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Limitation period not tolled for incapacity, but unclear denial notice allowed income replacement benefits claim to proceed.
The applicant sought to proceed to arbitration for income replacement benefits and housekeeping and home maintenance benefits after the two-year limitation period had expired.
She argued the limitation period should be tolled because she lacked capacity to instruct counsel due to severe substance abuse and cognitive impairments.
The arbitrator found the applicant was an unreliable historian and failed to rebut the presumption of capacity, precluding her claim for housekeeping benefits.
However, the arbitrator found the insurer's notices terminating income replacement benefits were confusing and not clear and unequivocal, particularly given the applicant's extremely low cognitive abilities.
Therefore, the limitation period for the income replacement benefits claim did not commence, and the applicant was permitted to proceed to arbitration on that issue.
HIV transmission lawsuit dismissed as statute‑barred with no duty of care owed by defendants.
The plaintiff alleged that his former spouse knowingly infected him with HIV and sued multiple defendants, including the federal Crown, an immigration medical examiner, and the employer of the spouse.
The defendants brought motions for summary judgment dismissing the claims.
The court held that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of material facts when he was diagnosed as HIV‑positive in March 2004 but commenced the action in 2008.
The court further held that neither the federal government nor the immigration physician owed a private law duty of care to the plaintiff under the Anns/Cooper framework, and there was no evidentiary basis for negligence or vicarious liability against the nightclub employer.
The claims against all moving defendants were dismissed.
Litigation privilege protects an insurance adjuster's file in a third-party tort claim from the moment of retention.
The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel the defendant property owner to fulfill undertakings and answer refusals from examinations for discovery, primarily concerning the production of an insurance adjuster's file.
The defendant brought a cross-motion to compel the plaintiffs to fulfill their own undertakings.
The court held that in third-party tort claims, an insurance adjuster's investigation is conducted solely in anticipation of litigation, meaning litigation privilege attaches to the adjuster's file from the moment they are retained.
The court upheld most of the defendant's refusals based on litigation privilege but ordered the production of redacted monthly property management reports.
The court also ordered the plaintiffs to provide particulars of out-of-pocket expenses and collateral benefits.
Appeal from preliminary order refusing to remove respondent's counsel for alleged conflict of interest rejected.
The appellant sought to appeal a preliminary arbitration order that refused to remove the respondent's counsel for an alleged conflict of interest.
The appellant argued that counsel representing the respondent in both the first-party accident benefits arbitration and a related third-party tort action possessed prohibited information.
The Director's Delegate rejected the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court had previously ruled there is no requirement for an insurer to retain separate counsel in such circumstances.
The Delegate concluded that hearing the appeal would cause delay and extra expense without streamlining the process.
Costs denied to successful responding party on motion because the motion raised a novel issue.
The applicant was injured in a hit-and-run motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.
At the arbitration hearing, the applicant brought a motion to remove the Fund's counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest, which was dismissed.
In this subsequent decision on expenses, the Fund sought its costs for the motion.
The arbitrator found that the motion raised a novel issue regarding the Fund's practice of using the same counsel for tort and accident benefit claims without a 'Chinese Wall'.
Consequently, the arbitrator ordered that each party bear its own expenses.
Motion to remove insurer's counsel for acting in both tort and accident benefits claims dismissed.
The applicant brought a motion to remove the respondent's counsel and his law firm as solicitors of record due to an alleged conflict of interest.
The applicant argued that the same counsel could not represent the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund in both the tort action and the statutory accident benefits claim.
The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding no conflict of interest, as the counsel's only client was the Fund and there was no legal requirement for an insurer to retain separate solicitors for tort and accident benefits claims.
Appeal dismissed; insurer has no duty to defend where true nature of claims falls within policy exclusions.
The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent insurer had no duty to defend him against a landlord's statement of claim.
The landlord alleged arson, breach of contract, and negligence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the arson claim fell under the intentional act exclusion, the breach of contract claim fell under the contractual liability exclusion, and the negligence claims were merely labels for what were in substance breaches of contract.
Applicant precluded from accident benefits because her election to sue was made primarily to claim them.
The applicant, a school bus driver, was injured when her bus rolled forward and struck other vehicles.
She applied for statutory accident benefits but did not pursue a WSIB claim.
Two years later, after the insurer raised a defence under s. 59(1) of the SABS, she commenced a tort action against the bus manufacturer.
The arbitrator found that the applicant's delay in bringing the tort action and her failure to prosecute it demonstrated that her election to sue was made primarily for the purpose of claiming accident benefits.
Therefore, under s. 59(2) of the SABS, she was precluded from receiving statutory accident benefits.