Marie Henein

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious assault.

At trial, the Crown introduced telephone records under s. 30 of the Canada Evidence Act to rebut the appellant's alibi that he was with his former wife at the time of the offence.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider whether the records were made in the usual and ordinary course of business and their reliability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records were properly admitted and reliable.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 3-year sentence for the vicious attack was not manifestly unreasonable.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of first-degree murder in the death of the mother's husband.

The son admitted to killing the deceased but claimed self-defence, defence of his mother, or provocation, citing a history of severe domestic abuse by the deceased.

The Crown's theory was that the appellants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance money.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding self-defence, party liability, the use of co-accused statements, the standard of proof for reasonable doubt, and the need for a Vetrovec warning for unsavoury Crown witnesses.

The son also argued the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge and concluding that the cross-examination, while aggressive, did not compromise trial fairness.

The appellant, a bouncer, appealed his manslaughter conviction after punching an intoxicated patron in the head, causing a fatal fall.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to consider self-defence, finding causation, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim given the appellant was a trained, sober bouncer facing an intoxicated victim with his hands down.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, noting medical evidence supported that the punch caused the fatal fall.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions on self-defence.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain the elements of self-defence under section 34(1) of the Criminal Code, including the definition of provocation, and failed to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the accumulation of errors undermined the correctness of the verdict and that the curative proviso could not be applied.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction, arguing his statements to the police were involuntary.

The trial judge found that an officer had assaulted the appellant in an elevator prior to the interview but ruled the subsequent statements voluntary because they were not temporally connected to the assault.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the test for voluntariness, as the assault undermined the officers' credibility and the temporal connection was not broken.

The statements were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a 42-year-old school teacher, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual touching of a 13-year-old complainant he met on a chat line while pretending to be a 17-year-old.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable, the jury charge was unbalanced, and the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding child witnesses and in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts reasonable, the jury charge fair overall, and a custodial sentence appropriate given the predatory nature of the offence.

The Crown appealed an order awarding costs to the accused following a stay of proceedings.

The stay was granted because the Crown failed to disclose notes of an eyewitness interview until the second week of a manslaughter retrial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the failure to disclose was a marked and unacceptable departure from the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution, justifying the rare award of costs against the Crown.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent, while under the influence of alcohol, struck and killed a pedestrian at high speed, then fled the scene and failed to seek assistance.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was manifestly unfit as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was imposed.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of indecent assault against his two step-daughters for incidents occurring between 1975 and 1980.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in treating the complainants' evidence as mutually confirmatory, in assessing credibility, and in dismissing an application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence's probative value outweighed its prejudice and that the third-party records did not meet the test for likely relevance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's sleep apnea was adequately accommodated in custody.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for indecent assault arising from historical allegations of sexual touching said to have occurred when the complainant was between five and nine years old.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's charge to the jury contained serious errors concerning the permissible use of prior consistent statements, including failure to distinguish narrative use from use to rebut recent fabrication or address delay in complaint.

The court also held it was wrong to instruct that inconsistencies between witnesses could themselves be taken as a sign of credibility and that the charge overstated the defence theory as one of contrivance and concerted action.

Although the verdict was not unreasonable on the evidence, the cumulative effect of the charge errors required a new trial.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two counts of sexual interference and one count of sexual assault involving young adolescent victims.

The court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the serious and repeated sexual violations, the sentencing judge's improper attribution of blame to the victims, and the respondent's repeated breaches of court-imposed release conditions.

The respondent's admitted attraction to young men, absence of a relevant treatment plan, and poor compliance history made him a poor candidate for a community-based sentence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment less credit for time served under the conditional sentence, resulting in 6 months' incarceration.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period.

He appealed both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury was properly instructed and the verdict was reasonable.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge over-emphasized the appellant's dangerousness without adequately considering his personal circumstances, including his lack of a criminal record and tragic background.

The parole ineligibility period was reduced to 12 years.

The 80-year-old appellant pled guilty to tax evasion for failing to remit over $600,000 in GST.

He was sentenced to a 12-month conditional sentence, a mandatory fine equal to the tax evaded, and 9 months' imprisonment in default of paying a portion of the fine.

On appeal, the appellant argued he lacked the ability to pay and that a conditional sentence should be available for the default period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding on ability to pay but, applying its recent decision in R. v. Wu, allowed the appeal to substitute a 9-month conditional sentence in default of payment of the fine.

The appellant, a former Premier of Nova Scotia, was charged with numerous historic sex-related offences.

He sought a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process due to police prematurely identifying him as a suspect, a Crown attorney engaging in 'judge shopping', and the Crown conducting pre-charge interviews of complainants which allegedly compromised their objectivity.

The trial judge granted a partial stay of nine counts.

The Court of Appeal overturned the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the conduct did not amount to an abuse of process warranting a stay.

The Court clarified that pre-charge Crown interviews are not inherently abusive and that a stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice will be perpetuated and no other remedy is capable of removing it.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder on the basis that he forcibly confined the deceased while causing his death.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in several aspects of the jury charge, including the definition of forcible confinement and instructions on self-defence, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury charge and concluded that there was sufficient circumstantial and expert evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the deceased had been forcibly confined.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after a trial by jury.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offence of manslaughter and in his instructions on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that intent was a live issue requiring a manslaughter instruction, and that the self-defence instruction improperly reversed the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault following a second jury trial.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the eyewitness identification of the two teenage complainants.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding significant frailties in the identification evidence, including a mishandled photo lineup, discrepancies in descriptions, and potential contamination of testimony.

Furthermore, the timeline of events described by the complainants was irreconcilable, there was no forensic evidence linking the appellant to the crimes, and the appellant presented a corroborated alibi.

The Court concluded that no properly instructed jury, acting judicially, could have reasonably convicted the appellant on the totality of the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for surrender pursuant to the Extradition Act and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the extradition judge's conclusions that the alleged conduct would constitute an offence in Canada, that the record was sufficient, and that he lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Charter application.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, finding no error in the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the principles governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence during a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge stated the correct principles and fully appreciated the legal significance of the proposed evidence during submissions.

Given the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial rulings on similar fact evidence, the court declined to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's findings of credibility were inconsistent, particularly given the complainant was a self-admitted manipulator and liar who had previously concocted a story of physical abuse.

The Court also found the trial judge's identification and analysis of corroborative evidence was flawed.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.