M. J. Donohue

The mother brought a motion to change a 2012 order, seeking sole custody of both children, a reduction in access, and child support.

The father sought sole custody and primary residence based on an Office of the Children's Lawyer report.

The court rejected the OCL's recommendation to transfer primary residence to the father, finding the mother's home was now clean and the father exhibited alienating behaviours.

The court granted the mother sole custody of both children due to the parents' inability to communicate, but ordered that both parents have decision-making authority regarding religious practices while the children are in their care.

The existing access schedule was largely maintained, and the claim for child support was dismissed.

The accused was charged with failing to stop at the scene of an accident after his truck struck and paralyzed a cyclist.

The accused testified that he was blinded by sun glare, heard a loud bang, and believed his vehicle had suffered a mechanical failure.

He returned to the scene an hour later after hearing a firefighter radio dispatch about the collision.

The court applied the W.(D.) test and found the accused's testimony credible, concluding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew he had struck a person.

The accused was acquitted.

The parties separated after a long marriage, but disputed the date of separation.

The court found the date of separation was August 15, 2009, when the respondent announced her intention to separate during marriage counselling, despite the parties remaining under the same roof for another year.

The court resolved various financial issues, denying the respondent's claim for occupation rent and the applicant's reciprocal claims for home maintenance and improvements.

The court also denied claims for retroactive child support and pre-judgment interest on the equalization payment, but ordered prospective child support and the immediate sale of the matrimonial home without a right of first refusal.

The plaintiff was assaulted by a bouncer outside the defendants' bar.

The defendants were noted in default and an undefended trial proceeded to assess damages.

The court found the bouncer liable for assault and the bar owner vicariously liable.

The plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages for a permanent facial scar and minor nasal fracture, $330 for loss of income, $10,000 for loss of competitive advantage, $100 in special damages, and $1,333.45 for a subrogated OHIP claim.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault after throwing a glass at her sister-in-law's face during a family argument, causing a severe laceration and permanent scarring.

The jury acquitted her of assault with a weapon.

The sentencing judge determined the facts underlying the verdict, finding the act was a sudden, spontaneous response in the heat of an argument, but that the offender intended to strike the victim.

Weighing the offender's lack of criminal record and positive character references against the severe, disfiguring injury to the victim, the court sentenced the offender to 12 months in custody and 1 year of probation.

The respondent mother-in-law was successful at trial in defending against the applicant's claim of a resulting or constructive trust over the former matrimonial home.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $47,000 or partial indemnity costs of approximately $32,000.

The court considered the Family Law Rules factors, noting the applicant's reasonable behaviour, the lack of complexity of the claim against the mother-in-law, and the applicant's limited ability to pay as a self-represented custodial parent of three children.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $30,000, inclusive of prior costs orders, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiff, Seeta Angel, and her niece, the defendant Monica Beepat, entered into an oral agreement for the purchase and sale of goods to be shipped from Canada to Guyana.

The plaintiff shipped nine shipments of goods, but the defendant only acknowledged an agreement for the first shipment and refused to pay for the rest.

The court found that the parties had an enforceable oral agreement for all nine shipments, preferring the plaintiff's evidence.

The court ordered the defendant to pay $177,444.80 for the goods, less a credit for mitigated goods.

Claims for mental distress, aggravated damages, and punitive damages were dismissed.

Following a six-day family law trial regarding custody, access, residency, and equalization, both parties sought costs.

The applicant sought partial and substantial indemnity costs based on an unsigned offer to settle, while the respondent sought costs claiming he was the more successful party.

The court found that the applicant's unsigned offer did not comply with Rule 18(4) of the Family Law Rules.

Concluding that success at trial was almost equally divided, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The offender was convicted of invitation to sexual touching and attempting to obtain sexual services of a minor after making telephone calls to his friend's 14-year-old daughter offering money for dirty panties and sexual acts.

The Crown sought two to three years in custody, while the defence sought six to nine months.

The court found the offender was in a position of trust, which was an aggravating factor, but noted the offences consisted of brief conversations.

The court sentenced the offender to one year of imprisonment concurrent on both counts, followed by two years of probation, and imposed a lifetime SOIRA order and a five-year s. 161 prohibition order.

In a motor vehicle personal injury action, the plaintiff’s underinsured insurer brought a motion compelling production of documents from the tortfeasor’s insurer, which had denied coverage based on lack of consent and alleged material misrepresentation.

The moving insurer sought underwriting materials, broker records, correspondence, and policy documentation relevant to whether the tortfeasor’s policy limits were properly reduced by operation of law.

The court held that the plaintiff and the underinsured insurer were entitled to disclosure necessary to test the tortfeasor insurer’s off‑coverage position.

Relying on appellate authority requiring proof that policy limits are reduced by operation of law, the court ordered production of specified documents from the insurer notwithstanding its status as a statutory third party.

The defendant appellants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to set aside a Mareva injunction.

They argued that the motion judge relied on a purported fraud exception excusing the requirement to show dissipation of assets and that conflicting authorities existed on that issue.

