited U-Turn under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act:

It is conceded by the Crown that both the trial and appellate courts below misinterpreted s. 143 (c) of the Highway Traffic Act by resting liability on the unsafe nature of the turn. Section 143(c) makes it an offence to make a U-turn near the crest of a grade without the driver being able to see oncoming vehicles for 150 metres. The unsafe or imprudent nature of the turn is not an element of the offence. Accordingly, the trial court failed to give proper effect to the contradicted evidence that the appellant had a sight line of more than 150 metres when he made his turn. As result, the learned Justice of the Peace failed to appreciate correctly the nature of the offence. The learned appeal judge was also in error in upholding the conviction.

[40] Therefore, motorists who make U-turns on a public roadway or highway are making inherently unsafe turns or driving maneuvers, especially when there are other motor vehicles or pedestrians around because the motorist making that U-Turn maneuver affects motor vehicles travelling in two opposite directions and can be especially dangerous to other motorists travelling in the opposite direction who would not expect a motor vehicle to do such a maneuver across their path at an intersection or at mid-block, as well as creating unsafe risk to pedestrians crossing the street at an intersection.

(3) In Promoting The Purposes And Goals Of The Highway Traffic Act And In Protecting The Procedural Rights Of An Accused What Criteria Should Be Used To Decide What Type Of Turn Or Driving Maneuvers And In What Circumstances Such Turns Or Driving Maneuvers Would Constitute A "U-Turn" Maneuver Within The Meaning Of The Highway Traffic Act?

[41] To promote the purposes or objectives of the Highway Traffic Act in reducing the risk of accidents, ensuring the safe use of public roads, and to protect motorists and pedestrians on public roads, the type of turns or driving maneuvers and circumstances that would constitute a prohibited "U-Turn" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act must be interpreted broadly, but at the same time that interpretation must be balanced with the procedural rights of the accused: Ontario (Ministry of Labour) v. Hamilton (City), [2002] O.J. No. 283 (O.C.A.). As such, motorists should have full and fair notice of what turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances such turns or driving maneuvers would constitute a "U-Turn" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act.

(a) Does A Prohibited U-Turn Maneuver Within The Meaning Of The Highway Traffic Act Have To Be Accomplished In One Continuous Movement Or Can It Be Accomplished By More Than One Turn Or Driving Maneuver?

[42] In People v. McGuire (1978), 80 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 145 Cal. Rptr. 514, the Court of Appeals for the State of California had to consider, on an appeal of a conviction, the question of whether a motorist who makes a turn or driving maneuver in order to complete a turn to go in the opposite direction on a public roadway, by driving into a driveway and then reversing back onto the roadway to complete that opposite-direction turn or driving maneuver, had made a U-Turn, which had been prohibited in that area of the highway. The convicted motorist at trial had been found guilty of making a prohibited U-Turn under section 22102 of the California Vehicle Code, which had stated:

22102. No person in a business district shall make a U-turn, except at an intersection, or on a divided highway where an opening has been provided in accordance with Section 21651. This turning movement shall be made as close as practicable to the extreme left-hand edge of the lanes moving in the driver's direction of travel immediately prior to the initiation of the turning movement, when more than one lane in the direction of travel is present.

[43] The California Vehicle Code, by virtue of sections 22103, 22104, and 22105 also made it illegal to make a U-Turn in specified situations, such as when any other vehicle is approaching from either direction within 200 feet, except at an intersection controlled by a traffic control device; when in front of the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station or not to use the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction; and upon any highway where the driver does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon:

22103. No person in a residence district shall make a U-turn when any other vehicle is approaching from either direction within 200 feet, except at an intersection when the approaching vehicle is controlled by an official traffic control device.

22104. No person shall make a U-turn in front of the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station. No person shall use the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction.

22105. No person shall make a U-turn upon any highway where the driver of such vehicle does not have an unobstructed view for 200 feet in both directions along the highway and of any traffic thereon.

[44] But more importantly, under s. 665.5 of the California Vehicle Code, a "U-Turn" had been defined as "the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not":

665.5. A U-turn is the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not.

[45] However, in arriving at their decision that a motor vehicle, which makes a turn into a driveway for the purpose of turning around to go in the opposite direction, was not a "U-Turn" or a driving maneuver specifically prohibited by the statutory provision under which the convicted motorist had been charged and convicted, the California Court Of Appeals in People v. McGuire had taken a narrow and strict construction approach to interpreting what constitutes a U-Turn by relying precisely on the "plain meaning" or "literal meaning" of the wording in that statutory provision. The California Court Of Appeals had concluded that the turns and driving maneuvers used and made by the convicted motorist did not constitute a U-Turn maneuver because section 22102 of the California Vehicle Code, which prohibited the making of a U-Turn in a business district unless at an intersection or on a divided highway at a properly designated opening, had not specifically and expressly prohibited the turn or driving maneuver in which a motor vehicle would use a driveway to accomplish turning around so as to proceed in the opposite direction on a highway, which the convicted motorist had done so by turning into a driveway and then reversing to complete a three-point turn (as that driving maneuver is commonly known). Moreover, the California Court Of Appeals had also concluded that if the California Legislature had desired or intended to prohibit that particular type of turn or driving maneuver using a driveway, it could have easily done so, as it had done in the second sentence of section 22104 of the California Vehicle Code, which had clearly stated that a motorist was prohibited from using "the driveway entrance or approaches to a fire station for the purpose of turning a vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction":

… defendant made an illegal U-turn in violation of Vehicle Code section 22102. Defendant, southbound within a business district, made a left turn, crossed northbound lanes, entered into a driveway on the easterly side of the street, backed up to head northward, then proceeded in a northerly direction and parked at the east curb.

We cannot fairly read section 22102, involved here, to include the use of a driveway, since that section's reference to a "U-turn" was inserted at the same time and by the same 1970 statute (ch. 620, § 2). A myriad of cases instructs us that statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together and harmonized if possible (e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 437, 442 [62 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432 P.2d 31]). "Both Acts were passed upon the same day and relate to the same subject matter. They are, therefore, according to a well settled rule of interpretation, to be read together, as if parts of the same Act...." (People v. Jackson (1866) 30 Cal. 427, 430.) [1b] In the light of these guidelines, we construe section 22102 not to prohibit a turn accomplished by the use of a driveway, such as occurred here

Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 652, in stating that the use of a driveway did not constitute a "U-turn" said "Neither the making of a left turn into a private driveway nor the backing out of a driveway is in itself prohibited, and the [then] section does not specify that the combination of the two, when the driver's real purpose is to proceed in the opposite direction, must be treated as a single, complete turn coming within the prohibition of the statute." (Id., at p. 656.) The People urge that the language of section 665.5 which defines a U-turn as the turning of a vehicle upon a highway so as to proceed in the opposite direction "whether accomplished by one continuous movement or not" was designed to meet the holding of Butigan. Clearly, as the People suggest, one turning a vehicle on a narrow street, so as to go in the other direction, and having to make a series of backings and fillings to accomplish that result, would have made a U-turn within the present definition. But in urging, without citation of other authority, that the definition likewise extends to turns which involve the use of driveways, the People fail to take into account the statutory history which we have recited here. If the Legislature desires to prohibit the type of turn which defendant made in this case it can easily do so, without ambiguity, as it has done in the second sentence of section 22104.

