Stephanie Drisdelle

The defendants, engineering consultants, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a crossclaim by the co-defendant developer.

The crossclaim was a subrogated claim advanced by the developer's insurer.

The moving parties argued they were additional insureds under the developer's wrap-up liability policy and thus protected by a waiver of subrogation clause.

The developer argued the waiver should not apply because the moving parties' professional services were excluded from coverage under the policy.

The court held that the moving parties were additional insureds and the clear language of the policy's waiver of subrogation clause applied, regardless of the professional services exclusion.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the crossclaim was dismissed.

In a bifurcated trial concerning construction damage, the damages phase was completed and the main action settled, leaving only the crossclaims for the liability phase.

The cross-claimants brought a motion to compel the defendant developer to answer questions refused on discovery regarding insurance coverage.

The developer brought a motion for a declaration that the judge who presided over the damages phase was seized of the liability phase.

The court granted the refusals motion, finding the questions relevant to the amended pleadings.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the seized judge, holding that a bifurcated trial consists of two separate trials and the judge is not seized of the second phase as a matter of law; judicial scheduling remains within the discretion of the Regional Senior Justice.

In a bifurcated trial concerning construction damage, the damages phase was completed and the main action settled, leaving only the crossclaims for the liability phase.

The cross-claimants brought a motion to compel the defendant developer to answer questions refused on discovery regarding insurance coverage.

The developer brought a motion for a declaration that the judge who presided over the damages phase was seized of the liability phase.

The court granted the refusals motion, finding the questions relevant to the amended pleadings.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the seized judge, holding that a bifurcated trial consists of two separate trials and the judge is not seized of the second phase as a matter of law; judicial scheduling remains within the discretion of the Regional Senior Justice.

The defendant Tega brought a motion to strike amended defences to crossclaims delivered by co-defendants Goodeve Manhire and the Paterson Group.

The co-defendants had previously relied on deemed defences under Rule 28.05(2) but sought to file detailed defences due to a changed litigation landscape, including settlements and insurance coverage issues.

The court treated the motion as one for leave to amend under Rule 26.01.

Finding no non-compensable prejudice to Tega and noting the expanded scope of the action, the court dismissed the motion to strike and granted leave to amend the defences to crossclaims nunc pro tunc.

The plaintiff's highway service centre was damaged by a fire originating in an exterior neon sign.

The plaintiff sued the defendant, a company that serviced signs and lights at the centre, alleging it should have warned the plaintiff about the risk of an electrical fire due to improper installation and aging components.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant's technicians had never worked on the specific sign in question or observed its faulty assembly.

Furthermore, the court held that the defendant did not owe a positive duty to warn the plaintiff of the danger of an electrical fire, as the risk was not reasonably foreseeable in the context of their limited service relationship.

The moving parties, Goodeve Manhire Inc. and Goodeve Manhire Partners Inc., brought a motion to compel the responding party, Tega Homes Developments Inc., to answer questions refused on an examination for discovery.

The examination was permitted following the late delivery of an expert report by Tega.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that questions relating to a withdrawn expert report, previously canvassed issues, and the expert's retainer letter were properly refused.

The court also held that the foundational information for the new expert report was adequately disclosed within the report itself.

Costs were awarded to Tega on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant insurer brought an application to determine priority of coverage under s. 277(1.1) of the Insurance Act following a rental car accident.

The driver, acting in the course of her employment, rented the vehicle using a corporate credit card.

The court found that the employer, not the employee, was the lessee of the vehicle, and therefore the employer's non-owned automobile liability policy with the respondent was first in priority to respond to the claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's limitation period defence, finding the claim was not discoverable until the driver was served with the underlying action.

The defendants brought a motion seeking particulars of the plaintiff insurer’s claim, arguing that the statement of claim failed to comply with Rule 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure by not identifying specific contractual provisions or statutory sections relied upon.

The dispute arose from a fire loss claim where the insurer alleged it overpaid the insured following an appraisal under s.128 of the Insurance Act.

The court held that pleadings must contain concise material facts but not detailed evidence or legal authorities.

It concluded that the plaintiff was not required to identify specific sections of the insurance contract or the Insurance Act at the pleading stage.

The defendants’ motion for further particulars was dismissed.

The plaintiff was allegedly injured by propane gas poisoning at a cabin owned by the Ministry of Natural Resources.

An MNR supervisor attended the hospital, spoke to the plaintiff's parents, took notes, and reported the incident.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action for failure to comply with the strict 10-day written notice requirement under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the notice provisions should receive a liberal construction, there is no clear requirement that notice must be in writing, and the supervisor's notes contained sufficient particulars to satisfy the Act.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order requiring the plaintiff to attend a further independent medical examination by a physiatrist and permitting the resulting expert report to be served after the pre-trial conference.

The plaintiff opposed the request on the basis that it constituted a second medical examination and argued the defendants had not established its necessity.

The court held that the plaintiff’s physiatrist report introduced issues concerning mood, anxiety, and cognitive symptoms that were outside the expertise of the defendants’ orthopaedic surgeon who had previously examined the plaintiff.

Given the differing medical specialties and the need to respond to new issues raised in the plaintiff’s expert evidence, the court exercised its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to order the additional examination.

The plaintiff was ordered to attend the defendants’ physiatrist examination and the expert report was permitted to be served after the pre-trial.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01 to strike the plaintiff’s action on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute was academic in nature, and that the Notice of Action was a nullity.

The plaintiff alleged defamation and negligence arising from allegedly false reports made by a fellow student to university protection services and the university’s subsequent publication of those allegations.

The court held that it was not plain and obvious the court lacked jurisdiction, as the claim concerned torts rather than internal academic decisions.

The court further found the defamation claim was arguable on the pleadings and that the Notice of Action sufficiently identified the nature of the claim.

The motion to strike was dismissed and the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim.