ODC 2015

The appellant appealed a trial decision regarding support, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to decide whether to impute income to the respondent for 2012.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the trial judge effectively made an interlocutory order by leaving the issue subject to review upon additional disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and the issue of imputation of income and support from 2012 onwards was remitted back to the trial judge for a final determination.

The applicant tenant sought judicial review of an interim order made by the Landlord and Tenant Board in a proceeding that the landlord subsequently abandoned.

The landlord had commenced a second proceeding, resulting in a final order terminating the tenancy and fixing arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding it moot because the interim order ceased to have effect when the first proceeding was abandoned.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to hear the moot case, noting that due process issues before the Board can be reviewed in cases that are not moot.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of its motion for summary judgment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, noting that the underlying decision was interlocutory and the final rights of the parties would be determined at trial.

The court emphasized that appellate review would be available later on a full record, and extensive interlocutory appeals cause unnecessary delay and cost.

The court also set a timetable for the remaining steps to ready the matter for trial.

The applicants, two environmental organizations, brought an application challenging the validity of Ontario Regulation 176/13 made under the Endangered Species Act, 2007.

They argued the Minister failed to meet a mandatory condition precedent under s. 57(1) of the Act and that the regulation was inconsistent with the Act's purposes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister had properly formed the required opinion that the regulation would not jeopardize the survival of species at risk, and that the regulation's balancing of environmental protection with economic considerations was consistent with the broader purposes of the Act.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which upheld a Hearing Panel's finding of professional misconduct and the penalty of revocation of his licence.

The misconduct involved overcharging a family law client, failing to explain irrevocable directions, and failing to keep the client informed.

On appeal, the appellant raised new issues regarding the burden of proof and the sufficiency of the Hearing Panel's reasons.

The Divisional Court allowed the new issues to be raised but dismissed them on the merits, finding that the Hearing Panel did not reverse the burden of proof and that its reasons were sufficient under the Newfoundland Nurses standard.

The court also upheld the global assessment of the lawyer's fees without expert evidence and confirmed the penalty of revocation.

The self-represented moving party sought to set aside a registrar's order dismissing his appeal for failure to perfect it in a timely manner.

The underlying appeal was from a Master's decision refusing to set aside the dismissal of his wrongful prosecution action for delay.

Applying the factors from Paulson v. Cooper, the Divisional Court found that while there was an intention to appeal and no prejudice to the respondent, the appeal lacked any real chance of success on the merits.

The motion was dismissed with costs fixed at $500.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against three Muslim employees by requiring them to taste pork, failing to accommodate religious holidays, and engaging in reprisals.

The applicants argued the Tribunal made unreasonable findings of fact, erred in its treatment of s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, and improperly ignored unsworn willsay statements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal's fact-finding was reasonable, the s. 45.1 argument was not raised before the Tribunal, and willsay statements of uncalled witnesses are not evidence.

The Divisional Court issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and motion for leave to appeal.

The appellant was awarded $50,000 inclusive for the appeal and leave motion.

The costs of the underlying certification motion were remitted to the motion judge, who had extensive experience with the matter, to determine a fair and reasonable amount.

Following the dismissal of both the appeal and cross-appeal regarding whether glass doors and track lighting were chattels or fixtures, the court determined the issue of costs.

Given that the main issue was similar in both the appeal and cross-appeal and the trial judge's findings were upheld, the court ordered that each party bear its own costs.

The appellant employer appealed decisions of the Financial Services Tribunal ordering a partial windup of its pension plan following a plant closure.

The Tribunal found that a reorganization had occurred prior to the closure and included employees laid off during that period in the windup group.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's determination that a reorganization occurred and its definition of the windup group were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the Tribunal's jurisdictional rulings regarding the Superintendent's authority.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order refusing relief from eviction.

The tenant, who owed over $13,000 in rent arrears, did not appear but requested an adjournment due to a serious medical condition.

The court granted the adjournment on peremptory terms, ordering the tenant to pay $2,000 towards rent and arrears by a specified date, failing which the landlord could move without notice to lift the stay of the eviction order.

The applicant union sought judicial review of three Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions that declared it no longer represented the employees of the respondent employer.

The union argued the Board unreasonably dismissed its allegations of employer interference without a hearing, relying on a continuing taint from a prior Board finding of interference three years earlier.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding it was reasonable for the Board to require the union to plead specific, proximate facts of interference rather than relying on the historical taint, especially since the statute does not impose a reverse onus on the employer in these circumstances.

Two competing groups of plaintiffs, KMG and RGG, brought class actions against Barrick Gold Corporation for securities misrepresentations related to environmental violations at a Chilean mine.

The motion judge granted carriage to RGG, finding their broader claims and superior state of preparation were in the best interests of the class.

KMG appealed the carriage order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge articulated the correct test, did not err in law or principle, and committed no palpable and overriding factual errors in his assessment of the carriage factors.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord damages for unpaid rent and property clean-up, and dismissing their counterclaim for disposed personal property.

The trial took place over two days, nearly a year apart.

The appellants mistakenly missed the second day, and the trial judge concluded the trial in their absence, making factual findings based on an incomplete record and expressing bias regarding their character.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by proceeding without the appellants and relying on irrelevant context.

A new trial before a different judge was ordered.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her long-term disability insurer after being denied benefits.

She was receiving income replacement benefits from her accident benefits insurer.

The accident benefits insurer successfully moved to be added as a defendant to help the plaintiff secure long-term disability benefits, which would reduce its own payment obligations.

The long-term disability insurer appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the accident benefits insurer was not a necessary party under Rule 5.03 and had no direct cause of action against the long-term disability insurer.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his motion to change and terminate his $1,000 monthly spousal support obligation following his voluntary retirement at age 55.

He argued his retirement constituted a material change in circumstance and that paying support from a previously divided pension amounted to double dipping.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motions judge's finding that the retirement was a voluntary, self-engineered withdrawal from the workforce partly motivated by a desire to avoid support obligations.

A cross-appeal by the respondent to remove a court-imposed termination date of age 64 was granted on consent.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion to stay the plaintiffs' action.

The plaintiffs had sued for fraudulent misappropriation of funds under a joint venture agreement, and the defendants argued the dispute fell within the agreement's arbitration clause.

The motion judge found the claim was essentially in fraud and not covered by the arbitration clause.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

The prospective appellant sought leave to appeal an order requiring its representatives to re-attend an examination and pay costs.

The appellant argued the underlying contempt motion was a nullity because it was brought on the civil motion list rather than in Bankruptcy Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the motion was properly brought in both emanations of the Superior Court.

The appellants, federal inmates, sought to certify a class action against the Crown after correctional officers seized t-shirts they had designed to commemorate inmates who died in custody.

The motion judge refused certification, finding that the inmate grievance process under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act was the preferable procedure for resolving the dispute.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her preferability analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge correctly applied the framework from AIC Limited v. Fischer and made no error in principle in concluding that the grievance process could provide meaningful redress and access to justice.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee six months' reasonable notice for wrongful dismissal and $23,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The employer argued the trial judge erred by considering the employee's prior service, finding he mitigated his damages by accepting a lower-paying role, and awarding Superior Court costs for a judgment under $25,000.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the six-month notice period was reasonable given the circumstances, the employee properly mitigated his damages, and the costs award was an appropriate exercise of discretion despite the trial judge's error in including prejudgment interest to meet the Small Claims Court threshold.