[46] And, in Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co. (1958), 49 Cal. 2d 652, 656, 320 P.2d 500, the Supreme Court of California had to also consider whether a motorist who commences to make a left turn into a driveway and then reverses back out for the purpose of making a "three-point turn" (as that driving maneuver is commonly known as), had contravened the "No U-Turn" prohibition of s. 541 of the California Vehicle Code (as it was then), which stated that "No vehicle in a business district shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction, except at an intersection." In interpreting whether the intended maneuver of the motorist had contravened the "No U-Turn" prohibition, the majority of the Supreme Court of California had interpreted s. 541 of the Vehicle Code using the "plain meaning" of its wording that it did not, since the provision itself did not specifically prohibit the turning movements which the motorist had been attempting to execute of making a left turn into a driveway and then the backing out of a driveway, nor did s. 541 specify that the combination of those two turning movements must be treated as a single, complete turn when the driver's real purpose for making those two turning movements had been for turning around to proceed in the opposite direction:

The first question is whether the evidence shows as a matter of law that the collision was caused by the negligence of any of the defendants. Plaintiff contends that the manner in which Bland turned violated sections 541 and 544 of the Vehicle Code. [1] Section 541, insofar as applicable, reads: "(a) No vehicle in a business district shall be turned so as to proceed in the opposite direction, except at an intersection." This provision, which prohibits "U" turns, does not prohibit the movements which Bland testified he was attempting to execute. Neither the making of a left turn into a private driveway nor the backing out of a driveway is in itself prohibited, and the section does not specify that the combination of the two, when the driver's real purpose is to proceed in the opposite direction, must be treated as a single, complete turn coming within the prohibition of the statute. [2] Section 544 permits the making of a turn only when it can be made with reasonable safety and after giving an appropriate signal. This provision does not require the driver to know that a turn can be made with safety but only that he must exercise reasonable care, and whether such care has been exercised is normally a question of fact. (Washam v. Peerless Automatic etc. Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 174, 177 [113 P.2d 724]; Spear v. Leuenberger, 44 Cal.App.2d 236, 247-248 [112 P.2d 43].)

[47] But, unlike the California Vehicle Code, Ontario's Highway Traffic Act does not contain an actual definition for the driving maneuver commonly known as a "U-Turn", while the California Vehicle Code did have a definition for the "U-Turn" maneuver. Furthermore, the definition of a "U-Turn" in the California Vehicle Code clearly stated that for a driving maneuver to constitute a U-Turn it did not have to be accomplished in one continuous movement while the Ontario Highway Traffic Act is silent in that respect. Moreover, in reference to the prohibited U-Turn offence for the four special situations listed under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act, there was no expressed condition that the U-Turn maneuver had to be completed on a highway in one continuous movement or whether it could be comprised of more than one turn or driving maneuver.

[48] On the other hand, the type of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances that would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver when prohibited had been interpreted by the English courts much more purposively and broadly than the interpretation that had been used by the California Court of Appeals. In a similar situation to the case at bar, where a motorist had been charged and convicted in London, England with contravening a posted "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign after completing a three-point turn to proceed in the opposite direction on a public roadway, Justice Keyser of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales in R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, [2014] E.W.H.C. 560 (H.C. of Engl. And Wales (Q.B. Div. (Admin. Ct.))), had to also consider the same legal arguments as that which had been brought by the defendant, Michael Robinson, in the case at bar. And, like Ontario's Highway Traffic Act, the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 (U.K.), 1984, c. 27, the legislation governing the prohibited U-Turn in England, Scotland, and Wales, also did not specifically define the expression "U-Turn", nor did it specify whether a prohibited U-Turn maneuver had to be made in one continuous movement or whether it could be made in several turns or driving maneuvers.

[49] The convicted motorist in that English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor had argued that to constitute a U-Turn the driving maneuver had to be accomplished in one continuous movement without stops or reversals; that the convicted motorist had not made a U-Turn but instead had made a three-point turn, which is not an illegal maneuver; and that the legislator's intention that a U-Turn had to be accomplished in one single and continuous forward movement is demonstrated by the pictorial description of the prohibited turn shown on the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign, which depicts what a prohibited U-Turn would look like in form -- which would not include nor prohibit a three-point turn as the pictorial description had only depicted a continuous upside-down curved "U" shape for that prohibited turn.

[50] After considering the convicted motorist's arguments brought at the appeal, Justice Keyser at para. 49 in R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, rejected all of the convicted motorist's arguments. First of all, Justice Keyser rejected the argument that making a right turn to do a legal three-point turn was not a U-Turn nor prohibited by the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign. (It is important to remember that motorists in England drive on the left side of a divided highway unlike in Canada where motorists drive on the right side of a divided highway, so that motorists in England would make a right turn into a driveway to make a three-point turn or a right turn to make a U-Turn.) In finding that the three-point turn made by the convicted motorist would constitute a U-Turn that is prohibited by the posted traffic sign, Justice Keyser had essentially used a purposive approach in making that determination, as well as applying the "mischief rule" of statutory interpretation, which involves determining the mischief and defect that the statute is set out to remedy and what ruling would effectively implement this remedy. Second, Justice Keyser rejected the convicted motorist's argument that a U-Turn had to be accomplished in one single and continuous forward movement, reasoning that there was no legitimate reason for finding that the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign had only prohibited U-Turn maneuvers that are brought about by one single and continuous forward movement, but not for finding that the traffic sign had prohibited three-point turns that are the result of a sequence of forward and backward movements. In addition, Justice Keyser had concluded that the prohibition on the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign had been concerned with prohibiting a motor vehicle from making a turn or driving maneuver that would result in the motor vehicle changing its original direction of travel so as to go in the opposite direction, such that it would be practical and desirable to conclude that sign 614 (the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign) had been intended to apply to both paradigmatic U-Turns and to three-point turns. And thirdly, Justice Keyser had rejected the convicted motorist's argument that the U-shaped black directional line depicting the prohibited turn on the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign had been evidence of the legislators' intent that a U-Turn had to be made in one single and continuous forward movement, since accepting that argument, Justice Keyser had reasoned, would have taken pictorial literalism to an absurd length:

49. Second, it can hardly be supposed that, although traffic authorities might have reasons for prohibiting paradigmatic U-turns, they could have no reasons for prohibiting 3-point turns. On the contrary: the principal point of objection is the oppositional change of direction of the vehicle, and to the extent that it matters how that change is brought about it is likely to be preferable that it be achieved in a single forward movement rather than in a sequence of forward and backward movements. There is immediate attraction in the supposition that sign 614 is intended to apply to both kinds of manoeuvre. The claimant's reliance on the pictorial nature of traffic signs and on the single forward movement of the black directional line on sign 614 seems to me to take pictorial literalism to an absurd length.

(i) Can a "three-point turn" maneuver constitute a U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act?

[51] The defendant argues that he did not make a U-Turn maneuver on Sunforest Drive because the turn or driving maneuver that he did make had been a "three-point turn", which he submits is a legal driving maneuver that is recognized, illustrated, and explained in the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook.

[52] However, like a U-Turn maneuver, a three-point turn maneuver is also not specifically defined in Ontario's Highway Traffic Act. And even though the expression "U-Turn" is used in the heading for s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act, "three-point turns" are not even mentioned or appear as a term or name for a driving maneuver in the Highway Traffic Act. Furthermore, even though the terms "U-Turn" and "three-point turn", as driving maneuvers, have a common meaning to motorists, the driving maneuver commonly known as a "three-point turn" does not in fact have any legal meaning within the Highway Traffic Act.

