Michael N. Freeman

The respondent brought a motion to change seeking retroactive adjustment of child support based on deductibility of motor vehicle expenses.

The applicant opposed and brought a cross-motion seeking increased child support based on undeclared rental income, fixed contributions to section 7 expenses, spousal support, and enforcement of health insurance provisions.

The court found the respondent entitled to deduct motor vehicle expenses from income effective January 1, 2013 (not retroactively to 2009), and ordered inclusion of net rental income in the respondent's income for child support purposes effective January 1, 2013.

The court dismissed claims for retroactive rental income inclusion, section 7 expense contributions lacking proper consent, spousal support due to insufficient evidence of material change in circumstances, and the health insurance enforcement claim.

A children's aid society brought a motion under section 74 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order to compel a hospital to produce clinical records and reports regarding a 16-year-old child in protection proceedings.

The child had disclosed allegations of sexual abuse facilitated by her mother and was placed in society care.

The society sought the records to facilitate treatment planning.

The child opposed the motion, indicating she would consent to direct release to her treatment providers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the society had not met the low threshold of establishing relevance, particularly where the records were sought for treatment facilitation rather than investigation of protection concerns, and where the child's privacy interests and therapeutic needs could be adequately addressed through alternative means.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a claim by an estate seeking repayment of common expenses allegedly owed by a former common-law partner pursuant to a verbal agreement.

The estate asserted that the deceased had paid the partner’s share of expenses during cohabitation on the understanding she would later repay him once disability benefits were received.

The court held that any such arrangement constituted a domestic contract under the Family Law Act and was unenforceable because it was not in writing as required by s. 55(1).

Arguments that the parties were not spouses, that their disabilities prevented written agreements, and that the statute had not been pleaded were rejected.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.