Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dated September 18, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $3,660 to the responding party.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking out his negligence claim against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).

The appellant alleged that FRO was negligent in handling his child support payments and reporting him to a credit bureau, arguing FRO owed him a duty to reply to his correspondence.

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that FRO did not owe a duty of care to the appellant, applying the Cooper v. Hobart framework.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order requiring him to pay $193,596.50 to the respondent for her share of a joint bank account following their separation.

The appellant argued there was a genuine issue for trial regarding the quantum owed and that he was entitled to a trial under Rule 16(7) of the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge made no error in relying on the appellant's failure to respond to a Request to Admit, which deemed the quantum admitted.

The court held the motion judge properly applied the summary judgment framework and made no palpable and overriding error.

The moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal an order dated March 20, 2024, as well as leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, with no order as to costs.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the self-represented respondent.

The appellant sued her former family lawyer for negligence, alleging the lawyer failed to properly advise her regarding spousal support and business valuations when negotiating a separation agreement.

The motion judge stayed the civil action as an abuse of process, ruling that the appellant must first attempt to set aside the separation agreement under the Family Law Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Family Law Act is a complete code for spousal support claims and the civil system should not be used to circumvent the statutory regime governing matrimonial disputes.

The mother appealed a motion judge's decision regarding retroactive child support and imputed income.

The motion judge had denied the mother's request for retroactive support prior to October 2019, finding that the father had made payments for airline tickets and a lump sum that offset the amount owed.

The motion judge also imputed an income of $30,000 to the mother and ordered her to pay child support for the child in the father's care.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings or exercise of discretion.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, but restricted it solely to issues concerning COVID-19 vaccination.

The court recommended the appeal be heard alongside a related case and ordered the responding party to pay costs of $4,500.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal in respect to three of the four issues raised in the notice of motion.

Costs of the motion for leave to appeal were fixed at $6,750, payable in the discretion of the appeal panel.

The appellant father appealed a case management judge's decision to adjourn a contested motion brought by the Office of the Children's Lawyer until a recusal motion could be heard.

The case management judge had determined the recusal motion was too long to be heard during COVID-19 protocols, resulting in legal paralysis for the family.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the situation inappropriately left the children in limbo, and directed the Regional Senior Judge to appoint a temporary case management judge until the recusal motion is decided.

The applicant sought to challenge final Crown wardship and adoption orders regarding his children, as well as a recent decision of the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The court found the applications to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the underlying orders were final and not subject to review.

The court dismissed the applications under Rule 2.1.01 and ordered that the applicant be prohibited from commencing further proceedings related to the wardship or adoption of his children without prior leave of the court.

The moving party sought a stay of an order requiring her to vacate the matrimonial home, pending a motion for leave to appeal.

The court noted that deadlines were temporarily suspended due to COVID-19, making an extension of time unnecessary.

The court granted a temporary stay of the eviction order until the final disposition of the motion for leave to appeal and set a timetable for the delivery of motion materials.

The self-represented appellant failed to comply with previous court directions regarding the perfection of her appeal, citing a hearing disability, lack of computer access, and inability to participate in teleconferences.

After court staff successfully communicated with the appellant by telephone, the court scheduled a peremptory case management teleconference to address the respondent's proposed motion to dismiss the appeal for delay and to set a new timetable.

A case management teleconference was held to schedule an appeal that had been adjourned due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court directed that the appeal proceed by video conference before a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

Detailed procedural directions were provided regarding the electronic filing of documents, factums, and compendiums using a password-protected drop box.

The appellant husband appealed an order for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The property was sold prior to the hearing of the appeal.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was moot and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it.

The court awarded the respondent wife full indemnity costs of $20,000, finding the husband's conduct in pursuing the appeal and opposing the sale amounted to bad faith litigation.

The appellant appealed a family court order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the relief appealed from was granted under the Divorce Act, meaning jurisdiction properly lay with the Court of Appeal pursuant to s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court ordered the appeal transferred to the Court of Appeal under s. 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant mother moved for an extension of time to serve and file her notice of motion for leave to appeal an interim access order, and requested that the motion for leave be heard orally by a single judge.

The court granted the extension of time, finding the mother had a bona fide intention to appeal and a reasonable explanation for the short delay.

However, the court dismissed the request for an oral hearing before a single judge, holding that Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires leave motions to be heard in writing by a panel of the Divisional Court.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the respondent father for the procedural issue.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for civil fraud and ordering him to pay $30,526 plus costs.

The respondent had paid the appellant's CRA tax lien to clear title to a jointly owned family residence transferred to her pursuant to a family law settlement, and subsequently sued him after he declared bankruptcy, alleging his failure to disclose the tax debt constituted fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the action, finding the trial judge erred in law by applying a test for fraudulent non-disclosure rather than the strict four-part test for fraudulent misrepresentation, and made palpable and overriding errors of fact unsupported by the evidence.

The appellant wife appealed a decision dismissing her motion for judgment to enforce minutes of settlement.

The motions judge had found that the parties entered into a binding written settlement but directed a trial to determine whether there was a subsequent oral agreement to vary the terms.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred in failing to enforce the binding written contract, especially since the husband had not brought a cross-motion regarding the alleged oral variation.

A concurring opinion noted that under s. 55(1) of the Family Law Act, any agreement to amend a domestic contract must be in writing, rendering the alleged oral variation unenforceable.

The appellant wife appealed an order directing the sale of the matrimonial home and a distribution of $75,000 of the proceeds to each party.

The wife argued the distribution order impaired her claim for an unequal division of the proceeds.

The Divisional Court found the motion judge erred by ordering a specific distribution without knowing the sale price, rather than holding back funds to cover the wife's claim.

The court varied the order to distribute $15,000 to the husband and $75,000 to the wife, with the balance held in trust pending trial.