Major

The company TCT became insolvent and an interim receiver, KPMG, was appointed.

The order appointing KPMG stated it could not be considered a successor employer and prohibited proceedings against it without leave.

KPMG terminated unionized employees and sold assets to a new company, which hired some employees without union representation.

The union sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to bring a successor employer application before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction to determine successor employer status, which belongs exclusively to the labour board.

The Court also held that the traditional Mancini test applies to s. 215 leave applications, requiring only a prima facie case, and granted the union leave to proceed.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellants under the 'record of the case' method.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the evidentiary provisions of the Extradition Act, arguing they violated section 7 of the Charter by allowing committal on unreliable evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are constitutional because section 29(1) of the Act grants the extradition judge the discretion to refuse committal if the evidence is manifestly unreliable or unavailable for trial.

The appeals were dismissed and the committals for extradition were upheld.

The appellant, manufacturer of BARBIE dolls, opposed the respondent's application to register the trade-mark 'Barbie's' for its chain of restaurants.

The Trade-marks Opposition Board rejected the opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant difference in the nature of the wares and services.

The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The Court confirmed that while a trade-mark's fame is an important factor, it does not trump all other factors under section 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act, and the totality of the circumstances must be considered.

The appellant, owner of the famous VEUVE CLICQUOT trade-mark for champagne, sought to prevent the respondents from using the trade-name and registered trade-marks 'Cliquot' in association with their mid-priced women's clothing stores.

The appellant alleged that the respondents' use caused confusion under section 20 of the Trade-marks Act and depreciated the value of the goodwill attaching to its mark under section 22.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant differences in the wares and channels of trade.

The Court also dismissed the section 22 claim, holding that the appellant failed to establish that consumers would make a mental association between the clothing stores and the champagne mark, or that any such association would likely depreciate the value of the appellant's goodwill.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, was detained at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The Review Board ordered that he continue to be held in custody but imposed conditions requiring the hospital director to review his treatment plan, provide an independent risk assessment, and explore culturally appropriate treatment.

The Court of Appeal struck the conditions, finding the Board lacked jurisdiction to impose medical treatment or bind parties other than the accused.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while Review Boards cannot prescribe medical treatment, they have the authority under the Criminal Code to make conditions regarding or supervising medical treatment that are binding on hospital authorities.

The appellant, an orthodox Sikh student, was prohibited by his school board from wearing a kirpan to school on the basis that it violated the school's code of conduct prohibiting weapons.

The student and his father proposed an accommodation to wear the kirpan sealed inside his clothing, which the school board rejected.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the absolute prohibition infringed the student's freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the infringement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, as the absolute prohibition did not minimally impair the student's rights given the low risk of violence when the kirpan is worn under strict conditions.

The school board's decision was declared null.

The parties were involved in a motor vehicle accident in California.

The appellant brought an action in Alberta after the one-year California limitation period had expired, but within the two-year Alberta limitation period.

The appellant argued that s. 12 of the Alberta Limitations Act applied the Alberta limitation period to the exclusion of the California one.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the substantive law of California, including its limitations law, governed the action.

Section 12 does not revive an action that is already time-barred by the substantive law of the place where the tort occurred.

The applicant applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application for an extension of time.

The appellant pleaded guilty to producing cannabis and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory firearms prohibition order under s. 109(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the mandatory order constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the prohibition has a legitimate connection to drug offences and relates to the recognized sentencing goal of protecting the public.

The Court found that the loss of the privilege to possess firearms is not grossly disproportionate, especially given the ameliorative provision in s. 113 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant inmates, serving life sentences, were involuntarily transferred from a minimum-security to medium-security institutions based on a computerized reclassification scale.

They applied to the provincial superior court for habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court to hear habeas corpus applications from federal inmates and should not decline jurisdiction merely because an alternative remedy exists.

The Court further held that while the transfers were not arbitrary, the Correctional Service of Canada breached its statutory duty of disclosure under s. 27(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by failing to provide the scoring matrix used in the reclassification.

This breach of procedural fairness rendered the transfer decisions null and void for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant operated a club where members and guests engaged in consensual group sex.

