Michael S. Rankin

The applicant sought costs following a contested family law motion, requesting full recovery costs of $33,539 or alternatively partial recovery costs of $22,136.

The respondent argued that a clause in a Partial Interim Separation Agreement barred any costs award or, alternatively, that costs should be limited to a substantially lower amount.

The court held that the contractual clause requiring each party to pay their own legal and professional fees did not waive the applicant’s right to seek a judicial award of costs.

Finding the applicant to be the successful party and noting that an offer to settle engaged full recovery entitlement for part of the proceeding, the court reduced the claimed amounts due to excessive hourly rates, duplication of work, and unnecessary attendance by multiple counsel.

Costs were fixed on an all‑inclusive basis.

The applicant mother brought a motion to compel the respondent father and a non-party corporation to produce extensive financial documents and answer undertakings to determine the father's income for spousal support purposes.

The father brought a cross-motion to compel the mother to answer undertakings.

The court ordered extensive third-party corporate disclosure, finding that the father's complex corporate and trust structures necessitated broader production to fairly determine his income.

Both parties were also ordered to answer specific undertakings and refusals.

The respondent moved to bifurcate a family law trial to determine custody, support, and the validity of a marriage contract before addressing equalization of net family property.

The applicant opposed and sought extensive financial disclosure, arguing the issues of property division and spousal support were interrelated.

The court held that the validity of the marriage contract and spousal support analysis under Miglin require knowledge of the parties’ financial positions at separation.

Because property equalization must precede spousal support and the issues were intertwined, bifurcation would risk prejudice and inefficiency.

The motion for bifurcation was dismissed and the respondent was ordered to provide full financial disclosure regarding assets and liabilities at separation.

The defendant corporation brought a motion seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to re-attend for examination for discovery to complete discovery and follow up on undertakings.

The court reviewed the discovery history, including prior undertakings, a resolved motion to compel answers, and cross-examinations conducted in the context of a summary judgment motion.

Applying proportionality principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the factors outlined in Senechal, the court held that further oral discovery was unnecessary and would risk delaying pre-trial and trial scheduling.

However, the court permitted limited written follow-up questions relating to specific undertakings and refusals.

The motion for additional oral discovery was dismissed with conditions allowing narrowly tailored written follow-up questions.

Following the dismissal of a motion brought by the plaintiff, the court determined the issue of costs.

Applying the general principle that costs follow the event, the court held that the defendants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the defendants’ request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the motion was not unreasonable and there was no evidence of bad faith.

Considering the complexity and importance of the issues raised, the court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiff to each defendant.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act seeking a sealing order and anonymization of the parties and their children in a family law proceeding.

The motion was based on evidence that the children were emotionally vulnerable due to their parents’ separation and other recent traumatic events, and that the family’s prominence could attract media attention and expose the children to bullying or psychological harm.

Applying the Dagenais–Mentuck framework and authorities on open courts and confidentiality orders, the court found a serious risk of harm to a public interest—namely the protection of vulnerable children.

However, the court held that sealing the entire file was unnecessary.

Instead, it ordered that the parties and children be identified by initials and that only the portions of the file dealing with the marriage contract challenge, exclusive possession of the cottage, and custody and access be sealed.

The appellants, owners and operators of adult entertainment parlours, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a City of Ottawa by-law regulating their establishments.

The by-law prohibited touching between dancers and customers and required live entertainment to be performed in open designated areas.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the City had the authority to enact the by-law under the Municipal Act, 2001, for health, safety, and consumer protection purposes.

The Court rejected arguments that the by-law was ultra vires, void for vagueness, or a colourable attempt to prohibit the businesses.

Charter challenges under s. 2(b) regarding signage and mandatory notices were either rejected or saved under s. 1, and claims under ss. 7 and 8 lacked a sufficient evidentiary record.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Ontario Municipal Board's dismissal of their objections to a sand pit licence granted to the respondent.

The appellants argued the OMB erred in its interpretation of the local zoning by-law, its conformity with the upper-tier municipality's official plan, and its regard for the Provincial Policy Statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that under the Planning Act, the unamended by-law remained in force and permitted the sand pit operation, and that the OMB properly considered all required planning issues and evidence.

Commercial property owners appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a municipal by-law that granted tax relief to residential property owners.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires, conflicted with provincial legislation, and constituted illegal rebates rather than grants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the municipality had broad powers under the Municipal Act, 2001 to issue grants for municipal purposes, the by-law did not conflict with provincial legislation as dual compliance was possible, and the payments were properly characterized as grants.