Narissa Somji

The plaintiffs, commercial tenants of a sports bar, sought leave to amend their statement of claim against the defendant landlord to add claims under the Occupiers' Liability Act and for punitive damages related to toxic mold on the premises.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amendments constituted new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the original claim contained sufficient material facts regarding the defendant's control of the premises and alleged bad faith conduct, such that the amendments merely particularized existing claims and did not constitute new causes of action.

The applicant mother brought an application for divorce, sole decision-making responsibility, child support, and property division.

The respondent father failed to file an Answer and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The court granted the divorce, awarded the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, and limited the father's parenting time to supervised virtual contact due to pending criminal charges for domestic violence.

The court also ordered an equalization payment of $22,985 for RRSPs, imputed the father's income at minimum wage for child support purposes, and issued a restraining order against the father.

The father brought a motion to terminate his child support obligations for the parties' child, effective March 3, 2012, when the child moved in with him.

The mother filed an Answer but failed to attend the settlement conference and the uncontested trial.

The court found that the child had resided with the father since March 2012 and that the father had satisfied his child support obligations.

The court ordered the termination of child support effective March 3, 2012, and fixed the arrears owed to the mother at $0.00.

In a child protection motion concerning a newborn apprehended at birth, the parents sought return of the child under a temporary supervision order and the society sought continued temporary society care with prejudice.

The court applied the statutory test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and found reasonable grounds to believe the child would be at risk of harm if placed with the parents, based on longstanding parental alcohol addiction, repeated domestic violence incidents, unresolved parenting-capacity concerns, and the parents’ failure to address prior protection concerns arising in proceedings involving another child.

The court further held that supervision terms would not adequately manage the risk because the parents denied their addiction issues, had not meaningfully engaged in treatment or recommended services, and had not demonstrated reliable compliance or a workable care plan.

The least disruptive placement consistent with the child’s protection was continued temporary society care, with parental access at the society’s discretion subject to a minimum schedule.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a six-month supervision order to return two children to the care of their mother, with scheduled contact for the father.

The mother and her new partner had taken significant steps to address addiction and child protection concerns, and the father, though unable to care for the children, supported their return to the mother.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and granted the summary judgment, holding that returning the children to the mother and allowing contact with the father was in their best interests, particularly given their Indigenous heritage.

The respondent father sought costs of $25,743.20 on a full recovery basis after successfully defending a motion for relocation and an urgency application brought by the applicant mother.

The mother argued for no or nominal costs, citing her inability to pay and alleging unreasonable conduct by the father.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, including the father's reasonable offers to settle and the conduct of both parties.

The court found no unreasonable conduct by the father and determined the mother had some ability to pay.

The court awarded the father costs fixed at $18,000.

The accused, Salam Fadhil, sought to bring a late Charter application under s. 10(b) and s. 24(2) to exclude his statement to police, alleging a violation of his right to counsel of choice.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing it was untimely and prejudicial.

The court granted the application, finding a valid reason for the late filing and that any prejudice to the Crown could be addressed through procedural accommodations, such as allowing more latitude in cross-examination and a separate voir dire.

The court emphasized that judges should be cautious before dismissing Charter claims due to notice non-compliance, considering factors like the reason for delay, prejudice, and disruption.

The accused, Mahmood Ahmad and Salam Fadhil, charged with sexual assault, brought a voir dire application to exclude their statements to police, arguing they were not voluntary due to language comprehension issues.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and found that both accused had sufficient language comprehension in French (for Fadhil) and English (for Ahmad) to understand their rights, including the right to silence and the consequences of speaking to police.

The court dismissed the application, ruling that the statements were voluntary and admissible at trial.

The applicants brought a Charter motion under s. 11(b) seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 36 months and 6 days, with a net delay of 30 months and 28 days after accounting for defence delay, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found COVID-19 to be a discrete exceptional event and that the Crown and justice system took reasonable steps to mitigate the delay.

Consequently, the period of delay attributable to COVID-19 was subtracted, bringing the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The moving party father brought a motion for interim primary residential care of the parties' three children, alleging that the responding party mother had alienated the children from him following a child protection intervention.

The mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the motion, arguing that the children wished to remain with the mother and that a forced separation could be traumatic.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that the facts regarding the family's history and the allegations of alienation were highly contested and could not be resolved on a written record alone.

The court maintained the status quo of the mother having interim sole custody, ordered reunification counselling, and expedited the matter for trial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand because she mistakenly arrested him for 'over 80' instead of 'impaired driving', and that the trial judge erred in admitting the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to make the breath demand based on the totality of the circumstances, and that the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence despite the minor s. 9 Charter breach.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking interim sole custody and permission to relocate her two children, a 9-year-old from a previous relationship and a 12-month-old with the respondent father, from Stittsville to Deep River.

The father opposed the relocation of his biological child and sought interim joint custody and primary residence.

The court dismissed the mother's request to relocate the 12-month-old, finding she had not established compelling reasons to upset the status quo on an interim basis.

The court ordered interim joint custody, with the child to reside primarily with the father in the matrimonial home, and granted the mother weekend access.

The court also dismissed the mother's claim for interim child support for the 9-year-old step-child, finding no prima facie case that the father stood in the place of a parent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred by applying the Hatfield test instead of the Boudreault framework to assess the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, holding that Boudreault did not overrule Hatfield, and the relevant time to assess the driver's intention remains when occupancy of the vehicle began.

The trial judge's factual findings regarding the appellant not exiting the vehicle were also upheld as reasonable.