[53] But more important, the Ministry of Transportation states that the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook is only a guide and that legal obligations of motorists are to be found in the Highway Traffic Act or in its Regulations (see Ontario Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook):

This handbook gives new drivers the basic information they need about learning to drive in Ontario: the rules of the road, safe driving practices and how to get a licence to drive a car, van or small truck. The ministry recommends that all drivers would benefit from taking an advanced course in driver training.

As you read, remember that this handbook is only a guide. For official descriptions of the laws, look in the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario and its Regulations. Information on how to get licences to drive other types of vehicles is available in Part Two of this handbook, the Official MTO Motorcycle Handbook, the Official MTO Truck Handbook, the Official MTO Bus Handbook and the Official MTO Air Brake Handbook.

[54] Also, in the English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, Justice Keyser had to decide whether both the municipal order that had prohibited motorists from making a turning movement to go in the opposite direction, commonly known as a U-Turn", on a specific public roadway in the City of London and the "No U-Turn For Vehicular Traffic" sign that had been posted, had made it unlawful for a motorist to make a three-point turn in that area where U-Turn maneuvers are prohibited. At paras. 4, 21, and 37, Justice Keyser noted that neither the municipal order governing the prohibition of U-Turn maneuvers being made at that particular location of the public roadway, which had been passed by the municipal council under the power granted to them under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, nor the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 itself, had actually used the expression "U-Turn" to describe the prohibited turn or driving maneuver and had only described it as "vehicles turning so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding". Justice Keyser also noted that the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 had not differentiated between the various turns or driving maneuvers that could be used to facilitate a motor vehicle going in the opposite direction on a public roadway or between ones involving reversing movements:

4. The issue in the case is a point of law: whether the combination of Article 3 of the Hammersmith and Fulham (Gliddon Road) (Banned U Turn) Order 2011 ("the Order") and the familiar "No U-turn" traffic sign made unlawful the manoeuvre performed by the claimant, which was what is generally known as a 3-point turn.

5. The Order was made on 3 August 2011 under powers conferred by the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act") and came into effect on 15 August 2011.

6. Article 3 of the Order reads as follows:

"No person causing or permitting any vehicle to proceed in those lengths of Edith Road or Gliddon Road that lie between the common boundary of Nos. 21 and 23 Edith Road and the northern kerb-line of Talgarth Road shall cause or permit that vehicle to turn at any point in those lengths of roads so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which it was proceeding."

8. Article 2 (2) of the Order provided:

"The reference in Article 3 of this Order to lengths of Edith Road or Gliddon Road shall be construed as a reference to the whole width of those lengths of roads, including the carriageway, the footway and the footway crossovers leading to or from premises adjacent to those lengths of road."

21. As the traffic authority for a road in Greater London, the Council has power under section 6(1) of the 1984 Act to make an order for controlling or regulating vehicular and other traffic. The purposes for which such orders may be made are set out in Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act; paragraph 4 specifies the following such purpose:

"For prescribing the places where vehicles, or vehicles of any class, may not turn so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding, or where they may only so turn under conditions prescribed by the order."

The Order in the present case was made pursuant to these powers and reflects the terms of paragraph 4. Schedule 1 does not distinguish between different versions of the turn mentioned in paragraph 4; the paragraph relates to all such turns, both those that do and those that do not involve a reversing movement, and no other paragraph makes provision in that regard.

37. The 1984 Act does not use the expression "U-turn" but instead refers to vehicles turning so as to face in the opposite direction to that in which they were proceeding; see paragraph 21 above.

[55] Justice Keyser also noted at para. 38 that the 2002 Regulations and the 2002 Directions governing the use of the "No U-turns For Vehicular Traffic" sign, designated as sign 614, also did not provide for a definition for a "U-Turn" nor did they specify the kind of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances that would be prohibited by that particular traffic sign:

38. The 2002 Regulations and the 2002 Directions provide for the use of sign 614, "No U-turns for vehicular traffic", but they neither specify the prohibitions that can be shown by its use nor contain a definition of "U-turns"; see paragraphs 31 to 35 above.

(A) the purpose of a "three-point turn" is for a motor vehicle to turn around to go back in the opposite direction

[56] Although the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook is only a guide and has no legal status, it is noteworthy that the Driver's Handbook, which the defendant relies on for arguing that three-point turns are legal driving maneuvers recognized by the Ministry of Transportation, does nevertheless expressly state that "U-Turns" and "Three-Point Turns" are different methods of turning a motor vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction. The Driver's Handbook also advises a motorist not to make the three-point turns, like it does for a U-Turn maneuver, in such situations as in curves or on hills on a highway where visibility in those areas may not be ideal for other motorists to see those dangerous turns or driving maneuvers being made (see Ontario.ca: The Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook):

• Methods of turning your vehicle around to travel back in the opposite direction (U-turns, three-point turns)

U-turn

Before you make a U-turn, check to make sure there is no sign saying not to.

To make a U-turn safely, you must be able to see well in both directions. It is illegal to make a U-turn on a curve in the road, on or near a railway crossing or hilltop, or near a bridge or tunnel that blocks your view. Never make a U-turn unless you can see at least 150 metres in both directions.

To make a U-turn, signal for a right turn, check your mirror and over your shoulder and pull over to the right side of the road. Stop. Signal a left turn and when traffic is clear in both directions, move forward and turn quickly and sharply into the opposite lane. Check for traffic as you turn.

A three-point turn is a method of turning a vehicle around in a narrow space by moving forward, backward, and forward again in a sequence of arcs.

Three-point Turn

On narrow roads you need to make a three-point turn to change directions. As shown in Diagram 2-44, a three-point turn starts from the far right side of the road. Make sure you do not make a three-point turn on a curve in the road, on or near a railway crossing or hilltop, or near a bridge or tunnel that blocks your view.

Signal for a left turn. When the way is clear in both directions, move forward, turning the steering wheel sharply left towards the curb on the far side of the road. When you have reached the left side of the road, stop. Shift the vehicle into reverse. Signal a right turn. After checking that the way is still clear, turn the steering wheel sharply to the right, while backing up slowly to the other side of the road. Stop. Shift to forward gear and check traffic. When the way is clear, drive forward.

Diagram 2-44

[57] Furthermore, in the situation of a narrow roadway, a motorist attempting a turn or driving maneuver in order to go in the opposite direction, may only be able to accomplish this turn around by making stops and reversals on the roadway or to use a driveway to complete a three-point turn, since it may be difficult to complete the driving maneuver for turning a motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction in one continuous forward movement wholly on that narrow roadway. Moreover, using a three-point turn to accomplish the purpose of going in the opposite direction on a narrow roadway would have the same outcome as a motor vehicle on a wider roadway making one continuous forward movement wholly on that roadway to go in the opposite direction. Ergo, a three-point turn accomplishes the same purpose, and has the same outcome that a classic one continuous forward movement U-Turn would have, in that it is a method for a motorist to turn his motor vehicle around on a highway to go back in the opposite direction.

[58] Accordingly, the U-Turn and the three-point turn are like fraternal twins. And like fraternal twins they have the same beginnings, go in similar ways, and have common aims, yet they are different enough in attributes and character so that they are not identical twins. The chief similarity between the U-Turn and the three-point turn is that a motorist can utilize either of the two turns or driving maneuvers to turn their motor vehicles around so as to go in the opposite direction on a highway. Therefore, because a three-point turn driving maneuver has no legal meaning in the Highway Traffic Act, nor has it been defined or recognized as a distinct driving maneuver in that Act, then there would be no valid legal reason to treat a three-point turn as something distinct from a U-Turn, since the purpose of a three-point turn for a motorist is the same as that for a motorist executing a U-Turn maneuver.

[59] In sum, as there is no requirement in the Highway Traffic Act, that a U-Turn maneuver has to be accomplished in one continuous movement, and since a three-point turn is not recognized or mentioned in the Highway Traffic Act as a special turn or driving maneuver, and since both a U-Turn and a three-point turn are methods for turning a motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction then the commonly known three-point turn would constitute a "U-Turn" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, whenever such a maneuver is prohibited.

(b) Does The Highway Traffic Act Require That A U-Turn Maneuver When Prohibited Has To Be Completed Wholly On The Public Roadway?

[60] As the defendant has raised the issue that the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to his driving maneuvers while his motor vehicle is wholly on private property, it would be appropriate at this point to set out the definition of a "highway" that is contained in s. 1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. A highway within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act includes a "common and public highway, street, avenue" and "any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof":

1(1) 'highway' includes a common and public highway, street, avenue, parkway, driveway, square, place, bridge, viaduct or trestle, any part of which is intended for or used by the general public for the passage of vehicles and includes the area between the lateral property lines thereof.

[61] As such, Sunforest Drive, as a highway withing the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, includes the lateral property lines of the roadway even though the paved portion or travelled portion of Sunforest Drive may be well within its lateral property lines. In other words, if there were a requirement that a U-Turn maneuver when prohibited by situation or by a posted traffic sign has to be wholly completed on a "highway" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, then a highway also includes the area between its lateral property lines, which includes the paved travelled portion of the highway, as well as the width of the non-travelled portion of the highway, if any, which could also then include the width of the sidewalk and the width of the grass boulevard.

[62] However, there is no evidence of where those actual lateral property lines are specifically located in respect to the west curb and the westside sidewalk. As such, the defendant's vehicle may not have been completely or wholly on private property before the defendant had reversed his vehicle back onto Sunforest Drive from the driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive that he had momentarily driven on.

[63] But more importantly, there is no requirement set out in the Highway Traffic Act that that all the turns and driving maneuvers that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited by a "No U-Turn" sign have to be completed wholly between the lateral property lines of a highway. As such, all the turns or driving maneuvers that a motor vehicle would make for the purpose of turning on a highway to go in the opposite direction do not have to be wholly carried out within the lateral property lines of a highway for those turns or driving maneuvers to constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act.

(i) Was the defendant's motor vehicle completely off the public roadway (i.e. beyond the lateral property lines of the public highway) when it was driven onto the residential and private driveway located at #6 Sunforest Drive?

[64] There is, however, conflicting evidence on whether the defendant's Dodge Caravan SUV motor vehicle had been driven completely off the roadway. The defendant testifed that he had driven his vehicle 15 feet past the west curb and also pass the westside sidewalk and that his vehicle had been longer than the length of the driveway between the westside curb line and the sidewalk, which he contends would have put his vehicle wholly on private property and completely off the public roadway. On the other hand, Officer Orgill, who had been sitting in his low-profile police cruiser that had been situated just a few houses north of #6 Sunforest Drive, and facing southbound, and who had been at that location to monitor and enforce the three posted "No U-Turn" signs on Sunforest Drive for northbound traffic that would make a turn or driving manuever to go southbound on Sunforest Drive, contradicted the defendant's testimony.

[65] Officer Orgill had testified that before the Dodge Caravan motor vehicle had reversed back onto Sunforest Drive, he had observed its front wheels come to a stop on the westside sidewalk while the vehicle's rear wheels were still on the roadway. In addtion, Officer Orgill also said that when the Dodge Caravan vehicle had stopped on the sidewalk the rear part of the vehicle had still been overhanging the driveway, over the roadway.

[66] Ergo, because of Officer's Orgill's vantage point, his reason for being there to monitor traffic in enforcement of the three "No U-Turn" signs, and his testimony not being undermined during cross-examination, his observation of where the rear wheels and the rear part of the defendant's motor vehicle had been situated in respect to the westside curb line and in respect to the sidewalk when it stopped on the driveway and then reversed back onto the roadway is credible. As such, the defendant's motor vehicle had not been completely off the roadway. Moreover, the evidence also does not establish that the defendant's vehicle had been wholly on private property, since there is not evidence of where the lateral property lines of the highway are located.

[67] However, even if the defendant's motor vehicle had been completely off the roadway and wholly on private property, it had only been for a moment, and the defendant's purpose of turning left onto the private driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive had been done there purposely, so that he could turn his vehicle around to be able to go southbound on Sunforest Drive.

(c) Does Any Part Of A Turn Or Driving Maneuver Made On Private Property Affect Whether The Turn Or Driving Maneuver Constitutes A Prohibited "U-Turn" Maneuver?

[68] The defendant also argued that he had driven his Dodge Caravan motor vehicle onto the private driveway so that his vehicle had been completely on private property and as such, the Highway Traffic Act would not apply to his vehicle when it is on private property. Therefore, does a vehicle that drives completely onto private property in making a three-point turn for the purpose of going in the opposite direction affect whether the driving maneuver would still constitute a U-Turn maneuver when it is prohibited?

[69] Furthermore, the argument that the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to motorists on private property was considered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Hajivasilis, 2013 ONCA 27, [2013] O.J. No. 253. Doherty J.A., writing for the Court of Appeal, held at para. 4 that the operation of the Highway Traffic Act is limited when the term "highway" is contained in a provision. However, where a provision in the Highway Traffic Act does not mention or refer to a "highway", then Doherty J.A. concluded that such a statutory provision is not so limited, and as such, the Highway Traffic Act would apply to the event in question in respect to that provision, even if a particular act or omission in respect to the operation of a motor vehicle did not physically occur on a highway, as defined under s. 1(1) of the Act. Moreover, Doherty J.A. also concluded that there is nothing in the overall structure of the Highway Traffic Act or its purpose that would compel the reading of the word "highway" into sections or provisions of the Highway Traffic Act in which the word "highway" does not appear:

I agree with the position advanced by the appellant. I would hold that the obiter in Shah limiting the operation of the "entire HTA" to "highways" is wrong and should not be followed. Many provisions of the HTA are by their terms limited to "highways". Other provisions, however, are not so limited. Nothing in the overall structure of the HTA or its purpose compels the reading of the word "highway" into sections in which it does not appear. Section 199 is one such section. I would hold that the reporting requirement in s. 199 generally applies even if the accident does not occur on a "highway" as defined in the HTA.

[70] Doherty J.A. also reasoned, at paras. 12 and 13, in R. v. Hajivasilis that not only would the Highway Traffic Act be limited to a "highway" as defined under s. 1(1) when reference in a provision expressly referred to an act or omission having to occur on a "highway", but that any other provision of the Highway Traffic Act which does not include the term "highway" would still be limited to only apply to a highway when there is an expressed reference in a provision to a "driver" having to specifically commit the act or omission, instead of just the act or omission being committed by a person:

Other words used in the HTA are defined using the word "highway". In doing so, those words arguably incorporate within their definition the limitation found in the definition of "highway". "Driver" and "roadway" are two examples. According to s. 1(1) of the HTA:

"driver" means a person who drives a vehicle on a highway;

"roadway" means the part of the highway that is improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular traffic, but does not include the shoulder, and, where a highway includes two or more separate roadways, the term "roadway" refers to any one roadway separately and not to all of the roadways collectively[.]

Thus, for example, s. 48, which allows a police officer to "require the driver of a motor vehicle to stop" for a specified reason, arguably has application only on highways as defined in the HTA since, by definition, "driver" means "a person who drives a vehicle on a highway". A person driving a motor vehicle on a private parking lot is at least arguably not a driver for the purposes of the HTA.

[71] Ergo, the defendant's argument that the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to private property is not completely correct. For sections or provisions of the Highway Traffic Act that do expressly refer to a "highway" or by implication to a "highway" through the expressed mention of the word "driver", then they are still limited in application to only a "highway" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, but where the section or statutory provision does not make reference specifically or by implication to a "highway" then that section or statutory provision can apply to such locations or places that are not a "highway" within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act.

[72] In the defendant's case, the s. 182(2) provision does not include the term "highway" but it does include the term "driver", which would then limit the application of the Highway Traffic Act over any act or omission of the defendant or over any driving maneuver made by the defendant's motor vehicle while wholly on private property for the purposes of s. 182(2). In addition, it should be noted that the provision under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act, which established the offence of making a prohibited U-Turn in four special situations, does refer to the requirement that the U-Turn maneuver has to be made on a "highway" by a motor vehicle, which also means that s. 143 would not apply to U-Turns made wholly on private property.

[73] However, not all of the turns or driving maneuvers that the defendant's motor vehicle had engaged in had occurred wholly on private property. Even if the defendants' motor vehicle had been wholly on private property at some point or even if a portion of the defendant's three-point turn had been indeed made on private property while using the private driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive, it still would have only been on the private property for a moment and for only a small fraction of all the turns and driving maneuvers that his motor vehicle had made to turn his motor vehicle around to go in the opposite direction on Sunforest Drive. Therefore, the Highway Traffic Act would not have applied to the time the defendant's vehicle had been wholly on private property, if indeed it had been, but would have still applied to the defendant's motor vehicle at all other times when it was on Sunforest Drive, a highway within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, for the purposes of s. 182(2).

[74] As such, the action of a motorist driving wholly onto private property to make a three-point turn does not have any negative effect on whether that turn or driving maneuver would objectively still constitute or be viewed as a U-Turn if the entry onto private property is only a momentary entry. Moreover, a U-Turn maneuver may be comprised of more than one turn, movement, or maneuver. Thus, even if any part of the three-point turn is carried out on private property, but that particular portion of the three-point maneuver viewed objectively is still an integral part of the turns and driving maneuvers made by a motorist for the purpose of turning the motor vehicle around on a highway to go in the opposite direction, then driving wholly onto private property momentarily does not change the purpose of the three-point turn. In short, the inapplicability of the Highway Traffic Act would only be in respect to the short time that the motor vehicle had wholly been on private property and not to the time it was on a highway making maneuvers or turns that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver.

[75] Therefore, if part of the turns or driving maneuvers are momentarily or partly carried out on private property for the purpose of turning around to go in the opposite direction, it would still constitute a U-Turn maneuver for the purposes of s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

(d) Does A U-Turn Maneuver When Prohibited Only Have To Result In The Motor Vehicle Actually Turning Around To Go In The Opposite Direction From Its Original Direction For It To Constitute U-Turn Within The Meaning Of The Highway Traffic Act?

[76] Although the California Court of Appeals in People v. McGuire did not interpret the U-Turn provisions of the California Vehicle Code to include three-point turns using a driveway as a U-Turn maneuver when U-Turns are prohibited on a particular public roadway, the English High Court did find that the English legislation would include three-point turns using a driveway as a U-Turn maneuver, when the U-Turn maneuver is prohibited on a particular public roadway. In addition, unlike the California legislation which had clearly specified that a U-Turn maneuver when prohibited did not require the maneuver to be accomplished by one continuous movement, the Ontario Highway Traffic Act is like the English legislation which did not specifically define a "U-Turn" maneuver for the purposes of the legislation governing motorists on highways nor did it specifically refer to whether the U-Turn maneuver could be accomplished by one continuous movement or not.

[77] Moreover, even though the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. Dockman, [1996] O.J. No. 4548, had held that evidence of the actual unsafeness of a particular U-Turn being made by a motorist is not a required element of the U-Turn offence that needs to be proven by the prosecution in order to prove that a motorist had committed the prohibited U-Turn offence under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act, the Court of Appeal still recognized that the making of a U-Turn on a highway is a naturally unsafe and dangerous maneuver. Therefore, as one of the purposes of public welfare legislation is for regulating a lawful activity for the protection of the public, then interpreting what type of turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances would constitute a U-Turn maneuver would also have to be consistent with the purpose of the Highway Traffic Act of ensuring the safe operation of motor vehicles on public roads and the safety of motorists and others using public roads. As such, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a traffic sign posted on a public roadway that prohibits "U-Turns" would prohibit all turns or driving maneuvers made by a motor vehicle in which the motor vehicle would end up proceeding in the opposite direction from the original direction it had been travelling on the highway. And, as the Official Ministry of Transportation (MTO) Driver's Handbook indicates that both a U-Turn maneuver and a three-point turn maneuver would be turns or driving maneuvers that can be used by a motorist for turning around their motor vehicle on a highway to travel in the opposite direction, then it also would not be unreasonable to conclude that a "No U-Turn" sign would prohibit a driving maneuver consisting of a left turn into a driveway to complete a three-point turn, especially since a three-point turn is not a legally distinct driving maneuver in the Highway Traffic Act. Moreover, a motor vehicle making a left turn across a lane of traffic to enter into a private driveway and then immediately reversing out of the driveway back onto the public roadway would have the same level of unsafeness and danger that a U-Turn maneuver completed wholly on a public highway would have.

[78] On the other hand, a motorist making a left turn from the school parking lot located on the eastside of Sunforest Drive in order to go southbound on Sunforest Drive would not be changing direction to go in the opposite direction as a motorist who had been heading northbound on Sunforest Drive and then makes a U-Turn maneuver to go southbound on Sunforest Drive would have done. And, even though the left turn from the school parking lot may be as dangerous as a U-Turn or a three-point turn made by a motorist originally proceeding northbound on Sunforest Drive in order to go southbound on Sunforest Drive, a left turn maneuver made by a motorist from the school parking lot on the eastside of Sunforest Drive is still not a turn for the purpose of going in the opposite direction that is prohibited by the three "No U-Turn" signs posted on the eastside of Sunforest Drive.

(e) Should There Be Any Reliance On The Physical Appearance Of The Actual Symbol Or Arrow Representing The Prohibited U-Turn Maneuver On The "No U-Turn" Sign To Determine What Type Of Turns Or Driving Maneuvers Or Circumstances Would Constitute A "U-Turn" Maneuver?

