OCJ 2025

The accused was tried on multiple counts of fraud over $5000 arising from residential renovation contracts, deposits taken from customers, and extensive delays or non-completion of work.

Applying the fraud analysis in Théroux and the credibility framework in W.(D.), the court found that deprivation was established in many instances but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in objectively dishonest acts or had the required subjective mens rea.

The court accepted that many jobs were derailed by supplier shortages, labour instability, GreenOn program disruption, weather, illness, family tragedy, permit issues, customer changes, and eventual licence revocation.

Similar fact reasoning, banking records, and GreenOn paperwork did not convert poor business practices and civil disputes into criminal fraud on this evidentiary record.

The accused was acquitted on all remaining counts.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings in a multi-count fraud prosecution on the basis that the prosecution exceeded the presumptive ceiling under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court conducted a detailed Jordan analysis over a five-year timeline, allocating delay among defence-caused delay, discrete events, and institutional delay, with particular attention to COVID-19 disruptions, repeated judicial unavailability, changes of defence counsel, and a restart of the trial before a new judge.

After deducting 693 days of defence-caused delay and 1,002 days for discrete events from the total 2,264 days, the court found remaining delay of 569 days, exceeding the 18-month ceiling by 21 days.

The court held the accused's s. 11(b) right had been breached and stated that a stay of proceedings would be entered.

In a criminal fraud prosecution involving multiple complainants and home improvement contracts, the Crown sought a cross-count ruling permitting the evidence on the counts to apply across the indictment as similar fact evidence.

The defence conceded the applicable framework except for alleged collusion, arguing that complainants' views were shaped by a Facebook group, media coverage, and a public protest.

The court held that the complainants' subjective belief that they had been deceived was legally irrelevant to the fraud mens rea analysis, which turns on the accused's subjective knowledge and the objective character of the deceitful conduct.

Finding no evidence and no air of reality to collusion, the court granted the Crown's application.

Sentencing for possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl, with methamphetamine and cash seized on arrest, by a first offender who pleaded guilty on the trial date and asserted drug dependency.

The court held that although there was some evidence of moderate fentanyl dependency and difficult pre-sentence custody conditions, the quantity and nature of the Schedule I drugs, the trafficking indicia, and the offender's release status on other drug-related charges made denunciation and deterrence paramount.

Applying the conditional sentence framework, the court found no exceptional circumstances and rejected a community sentence.

After granting Summers credit and accounting for harsh jail conditions through the Marshall approach, the court imposed a 32-month custodial sentence less 455 days' enhanced credit, resulting in 519 days remaining to serve.

Sentencing for multiple offences arising from a sustained episode of intimate partner violence involving repeated assaults, choking, threats to kill, forcible confinement, and mischief.

The court treated the intimate partner context, repeated strangulation, prolonged controlling conduct across multiple locations, and significant harm to the victim and her family, including children exposed to the violence, as serious aggravating factors.

Although the offender was a first offender with employment, family support, counselling efforts, and some evidence of remorse, the court held that a conditional sentence would be inconsistent with the principles in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.

A mid-to-high reformatory sentence of 15 months' custody followed by three years' probation, together with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders, was imposed.

The accused was tried on charges of criminal harassment and mischief arising from post-separation conduct toward a former intimate partner.

The court found that repeated unwanted and degrading text messages, surveillance, unauthorized entry into the complainant’s home, confrontation of her new partner, and placement of a GPS tracking device in her vehicle established the actus reus of criminal harassment and supported a finding that the complainant’s fear was objectively reasonable.

Applying the subjective mens rea standard, the court held the accused knew or was at least reckless or wilfully blind to whether the complainant was harassed, particularly in light of repeated express demands to stop and his own acknowledgements in the messages.

The court also found that installing or causing the installation of the GPS device interfered with the complainant’s lawful use and enjoyment of her vehicle.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The accused were tried on fraud over $5000 charges arising from fraudulent corporate cheques issued by an employee of the victim company to the accuseds' businesses.

The court treated the employee witness as an unsavoury witness and applied a Vetrovec warning, finding that actual knowledge of the internal falsification of records was not proven against either accused.

