Court of Justice

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to add the paternal grandparents as party respondents in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The grandparents had been caring for the two children for seventeen months under a child protection order.

The father consented to adding the grandparents as parties and sought a deemed custody order in their favour.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the grandparents had sufficient participatory rights under the statute without requiring party status.

The Crown applied for a ruling on the admissibility of opinion evidence from a probation officer regarding the identification of an unknown male recorded on home surveillance video from a residence proximate to where a break-in and sexual assault allegedly occurred.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility under the "prior acquaintance/better position" test established in Leaney.

The probation officer had supervised the accused on multiple occasions and observed his physical appearance, gait, clothing, and other characteristics.

The court found the evidence admissible, as the witness had sufficient familiarity with the accused and was in a better position than the court to identify similarities between the accused and the person in the video.

The witness testified only to consistencies and similarities, not to a positive identification.

Following an oral decision granting the respondent mother temporary custody and supervised access to the applicant father, but dismissing her motion to travel, the mother sought costs of $3,200.

The court found divided success but noted the mother was successful on the dominant issue of access, which was necessitated by the father's abusive behaviour towards supervised access centre staff.

The court ordered the father to pay costs of $2,400, payable in monthly installments due to his limited financial resources.

The offender was convicted after an eleven-day trial of multiple serious firearm offences arising from an incident on July 31, 2017, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger, pointing a firearm, and possession of a firearm without a licence.

He also pleaded guilty to breaches of recognizance and probation from 2018.

The court imposed a global sentence of 7 years less 34½ months presentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 61 months, with lifetime firearms prohibitions, DNA orders, and a forfeiture order.

The offender's extensive criminal history, pattern of recidivism, breaches of court orders, and the serious nature of the firearm offences were significant aggravating factors.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a single motor vehicle collision on July 30, 2017.

The Crown called three witnesses and filed a toxicology report.

The defence raised four issues: (1) the admission that the accused was the driver was obtained in violation of section 7 Charter rights as a compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act; (2) the accused did not waive rights to counsel under section 10(b); (3) the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated a motor vehicle; and (4) there was no proof the accused operated the vehicle after 3:15 hours per expert opinion.

The court found that the accused's self-identification as the driver was a statutorily compelled statement under the Highway Traffic Act and must be excluded.

Without this identification, the ASD demand was unlawful and the breath test must be excluded.

The court excluded the breath samples and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while suspended.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and make the breath demand, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that while the right to counsel issue was potentially troubling, the accused failed to exercise appropriate diligence in communicating his preference for his own counsel.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with unlawful possession of Fentanyl (two grams), a Schedule I controlled substance, contrary to Section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 30 days with two years' probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court granted a conditional discharge with two years' probation, finding that despite the seriousness of Fentanyl as an aggravating factor, the exceptional circumstances of the case—including the accused's status as a first offender, his addiction stemming from legitimate medical treatment for serious injuries and medical conditions, his substantial rehabilitation efforts including methadone treatment, his educational advancement, and the jeopardy to his employment prospects—warranted a discharge rather than conviction.

The accused pleaded guilty to six domestic violence offences spanning a two-year period, including assault causing bodily harm, failure to comply with probation and recognizance, threatening bodily harm, criminal harassment, and obstruction of justice.

The victim suffered from multiple sclerosis and was extremely vulnerable.

The accused had an extensive history of domestic violence convictions with over 40 prior convictions, at least seventeen of which were domestic-related.

The court imposed a four-year global sentence with credit for 538 days of pre-trial custody at the standard 1.5:1 ratio, resulting in 21 months remaining to be served, followed by a three-year probation order.

The defendant was sentenced for two counts of breaching a section 161 prohibition order under the Criminal Code.

The defendant had previously been convicted of sexual interference against his stepson and was subject to a prohibition order restricting contact with persons under 16 years of age.

The defendant breached this order on two occasions by being alone with children without an approved adult present.