[79] In the English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, at paras. 50 to 55, Justice Keyser, had also addressed the issue of whether the actual symbol of the U-shaped arrow that had been used for depicting the prohibited turn on the "No U-turns For Vehicular Traffic" sign could be used to interpret what type of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver and concluded that since there had been no legal definition for the term "U-Turn" in the English legislation, then the convicted motorist's interpretation that the "No U-turns For Vehicular Traffic" sign had only prohibited the paradigmatic U-turn, but left untouched the 3-point turn was not a reasonable interpretation and would be contrary to reason and sound common sense. Moreover, Justice Keyser had reasoned that the term "U-turn" is itself a figurative expression and that the meaning of any symbol on a traffic sign, whether verbal or other, cannot be ascertained in isolation from the context of its use. Accordingly, Justice Keyser noted that even though the expression "U-Turn" is commonly used to describe the paradigmatic case of a U-Turn maneuver, it is by no means the only sense in which it is used. Justice Keyser then supported his conclusion by referring to evidence from an employee of the Driving Standards Agency who had referred to a U-Turn maneuver being used in the wider sense of "turning round and going back the way you came", which the employee had stated could be accomplished by either a "U-Turn" or by the "three-point turn":

50. The claimant's contention that sign 614 renders unlawful a paradigmatic U-turn but not a 3-point turn is also open to the objection that it produces results so surprising that it cannot be right. If the claimant is correct, a prohibition on U-turns can be circumvented by making the manoeuvre more complicated and turning it into a 3-point turn. He denied this conclusion, but as I understood his submission it was simply that the subjective intention of the motorist to circumvent the traffic regulation would not be permitted to succeed. That is no basis for traffic enforcement. Again, the distinction between the manoeuvres might be fortuitous: you are a skilled driver in a good, modern car and succeed in performing a simple U-turn; but I am less skilled, or the steering on my car is less responsive, and I fail to clear the kerb and have to reverse before completing the manoeuvre; or perhaps I am having a bad day and failed to commence my turn close enough to my nearside kerb, so that I am forced into a 3-point turn: in these cases you are in breach of the prohibition and I am not. Or perhaps, just after I have commenced my intended U-turn, a temporary obstacle comes into the road at the far end of my turning circle and I am forced to stop and reverse; my manoeuvre would have been an unlawful U-turn but it has been turned into a lawful 3-point turn. These conclusions do not seem right.

51. In my judgment, sign 614 is a perfectly adequate schematic representation of the manoeuvre or group of manoeuvres to which paragraph 4 in Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act applies. I do not consider that a motorist interpreting the sign reasonably and in good faith, and without what in a different context Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. (as he then was) called excessive exegetical sophistication, would consider that it prohibited only the paradigmatic U-turn but left untouched the 3-point turn.

52. So far as the expression "U-turn" itself is concerned, it does not form part of sign 614, which is pictorial not verbal. Nonetheless, both the statutory description of the sign and its common name include "U-turn", and it is right to have regard to that fact when considering the information that would reasonably be conveyed by the sign. It may very well be true that "U-turn" is commonly used of what I have called the paradigmatic case. That is by no means the only sense in which it is used however. By way of example, part of the evidence submitted by the claimant included correspondence from an employee of the Driving Standards Agency which used the expression in the wider sense of "turning round and going back the way you came" and said that this could be done in either of the ways that I have called the paradigmatic U-turn and the 3-point turn. That correspondence has no force as a legal authority, but I do not see that the employee's use of language was idiosyncratic. Indeed, when the claimant wrote to take issue with his correspondent's definition, he suggested not only that she had been "nobbled" (which did not do him credit) but that she was "confusing the strict, technical, driving meaning with its everyday metaphorical use". A difficulty with that objection is that there is no legal definition of "U-turn", which is itself a figurative expression. The meaning of any symbol, whether verbal or other, cannot be ascertained in isolation from the context of its use. I do not think, for example, that the use of the expression in the context of provisions relating to the competence of an examinee in the physical handling of his motorcycle is illuminating when one comes to consider the relevant context, which is that of traffic regulation and the prohibition of manoeuvres that are deemed contrary to good traffic management. In the latter context, to confine the meaning of the expression to the paradigmatic case would in my view be contrary to reason and sound common sense.

53. In his oral submissions, the claimant attempted to explain how it could be sensible to interpret the traffic sign at Gliddon Road as prohibiting the paradigmatic U-turn but not a 3-point turn. He said that it was simply impossible to perform the former manoeuvre with any vehicle other than a motorcycle. Therefore it was reasonable to understand the sign as being intended to prohibit a manoeuvre that could not be performed by the vast majority of vehicles—as I understood it, lest imprudent attempts be made to do the impossible—but as leaving unaffected the manoeuvre that he and others had performed without difficulty for many years. That attempted explanation serves only to confirm me in the view expressed in the second sentence of paragraph 51 above.

54. In conclusion, I hold that sign 614 was the appropriate sign by which to inform the public of the prohibition in Article 3 of the Order.

55. That was also the conclusion reached by the appeals Panel in the Azadegan case. That decision does not bind this Court but I consider it to be correct on this point and, though I have referred to it only in passing, I have found the Panel's consideration of the issues to be of much assistance.

[80] Ergo, for the case at bar, the graphical depiction of a U-Turn maneuver on the "No U-Turn" sign authorized under s. 23 of the Sign Regulation (Highway Traffic Act), R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 615, is only a communicative symbol to identify the prohibited turn or maneuver as a prohibited turn known as a "U-Turn". The curved upside down "U-shaped" symbol represents a turn or maneuver in which a motor vehicle would proceed in the opposite direction of which it had been originally travelling. Moreover, this U-shaped icon on the "No U-Turn" sign symbolizes the turn or maneuver made by a motor vehicle when it proceeds in the opposite direction of its original direction of travel. However, that curved "U-shaped" symbol does not literally represent only turns or maneuvers made by a motor vehicle that physically match or are identical physically to the "U" shape.

[81] Furthermore, deciding whether a particular motor vehicle had made a U-Turn maneuver based on the requirement that the turn or driving maneuver used had to be accomplished in one continuous movement on a public roadway so that it would physically correspond with the actual symbol of a curved U-shaped arrow representing a U-Turn maneuver on the "no U-Turn" sign would not necessarily protect other motorists or pedestrians who utilize public roads nor reduce the potential risk of accidents, since a three-point turn would create the same level of risk of an accident occurring on a highway as a U-Turn maneuver that is made on a highway would.

(f) Should a "No Left-Turn" Sign Have Been Posted By The City Of Brampton To Prohibit Motorists From Making Left Turns Into The Driveways On The Westside Of Sunforest Drive For The Purpose Of Making A Three Point Turn?

[82] The defendant suggested that a "No Left Turn" sign should have been erected on Sunforest Drive if the municipality had wanted to prohibit the defendant while travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive from making a left turn into a driveway located on the westside of Sunforest Drive for the purpose of making a three-point turn.