He was convicted of keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of acts of indecency under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction, establishing a new harm-based test for criminal indecency.

The Court held that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct causes harm or presents a significant risk of harm to individuals or society, and that the harm is of a degree incompatible with the proper functioning of society.

The Court found no evidence that the consensual acts behind closed doors caused such harm.

The accused operated a licensed bar where couples paid an entrance fee to engage in or observe group sex activities.

He was charged with keeping a common bawdy-house for the practice of indecent acts under s. 210(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying the harm-based test for criminal indecency established in the companion case of R. v. Labaye, held that the conduct did not constitute criminal indecency.

The Court found no significant risk of harm to the autonomy and liberty of members of the public, as access was restricted to informed and willing participants, and no evidence of physical, psychological, or anti-social harm.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and the acquittal affirmed.

The appellant optometrist sought judicial review of the College's 1996 decision refusing to renew his license for failing to provide evidence of continuing education, and its 2001 decision imposing conditions on his application for a new license.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review was reasonableness.

The Court upheld the 1996 refusal to renew and the 2001 condition requiring a jurisprudence examination as reasonable.

However, the Court quashed the 2001 condition requiring an ethics course, finding it unreasonable because no such course was accredited or prescribed by the College.

The accused was charged with operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

At trial, he testified he had consumed two large beers, and a defence expert testified that based on this consumption, his blood alcohol level should have been much lower than the breathalyzer results.

The trial judge rejected the accused's testimony as not credible and therefore rejected the expert opinion based on it, convicting the accused.

The Superior Court and Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that an expert opinion based on rejected testimony cannot constitute 'evidence to the contrary' to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy of breathalyzer results.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant was fired from her position as bookkeeper and office manager of the respondent trade union after reporting alleged financial misconduct by her supervisors to the International Union of Iron Workers.

The trial judge found she was terminated for reporting the misconduct but held that the union was not a 'lawful authority' under s. 74 of The Labour Standards Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'lawful authority' includes individuals within the employer organization who exercise lawful authority over the employee or the activity, thereby protecting employees who report misconduct 'up the ladder'.

Kirkbi held patents for LEGO construction sets.

When the patents expired in Canada, Ritvik began manufacturing and selling interchangeable bricks.

Kirkbi claimed an unregistered trade-mark in the 'LEGO indicia' (the pattern of raised studs) and sued for passing off under s. 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act.

Ritvik challenged the constitutionality of s. 7(b).

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 7(b) is intra vires Parliament as a valid exercise of the general trade and commerce power.

However, Kirkbi's passing-off claim was dismissed because the doctrine of functionality bars purely functional designs from being the basis of a trade-mark, whether registered or unregistered.

The appellants, former employees of Stelco in Quebec, sought early retirement benefits under Stelco's pension plan after plant closures.

The plan was governed by Ontario law.

Ontario's Superintendent of Pensions ordered a partial wind up and approved a report granting early retirement benefits only to Ontario employees, while Quebec employees received deferred pensions under Quebec law.

The appellants did not contest this decision in Ontario but sued in Quebec based on their employment contracts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the action was an impermissible collateral attack on the Superintendent's final decision, barred by res judicata and issue estoppel, and that the Quebec courts should decline jurisdiction based on forum non conveniens.

The father applied to reduce his child support payments after the child began spending 50 percent of the time with him.

The Supreme Court of Canada established the proper approach to calculating child support under section 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines for shared custody arrangements.

The Court held that there is no presumption in favour of the Guidelines amount or a simple set-off.

Instead, courts must take a contextual approach, considering the Table amounts, the increased costs of shared custody, and the conditions, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse and the child.

The father was ordered to pay $500 per month.

The appellant attended a residential school run by the respondent Order.

He was sexually assaulted by a lay employee who worked as a baker and maintenance man.

The trial judge found the Order vicariously liable based on the operational characteristics of the school.

The Court of Appeal set aside the decision, finding insufficient connection between the employee's duties and the wrongful acts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that vicarious liability requires a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful act, which was not established given the employee's limited duties and lack of authority over the students.