However, applying the fraud framework and the doctrine of wilful blindness, the court held that each accused knowingly engaged in dishonest dealing by accepting large cheques from a company to which neither was entitled, remitting false HST and income tax to make the transactions appear legitimate, and failing to make obvious inquiries.

A co-conspirator statement was admitted against the second accused under the Carter test.

Both accused were found guilty as charged.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial on a twenty-count information arising from an alleged intimate partner violence episode over a single evening and early morning, the court applied the W(D.) framework and the reasonable doubt standard to sharply conflicting testimony.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence where it was corroborated by independent eyewitness testimony, surveillance videos, audio recordings, and injury photographs, and rejected much of the accused’s evidence as evasive, inconsistent, and untruthful.

The Crown proved multiple counts of assault, assault by choking, uttering threats, forcible seizure, and mischief, including incidents in a park, a parking garage, an Uber ride, a bar, and at a residence.

Several counts, including some threat, assault, and theft allegations, were dismissed where the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of possession of cocaine, oxycodone and hydromorphone for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and breach of house arrest bail after resuming trafficking shortly after release.

The court held that Gladue principles were not engaged because Indigenous ancestry was not established on the record, though the accused's background of trauma, addiction and economic disadvantage remained relevant mitigating circumstances.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for mid-level trafficking in hard drugs, and treating the continuation of trafficking while on bail as a serious aggravating factor, the court found that a conditional sentence was neither available nor fit.

A global penitentiary sentence of three years was reduced for harsh remand conditions, Summers credit, and restrictive bail credit, resulting in a final sentence of two years.

Sentencing on a guilty plea to careless driving causing death contrary to s. 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant drove a van at high speed toward a boat launch ramp in a parking lot adjacent to Ashbridges Bay, mistaking it for an exit road.

The vehicle entered the icy waters of Lake Ontario and sank, resulting in the death of the front-seat passenger who was trapped by an interior security cage.

The original charge of dangerous driving causing death under the Criminal Code was withdrawn after the Crown determined insufficient evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care.

A joint submission was accepted pursuant to R. v. Anthony-Cook.

Sentence comprised time served of four months actual custody with enhanced credit of six months less a day, twelve months probation with counselling conditions, a five-year driving suspension, and a victim fine surcharge.

This was a family law costs decision following a trial over mobility, parenting, and child support issues arising from a recognized extra-provincial divorce decree.

The court found the respondent had acted in bad faith by misrepresenting her address and the children's availability, interfering with parenting time, coaching the children, and making false allegations, thereby increasing the complexity and cost of the litigation.

Applying the Family Law Rules and appellate guidance on bad faith costs, the court held that full recovery was the starting point, but reduced the award to account for support-related costs and overall proportionality.

Costs were fixed at $120,000 with staged payment terms.

At a Family Responsibility Office default hearing, the court considered whether a payor with substantial child support arrears under a registered foreign support order had the ability to pay significant monthly amounts and whether imprisonment-backed enforcement should issue.

The payor rebutted the statutory presumption of ability to pay immediate full arrears and substantial monthly payments by filing credible financial and medical evidence showing serious cardiac and related health limitations, minimal assets, and significant debt.

The court nevertheless found that the payor had delayed the proceeding, failed to pursue a motion to change, and made only sporadic payments over time.

Balancing the remedial purpose of enforcement against the requirement that committal operate only where payment is within the payor's capacity, the court fixed arrears and ordered monthly payments of $120 with a limited three-day-per-default committal term, capped cumulatively at 30 days.

On a father's motion to change a final parenting order, the court held that no material change in circumstances had been established under s. 29 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

Allegations that the mother neglected the child's medical, educational, therapeutic, and extracurricular needs, and failed to consult properly, were rejected on the evidence.

The court further held that, even if the threshold had been met, joint decision-making and expanded parenting time would not be in the child's best interests given the father's unilateral conduct, poor communication, the child's anxiety, and the child's stated preference to maintain the existing schedule.

The motion to change was dismissed, communication was restricted to Our Family Wizard, and the moving party was required to obtain leave before bringing any further motion to change.

On a motion to change, the moving party sought to terminate child support for an adult child as of her eighteenth birthday and to end any obligation for special or extraordinary expenses.

