Kristy Maurina

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion under the Hague Convention for the return of the parties' child to Florida.

The respondent father had retained the child in Ontario following a parenting visit and claimed the child objected to returning.

The court found that the child was habitually resident in Florida and wrongfully retained in Ontario.

The court declined to apply the Article 13 objection exception, finding that the child's sudden refusal to return was the result of parental alienation and undue influence by the father.

The motion for the child's return was granted.

The applicant father brought an application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of the parties' one-year-old son from Ontario to California.

The respondent mother argued that the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that returning him would expose him to a grave risk of harm due to alleged abuse.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was California, as it was the only place where both parents lived together with the child, and the father had not consented to a change in residence.

The court also dismissed the mother's Article 13(b) defence, finding insufficient evidence that a return would create an intolerable situation.

The application was granted, and the child was ordered returned to California, where custody and access issues would be determined.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for leave to appeal an arbitration award, the respondent sought costs on a full recovery or substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued for a reduced quantum due to his success on the issue of the appropriate test for leave to appeal.

The court found that while the respondent was the successful party, the applicant's partial success warranted a reduction.

After considering the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, including duplication of counsel time, the court fixed costs payable to the respondent at $9,000.

The appellant sought leave to appeal an order granting the respondent exclusive possession of the matrimonial home under s. 24(3)(f) of the Family Law Act based largely on hostile and threatening text messages sent during the parties’ separation.

The appellant argued the motion judge misapplied the law and that conflicting case law required more than text messages to establish “violence.” The court held that differing outcomes in other cases reflected discretionary factual determinations rather than conflicting legal principles.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the original order and held that intimidation or psychological abuse conveyed through text messages can constitute violence depending on the factual context.

Leave to appeal was therefore denied.