[83] Similarly, in the English case of R. (on the application of Alexander) v. The Parking Adjudicator & Anor, the convicted motorist had also argued that the municipality should have erected a different traffic sign if it wanted to prohibit motorists from making three-point turns on that particular roadway. In rejecting the convicted motorist's argument that sign 606, which had been a traffic sign directing motorists to proceed straight through instead of making a U-Turn or a right turn should have been erected in order to prohibit the making of three-point turns on that particular roadway, Justice Keyser held, at paras. 39 to 48, that there had been no other traffic sign that had the effect of distinguishing between the paradigmatic U-turn and the 3-point turn, nor was there a traffic sign capable of informing the public that both a 3-point turn and a U-Turn were both not permissible at that location:

39. The claimant's contention that sign 614 was inappropriate to give notice of a prohibition of the manoeuvre that he was performing, which I but not he call a 3-point turn, rests at least in part on the assertion that the common understanding of a U-turn, and therefore the, or at least a, natural interpretation of sign 614, is that it comprises a single, sweeping forward movement, without using reverse gears, and that it is different from a 3-point turn. For convenience, I shall refer to the manoeuvre described by the claimant as "the paradigmatic U-turn". In support of that assertion the claimant has referred to numerous definitions of "U-turn" or instances of the use of that expression. I shall mention only what I consider the most important of these.

i) The AA publication, Theory Test for Car Drivers (12th edition, 2011), advises: "If you want to make a U-turn, slow down and ensure that the road is clear in both directions. Make sure that the road is wide enough to carry out the manoeuvre safely." The claimant says that the second sentence in this advice seems to suppose the paradigmatic U-turn. The same advice is contained in the Driving Standards Agency's official Theory Test for Car Drivers (16th edition, 2012).

ii) The Driving Standards Agency's publication, Driving – the essential skills (7th edition, 2010), states: "A U-turn means turning the car right round without any reversing." Underneath, it says: "Never make a U-turn … wherever a road sign forbids it."

iii) The Highway Code (15th edition, 2007; 13th impression, 2011) mentions U-turns only once in its index, and that is a reference to advice to avoid making U-turns at mini-roundabouts.

iv) Schedule 8 to the Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) Regulations 1999 makes provision for the practical section of the driving test for motorcycles. In its original form, Schedule 8 contained the following requirement at paragraph C.9: "Cause the vehicle to face in the opposite direction by driving it forward (a 'U-turn')." That requirement was revoked by subsequent amendment, but it has been repeated in identical terms in the new Schedule 8A, which deals with the specified requirements for the motorcycle manoeuvres test. It is the only statutory explanation of a U-turn, in any context, to which I have been referred. In the decision in the Azadegan case, mentioned in paragraph 13 above, it is recorded that the Department for Transport had informed the appeals Panel that this was the only such provision of which it was aware. A letter dated 30 December 2013 from the Department for Transport to the claimant confirms that the meaning of "No U-turn" is not defined in primary legislation and says that "it would be a matter of factual evidence in any particular case."

v) Consistently with the schedules to the Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) Regulations 1999, the pictorial representation of a U-turn in the Driving Standard Agency's publication, Compulsory Basic Training for Motorcyclists (2nd edition, 1999) shows the paradigmatic U-turn.

40. Two other publications, both by the Department for Transport, may be mentioned. Know Your Traffic Signs (5th edition, 2007; 6th impression, 2010), shows sign 614 ("No U-turn") with the familiar "No right turn" and "No left turn" signs underneath the explanatory text: "Where changes of direction are prohibited, a red bar across the sign is used in addition to the red circle."

41. Traffic Signs Manual (2008) was published "to give advice to traffic authorities and their agents on the correct use of signs and road markings". It gives technical guidance as to the use of sign 614, but as to the reason for its use it says only, "The 'no U-turn' sign to diagram 614 is used to give effect to an order which may apply to a junction or a length of road."

42. One question that occurs is: if sign 614 is inapt to refer to 3-point turns as well as to paradigmatic U-turns, which sign ought to be used for that purpose? The claimant suggests the sign to diagram 606, which shows a white arrow on a blue background with a white border; the arrow may point either horizontally to the left or to the right or vertically upwards.

43. Whereas regulatory signs that are circular with a red border, such as sign 614, are prohibitory, in that they tell drivers what they must not do, regulatory signs that are circular with a white border and symbol on a blue background are generally positive, in that they indicate something that all drivers must do. Thus the description of the sign to diagram 606 in the 2002 Regulations is, "Vehicular traffic must proceed in the direction indicated by the arrow." The claimant's argument is to the effect that, by requiring positive conduct which is inconsistent with the manoeuvre prohibited by the Order, the sign to diagram 606 would sufficiently indicate that the prohibited manoeuvre was not to be performed.

44. I do not accept that the sign to diagram 606 was appropriate.

45. First, the sign would prohibit both right and left turns. A prohibition in the terms of Article 3 of the Order and paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the 1984 Act does not prohibit either right or left turns. The claimant seeks to respond to this objection by saying that the only relevant turn on the piece of road in question would be a right turn into the entrance to the gated block of flats mentioned in paragraph 10 above; and he suggests that the residents of those flats would doubtless be willing to put up with the minor inconvenience of taking a minor detour and turning left into the entrance to their block of flats. However, whether or not the residents would object to a prohibition on right turns and whether or not there might be merit in such a prohibition, the fact remains that the prohibition in the Order does not extend to right turns; therefore a sign that has the effect of showing a prohibition on right turns is inappropriate. Further, the question whether the sign to diagram 606 is appropriate to give notice of the prohibition in the Order cannot turn on the contingency of whether a particular right turn might also be prohibited. No one has suggested that it is axiomatic that the circumstances that would justify a prohibition in the terms of Article 3 of the Order would necessarily justify a prohibition of right turns; there is no reason to suppose that it is axiomatic. As the sign to diagram 606 does not distinguish between those different directional movements, it would be inappropriate to use the sign to show a prohibition of the former movement only.

46. Second, the recommended purpose of the sign to diagram 606—and accordingly its normal use—is different from the purpose for which the claimant says it might have been used. It is "to indicate the only route that may lawfully be taken through a junction", including a roundabout or the slip road to a dual carriageway; see Traffic Signs Manual, chapter 4, and in particular paragraph 4.2.

47. As I have already mentioned, no other traffic sign has the effect of distinguishing between the paradigmatic U-turn and the 3-point turn. Although that might not be a conclusive point against the claimant's argument, it strongly suggests that the argument is wrong.

48. First, the 1984 Act and the Procedure Regulations permit the making of a prohibition such as that contained in the Order and require it to be brought to the attention of the public by way of traffic signs, but if the claimant's objection to sign 614 is correct there does not appear to be a traffic sign capable of giving the required information.

[84] Ergo, in respect to the case at bar, the posted "No U-Turn" signs on Sunforest Drive would not have prohibited someone residing at one of the residences on the westside of Sunforest Drive, or prohibited someone visiting one of those residences on the westside, from turning left into one of those private driveways while proceeding northbound on Sunforest Drive. In that circumstance, those motorists would not be making a left turn using those driveways for the purpose of turning in the opposite direction, but would be there for a legitimate purpose and for more than a moment of time. Moreover, the purpose of the "No U-Turn" sign is for prohibiting a motorist from making a turn or driving maneuver so as to go in the opposite direction and does not apply to a motorist having a legitimate purpose for driving onto one of those private driveways on the westside of Sunforest Drive. The "No U-Turn" prohibition would, therefore, apply to a motorist turning left into the driveway and who is there for only a moment before reversing back onto Sunforest drive in order to proceed southbound on Sunforest drive, since that motorist would not be using the driveway except to complete a turn or maneuver to go southbound on Sunforest drive, which is the very turn or driving maneuver intended to be prohibited by the "No U-Turn" signs. Moreover since it was the municipality who erected the "No U-Turn" signs and who had validly passed a bylaw prohibiting U-Turn maneuvers being made in that area, and who would have knowledge of the concerns and desires of the residents living on Sunforest Drive, then a court, without valid grounds, should not question whether a different sign should have been erected instead of the "No U-Turn" sign.

