Court Information

Ontario Court of Justice Old City Hall, Toronto Region

Between: Her Majesty the Queen — and — Steven Bydeley

Before: Justice S.R. Shamai

Ruling Released: October 3, 2012

Counsel:

• Mr. R. Maxwell, Respondent (for the City of Toronto)
• Mr. Steven Bydeley, Appellant (Self-Represented)

SHAMAI J.

INTRODUCTION

[1] Steven Bydeley appeals his convictions of May 24, 2011, on three Provincial Offences: that in the City of Toronto, on March 16, 2010 he failed to have an insurance card, contrary to Section 3(1) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act; that he was speeding, at a rate of 68 kph in a 50 kph zone, contrary to s. 128 of the Highway Traffic Act; and that he failed to surrender his driver's licence, contrary to Highway Traffic Act section 33(1). He declined to enter a plea, so the Court entered pleas of not guilty on his behalf, as mandated by Section 44(5) of the Provincial Offences Act. On the evidence, and having heard defence and the prosecution submissions, Her Worship Justice of the Peace Churley found Mr. Bydeley guilty on the three counts.

[2] The position now taken by Mr. Bydeley asserts 20 grounds of appeal. I have appended the lengthy grounds to this ruling. It is evident that Mr. Bydeley holds an idiosyncratic view of the interpretation of constitutional law, statutory enactments and the common law. This is clear from an examination of the pretrial proceedings in this matter, as well as a review of his previous efforts to litigate his wife's speeding infraction, on which Justice of the Peace Stinson ruled. The grounds raised on this appeal appear very similar to those dealt with in the previous matter. Mr. Bydeley acted on behalf of his wife in that case. It was appealed to this Court, and ultimately was subject of an application to the Court of Appeal. The reasons of Justice LaForme, disposing of the application and refusing leave, are helpful and in fact binding on me in this matter on most points raised.

[3] In detailed reasons, in Ms. Bydeley's case, His Worship convicted on the speeding charge before the Court. He did not accept the grounds argued on behalf of Ms. Bydeley, which JP Stinson conveniently summarized as follows:

• the HTA did not pertain to the defendant because she was not engaged in traffic;
• the HTA did not pertain to the defendant because she was not a driver;
• the HTA did not pertain to the defendant in that she was not acting as a legal representative of a person;
• the HTA cannot be applied to the defendant without her consent

[4] That ruling was upheld on appeal to this Court, and in turn, by Justice Harry LaForme on an application for leave to the Court of Appeal. A similar approach was taken by Mr. Bydeley to the rule of law in that case, and I will refer to both rulings from time to time, as they assist in disposing of the issues before this Court. Clearly I am bound by the ruling of the Court of Appeal in these matters. I would make a few additional observations.

[5] An examination of Mr. Bydeley's grounds in this case show that, apart from a disclosure application, the grounds raised by way of legal issues on appeal are substantially the same as those argued on behalf of Dianne Marie Bydeley, by her agent, the Appellant in this case. Some of his points styled as appeal grounds do not raise issues either of fact or of law. Some of the factual assertions were previously dealt with in Justice LaForme's decision, some are unique to this set of facts.

JURISDICTION AND STATUTORY APPLICATION

[6] Mr. Bydeley asserts in Grounds 1 and 4 that he is not subject to the "jurisdiction of either Act"; he says that the evidence shows that the Acts do not apply to him. I believe that he intends to raise an issue of legal jurisdiction in the first ground, and a factual exception in the fourth ground. Grounds 7, 8, 13 amplify this position. Clearly Mr. Bydeley has attorned to the jurisdiction of the Court, making numerous appearances, and not disputing that he is the person identified as the subject of investigation in his motor vehicle at the specified time and place by Police Constable Jahjefendic, of the Toronto Police Service. As to the second aspect of the so-called non-application of the Acts of the Legislature, the Appellant argues that the definition of "Driver" in the Highway Traffic Act does not apply to him, as the term applied only to commercial drivers. This position was raised in the case of R. v. Dianne-Marie Bydeley, the decision I referred to earlier, pertaining to the Appellant's wife. On the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, Justice LaForme adopted the reasons of the Justice of the Peace, whom he said "gave due regard and careful consideration to each of the arguments [the defendant] advanced". The Court continued:

In this case, I expect Ms Bydeley believes her arguments to be creative and novel… However they are fanciful and have no air of reality – particularly in the way this trial proceeded. Indeed, as best as I can comprehend Ms. Bydeley's supporting materials and submissions, much of what she argues has been the subject of judicial consideration since the time of confederation and interpretation of the British North America Act commenced. It is now well settled law.

[7] In the present case, Mr. Bydeley applies his idiosyncratic interpretation to the word "traffic" in the "Highway Traffic Act". He argues that traffic refers to "the regulation of business, commerce and trade" and concludes that it is not within the jurisdiction of the Province to legislate in this field. The issue has been dealt with, as well, in the case of Dianne Marie Bydeley. That Court's conclusion that "The defendant is therefore incorrect in law when concluding that the entire HTA concerns itself with only the commercial use of highways" is dispositive of the position taken in the present matter.

[8] Similarly the position that the "driver" cannot be himself, as he was not engaged in commerce, or in employment as a driver, is dealt with in the previous decision, upheld by the Court of Appeal. His Worship reviews the authorities proffered by the Defendant and concludes that "as fact and as law… the defendant in the circumstances of the charge before this court – was a driver within the meaning of the HTA." The fact pattern is very similar: Mr. Bydeley, the Appellant here, was operating, or driving the motor vehicle, alleged to have been speeding and for which he was unable to produce proof of valid insurance or his own driver's licence. There is no factual dispute as to what Mr. Bydeley was doing, only his assertion that the statute did not apply to him. I rely on the reasoning in the previous case, affirmed by the Court of Appeal, to reject this argument, finding that clearly, he was the driver of the vehicle at the relevant time.

DEFINITION OF "PERSON"

[9] Mr. Bydeley has offered a few further positions arising from his understanding of the law. He argues that he is not a person, that only a corporation can be a "person". He cites a passage from a case styled "Hague v. Cancer Relief and Research Institute" (1939), to the effect that the only legal person known to our legal system is the corporation, the body corporate. Clearly the distinction between a natural person and a legal person is one which did not enter Mr. Bydeley's consideration: that is the distinction which the court made in that case. Obviously the law governs the individuals who reside in our community.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

[10] Mr. Bydeley complains in his Notice of Appeal that his closing submissions have not been included in the record. He might well have ordered them, that was his option. Once again, Mr. Bydeley's unfamiliarity with the system of the Courts cannot be itself a ground for appeal.

ALLEGATIONS OF COLLUSION AND BIAS

[11] Mr. Bydeley submits collusion between the presiding jurist at trial and the prosecutor, which he says denied him due process. There is no such appearance in the trial. Such a serious allegation must not be made lightly, and in view of the utter lack of substantiation, I dismiss that ground. The mere fact that the jurist was not prepared to address all questions put to the Court by an unrepresented litigant in no way shows collusion or denial of due process. While the role of the Court expands to offer assistance in some degree to an unrepresented party, and while the purpose of the Provincial Offences Act is to open the doors of justice to unrepresented parties, that does not require the Court to depart the position of neutrality which it must maintain as between the parties. In the case of R. v. Rijal [2010] O.J. 3440, Justice Libman dealt with the issue of the Bench offering assistance to an unrepresented defendant in a Provincial offences trial. He cites appellate authority to describe the significant extent of assistance which the Court must render, even in trials which appear insignificant and inconsequential on the face of it:

25 In a decision rendered over twenty years ago, R. v. McGibbon (1988), 45 C.C.C. (3d) 334 at 347, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:

• Consistent with the duty to ensure that the accused has a fair trial, the trial judge is required within reason to provide assistance to the unrepresented accused, to aid him in the proper conduct of his defence, and to guide him throughout the trial in such a way that his defence is brought out with its full force and effect. How far the trial judge should go in assisting the accused in such matters as the examination and cross-examination of witnesses must be of necessity a matter of discretion.

