ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Kanwaljeet Singh Hura
Applicant
— AND —
Neeraj Kaur
Respondent
Before Justice J. Beasley
Heard on September 17-18-19 and 22, 2025
Reasons for Judgment released on November 25, 2025 (amended January 7, 2026)
Stephen Eaton counsel for the applicant(s)
Kristy Maurina counsel for the respondent(s)
1The trial in this matter occurred on September 17-18-19 and 22, 2025. Dr. Hura seeks costs.
TRIAL DECISION
2The Final Decree of Divorce issued by Justice Laura Salinas of the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, on March 4, 2024 ("Texas Order"), and recognized as an extra-provincial order under s.41 on September 19, 2024, by Justice Cheung, shall be varied pursuant to s.42 to include the following language:
3The Respondent Neeraj Kaur shall not relocate with the Children, namely Ikleen Hura born […], 2012, and Harleen Kaur Hura, born […], 2019, outside the boundaries of the Region of Peel, Province of Ontario, in the absence of the Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura’s written consent, or further court order.
4The provisions of the Texas Order that permit the Respondent Neeraj Kaur to designate the primary residence of the Children anywhere in Canada or the USA without the Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura’s consent shall be of no force and effect.
5The Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura shall pay child support for the children Ikleen Hura, born […], 2012 and Harleen Kaur Hura, born […], 2019 to the Respondent Neeraj Kaur in the amount of $ 2,415 per month as of October 1, 2025 and on the first day of each month thereafter based on the Child Support Guidelines and his income for support purposes was $178,142, calculated as follows: $120,000.00 of employment income; $57,133.00 of 2024 retained earnings; $54 of investment income; and $955 of other taxable income.
6The Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura’s shall pay child support arrears for the children Ikleen Hura, born […], 2012 and Harleen Kaur Hura, born […], 2019 to the Respondent Neeraj Kaur in the amount of $10,740.00 as of September 30, 2025 at the rate of $2,000 per month.
7The Respondent Neeraj Kaur has been found to have breached the Final Decree of Divorce issued by Justice Laura Salinas of the District Court of Bexar County, Texas, on March 4, 2024 ("Texas Order"), and recognized as an extra-provincial order under s.41 on September 19, 2024, by Justice Cheung.
8The Respondent Neeraj Kaur shall pay costs to the Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura pursuant to Rule 1(8) s in the amount of $5,000, at the rate of $1,000 per month commencing November 1, 2025.
Applicant Father’s Position
9Dr. Hura seeks full recovery costs of $137,876.13 or, in the alternative, substantial-indemnity costs of $110,300.90. Dr. Hura asserts that he was the successful party and that full recovery is mandated pursuant to Rule 24(10) where a party has acted in bad faith.
10Dr. Hura asserts that Dr. Kaur’s bad faith conduct increased his legal fees. One example is the correspondence required when Dr. Hura claimed to be on vacation in Thunder Bay, suspending the father’s parenting time. Another is the aborted attempt to relocate to Windsor in June 2024. Dr. Kaur's address deception led to extensive school-record tracing. Dr. Kaur’s police and CAS allegations necessitated a review of disclosure and witness attendance. Dr. Kaur was unreasonable in refusing to consent to the police and CAS records prior to trial. Questioning of Dr. Kaur was adjourned twice for reasons the Court found not trustworthy. The examination in August 2025 resulted in Dr. Kaur failing to give honest answers to straightforward questions, including when she moved to Brampton in 2023, and her inability to recall if she had called the police/CAS just two months prior to questioning. Dr. Kaur amended her pleadings twice to argue the Ontario Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction in this matter.
11Dr. Hura's Bill of Costs has been adjusted to remove court events where costs were already adjudicated or not reserved.
12Dr. Hura made three Offers to Settle. The June 17, 2024 Offer sought recognition of the Divorce Decree that the children would remain in Brampton and would remain at their current schools. The January 10, 2025 Offer proposed to amend the recognized Divorce Decree to restrict the children's mobility to Brampton, absent a court order or consent. The August 8, 2025 Offer with respect to relocation, the primary issue at trial, meets the Rule 18 requirements for full recovery and was fully severable. The Court Order aligned with the offers of Dr. Hura.