(4) The Appropriate Test For Determining Whether A Particular Turn Or Driving Maneuver And In What Circumstances Would Constitute A "U-Turn" Maneuver Within The Meaning Of The Highway Traffic Act?

[85] The prosecution submits that an interpretation of what constitutes a U-Turn maneuver should be adopted that is based on the outcome of the motor vehicle's movements or driving maneuvers. In other words, the prosecution argues that a U-Turn is accomplished when a motor vehicle has made a turn or driving maneuver that results in the motor vehicle travelling in the opposite direction from the original direction that the motor vehicle had been travelling in before it made that turn or maneuver.

[86] To reiterate, the type of turns or driving maneuvers or circumstances that would constitute a U-Turn maneuver is not clearly spelled out in the Highway Traffic Act, nor is the expression "U-Turn" defined in the Act. Moreover, the prohibited U-Turn offence set out under s. 143 of the Highway Traffic Act only describes such an offence being committed if a motorist "turn[s] the vehicle so as to proceed in the opposite direction" on a highway in four specific situations, which does not include the situation where there is a posted "No U-Turn" sign.

[87] Ergo, since the Highway Traffic Act does not provide for a definition of what turns or driving maneuvers or in what circumstances would constitute a U-Turn when it is prohibited by a "No U-Turn" traffic sign and only provides a broad description of a U-Turn maneuver under s. 143 as a turn where a motor vehicle would proceed in the opposite direction from the direction it had been travelling at, and because of the principle that provisions contained in public welfare legislation have to be given a broad interpretation to achieve the purpose of that legislation, then a broad and purposive interpretation of what type of turns or driving maneuvers and in what circumstances would constitute a prohibited "U-Turn" maneuver will be adopted. More important, there is no requirement set out in the Highway Traffic Act that the U-Turn maneuver when prohibited has to be completed in one continuous forward movement or that a U-Turn maneuver when prohibited would not include turns or driving maneuvers in which a motor vehicle would turn left into a private driveway in order to make a three-point turn so that the motor vehicle could then proceed in the opposite direction. As well, there is also no legal requirement that the U-Turn maneuver has to be completed wholly on the public roadway to constitute a U-Turn. As such, a motorist that drives a motor vehicle off a public roadway so that it is wholly on private property and off a public roadway momentarily to complete a three-point turn would still have carried out a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, since a three-point turn is not legally defined in the Highway Traffic Act and the purpose of a three-point turn is to enable a motor vehicle to turn around so as to go in the opposite direction from the original direction it had been travelling, which is exactly the same purpose for why a motor vehicle would make a U-Turn on a highway.

[88] Therefore, considerations of whether the turns or driving maneuvers at issue had been accomplished in one continuous forward movement or whether the motor vehicle had been wholly on private property to complete the turnaround driving maneuver commonly known as a three-point turn would not be a required in deciding whether the turns or driving maneuvers or in what circumstances would constitute a U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act. This broad and purposive interpretation would also fulfill the public safety aim of the Highway Traffic Act, as well as the goal of reducing accidents from occurring on highways.

[89] As such, the criterion that the prosecution has to prove in the determination of whether particular turns or driving maneuvers, and in what circumstances, would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act is that the motor vehicle in question had in the circumstances made a turn or driving maneuver on a highway "so as to proceed in the opposite direction".

5. CONCLUSION

[90] When the defendant's motor vehicle had executed a left turn into the private driveway of #6 Sunforest Drive while it had been travelling northbound on Sunforest Drive, so that the defendant could complete a three-point turn for the purpose of going southbound on Sunforest Drive, it had indeed in the circumstances been a turn or driving maneuver that had been utilized by the defendant so that the defendant's motor vehicle would go in the opposite direction than it had been originally doing on Sunforest Drive. Therefore, under the circumstances, the defendant's turn and driving maneuvers would constitute a "U-Turn" maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act.

[91] In addition, the defendant's argument that his left turn and three-point turn maneuvers would not be a U-Turn maneuver or be in disobedience of the three "No U-Turn" signs because he had only executed turns and driving maneuvers on Sunforest Drive that he had reasonably and mistakenly believed they were not illegal to do, is not a valid or persuasive due diligence defence. It is not well-founded because the defendant has himself admitted that he had turned left into the private driveway while proceeding northbound on Sunforest Drive to complete a three-point turn so that he could go southbound on Sunforest Drive, which is exactly the turnaround driving maneuver that the municipality did not want motorists to do at that location when they posted the "No U-Turn" signs. Moreover, a three-point turn as a driving maneuver is not defined in the Highway Traffic Act, nor is it a legally recognized maneuver under that Act, and as such, a three-point turn for the purposes of the Highway Traffic Act is not legally distinct from a U-Turn maneuver. As a consequence, the defendant's turns and driving maneuvers on Sunforest Drive in the circumstances would constitute a U-Turn maneuver within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act, since their purpose had been to facilitate the motor vehicle turning around to proceed in the opposite direction. Moreover, the use of the private driveway at #6 Sunforest Drive to make that turnaround maneuver or to even be on private property momentarily does not change the purpose of the turns and driving maneuvers executed by the defendant so that the defendant could have his motor vehicle go southbound on Sunforest Drive from its original northbound direction, which is the very action that is prohibited by the three "No U-Turn" signs.

[92] As such, the defendant's turn and driving maneuvers from northbound Sunforest Drive to southbound Sunforest Drive using a private driveway on the west side of Sunforest Drive on September 13, 2015, at 1:45 p.m., would constitute a U-Turn maneuver that violates the three "No U-Turn" signs situated on the eastside of Sunforest Drive, and as such, the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the offence of "disobey sign" under s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8.

6. DISPOSITION

[93] In respect to the charge of "disobey sign" contrary to s. 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.8, the prosecution has met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Michael Robinson, had made a prohibited U-Turn within the meaning of the Highway Traffic Act on Sunforest Drive between Bovaird Drive and Cashel Street in the City of Brampton on September 13, 2015, at 1:45 p.m., and therefore, has disobeyed the posted "No U-Turn" signs. As a consequence, Michael Robinson has committed the offence of disobey sign under s. 182(2) beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction will therefore be entered against Michael Robinson.

Dated at the City of Brampton on August 18, 2017.

QUON J.P.

Ontario Court of Justice

Footnote

[1] See Professor Ruth Sullivan's textbook, Statutory Interpretation (Toronto, Ontario: Irwin Law Inc., 1997), at p. 139, under heading number 3, "Purpose Inferred from Mischief to Be Cured", for an explanation of "mischief rule":

When carrying out a purposive analysis, courts sometimes refer to the mischief rule, also known as the rule in Heydon's Case. Heydon's Case was decided in 1584 and has been cited ever since for the following passage:

[F]or the sure and true interpretation of all statutes . . . four things are to be discerned and considered:-

1st. What was the common law before the making of the Act.

2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide.

3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.

And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy. . . .

On this approach, each new Act or amendment is to be understood as an attempt to solve a problem, suppress an evil, or deal with an inadequacy in existing law. The court discovers the purpose by locating the "mischief" it was meant to cure. More precisely, the court looks at the legal and external contexts existing at the time the legislation was enacted and it identifies the purpose by matching the "remedy" - the provisions adopted by the legislature - with the "mischief" to which it is a plausible response.