Marrocco A.C.J.

The appellants, construction trades, appealed a Master's decision granting summary judgment dismissing their breach of trust actions against the respondents and refusing to lift bankruptcy stays.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's finding that the appellants' breach of trust claims were discovered when they signed minutes of settlement in 2009, making their 2012 and 2013 actions statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Consequently, there was no basis to lift the bankruptcy stays under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appeals were dismissed.

The tenant, who lived in rent-geared-to-income premises, appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order for non-payment of rent.

The tenant argued the rent increases were unlawful.

The Board ruled it lacked jurisdiction to determine the lawful rent under s. 203(a) of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that because the tenant's rent was not payable under the Housing Services Act, s. 203(a) did not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of the rent charged.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding them liable for insider trading and tipping contrary to s. 76 of the Securities Act.

The Commission found that a corporate lawyer tipped an investment advisor about three corporate transactions, who then tipped others in a chain.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings against the lawyer and three of the investment advisors, finding the Commission's inferences from circumstantial evidence were reasonable.

However, the court allowed the appeal of one investment advisor at the end of the chain, finding the Commission made factual errors in concluding he ought reasonably to have known the information came from an insider.

The sanctions against the unsuccessful appellants were upheld.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that he had no right to unilaterally set off disputed amounts against a court-ordered costs award in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that neither the Courts of Justice Act nor equitable principles permit unilateral set-off against a court order.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the motion judge's costs award, reducing it from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, finding the motion judge erred in principle by treating the appellant's maintained position as an additional factor justifying enhanced costs.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim brought by an insurer in the names of the respondents for damages arising from a fuel oil spill.

The appellants argued the action was a nullity because the respondents were undischarged bankrupts when the claim was issued, meaning their causes of action had vested in their Trustees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the insurer's subrogation rights crystallized before the husband's assignment in bankruptcy, and the Trustee had disclaimed interest in the insurance claims.

Thus, the insurer was entitled to commence the action in the husband's name.

Trinity Western University (TWU) applied for judicial review of the Law Society of Upper Canada's decision to deny accreditation to its proposed law school.

The Law Society denied accreditation because TWU's community covenant, which prohibits sexual intimacy outside of heterosexual marriage, was found to be discriminatory against LGBTQ individuals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Law Society's decision was reasonable.

The Court held that while the decision infringed TWU's freedom of religion, the Law Society proportionately balanced this right against its statutory mandate to protect the public interest and the equality rights of its future members.

The minor appellant brought an application seeking child support from her biological father.

The motion judge held that the appellant was required to have a litigation guardian under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the Family Law Rules did not adequately cover the situation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Family Law Rules do adequately cover the situation, specifically exempting a child in a child support case from the definition of a 'special party'.

The appeal was allowed, and the order requiring a litigation guardian was set aside.

The applicants, who recently took over the operation of a convenience store, sought judicial review of a Minister's decision applying a tobacco sales prohibition order to them.

The prohibition was issued under section 16 of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act because employees of the prior, unrelated operator had been twice convicted of selling tobacco to minors.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that on a purposive interpretation of the Act, the prohibition can only be applied to a person who has committed at least one tobacco sales offence.

Since the applicants had never been convicted of such an offence, the Minister lacked jurisdiction to apply the prohibition to them.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Alberta.

His insurer brought a subrogated action in his name for property damage without his knowledge, which was resolved by a consent judgment.

The plaintiff subsequently commenced a personal injury action in Ontario.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the personal injury claim was barred by res judicata as one wrong cannot generate multiple causes of action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Alberta Insurance Act differentiates subrogated property damage claims from personal injury claims, and an implied term in the consent judgment preserved the plaintiff's right to sue for personal injuries.