13Dr. Hura asserts that Dr. Kaur's bad faith conduct necessitates full-recovery costs to signal the court's disapproval.
Respondent Mother’s Position
14Dr. Kaur opposes the costs order sought. She acknowledges that Dr. Hura was the more successful party. Dr. Kaur asserts that the costs claimed are excessive. Such an award would be financially devastating to Dr. Kaur as the children’s primary caregiver.
15Dr. Kaur disputes that she acted in bad faith as alleged or that any finding would warrant an order for costs across the entirety of the proceeding as sought by Dr. Hura.
16The trial decision included $5,000 in costs pursuant to Rule 1(8) and there were costs decisions during the proceeding. She asserts that further awards would amount to additional recovery for the same allegations.
17The issue of child support was not a significantly contentious issue in this proceeding and took very little trial time. Dr. Hura agreed that his retained earnings should be included in his income at the commencement of trial.
18Dr. Kaur asserts that Dr. Hura’s request for costs is simply the total sum of his bill of costs without the required analysis of proportionality and reasonableness. Additionally, there are dockets that reflect duplication of work, tasks such as saving documents, and entries relating to items such as a section 30 assessment. No specifics are provided.
Costs Analysis
19I find that Dr. Hura is entitled to his costs on a full recovery basis. He was the successful party. Dr. Kaur shall pay costs to Dr. Hura in the amount of $ 120,000.
20Modern costs rules are designed to foster four fundamental purposes (1) to partially indemnify successful litigants; (2) to encourage settlement; (3) to discourage and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants and; (4) to ensure that cases are dealt with justly under subrule 2 (2) of the Family Law Rules). See: Mattina v. Mattina, 2018 ONCA 867.
21Costs awards are discretionary. Two important principles in exercising discretion are reasonableness and proportionality. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.
22The Court imposed a geographical restriction barring relocation outside Peel without consent, found a material change caused by Dr. Kaur's misconduct, fixed child support using retained earnings with arrears from March 2025, and held that Dr. Kaur engaged in multiple breaches of the Divorce Decree and the Mediated Settlement Agreement, ordering a Rule 1 (8) sanction of payment of $5,000.
23This case is similar to a mobility case which are challenging for everyone involved. By their very nature, an approved move will usually compromise a parent’s relationship with his or her child. For this reason such cases are difficult to resolve and often need to be decided by the court. It is understandable for parents to contest such requests. See: Kawamata v. Phan, 2015 ONCJ 96.
24Dr. Kaur asserts that an award of costs will be financially devastating to her and the children. Both parents are doctors and earn significant income. In awarding costs, the court must consider the financial means of the parties, their ability to pay, and the effect of any costs ruling on the parties and children: See: Fyfe v Jouppien, 2012 ONSC 97, 10 R.F.L. (7th) 371, at para 11. However, the court must also keep in mind the financial circumstances in each parent’s household, including the impact of unrecovered legal fees on the other parent’s ability to similarly provide for the children. See: Beckett v Beckett, 2010 ONSC 2706 at para 38; Jacques v. LeBlanc, 2023 ONSC 4269.
25The Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed in Scalia v. Scalia, 2015 ONCA 492 (C.A.), at para. 68 that a finding of bad faith within the meaning of Rule 24(8) (now 24 (10)) requires evidence of significant wrongdoing, dishonest purpose or moral iniquity. Where there is a finding of bad faith, full indemnity costs is the starting point. However, other factors could impact on the decision. See: Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 7476.
26In C.A.B. v. A.E.H., 2018 ONCJ 178, bad faith found where mother lied about father not having seen child. It turned out the parties had reconciled for one year – even after, the father exercised overnight access. Mother’s actions were intentional and malicious to obtain an advantage in the litigation. The court wrote:
Her behaviour was done knowingly and intentionally, with the intention of creating a false narrative in order to frustrate the father's relationship with the child and obtain an advantage in the litigation - which she was able to do in the short-term.
27In Fazuludeen v. Abdulrazack, 2020 ONSC 3394, the court found bad faith writing:
It was clear to me at the motion that Mr. Fazuludeen had misrepresented the situation to Jain J. when she heard the motion without notice. He falsely misrepresented the mother as having sexually abused the children. He said that the mother was “financially abusive”, and did not contribute towards the expenses of the household from the child tax credit; in fact this was patently untrue based upon the bank statements provided by the Respondent. He moved the children to Barrie without telling the court where they had lived for most of their lives and then tried to cut the children off from their mother. The material misrepresentations made by the Applicant at the hearing of the ex parte motion deceived the court resulting in a custody order and a restraining order.