26 The Court went on to observe that a judge is not required to become the defendant's advocate.

27 Subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeal have echoed these comments. In R. v. Taubler (1987), 20 O.A.C. 64, the Court opined that while a trial judge has a duty to ensure that an unrepresented accused has a fair trial, that duty only extends to doing what is "reasonable under the circumstances." The judge cannot be the advocate for the defendant and remain an impartial arbiter at the same time. Neither does the court's duty extend to providing the accused, at each stage of the trial, the kind of advice that counsel would be expected to provide if the defendant were represented by counsel.

[12] While the Court may indeed be obliged to answer questions about process and law, there are definite limitations to that obligation. Without specific examples of the unanswered questions Mr. Bydeley felt worked to prejudice him, it is hard to rule on specifics; however, a review of the transcript does not, in my view, show that Justice of the Peace Churley failed to discern the proper balance between aiding the defendant, and either descending into irrelevant or partisan exchange with him.

[13] The Appellant contends in paragraph 15 that "the witness, the prosecutor and the Justice of the Peace are all under the employ of those who have a hand in forming these statutes", and thus demonstrate a bias against him. Mr. Bydeley makes a critical error in his appreciation of the role of the judiciary in a democracy. The judiciary, which of course includes the presiding Justice of the Peace at trial, is a third branch of government, whose independence is maintained from the appointments process on through the appeals process. That principle was recently stated in succinct language by the British Columbia Supreme Court:

In a constitutional democracy, tensions that exist between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government must be resolved within the constitutional framework. No single branch of government is entitled to trump another; instead, all branches must respect their overall and particular constitutional obligations. (Provincial Court Judges Assn of B.C. v. B.C.(Attorney General) [2012] BCJ No.1443)

[14] That the prosecutor and the police witness are paid by the same municipal government, albeit through different legislated authorities, is of no moment in a consideration of entitlement to fair trial. In any event, no motion was brought at trial to seek relief for a Charter breach, as the Rules require.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

[15] Mr. Bydeley raises a number of so-called factual issues. He asserts flatly that he was not speeding, and cites disparities in the police evidence. I note that Mr. Bydeley did not specifically address all these issues in his own testimony. However, in dealing with the evidence at trial, the presiding Justice of the Peace carefully reviewed the evidence, and applied the proper test for assessing credibility. She approached the legal issues which were raised by the defence, as best I appreciate the positions taken. The Court rejects those grounds, in law, and carefully assesses the factual issues. It appears that at page 59 line 15 of the transcript, Her Worship misspeaks, and indicates that Mr. Bydeley's licence [sic] indicates the vehicle is green; she acknowledges in the following paragraph that contrary to the officer's testimony that the car is green, "it is actually gray"; but her finding of fact, that the vehicle referred to by the officer is the one owned and operated by the Appellant at the relevant time, is well supported by the evidence to which she refers in detail. Similarly, on other grounds of fact, I see no error in the manner in which the trial court reached its conclusions. I dismiss this aspect of the appeal.

[16] Her Worship dismisses Mr. Bydeley's defence that because he handed an expired insurance card to the officer, he complied with the law. She observes "there is no evidence that you had a valid insurance card that day, and it is required by law that you carry at all times an insurance card when you are behind the driver's seat [sic] and driving a vehicle in the Province of Ontario." To suggest, as the Appellant does, that any piece of paper indicating that it is an insurance card makes a mockery of the clear intent of the law. I dismiss this ground of appeal.

