Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of McKenzie J. dated May 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated April 22, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court.

On consent, the Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, set aside the lower court's decision, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court in Milton for the scheduling of a case conference.

No costs were ordered.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Daurio J. dated January 30, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her child in need of protection and placing the child in extended society care.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging ineffective assistance of former counsel, claiming she was coerced into signing a Statement of Agreed Facts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it could have been adduced earlier and did not meet the relaxed test for child protection cases.

The court upheld the motions judge's decision to admit the Statement of Agreed Facts and grant summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial and no error in principle.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) upholding a committee's decision to take no further action on her complaint against a psychologist.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness because 96% of the Record of Investigation was redacted.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the HPARB reasonably exercised its statutory discretion to limit disclosure to protect the privacy interests of the applicant's children and to prevent interference with ongoing family law proceedings.

The self-represented appellant commenced an appeal in the Divisional Court from a final family law order granting spousal support and equalization.

The amounts ordered were well in excess of the Divisional Court's monetary jurisdiction under s. 19 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent sought to dismiss the appeal, arguing prejudice from delay and that she had previously warned the appellant he was in the wrong court.

Applying the test under s. 110 of the Courts of Justice Act, the Divisional Court found there had been confusion regarding jurisdiction and ordered the appeal transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The parties advised the court in writing that the matter had been settled.

On consent, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed without costs to either party.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a temporary order placing his partner's daughter into the care of the children's aid society.

A subsequent temporary order replaced the appealed order, placing the child with her mother under supervision.

The Divisional Court found the appeal legally moot because the controversy over the child's placement had been removed by the subsequent order.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal and dismissed it.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Pinto J. dated September 1, 2021.

The Divisional Court denied the motion and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $2,500 all inclusive.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his request to reduce his child support obligations to zero.

The father argued he had quit his jobs due to mental illness and was now receiving ODSP.

The Divisional Court dismissed the father's motion to adduce fresh evidence from a psychiatrist, finding it would not have affected the result given the motion judge's factual findings that the father had voluntarily and strategically quit his jobs.

The Court upheld the motion judge's decision to impute income, finding no basis to interfere with the conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances.

The appellant children's aid society appealed a temporary order placing a newborn child in the care of the respondent parents subject to supervision terms.

The society argued the application judge erred by imposing terms irreconcilable with his findings regarding the mother's mental health and the father's prior criminal conviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the test under section 51(2) of the Child and Family Services Act and made no palpable and overriding error.

The Court also dismissed the society's motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the paternal grandfather's criminal record, applying a relaxed test but finding the evidence would not have affected the result.

The appellant mother appealed an order directing the pre-trial sale of the jointly-owned matrimonial home.

She argued the sale would prejudice the best interests of her autistic child, who had lived there since birth.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh expert evidence confirming that moving would be a high-level stressor for the child.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard, the court found the motion judge erred in ordering the sale before the resolution of the Family Law Act claims, as it would defeat the mother's claims for exclusive possession and a vesting order.

The appeal was allowed and the sale orders were set aside.

The applicant appealed an interlocutory order that lifted a stay on the respondent's motion to change custody and support.

The stay had originally been ordered under s. 1(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the respondent's non-payment of support arrears and costs.

The respondent consented to the appeal.

The Divisional Court found that lifting the stay without requiring the respondent to pay the outstanding arrears and costs was an error, granted the appeal, and set aside the order lifting the stay.

The former wife brought a motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a procedural order dismissing her motion for valuations, and for a stay pending appeal.

The motion was brought approximately 90 days after the deadline.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence explaining the delay was inadequate and uncorroborated.

Furthermore, as the underlying order was procedural, the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the former husband.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion for leave to appeal, the responding party sought full indemnity costs of $30,618.11.

The court found that the moving party acted unreasonably by overly complicating the motion and filing extensive materials.

However, the court agreed with the moving party that the cost of retaining senior litigation counsel was not entirely reasonable to pass on.

The court fixed costs payable to the responding party at $19,000, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $12,000 to the respondent, his former common-law partner, for an unpaid loan.

The appellant argued that the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction under section 21.8 of the Courts of Justice Act because the parties had signed a separation agreement, making it a family law matter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the pith and substance of the claim was a simple common law action in debt arising from a discrete loan agreement, not a claim created by the family law relationship or the separation agreement.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to terminate his spousal support obligation following his retirement.

The appellant argued that $600,000 in dividends he received from a family corporation should have been treated as a return of capital rather than income, and that the motion judge demonstrated bias by comparing him to a 'Wall Street businessman'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in treating the dividends as income for support purposes and concluding the judge's comments merely illustrated the different tax treatment of dividend income.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a trial judge's order awarding wasted costs against him and his counsel personally, following an adjournment necessitated by counsel's failure to respond to Requests to Admit.

The appellant's counsel argued he was not given proper notice that costs might be awarded against him personally.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the solicitor had objective notice of the possibility of personal costs and was given a full opportunity to be heard.

The trial judge made no error in principle in exercising her discretion.

The applicant mother moved to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her application for judicial review of an arbitration award for delay.

The arbitration award concerned custody and access to the parties' child following allegations of sexual abuse against the father.

The court noted that the applicant had also appealed a Superior Court order incorporating the arbitration award, and that appeal was scheduled to be heard by the Court of Appeal.

Finding that the issues raised in the judicial review would be expeditiously dealt with by the Court of Appeal, the court dismissed the motion to set aside the Registrar's order without prejudice to renew it after the Court of Appeal's decision.