Major

The appellants, a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, sought to build a place of worship in the respondent municipality.

After their initial application for a zoning amendment was refused with reasons, they made subsequent applications for a different lot, which the municipality summarily refused without providing reasons.

The appellants sought mandamus, arguing the refusal violated their freedom of religion and procedural fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the municipality breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide reasons for its subsequent refusals.

The matter was remitted to the municipality for reconsideration.

The Crown obtained an ex parte order for a judicial investigative hearing under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code in relation to the Air India bombings.

The application judge ordered the hearing to be held in camera and kept secret.

A newspaper reporter discovered the proceedings and sought access.

The hearing judge dismissed the application for access.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the newspaper's appeal in part, holding that the open court principle applies to s. 83.28 hearings.

While the initial ex parte application was properly held in camera, the existence of the order and the constitutional challenge should have been public.

The investigative hearing itself must be presumptively open, subject to the Dagenais/Mentuck test for publication bans or in camera orders.

The appellant, an inmate in a maximum security institution, was threatened by a fellow inmate who was a member of a violent gang.

Anticipating an attack, the appellant concealed homemade weapons in his clothing.

When the fellow inmate attacked him with a knife, the appellant defended himself and killed the attacker.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of murder based on self-defence, and of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, finding he possessed the weapons for deterrence and defence.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction on the weapons charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that while a defensive purpose does not automatically mandate an acquittal, in these specific circumstances where the attack was imminent and unavoidable, the possession was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

A forest fire caused by the negligence of Canadian Forest Products Ltd. damaged public lands in British Columbia.

The Province sued for suppression and restoration costs, which were agreed upon, as well as for lost stumpage revenue from harvestable trees and the value of non-harvestable trees in environmentally sensitive areas, including an environmental premium.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Province failed to prove a compensable financial loss for the harvestable trees because the Province's own Comparative Value Pricing system ensured revenue neutrality.

The Court also rejected the claim for the non-harvestable trees and the environmental premium, finding that the Crown had pleaded its case as an ordinary landowner rather than as parens patriae, and had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to quantify the environmental loss.

The appellant sought to intervene under art. 208 of the Code of Civil Procedure to represent her husband in his action for damages, arguing he was incapable of representing himself.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that under art. 62 C.C.P. and s. 128 of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec, only advocates may plead for another person.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that the intervention procedure does not override the statutory monopoly of advocates to represent others in court, and that allowing the appellant to represent her husband would bypass the legal mechanisms for instituting protective supervision for incapable persons.

The respondent filed multiple complaints with the Barreau du Québec regarding the conduct of a lawyer who was harassing her through the courts.

Despite the lawyer's extensive disciplinary record and a finding of incompetence, the Barreau delayed taking action for over a year.

The respondent sued the Barreau for damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Barreau's gross carelessness and serious negligence in handling the complaints amounted to bad faith, precluding it from relying on the statutory immunity provided by s. 193 of the Professional Code.

The Barreau was found civilly liable and ordered to pay moral damages.

The complainant was excluded from a municipal police officer hiring process because he did not meet a minimum hearing acuity standard adopted by the municipality.

The Commission brought a complaint alleging discrimination based on a handicap.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the standard was discriminatory and inoperable against the complainant, damages could not be awarded because public law principles provide immunity for the good faith application of a law subsequently found unconstitutional.

However, the Court ordered the municipality to reconsider the complainant's application under current hiring rules without considering his hearing loss.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 76 of the Canadian Wheat Board Act and the division of powers concerning flour mills.

The Court adopted the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Quebec and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against her former employer.

The Commission decided not to deal with the complaint.

The appellant sought judicial review and requested production of a legal opinion provided to the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solicitor-client privilege applies to legal advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel just as it does in private law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the legal opinion was protected from disclosure.

The respondents, securities brokers, breached the prospectus requirement of the British Columbia Securities Act by splitting a private placement.

