Murray Teitel

The defendant brought a motion seeking various relief including dismissal for delay, amendment of pleadings, issuance of a third party claim, a litigation timetable, and case management.

Following mixed success on the underlying motion, the court addressed costs.

The court found that the plaintiffs’ lawyer engaged in improper litigation conduct by misleading opposing counsel about payment of a prior costs order while secretly arranging for the funds to be garnished by a government creditor.

The court characterized the conduct as sharp practice contrary to professional obligations and held that it caused unnecessary motion costs.

Costs were awarded partly against the plaintiff corporation and partly personally against the plaintiffs’ lawyer under Rule 57.07.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out portions of his amended Statement of Claim and Defence to Counterclaim that challenged the validity of a prior judgment.

The motion judge found that the appellant's attempt to relitigate the issue, after declining to participate in a previous motion where he had notice and an opportunity to be heard, constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

Following a motion seeking to compel examinations under Rule 39.03 in aid of a contempt proceeding, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The moving parties had attempted to compel the examination of opposing counsel and several non-parties regarding a mortgage transaction allegedly breaching a prior court order.

The court found that the evidentiary steps taken were excessive, disproportionate, and primarily aimed at forcing the opposing lawyer to give evidence against his client and potentially disqualify himself.

Although the moving parties were entitled to limited costs for compelling a timetable for an affidavit, the motion to compel examination of counsel was dismissed and the responding party substantially succeeded.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the responding party due to the unreasonable litigation strategy adopted by the moving parties.

The applicant sought an extension of time and leave to appeal two case management orders made in a guardianship application that had been ongoing for 2.5 years.

The applicant argued the case management judge lacked inherent jurisdiction to case manage an estate matter.

The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and that the tests for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) were not met.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order that permanently stayed certain allegations in an assessment of costs proceeding and required her to order transcripts as a condition of proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the stay of allegations relating to the mortgagee's solicitor's alleged refusal to allow mortgage redemption, noting such issues must be litigated between the mortgagor and mortgagee, not on an assessment of the solicitor's costs.

However, the Court set aside the transcript requirement as the necessary transcript was already available, and ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The appellant appealed an order giving directions regarding the trial of an issue over the capacity to execute a power of attorney.

The respondent consented to a minor wording addition to the order.

The Court of Appeal held that no further changes were required, as the phrase 'knowledge and approved' merely identified the issue to be tried without precluding arguments on the appropriate legal test.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no order as to costs.

Following a costs endorsement, the applicant sought costs for preparing his costs submissions, arguing that his offers to settle the quantum of costs exceeded the costs ultimately awarded to the respondents.

The applicant relied on Rule 49.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the request, holding that while Rule 49 applies to motions, it does not apply to offers to settle the quantum of costs of a motion.

No costs were awarded to the applicant.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's motion for leave to appeal an order regarding a capacity examination, the respondents sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that while the appellant filed an unnecessarily voluminous 90-page factum, it did not create a significant additional burden.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $8,000 each for two respondents and $5,000 for the third, reflecting the moderate complexity of the issues and the principle of proportionality.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion to require his parents to undergo capacity assessments and to allow him to examine his mother for discovery.

The underlying dispute involved the validity of powers of attorney executed by the mother, who suffered from Alzheimer's disease.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision.

The court held that section 79 of the Substitute Decisions Act, rather than section 105 of the Courts of Justice Act, governed the request for a capacity assessment, and that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the assessments and discovery.

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their statement of defence and counterclaim which claimed equitable set-off against the respondent personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no connection between the struck paragraphs and the allegations of set-off.

However, the Court deleted a paragraph of the order that appeared to prohibit future amendments, clarifying it was merely commentary.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the insured to attend neuropsychological and psychiatric assessments, or alternatively to stay the arbitration until he attended.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that the insurer failed to provide proper notice under section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Furthermore, the arbitrator concluded that the requested examinations were not for the purpose of determining entitlement to benefits, but rather to gather evidence for the upcoming arbitration hearing.

The insurer was ordered to pay $600 in expenses.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision which found that the respondent did not acquiesce in an alleged conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty by her former solicitor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent's active participation in 19 days of assessment hearings over 4.5 years constituted acquiescence.

The Court held that it was not open to her to raise the issue for the first time after such a delay, which caused demonstrable prejudice to the assessment process and the solicitor.

The assessment was ordered to proceed without consideration of the conflict of interest allegations.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits until August 1994.

The insurer argued the applicant's request for arbitration was time-barred under subsection 281(5) of the Insurance Act, relying on an Assessment of Claim form dated July 26, 1994 as its notice of refusal.

The arbitrator found the form did not satisfy the requirements of subsection 24(8) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because it was self-contradictory, stating the claim was 'accepted in its entirety' while also referencing a final settlement, and failed to provide clear reasons for refusal.

Consequently, the limitation period was not triggered, and the applicant was permitted to proceed to arbitration.