M. Dambrot

The offender was found guilty of manslaughter by a jury after fatally shooting the victim in the chest during a dispute.

The court inferred the shooting was intentional for intimidation purposes but assumed the offender did not intend to hit the victim.

The court declined to revisit the constitutionality of the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm.

Balancing the gravity of the offence with the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and strong family support, the court imposed a sentence of six years, reduced to three years less 15 days after credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and deciding issues reserved for the trier of fact.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge improperly engaged in a piecemeal analysis of circumstantial evidence, specifically video surveillance showing the respondent allegedly retrieving and passing a firearm to the co-accused shortly before the murder.

The court quashed the discharge and ordered mandamus directing the preliminary inquiry judge to order the respondent to stand trial.

During a jury trial for first degree murder, the accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to adduce third‑party suspect evidence implicating other individuals in the killings.

The proposed evidence relied primarily on a witness’s recorded police statement alleging that one individual had confessed to committing the murders.

The court conducted a detailed hearsay analysis and held that the statement lacked threshold reliability due to the witness’s motive to fabricate, serious drug abuse, extensive criminal record, inconsistencies in her accounts, and the absence of meaningful cross‑examination.

The alleged confession was also inadmissible both as a declaration against penal interest and under the principled hearsay exception.

The court further declined to relax evidentiary rules for defence evidence because the statements were inherently unreliable.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder.

Prior to jury selection, the court heard three evidentiary applications.

The accused sought to exclude text messages based on authorship and hearsay.

The Crown sought to admit ante-mortem statements of the deceased under the principled approach to hearsay, and evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct to establish motive.

The court admitted the text messages, finding sufficient evidence of authorship.

The court admitted the ante-mortem statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test.

The court admitted some discreditable conduct evidence (prior gun possession, code of silence) as highly probative of motive, but excluded evidence of gang affiliation and drug trafficking as overly prejudicial.

During a trial for four counts of first-degree murder, the accused brought an application to exclude expert evidence regarding gunshot residue (GSR) found in his vehicle 14 months after the homicides.

The court reviewed the extensive history of the vehicle, including multiple police seizures and the accused's frequent discharge of firearms in other incidents.

The court concluded that the GSR evidence lacked any probative nexus to the specific homicides and that its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The application to exclude the evidence was granted.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and related offences.

The offences arose from a search of a residence where the offender was staying, which uncovered a loaded machine pistol, ammunition, and drugs in a bedroom also occupied by a toddler.

The court weighed the offender's lengthy criminal record and the serious aggravating factors against his recent good conduct in custody and expressions of remorse.

The court imposed a total sentence of 9 years and 3 months imprisonment, less 3 months credit for pre-trial custody.

Accused persons charged with murder brought applications to exclude historical text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider.

They argued that s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code did not authorize the production of private communications, or alternatively that the provision violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held that stored historical text messages constitute “data” within the meaning of the provision and that obtaining them by production order does not amount to interception of private communications under Part VI.

The statutory prerequisites for a production order satisfied constitutional standards for reasonable search and seizure.

The applications to exclude the evidence were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of an application for leave to appeal an order staying third party claims in a class action until completion of the common issues trial, the court addressed the issue of costs between the plaintiff and the defendant applicants.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $34,000 plus disbursements, while the defendants argued for a significantly reduced amount.

The court rejected the defendants’ criticism of the plaintiff’s preparation time and counsel allocation, emphasizing the importance of the application to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s leadership role in responding.

Considering the relevant factors, the court fixed costs at a reduced but substantial amount within the defendants’ reasonable expectations.

In a certified class proceeding, the defendants sought leave to appeal a case management order that refined the common issues and stayed their third party claims against numerous distributors pending the common issues trial.

The defendants argued the stay conflicted with principles governing third party claims and with provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Courts of Justice Act, and the Class Proceedings Act.

The court held that the broad discretionary powers under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act permitted such case management orders to ensure the fair and expeditious determination of class proceedings.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the stay order and rejected arguments that it conflicted with other statutory provisions or prior case law.