28Being unsuccessful does not equate necessarily to being unreasonable. See: Wauthier v. McAuliff, 2019 ONSC 5302; W.H.C. v. W.C.M.C., 2021 ONCJ 363.
29Unreasonable behavior “in relation to the issues” includes behavior that: (1) is disrespectful of other participants or the court; (2) unduly complicates the litigation, (3) increases the cost of litigation. See: Harper v Smith 2021 ONSC 3420.
30It was not unreasonable for the Respondent not to accept the Applicant’s offer. This matter involved an “all or nothing” issue in terms of varying the order to limit the Respondent’s mobility with the children. Either the Divorce Decree stood, or her mobility was limited.
31I agree with Justice Stewart in Kosewski v. Kosewski, 2025 ONSC 5017: Findings of bad faith are rarely made. The bar is a high one: The court must find evidence of significant wrongdoing, dishonest purpose or moral iniquity. Bad faith can occur when a party has a hidden purpose. Bad faith can also be overt. Whether committed secretly or overtly, bad faith is done knowingly and intentionally.
32The costs decision of S.(C) v S.(M) 2007 CanLII 20279 (ONSC) is particularly helpful. Note Rule 24(8) is now Rule 24(10) and Rule 24(11) is now Rule 24(14). Justice C. Perkins discussed costs and bad faith as follows:
16 The mother in her costs submissions claimed 14 separate heads of “bad faith” on the part of the father in this case. “Bad faith” has been explained as “not simply bad judgment or negligence but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.” See Biddle v. Biddle (2005), 137 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1164, [2005] W.D.F.L. 2089, 2005 CanLII 7660, [2005] O.J. No. 1056, 2005 CarswellOnt 1053 (Ont. Fam. Ct.), at para. [14].
The definition of “bad faith” in The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English (5th ed., 1964, ed. by H.W. Fowler and F.G. Fowler) is simply “intent to deceive”. The essence of bad faith is the representation that one’s actions are directed toward a particular goal while one’s secret, actual goal is something else, something that is harmful to other persons affected or at least something they would not willingly have supported or tolerated if they had known. However, not all bad faith involves an intent to deceive. It is rare, but not unknown in family law cases, for bad faith to be overt — an action carried out with an intent to inflict harm on another party or a person affected by the case without an attempt to conceal the intent.
17 In order to come within the meaning of bad faith in subrule 24(8), behaviour must be shown to be carried out with intent to inflict financial or emotional harm on the other party or other persons affected by the behaviour, to conceal information relevant to the issues or to deceive the other party or the court. A misguided but genuine intent to achieve the ostensible goal of the activity, without proof of intent to inflict harm, to conceal relevant information or to deceive, saves the activity from being found to be in bad faith. The requisite intent to harm, conceal or deceive does not have to be the person’s sole or primary intent, but rather only a significant part of the person’s intent. At some point, a party could be found to be acting in bad faith when their litigation conduct has run the costs up so high that they must be taken to know their behaviour is causing the other party major financial harm without justification.
18 In construing subrule 24(8), I think there is an implication from the context of the provision that the bad faith must relate to the issues at stake in the case or to the conduct of the case — not behaviour outside the issues in the case or in a separate (even if related) case— in order to justify a costs penalty in the case.
19 Several of the 14 heads of bad faith alleged by the mother, though certainly serious, distressing, unfortunate and even harmful behaviour for the parties and the children, have not been shown to fall within the ambit of bad faith intended by subrule 24(8). Examples of this conduct by the father are:
a motion brought by the father in person while he had a lawyer on record;
concealment of one of the children’s location, in contempt of an order in a separate child protection case;
involvement of Canada Court Watch in the case, leading to publication of information about the children and the mother;
having one of the children assessed without the mother’s knowledge or consent; withholding consent on various issues in the case longer than necessary or reasonable, without intent to deceive or conceal or to inflict harm;
battling with the mother’s lawyer in the course of cross-examination;
lodging complaints against lawyers and other professionals involved in the case with their governing bodies, if not done to inflict harm;
discussing the case in front of the children, contrary to their best interests;
tearing up the assessment report and calling it “garbage”;
refusing to participate in reconciliation counselling;
failing to provide prompt income disclosure, without intent to deceive or conceal.