The British Columbia Securities Commission imposed the maximum administrative penalty of $100,000, considering general deterrence.

The Court of Appeal reduced the penalty, finding the maximum unreasonable and general deterrence an inappropriate factor.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review is reasonableness, general deterrence is an appropriate factor in assessing a penalty in the public interest, and the Commission's imposition of the maximum penalty was reasonable given the respondents' deceitful conduct and leadership roles.

The appellant brought a class action seeking restitution for unjust enrichment arising from late payment penalties (LPPs) levied by the respondent gas utility in excess of the interest limit prescribed by s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant made out a claim for unjust enrichment.

The Court established a two-part test for the juristic reason analysis and found that the OEB orders did not constitute a juristic reason because they were inoperative to the extent they conflicted with the Criminal Code.

The respondent was ordered to repay LPPs collected in excess of the legal limit after the action was commenced in 1994.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder after the trial judge refused to put the defence of mental disorder automatism to the jury.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by weighing the evidence rather than simply determining if there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that the accused acted involuntarily.

The accused's testimony and the expert psychiatric evidence provided a sufficient evidential foundation to put the defence to the jury.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the accused's appeal as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Crown argued that the dissent in the Court of Appeal did not raise a question of law.

The Supreme Court dismissed the motion, finding that the dissenting opinion, which concluded that misapprehensions of evidence on credibility resulted in an unfair trial and a miscarriage of justice, was properly construed as a dissent on a question of law.

The parties entered into a marriage agreement that kept their property separate, which the respondent signed despite independent legal advice that it was grossly unfair.

After separation, the trial judge and Court of Appeal found the agreement unfair under s. 65(1) of the Family Relations Act and reapportioned the assets, including the appellant's law practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the agreement operated fairly at the time of distribution because the parties' circumstances unfolded exactly as anticipated, and the respondent's economic disadvantage could be addressed through the spousal support preserved in the agreement.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder, was transferred from a medium security facility to a maximum security facility by order of the Ontario Review Board.

The Review Board concluded that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code did not apply to the specific conditions of the disposition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement applies to the disposition order as a whole, including its conditions.

The Court found that the Review Board committed an error of law and that the Crown failed to demonstrate that no substantial wrong occurred, entitling the appellant to a re-hearing.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for an assault with a weapon due to a mental disorder.

The Review Board ordered his transfer to a medium security hospital with privileges, applying the 'least onerous and least restrictive' test to the conditions of his detention.

The Court of Appeal held this test only applied to the choice of disposition, not the conditions.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the 'least onerous and least restrictive' requirement under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code applies to both the disposition and the particular conditions forming part of it.

The City of Calgary enacted a bylaw freezing the number of taxi plate licences.

The respondents challenged the bylaw, arguing it was ultra vires the City under the new Municipal Government Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for a municipality delineating its jurisdiction is correctness.

Applying a broad and purposive approach to interpreting municipal legislation, the Court found that the Act granted the City the power to limit the number of taxi plate licences.

The appeal was allowed and the bylaw was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following the rape and death of a 76-year-old victim and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 10-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by characterizing the offence as one of 'stark horror'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while terms like 'stark horror' should be avoided, the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors.

The Court also upheld the parole ineligibility order, noting that specific deterrence was paramount given expert evidence that the appellant's personality disorders made him a danger to society.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and filed a notice of appeal, but died before the appeal could be heard.

Seven years later, the Crown moved to abate the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal but declined to exercise its discretion to do so.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while an appellate court retains jurisdiction to hear an appeal rendered moot by the death of an appellant, this discretion should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of justice.

The Court found no such exceptional circumstances in this case.

The appellant, a financial advisor, borrowed $100,000 to purchase a departing colleague's client list and sought to deduct the purchase price and the interest on the borrowed funds from his employment income.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the purchase price and the interest payments were payments 'on account of capital' and were therefore precluded from deduction under section 8(1)(f)(v) of the Income Tax Act.

The appeal was dismissed.