Leave to appeal was denied.

Four members of the Five Point Generals street gang were convicted of various offences including trafficking in cocaine and marihuana for the benefit of a criminal organization, conspiracy to traffic, and firearms offences.

The court considered the application of the Kienapple rule and found it did not preclude multiple convictions for the conspiracy and substantive trafficking offences.

The court sentenced the offenders to total terms ranging from 5.5 to 9 years imprisonment, after accounting for pre-sentence custody and the principle of totality.

The Crown sought to adduce videotaped statements of two young complainants under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a trial for historical sexual offences.

The accused conceded the prerequisites were met but sought to edit out portions of the statements, arguing they exceeded the scope of 'the acts complained of'.

The court held that in cases of ongoing abuse, the statutory phrase includes the accused's treatment of the complainants leading up to and during the period of the charges, as this provides necessary context.

The court ordered specific edits to remove irrelevant, hearsay, and overly prejudicial comments while admitting the contextual evidence.

The accused was tried for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized seven kilograms of methamphetamine and $1,800 from the accused's vehicle pursuant to a general warrant.

The accused argued that the drugs were planted by the police from a previous seizure.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding him to be an active drug trafficker who engaged in counter-surveillance.

The court accepted the police evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The Crown applied for a review of a justice of the peace's order granting judicial interim release to the respondent.

The respondent's original surety had applied to be relieved of his obligations, resulting in a committal order under s. 766(1) of the Criminal Code.

A justice of the peace subsequently substituted a new surety without holding a new bail hearing, relying on R. v. Alexander.

The Superior Court held that a committal order vacates the underlying release order, necessitating a new bail hearing.

Furthermore, because the original surety was specifically named in the release order, the justice of the peace had no jurisdiction to amend the order to substitute a new surety.

The release order was quashed and a new bail hearing was ordered.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his wife of 32 years.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 18 years, while the defence argued for 10 to 12 years.

The court considered the brutality of the killing, the gratuitous violence, the victim's suffering, and the offender's lack of remorse, balancing these against his lack of a criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a minimum period of parole ineligibility of 15 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

At his new trial for manslaughter, the accused sought to adduce evidence of two prior violent attacks by the deceased against him to support his claim of self-defence.

The Crown did not oppose this but sought to adduce reply evidence of the accused's prior convictions for violence.

The court ruled that the accused could adduce the evidence of the deceased's prior violence, but doing so would open the door for the Crown to adduce evidence of the accused's disposition for violence to ensure the jury had a balanced picture of the parties' respective dispositions for aggression.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder after intentionally driving his SUV onto a sidewalk and killing the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment and set the period of parole ineligibility at 12 years.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record, the devastating impact on the victim's family, and the danger posed to the public as aggravating factors justifying an increase from the minimum 10-year period.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder in 1984, sought a declaration that section 7 of the Charter requires the Crown to preserve all Stinchcombe disclosure material for the lifetime of the offender.

She alleged her section 7 rights were violated because autopsy photographs from her trial were lost or destroyed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that even if a post-appeal duty to preserve evidence exists, the loss of the photographs was adequately explained given the passage of time and lack of retention policies in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the applicant suffered no prejudice as the photographs would not have assisted in demonstrating her innocence.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging the Crown breached its s. 7 disclosure obligations.

The accused argued the Crown failed to disclose that a key witness admitted to ongoing involvement in pin-pad frauds shortly before testifying.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's disclosure was otherwise exemplary, the omission was inadvertent, and the accused suffered no prejudice because the defence successfully elicited the witness's criminal conduct during cross-examination.

During a trial for second degree murder where the accused allegedly drove his SUV onto a sidewalk and killed the victim following a nightclub altercation, defence counsel requested that the defence of provocation be put to the jury.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the defence.

The judge concluded there was no evidence that an ordinary person would be deprived of self-control by the insults exchanged, no evidence the accused actually lost self-control, and no evidence that the insults or the accused's reaction were sudden.