All of these types of behaviour by the father occurred in this case. Globally, they amount to seriously unreasonable behaviour in the case, and will be dealt with accordingly under subrule 24(11). As well, they have increased the costs of the case and are deserving of sanction for that reason.
20 I have not found that the father crossed the threshold of bad faith in the behaviour listed above, even in light of the enormous costs of this case, because I think he had a genuine belief in the rightness of his actions and in the correctness of the result he was seeking in the case. He knew, because he was paying major amounts of costs to his own lawyers along the way, that the mother’s costs were significant to the point of being ruinous. But on the central contested issue of access to the youngest child, as well as on the financial issues, I do not find the requisite intent to harm.
21 There are, however, some aspects of the father’s behaviour in this case, as found in my reasons of 27 February 2007, that do fall within “bad faith” as intended by the rule. He deliberately did not obey court orders in the case, including orders to which he consented. He made complaints against lawyers and other professionals, when he was unhappy with the way they performed their duties, not merely to report what he believed to be negligence or misconduct, but also as his form of punishment and vengeance. Most significantly, though, the father waged a campaign against the mother, both through and with the children, to alienate the children from her, a form of emotional harm to the children and to her, and to cause her emotional distress. This was done in the guise of forging closer ties with the children. It is true that the mother was not blameless in dealing with the children but, as between the two parents, I found his motives were to cause harm to the existing bond between the children and the mother, whereas the mother was trying to hang on to her relationship with her children rather than to harm the father’s relationship with them.
22 I know that it is an issue for the father that the mother engaged in surreptitious, illegal actions to try to get information about his activities, especially on his home computer. This did not cause the father harm at the time, did not cost him money and did not assume any importance in the case. Accordingly, it is not a significant factor in the determination of costs.
23 Now that I have made a finding of bad faith, what is the impact of it? Let me again set out subrule 24(8):
- Bad faith.— If a party has acted in bad faith, the court shall decide costs on a full recovery basis and shall order the party to pay them immediately.
24 The wording of the rule (for which I must take some responsibility, I acknowledge) is brief and leaves some unanswered questions. If a party has acted in bad faith on one occasion, are the costs of the whole case to be awarded against the party on a full recovery basis? What if it was a small act of bad faith? What if it was only in relation to one issue, and on the other issues the party behaved properly? Are the costs to be a full recovery only in respect of the consequences of the bad faith? What impact do the factors and the discretion in subrule 24(11) have on the full recovery mandated by subrule 24(8)? My tentative conclusion is that full recovery costs should be awarded in relation to the issues affected by the bad faith and then the whole picture should be looked at again in light of the considerations in subrule 24(11) and the discretion in that provision should be used as necessary to produce the correct overall result.
25 In most cases, the difference between the normal recovery of costs and full recovery — on this point, see Sims-Howarth v. Bilcliffe, supra; Biant v. Sagoo, supra; MacDonald v. Magel, supra — will not be as important as in this case, where even a 10% difference up or down in the mother’s costs amounts to over $32,000.
26 In this case, the father has acted in bad faith over a long period of time, in relation to more than one issue, and on many occasions. The consequences of his bad faith have been a vastly prolonged and more expensive court case and vastly increased emotional damage. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in finding that the mother is entitled to full recovery of her costs throughout, so long as the costs were reasonably incurred and bear some reasonable proportionality to the matters in issue. This will be discussed further below.
27 If I am wrong in this conclusion, the mother may still be entitled to full or close to full recovery in light of the other considerations in subrule 24(11) or in light of her offers to settle.
33I find that Dr. Kaur interfered with Dr. Hura’s relationship with the children by lying about her address and triggering the 100-mile parenting schedule and by denying parenting time wrongly by falsely claiming she was on vacation with the children. In addition, she coached the children and made false allegations against the father about his conduct with the children.
