Family and Matrimonial Law - OCJ

On competing temporary family law motions concerning a 21-month-old child, the court addressed parenting time expansion, supervision, decision-making responsibility, an OCL referral, and child support.

The court rejected renewed allegations justifying supervised parenting time, but found a limited expansion to include one overnight per week was in the child's best interests, while deferring any automatic move to shared parenting.

Ongoing parental conflict, inconsistent routines, and concerns about communications with third parties supported a temporary order granting the mother sole decision-making responsibility with mandatory meaningful consultation and use of a parenting communication application.

The court also ordered a s. 112 OCL investigation and imputed minimum-wage-level income to the father, fixing child support arrears and ongoing monthly support.

In a child protection summary judgment motion arising from severe unexplained injuries and the death of one infant sibling while in parental care, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Applying the cautious child-protection summary judgment approach under Rule 16 and the Hryniak framework, the court found the medical evidence overwhelming, the alternative explanations speculative, and the risk to the surviving children incapable of mitigation.

The court concluded one child continued to be in need of protection on status review and the other was in need of protection on the protection application.

Final orders placed one child in kin custody, the other in extended society care with an adoption plan, and provided supervised parental and sibling access.

In a child protection trial under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court found the child in need of protection on the basis of a risk of emotional harm.

The evidence did not support a finding of physical harm risk or actual emotional harm as statutorily defined, but did establish a future risk arising from the mother's cumulative absences during a mental health crisis and from the kith caregivers' conduct in fostering estrangement from the child's parents, extended family, language, and culture.

The court was highly critical of the child protection agency's investigation, disclosure, litigation positions, and compliance with statutory and regulatory duties.

Rather than granting deemed custody to the kith caregivers, the court ordered three months of interim society care with immediate reunification-focused therapeutic, cultural, and assessment steps, and structured access orders for the child's family.

In a child protection status review involving two children in society care, the court found the children remained in need of protection because of the mother's unresolved mental health concerns, ongoing conflictual behaviour, and lack of insight into the impact of that behaviour on the children.

Although the society and the mother sought a supervision order returning the children to the mother in another province, the court held that plan did not adequately protect the children's emotional wellbeing.

The court gave significant weight to the children's consistent wishes not to return, while grounding the analysis in the lived basis for those wishes rather than treating preference as determinative.

Extended care was ordered, with limited supervised virtual access preserved to maintain cultural, linguistic, and familial connection without undermining the children's stability and future permanency options.

In a child protection trial, the court conducted a voir dire to determine whether hearsay evidence from an OCL clinician concerning the child’s views and wishes should be admitted.

The clinician was also a full-time employee of the applicant society, had not disclosed that employment in prior affidavits, and no ethical wall or access restrictions had been implemented.

Applying the principled hearsay framework, the court held the proposed evidence failed threshold reliability because the conflicting institutional roles and surrounding circumstances created unacceptable risks of influence, inaccuracy, and loss of independence.

The court also found the evidence was not necessary because other, more reliable sources of the child’s views and wishes were available.

The evidence was excluded and costs were reserved.

The parties disputed a claimed retroactive downward variation of child support, the structure of resumed parenting time with the younger child, and whether the mother required the father's travel consent for international vacations.

Applying the retroactive support framework, the court held the payor failed to prove a real, significant, and continuous material decrease in income, finding the medical evidence insufficient and the non-employment effectively a matter of choice.

On parenting, the court found a material change arising from the lack of consistent visits and ordered a gradual transition of day visits before restoring alternate weekend parenting time with the younger child only.

On travel, the court held the father's refusal to consent to a one-week vacation was unreasonable and varied the prior order to permit international vacation travel of up to two weeks outside school time without his authorization, subject to itinerary disclosure and make-up parenting time.

In a parenting and child support trial concerning a young child, the court held that professionally supervised parenting time was necessary because the respondent parent’s volatility, family violence, mental health instability, and dysregulation created emotional and psychological safety risks for the child.

The court found the applicant parent had not consistently facilitated the child’s relationship with the respondent, but concluded that unsupervised parenting time would not presently be in the child’s best interests.

Monthly two-hour agency-supervised visits were ordered, together with strict no-direct-contact communication terms.

For child support, the court accepted the parties’ agreed imputed income for 2023 and 2025, declined to impute income for 2024 because of legitimate disability-related unemployability, fixed arrears at $1,516, and ordered repayment at 10% of ODSP income.

Following settlement of two family law motions concerning parenting time and access to child-related information, the court determined whether a costs award should nevertheless be made.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs may appropriately follow settlement where success and unreasonable conduct can still be assessed.

The court found that the mother made early, consistent, and reasonable offers on the core parenting issue that closely matched the ultimate resolution, while the father achieved limited success on the information motion.

Balancing divided success, litigation conduct, the timing of offers, and deficiencies in the mother's bill of costs, the court ordered the father to pay the mother $6,000 inclusive.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society moved for summary judgment on the protection finding and separately sought to strike the mother’s answer and plan of care.

The court permitted the summary judgment motion to proceed despite its lateness because the matter had been delayed repeatedly and the child’s best interests required movement toward finality.

On the admitted record, the court held that the combination of eviction, police involvement, and the mother’s involuntary hospitalization established a risk of physical harm under s. 74(2)(b)(i) of the CYFSA, but declined to find that no parent was available to make adequate care arrangements under s. 74(2)(k) because the record did not show sufficient effort to obtain the mother’s input.