The court held that the child remained entitled to support because the evidence established continuous full-time enrolment in a post-secondary teaching program and continued primary residence with the recipient parent.

The court nevertheless found a material change in the payor's income and applied the retroactive decrease framework in Colucci to fix January 1, 2025 as the variation date, rejecting any earlier retroactive relief because there had been no effective notice or prior financial disclosure.

Ongoing table child support was reduced to $294 per month and the section 7 obligation was terminated from that date forward.

On a summary judgment motion in a child protection proceeding, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on statutory findings, the finding that the child was in need of protection, and the permanent placement of the child with maternal grandparents.

The evidence established serious parental risk factors, including alleged intimate partner violence, the mother’s chronic drug use, and instability at the time of apprehension, while the child had been safely and stably placed with the maternal grandparents for most of his life.

Applying the cautious child-protection summary judgment framework under Rule 16 and the principles in Hryniak and Kawartha, the court held that a fair and just determination could be made on the written record.

The court granted a final s.102 custody order, made discretionary access for the mother, and denied the father’s request for expansive access and information rights, instead ordering limited supervised online and in-person access.

On a motion to change, the moving party sought termination or reduction of child support based on retirement and a substantial drop in income to CPP and OAS benefits.

The court found a material change in circumstances and varied support retroactively to reflect guideline support on the reduced income.

The court held that one adult child ceased to be entitled to support upon leaving university and that the other ceased to be entitled upon not pursuing further full-time education after high school.

The evidence of an Autism Level 1 diagnosis did not establish inability to withdraw from parental charge within s. 31 of the Family Law Act.

The motion was granted in part and no costs were ordered.

In a child protection status review matter, the society sought summary judgment for a final custody order placing three children with a kin caregiver and for discretionary access terms.

The court held that summary judgment in child protection proceedings requires exceptional caution, careful screening for inadmissible hearsay, and confidence that the record permits a fair and just best-interests determination.

The affidavit record was insufficient because it was heavily dependent on hearsay, lacked direct evidence on material protection and placement issues, and raised live disputes about the kin caregiver’s household stability, parenting history, discipline practices, and the practical reality of parental access.

The court concluded that there were genuine issues requiring a trial and that cross-examination was essential before final placement and access orders could be made.

On a temporary family-law motion, the applicant sought contribution to a child's private school tuition as a special or extraordinary expense under s. 7 of the guidelines.

The court found the tuition was extraordinary relative to the applicant's means and was necessary and reasonable in the child's best interests, given the child's autism diagnosis and the evidence that the private school provided materially superior educational and therapeutic supports to those available in the public system.

Applying the effective-notice analysis for retroactive support, the court fixed September 1, 2023 as the start date for temporary contribution.

The respondent was ordered to pay arrears for the 2023/2024 and 2024/2025 school years and to pay 63% of ongoing private school expenses.

On a motion to change final parenting-related orders, the moving party sought broader parenting time and revised travel terms, while the responding party sought to preserve most of the existing regime with her own modifications.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on the child's autism diagnosis, the responding party's eight-month suspension of contact, and unilateral relocation attempts without notice or consent.

Applying the best-interests analysis under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court varied the parenting schedule to increase the moving party's time in a structured way tied to the child's needs and the parties' communication history.

The court also imposed mutual written-consent requirements for out-of-Ontario travel, not to be unreasonably withheld, and consolidated the governing terms into one final order.

Sentencing of a 16-year-old young person who pleaded guilty to failing to stop and remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, contrary to Criminal Code s. 320.16(2).

The young person drove a stolen vehicle at nearly double the posted speed limit with four teenage passengers, fled from police, collided with another vehicle causing serious injuries to two passengers including life-threatening injuries requiring emergency surgery, then fled the scene.

The court considered the presumption of diminished moral culpability under the YCJA, the seriousness of the offence including multiple aggravating factors, the young person's background and rehabilitative prospects, and the inapplicability of Gladue principles due to insufficient evidence connecting self-identified Indigenous heritage to systemic factors.

The court accepted a joint submission for a four-month open custody and supervision order, finding this was the least restrictive sentence capable of holding the young person accountable while promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.