Michael N. Freeman

The parties, who are brothers, entered into a Share Purchase and Sale Agreement to resolve an oppression application.

The appellants defaulted on the monthly installment payments.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, seeking either enforcement of a purported settlement agreement or the full amount owing under the Share Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The motion judge found no binding settlement but awarded the full amount owing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in accelerating the debt in the absence of an acceleration clause in the agreement.

The cross-appeal regarding the settlement was dismissed, as the correspondence showed material terms remained unresolved.

Following reasons granting judgment to the applicant on a dispute arising from a share purchase and pledge arrangement, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis, while the responding parties argued that success was divided or that costs should be reduced.

The court held the applicant was clearly the successful party and entitled to costs but found no litigation conduct justifying full or substantial indemnity.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering proportionality, complexity, and reasonable expectations, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs were set at a lump sum payable jointly and severally by two respondents.

The applicant moved for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement against his brothers and their related companies following an oppression remedy application.

The parties had entered into a share purchase agreement in September 2013, which the respondents breached by defaulting on payments.

Subsequent settlement negotiations in 2014 failed to result in a binding agreement because the issue of costs remained unresolved.

The court found the 2013 agreement was binding, the respondents were in breach, and there was insufficient evidence of prejudice to justify refusing enforcement.

Judgment was granted enforcing the terms of the 2013 agreement.

Sentencing following jury convictions for aggravated sexual assault, two counts of sexual assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, four counts of assault, and threatening death against a former intimate partner during a prolonged abusive relationship.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were paramount, emphasizing the degrading nature of the sexual violence, the abuse of a spouse or common law partner as a statutory aggravating factor, and the victim's enduring physical and psychological harm.

Finding little mitigation, the court imposed a global penitentiary sentence of five years.

Mandatory and ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration for life, and no communication with the victim during incarceration were also made.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her liable for malicious prosecution and defamation after she reported a workplace assault by the respondent to the police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the deputy judge erred in law by failing to consider whether the police conducted an independent investigation and exercised unfettered discretion in laying the charge.

The court also found the deputy judge erred by reversing the burden of proof and improperly adding a fifth element of 'unequal relationship' to the test for malicious prosecution.

Following a lengthy family law trial involving a motion to vary a historic support and equalization order and related enforcement issues, the court determined the appropriate costs disposition.

Although the applicant was largely successful in resisting the variation motion, the court found both principal litigants behaved unreasonably throughout the proceedings, including failing to make proper settlement offers, prolonging litigation, and failing to provide adequate financial disclosure.

As a result, neither party received costs against the other.

A co‑respondent who successfully obtained an order removing historic court orders from title to her residence was awarded partial indemnity costs despite failing to meet the technical requirements for full recovery under the Family Law Rules settlement offer provisions.

The court exercised discretion under Rule 24 to award $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

Following a successful application declaring the applicant remained president and a member of a union organization, the court addressed costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs relying on an informal settlement offer and alleged improper conduct by the respondents in attempting to remove him from office.

The court held that the circumstances required for substantial indemnity costs were not present, including the absence of a valid Rule 49 offer or litigation misconduct.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court reduced the applicant’s requested costs due to litigation conduct, including late retention of counsel and a shift in litigation position.

The respondent brought a motion to change seeking retroactive adjustment of child support based on deductibility of motor vehicle expenses.

The applicant opposed and brought a cross-motion seeking increased child support based on undeclared rental income, fixed contributions to section 7 expenses, spousal support, and enforcement of health insurance provisions.

The court found the respondent entitled to deduct motor vehicle expenses from income effective January 1, 2013 (not retroactively to 2009), and ordered inclusion of net rental income in the respondent's income for child support purposes effective January 1, 2013.

The court dismissed claims for retroactive rental income inclusion, section 7 expense contributions lacking proper consent, spousal support due to insufficient evidence of material change in circumstances, and the health insurance enforcement claim.

A children's aid society brought a motion under section 74 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order to compel a hospital to produce clinical records and reports regarding a 16-year-old child in protection proceedings.

The child had disclosed allegations of sexual abuse facilitated by her mother and was placed in society care.

The society sought the records to facilitate treatment planning.

The child opposed the motion, indicating she would consent to direct release to her treatment providers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the society had not met the low threshold of establishing relevance, particularly where the records were sought for treatment facilitation rather than investigation of protection concerns, and where the child's privacy interests and therapeutic needs could be adequately addressed through alternative means.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, brought a motion for a stay of an order requiring her to pay $10,000 as security for costs pending her motion for leave to appeal that order.

The underlying action against her father's former common-law spouse was dismissed on summary judgment.

The appellant argued that a serious issue to be tried existed regarding whether American Sign Language (ASL) constitutes an oral language, which would exempt an alleged agreement from the writing requirement of s. 55 of the Family Law Act.

The court found that the appellant failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, noting the previous judge's finding that the appeal was almost certain to fail.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a claim by an estate seeking repayment of common expenses allegedly owed by a former common-law partner pursuant to a verbal agreement.

The estate asserted that the deceased had paid the partner’s share of expenses during cohabitation on the understanding she would later repay him once disability benefits were received.

The court held that any such arrangement constituted a domestic contract under the Family Law Act and was unenforceable because it was not in writing as required by s. 55(1).

Arguments that the parties were not spouses, that their disabilities prevented written agreements, and that the statute had not been pleaded were rejected.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The respondents requested that evidence given by a union representative before the Ontario Labour Relations Board be accepted as uncontested facts in the human rights application.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the OLRB had only assumed facts for the purpose of a motion to dismiss and had not made actual findings of fact regarding the disputed evidence.

The appellant appealed an order for retroactive spousal support.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the issue was not properly raised before the motion judge, the motion judge failed to consider relevant factors for retroactive support, and there were palpable and overriding errors regarding the parties' incomes.

The order for retroactive spousal support was set aside and the issue was remitted to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment regarding spousal support and equalization of matrimonial property.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's failure to contest the original motion was adequately explained by her being paralyzed by depression, contrary to her counsel's characterization before the motion judge.

Additionally, fresh evidence indicated the respondent had died.

The appeal was allowed, the default judgment set aside, and the matter remitted to the Superior Court for a fresh determination.

The plaintiffs resigned from their employment and withdrew the commuted values of their pensions from the OMERS pension plan.

Shortly after, the plan was amended to provide benefit enhancements from surplus funds.

The plaintiffs sued the plan administrator for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging it failed to inform them that benefit enhancements were under consideration.

The trial judge found the administrator liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the administrator's appeal, holding that a pension plan administrator does not have a duty to disclose potential plan changes that are merely under consideration, as such information is speculative and not highly relevant or material.

The appellant appealed convictions including being masked with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The Crown conceded that the masked with intent conviction was not supportable, and the Court of Appeal quashed it.

The appeals against the remaining convictions were dismissed as there was ample evidence to support them.