The motion to strike pleadings was dismissed because striking is a last-resort remedy and the mother’s recent non-attendance did not justify it in the context of her broader participation and self-represented status.

A grandmother sought contact with her grandchild after the child's mother terminated the relationship following prolonged family conflict and allegations of abuse.

The court held that the applicant's failure to file a Form 35.1A affidavit did not bar relief because the child welfare history was fully explored at trial and no prejudice arose.

Applying the grandparent-contact authorities, the court found there had been a meaningful prior relationship, but also significant family violence and harmful exposure of the child to adult conflict.

After considering the child's Indigenous heritage, prior wishes, recent refusal of contact, and the need for safety and stability, the court ordered limited supervised monthly virtual contact and refused reunification therapy for lack of evidentiary foundation.

In a child protection proceeding, the mother sought a second adjournment of the society's summary judgment motion after retaining new counsel.

The society and the child's counsel opposed the request, arguing that further delay would prejudice the child.

The court balanced the child's interest in a timely resolution against the mother's right to procedural fairness and adequate legal representation.

Finding that the mother had not intentionally delayed the proceedings and that the child was stable in kin care, the court granted a short adjournment to allow the mother's counsel to properly prepare.

The applicant mother sought a restraining order against the respondent father for herself and her 15-year-old daughter.

The parties had a history of domestic conflict, and the father sent numerous harassing and threatening text messages to the mother over a seven-month period.

The court found the mother had reasonable grounds to fear for her psychological safety based on the father's words and actions.

The court granted a three-year restraining order in favour of the mother but dismissed the claim regarding the daughter, as the messages directed at her did not rise to the same level of harassment.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2015 order, seeking shared transportation for access and other variations.

The respondent mother sought to impute the father's income at $50,000 for child support purposes.

The court found the father was not intentionally underemployed and set his income at $32,000 based on his current full-time employment.

The court dismissed the father's request for shared transportation, finding no material change in circumstances regarding the mother's relocation.

The applicant mother sought costs following a successful temporary motion regarding custody, access, and child support.

The court found the mother was the successful party and had acted reasonably, while the respondent father had acted unreasonably by serving voluminous materials late and failing to accept reasonable offers to settle.

The court rejected the mother's claim for full indemnity costs, noting the Family Law Rules do not presume full recovery, and fixed costs at $7,050.

The maternal grandmother, who had custody of two young children, brought a motion to vary a temporary access order to change the paternal uncle's access from overnight to day access only.

The motion was supported by the Children's Aid Society and opposed by the paternal uncle and the father.

The maternal grandmother alleged that the paternal uncle breached the access conditions by allowing the father, who had substance abuse issues, to stay overnight and have unsupervised access.

The court found that the maternal grandmother met the onus of proving a change in circumstances, relying on the children's statements and a private investigator's report, and concluded that overnight access with the paternal uncle was no longer in the children's best interests.

The motion was granted.

Following a motion where the court assumed jurisdiction over custody and access matters but refused to stay the access provisions of a German court order, both parties sought costs.

The mother sought full indemnity costs of $13,000 based on an offer to settle, while the father sought substantial indemnity costs of $16,699.

The court found the mother was primarily successful on the central issue of jurisdiction, but her non-severable offer to settle was not as favourable as the final order because she did not obtain the requested adjournment of the father's enforcement motion.

Considering divided success, the father's failure to make an offer, and the mother's need to amend her pleadings, the court awarded the mother partial recovery costs of $4,000.

Following a focused trial on access, child support, and special expenses, the applicant sought costs of $18,000.

The court found the applicant was the successful party overall, having obtained a more favourable result on child support and special expenses than her formal offer to settle, despite mixed success on access.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $11,500, noting that costs for prior case conferences could not be claimed as they were not reserved, but allowing full recovery for steps taken after the formal offer to settle.

The respondent father's application for a paternity test and a reduction in child support was dismissed.

The applicant mother and the assignee (Ministry) sought costs.

The court found the applicant was completely successful and had made a reasonable offer to settle, entitling her to full recovery costs.

The respondent's behaviour was found to be unreasonable and his evidence unreliable.

The court awarded the applicant $7,486.25 in costs.

The court declined to award costs to the assignee, noting that doing so would deprive the applicant of funds needed to support the child.

The applicant Society sought a temporary care and custody order to keep the 10-year-old child in care, while the respondent mother and First Nation requested the child be returned to the mother under supervision.

The child had significant behavioural challenges and trauma from past abuse, and had been placed in specialized foster homes far from her community, which prevented her from accessing necessary trauma therapy.

The court found that the mother had taken significant steps to secure housing and services, and that keeping the child in care without proper therapy was causing harm.

The court concluded there were no reasonable grounds to believe the child was likely to suffer harm if returned to the mother, and ordered the child returned subject to a supervision order with conditions.

The applicant Director sought a restraining order against the respondents, who claimed to be the legal guardians of a Métis child by virtue of an Aboriginal custom adoption.

The child was subject to a continuing custody order in British Columbia and had been placed in Ontario.

The respondents had attempted to apprehend the child from her school in Ontario.

The court declined to decide the validity of the custom adoption, recognizing the British Columbia custody order instead.

Finding that the Director had reasonable grounds to fear for the child's safety, the court granted the restraining order.