The Crown sought consecutive jail sentences totaling 12 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 9 to 12 months.

The court imposed consecutive conditional sentences of 6 months each for a total of 12 months, followed by 3 years of probation, finding that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the lower end seriousness of the breaches, the defendant's rehabilitation efforts, and the low risk of reoffending when conditions were imposed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams in 100 milliliters of blood.

Police observed erratic driving, arrested the accused, and obtained breath samples showing readings of 140 mg/100 ml and 130 mg/100 ml.

The trial judge dismissed the impaired driving charge, finding that while the accused likely had consumed alcohol, his driving and behaviour could reasonably be explained by reckless driving and a quick temper rather than impairment.

However, the trial judge found the accused guilty of the over 80 offence, rejecting arguments that the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) had been breached and that the breath results should be excluded.

An uncontested trial concerning child support obligations for a dependent child.

The applicant mother sought guideline child support retroactive to May 1, 2015, contribution to section 7 expenses, and costs.

The respondent father did not participate in the proceedings despite proper notice and multiple court attendances.

The court found the respondent had an obligation to pay child support, imputed income for years where disclosure was not provided, awarded prospective support from the date of notice, and made a retroactive award for a two-year period.

The court also determined which claimed expenses qualified as section 7 expenses and apportioned them based on the parties' respective incomes.

Costs were awarded to the successful applicant.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of trafficking fentanyl.

The charges arose after undercover purchases of heroin were analyzed and found to contain an unknown amount of fentanyl.

The court considered the serious nature of fentanyl trafficking, the lack of quantitative analysis of fentanyl concentration, and the accused's health challenges including Hepatitis C. The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day to be served at the Ontario Correctional Institute, followed by two years probation, balancing deterrence and denunciation with rehabilitative prospects.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The matter proceeded by way of a blended Charter application and trial.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter, and also alleged a violation of the right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make the breath demand, the accused's section 10(b) rights were violated when police failed to adequately facilitate contact with counsel of choice and instead funneled the accused toward duty counsel.

The breath samples were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident in which a complainant alleged that a man grabbed her buttocks outside an apartment building on Sherbourne Street in Toronto at approximately 3:30-4:00 a.m.

The complainant followed the alleged assailant to a convenience store and identified him on surveillance video.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's eyewitness identification.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that despite the complainant's detailed account and her absolute certainty, the cumulative frailties of her evidence, including inconsistencies regarding the assailant's build, the colour and design of his t-shirt, and the inherent dangers of eyewitness identification evidence, left the court in reasonable doubt as to the accused's identity as the perpetrator.

The accused was charged with attempt murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace following an incident on April 30, 2018, in which he allegedly stabbed the victim in the chest with a sharp object, causing a life-threatening cardiac injury and anoxic brain injury.

The Crown relied on eyewitness testimony, surveillance video evidence, and recognition evidence from police officers with prior acquaintance with the accused.

The trial judge found the identification evidence compelling through a combination of facial features, distinctive tattoos, clothing, and circumstantial factors including the suspect's proximity to the accused's residence and the timeline of events.

The court convicted on aggravated assault and weapons charges but acquitted on attempt murder, finding insufficient evidence of specific intent to kill.

The Crown charged two defendants with aggravated assault of a family member who sustained extensive facial bruising, stitches, and two significant fractures to her orbital bone on December 2, 2017.

The complainant gave two irreconcilable accounts: initially reporting a violent attack by both defendants to medical staff and police, then recanting at trial and claiming she had tripped and fallen down the stairs.

The court admitted the complainant's prior police statement under the KGB doctrine and found it more credible than her trial testimony.

However, the court concluded that while the evidence was highly suspicious of guilt and probably showed the assault occurred, the absence of independent corroborating evidence combined with the complainant's demonstrated willingness to fabricate evidence and her motive to do so created a reasonable doubt.

Both defendants were acquitted.