The court found that the motion judge had in fact identified evidence of dissipation of assets and had not relied solely on any fraud exception.

The applicants also failed to establish that the decision was open to very serious debate or that the proposed appeal raised an issue of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The accused was charged with robbery and being masked with intent to commit robbery following a home invasion by three masked men.

The Crown's primary evidence was the testimony of the accused's former girlfriend, who stated he confessed to the crime hours after it occurred.

The court found the girlfriend's testimony credible and corroborated by circumstantial evidence, including stolen property found at a co-perpetrator's residence and a prior minor altercation with the victim's friend.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Following dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim for conversion arising from the removal of chattels prior to a real estate closing, the court addressed costs.

Although the defendants were technically successful at trial and had made several settlement offers under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the defendant real estate agent had engaged in fraudulent and dishonest conduct, including theft of property, misleading discovery evidence, and concealment of witnesses and documents.

Relying on the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the misconduct exception recognized in appellate authority, the court departed from the usual rule awarding costs to the successful party.

The court ordered the defendants to pay partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs to sanction the misconduct and discourage similar behaviour.

The parties separated after a six-year marriage and have three children.

The mother sought sole custody, child support based on imputed income, spousal support, and equalization.

The court awarded sole custody to the mother and modified the father's daily access schedule to ensure earlier return times.

The court imputed an annual income of $52,694 to the father based on undeclared tips from his employment as a hotel doorman, resulting in child support arrears of $20,715.63.

The mother was awarded compensatory spousal support for a four-year term, resulting in $8,248 in arrears, but no ongoing support.

The father was also ordered to pay an equalization payment of $19,621.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing her motion for a court-appointed expert under Rule 52.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying claim sought damages for alleged mental harm and the defendant had already obtained an order for the plaintiff to be assessed by a psychiatrist.

The plaintiff requested the court appoint and fund her own psychiatric expert, but the earlier motion judge found the evidentiary record insufficient to justify a court-appointed expert.

Applying the leave test under Rule 62.02(4), the court found no conflicting authorities and no serious reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The court also held the issue did not raise matters of broader importance beyond the litigant’s own case.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The plaintiffs purchased a home under power of sale.

Before closing, the defendant real estate agent removed numerous high-quality chattels from the property and caused damage to the flooring.

The plaintiffs sued for conversion and property damage.

The court found that the defendant had no authority to remove the items and acted deceitfully.

However, the action was dismissed because the plaintiffs did not have ownership or possession of the chattels at the time they were taken, holding only an expectancy.

The property damage claim was also dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to first seek recourse against the vendor bank as trustee.

The accused was charged with two counts of obstruction of justice and two counts of intimidation of justice system participants after confronting individuals connected to sexual assault allegations against her spouse.

The Crown alleged the accused attempted to pressure witnesses to recant statements made to police.

The court found the accused engaged in aggressive conduct toward the father of one complainant, including repeated accusations of lying, threats of civil litigation, and emotionally charged statements intended to influence the complainant’s testimony.

The court concluded that this conduct constituted a wilful attempt to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

However, the evidence relating to alleged intimidation and obstruction involving the accused’s daughter raised a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on those counts.

The accused was charged with two counts of attempted murder after randomly attacking two individuals with a knife.

The defence conceded the acts but argued that the accused was not criminally responsible under s. 16 of the Criminal Code due to a mental disorder including psychosis and schizophrenia.

Psychiatric experts agreed the accused suffered from a major mental disorder but differed on whether it rendered him incapable of knowing his acts were morally wrong.

The court found that the accused understood the legal wrongfulness of his actions, citing his attempts to evade police and his admissions during a videotaped statement.

The court rejected the defence argument that command hallucinations rendered him incapable of appreciating moral wrongness and found the evidentiary basis for that theory weak.

The defence failed to meet its burden on a balance of probabilities, and the accused was convicted on both counts of attempted murder.

A secured lender applied to vary a criminal restraint order or obtain relief allowing enforcement of a collateral mortgage against property subject to forfeiture proceedings following a drug conviction.

The court considered the interaction between restraint orders under the Criminal Code and forfeiture orders under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act when a forfeiture order is appealed and stayed.

The court held that the restraint order ceased once the forfeiture order was made, even though the forfeiture order was stayed pending appeal.

As an innocent third‑party secured creditor with a prior registered mortgage in default, the lender was entitled to exercise its remedies under the Mortgages Act.

The court authorized the lender to enforce its mortgage and directed that any net sale proceeds remaining after satisfaction of secured debts be paid into court pending resolution of the criminal appeal.

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement given by the accused following arrest.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary and whether the accused possessed an operating mind at the time it was made.

The defence argued that the statement was involuntary due to alleged oppressive conditions and medication affecting the accused’s cognitive functioning, and further submitted that the Crown failed to call all relevant officers.

The court held that the Crown was not required to call every officer who had incidental contact with the accused and found no evidence of threats, promises, inducements, or oppressive conditions.

After reviewing the video evidence, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused understood the caution, possessed sufficient cognitive capacity, and gave the statement voluntarily.