DISCLOSURE

[17] Finally, I will address the complaint that a disclosure request was denied. It is fundamental in matters of disclosure that material within Crown control be disclosed where it is potentially relevant, that is, where a reasonable possibility exist that the material may be useful to the accused in making full answer and defence. In this case, Mr. Bydeley sought disclosure in relation to a large number of items or issues. The motion for disclosure was dealt with prior to trial, by Justice of the Peace Churley, on February 14, 2011. Mr. Bydeley had sought disclosure and received much material, according to the transcript, but took the position that items of proof had not been disclosed prior to trial to his satisfaction. It appears from the transcript that some of these items reflect Mr. Bydeley's unique perspective on the law: for example, reference to "the law…. that permits the officer to infringe upon my human rights to travel and detain me". He asks for "maintenance records, and specifications, limitations subsequent tickets and previous tickets to mine. All of those items that I've determined to be necessary in my defence". Clearly the law requires disclosure of items in possession of the Crown which might reasonably assist the defendant in making full answer and defence. The Justice of the Peace considered the application for a variety of items which were disclosed, and for these ones too. She considered the position as stated by the Defendant before her, that the outstanding items would assist in his defence. The Prosecutor at trial delineated his position. The Justice dismissed the request for further disclosure. I see no error in the ruling of February 14. No showing of possible relevance was shown in relation to the matters which might conceivably have been subject to disclosure.

CONCLUSION

[18] In some ways the litigation undertaken by Mr. Bydeley on his own behalf and previously on behalf of his wife raise issues of access to justice. They show a citizen, not trained in law, attempting to argue principles of law as they apply to a set of facts, as he sees them. They show the disconnect, in so many ways between the way this citizen interprets the law, and the manner in which the law has been interpreted by those trained in law and those with authority to interpret and apply the law. In his refusal to be bound by the common law, that is the authoritative interpretation of laws by judicial precedent, Mr. Bydeley presents argument which eerily resembles the language as deployed by Lewis Carroll in his famous poem, "Jabberwocky": It sounds like English, in the case of the famous poem, but it is largely comprised of invented words evincing meaning primarily to the speaker of them. The result is, that essentially Mr. Bydeley says, the law means what I say it means. In the presentation of argument thus constituted in Mr. Bydeley's case, it cannot form part of the social convention of legal argument in an institution as fundamental to constitutional democracy as a Court of Law.

[19] Unfortunately for the fertile imagination of this litigant, he cannot participate in activity regulated on behalf of the community without acceding to the system we have maintained, as a democracy, for centuries of common law. To return to the words with which Justice Laforme dealt with the same arguments:

In this case, I expect that Ms. Bydeley believes her arguments to be creative and novel, and I have no doubt that both her and her husband fervently believe the correctness of them. However, they are fanciful and have no air of reality – particularly in the way this trial proceeded. Indeed, as best as I can comprehend Ms. Bydeley's supporting materials and submissions, much of what she argues has been the subject of judicial consideration since the time of confederation and interpretation of the British North America Act commenced. It is now well settled law.

[20] For the preceding reasons, I dismiss the appeal and confirm convictions and sentence in this matter.

Released: October 3, 2012

Signed: Justice S.R. Shamai

Footnotes

[1] See the recently released Judgment of Rooke ACJ, Alberta QB – Meade v. Meade which reviews similar approaches to litigation by parties in Alberta and other Canadian courts.

[2] The Ontario Court of Appeal has also made it clear that the Provincial Offences Act was "intended to establish a speedy, efficient and convenient method of dealing with offences" under provincial statutes: R. v. Jamieson (1981), 64 C.C.C. (2d) 550 at 552. However, it was not, cautioned MacKinnon A.C.J.O., "intended as a trap for the unskilled or unwary but rather, as already stated, as an inexpensive and efficient way of dealing with, for the most part, minor offences." citing R v. Rijal, infra, para 55.

[3] See R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] SCR 326 and R. v. Chaplin, [1995] 1 SCR 727 for the foundational cases on disclosure as an aspect of Charter entitlement under Section 7.