34Dr. Kaur’s conduct did complicate the litigation and increase the costs of the litigation. Her misrepresentations constituted bad faith conduct. She misrepresented her address, being away on vacation and the children’s availability for parenting time. She made some effort to relocate to Windsor. She then coached the children to make false allegations against their father. I agree with Dr. Kaur, to establish bad faith the court must find some element of malice or intent to harm; the conscious doing of wrong because of a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. I find that Dr. Kaur conducted herself in this way and she did so intentionally.
35This conduct is a form of emotional harm to the children and to Dr. Hura. I find Dr. Kaur’s motives were to cause harm to the existing bond between the children and their father. Dr. Kaur engaged in bad faith conduct since the Mediated Agreement and the Divorce Decree.
36Rule 24(10) must be considered in light of the time period of bad faith, the entirety of the litigation and the Rule 24(14) considerations. The determination of costs requires analysis of conduct, success, review of Offers, the reasonableness of the actual bill of costs submitted and the discretion of the Court.
37In this case, Dr. Kaur acted in bad faith over a long period of time, and in a variety of ways, including involving the children in her deceit. The costs need to be reasonably incurred and bear some reasonable proportionality to the matters in issue.
38Both parties spent similar amounts on this litigation, well over $100,000. Both parties submitted Bills of Costs as required by Rule 24(16).
39The court must also consider whether the hours spent can be reasonably justified. See: Pagnotta v. Brown, [2002] O.J. No. 3033 (S.C.J.); Murphy v. Murphy, 2010 ONSC 7204 (S.C.J.); However, this analysis should be undertaken in a global fashion. The court is not required to embark upon a painstaking, line-by-line analysis of Bills of Costs and second guess every hour and item claimed, unless there are clear concerns about excessive claims and overreaching. See: Docherty v. Catherwood, 2016 ONSC 2140 (S.C.J.), at para. 50.
40There is no provision in the Family Law Rules that provides for a general approach of “close to full recovery” costs. Rather, subrule 24 (14) sets out the appropriate considerations in fixing quantum of costs. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the fact that the rules expressly contemplate full recovery in specific circumstances, e.g. bad faith or besting an offer to settle. See: Beaver v. Hill, 2018 ONCA 840.
41To trigger full recovery costs a party must do as well or better than all the terms of any offer (or a severable section of an offer). See: Paranavitana v. Nanayakkara, 2010 ONSC 2257, [2010] O.J. No. 1566 (SCJ); Rebiere v Rebiere , 2015 ONSC 2129 (SCJ); Scipione v Scipione, 2015 ONSC 5982 (SCJ).
42The court must step back and exercise a judgment, having regard to all the circumstances as to what a fair and reasonable amount should be paid by the unsuccessful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs to the successful litigant is. See: Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON C.A.), (2004) 71 O.R. (3d) 291. Cited with approval in Serra v. Serra, 2009 ONCA 395.
43A useful benchmark for determining whether costs claimed are fair, reasonable and proportionate is to consider the amount that the unsuccessful party paid for their own legal fees and disbursements in the same matter. See: Smith Estate v. Rotstein 2011 ONCA 491 (Ont CA); Durbin v. Medina, 2012 ONSC 640 (SCJ); Scipione v. Del Sordo 2015 ONSC 5982 (SCJ); Zhang v. Guo, 2019 ONSC 5767 (Div Ct); Laidman v. Pasalic and Laidman, 2020 ONSC 7068.
44Dr. Kaur spent over $113,000 in legal fees during this litigation.
45Dr. Hura is entitled to substantial costs. I have not granted Dr. Hura full recovery costs. Some of the costs relate to the support issue.
46The costs award is substantial. If bad faith is found, Rule 24(10) provides for costs to be paid immediately. I have considered how costs should be paid because of the amount of the costs.
47In my costs decision dated November 25, 2025, I ordered that Dr. Kaur shall pay $20,000 within 90 days and then $1,000 per month commencing April 1, 2026 and on the first day of each month thereafter. This allows her to pay the $5,000 already ordered as part of the trial decision first.
48My decision was not released until today, and I therefore change the payments terms.
ORDER
1 The Respondent Neeraj Kaur shall pay costs fixed in the amount of $ 120,000 to the Applicant Kanwaljeet Singh Hura, with $ 20,000 to be paid within 90 days and $1,000 per month commencing May 1, 2026 and on the first day of each month thereafter.
Amended January 7, 2026
Signed: Justice Joanne Beasley