Martin Greenglass

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion to amend its statement of claim against the defendant bank to allege that a specific individual was not an authorized signing officer when she conducted fraudulent transactions.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing it amounted to the withdrawal of an admission, asserted a new cause of action after the limitation period expired, and constituted an abuse of process.

The Master granted the motion, finding the original pleading was not an admission but a background fact, there was a triable issue regarding the discoverability of the new cause of action, and there was no abuse of process.

Two lawyers were victims of a fraudulent loan scheme involving counterfeit certified cheques deposited into their trust accounts.

Acting on instructions from fraudsters posing as a financing company, the lawyers issued a trust cheque and bank draft payable to a jewellery business, which were deposited into fraudulent bank accounts.

When the counterfeit instruments were discovered, the bank debited the lawyers’ trust accounts.

The plaintiffs sued the bank for conversion and negligence.

The court held that the payee was neither fictitious nor non‑existing because the drawers intended payment to an identifiable entity, and the collecting bank’s negotiation of the instruments constituted conversion.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting possession of a mortgaged property to the second mortgagee.

The appellants admitted the mortgage was valid and in default, but argued the property was owned by a trust and expressed concerns about a potential improvident sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the trust owned the property, the admitted default entitled the mortgagee to possession, and concerns about an improvident sale are not a legal defence to a claim for possession.

Following the granting of summary judgment in favour of a lender in a commercial loan enforcement action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The successful lender sought substantial indemnity costs based on contractual indemnity provisions in the mortgage, standard charge terms, and general security agreement.

The defendants argued that no costs should be awarded or that they should receive substantial indemnity costs due to alleged unfounded accusations of dishonesty and the purportedly novel nature of the dispute.

The court held that costs should follow the event and rejected the defendants’ arguments regarding misconduct and novelty.

Exercising its discretion and applying proportionality, the court awarded reduced costs rather than the full amount claimed.

The plaintiff Bank brought a motion for summary judgment on a demand loan and for possession of a mortgaged commercial property.

Although the borrower was current on monthly payments, the Bank demanded repayment based on non-financial defaults, including the unauthorized transfer of the property to a limited partnership, late financial statements, and misrepresentations in statutory declarations.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the loan documents clearly permitted demand at any time and that the non-financial breaches justified the Bank's decision to call the loan.

The appellant bank appealed a trial judgment finding it liable to its customer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge made some factual errors, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge was entitled to find a special relationship existed between the bank and the customer, taking it outside the normal debtor-creditor relationship, and that the bank's employee breached the standard of care by providing misleading information.

The appeal was dismissed with a minor correction to the damages calculation.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of defence and granting default judgment to the respondent bank for failing to pay $3,000 in costs in a $7 million fraud action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge failed to consider the proportionality of striking the defence and the possibility of an adjournment, given the appellant was out of the country.

The orders striking the defence and granting default judgment were set aside.

An employee of the appellant hospital defrauded his employer by causing it to issue cheques to a made-up entity for services never rendered.

The cheques were deposited by an accomplice at the respondent bank.

The hospital sued the bank for conversion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the made-up entity was a 'non-existing person' under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act, which allowed the bank to treat the cheques as payable to bearer and provided a complete defence to the conversion claim.