Lucy K. McSweeney

The applicant filed an urgent motion seeking a vesting order to facilitate the refinancing of a high-interest mortgage on the matrimonial home, which was due to mature.

The court, operating under COVID-19 protocols, made a preliminary determination that the matter appeared urgent due to potential significant financial hardship.

However, the court noted the applicant's non-compliance with service requirements, which had misled the self-represented respondent regarding hearing dates and response deadlines.

The court scheduled a teleconference hearing for the motion and issued specific directions and timelines for both parties to file proper materials, ensuring the respondent's right to respond to both urgency and merits.

The applicant sought a divorce, and the respondent counterclaimed to set aside their separation agreement, arguing she signed it under duress, without independent legal advice, without understanding it, and without proper financial disclosure.

The court found that the respondent, who had been the bookkeeper for the applicant's business, fully understood the agreement and the parties' financial situation.

The court held there was no duress, no material non-disclosure, and no unforeseen circumstances that would render the spousal support waiver unconscionable.

The respondent's claims were dismissed, and the separation agreement was upheld.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision granting sole custody of the parties' child to the respondent mother and ordering him to pay child support based on an imputed income of $420,000.

The mother cross-appealed, seeking to impute an even higher income to the father.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's best interests analysis for sole custody.

The court also upheld the imputation of income, noting the father's failure to provide adequate financial disclosure regarding his solely-owned business and the significant discrepancy between his reported income and his lifestyle and expenditures.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's two construction defect actions for delay.

The actions were commenced in 2011 and 2012 but had not progressed to discoveries.

The plaintiff's former counsel claimed a 'mental block' prevented him from advancing the files, and the plaintiff's principal claimed ignorance of the delay.

The court found the delay was inordinate and inexcusable, noting the plaintiff's principal failed to monitor the litigation.

The court also found actual prejudice to the defendants, including the death of a key witness.

The motions were granted and the actions dismissed.

The applicant Municipality sought a declaration of ownership over a strip of beach on Georgian Bay where the respondent had built a deck.

The respondent argued the beach was owned by the Provincial Crown.

The court analyzed the historical conveyances, including the original 1899 Crown Patent and a 1969 Reference Plan, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Walker.

The court found no express reservation of the beach in the Crown Patent or subsequent conveyances, concluding that the waterfront lots extended to the water's edge.

Consequently, the Municipality, having acquired the adjacent road, also owned the beach.

The respondent was found to be trespassing and ordered to remove the deck.

The plaintiff, Nadeem Ahmed Mughal, brought a civil fraud action against Bama Inc. and its directors, Abdul Raheem Qureshi, Mansoor Ahmed Khan, and Badar Sohail Khan, after losing $210,000 invested through Qureshi.

The plaintiff alleged misrepresentation, deceit, conversion, conspiracy, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found Qureshi personally liable for civil fraud and Qureshi, Mansoor Ahmed Khan, and Bama Inc. jointly and severally liable for conspiracy to cause economic injury.

The claims against Badar Sohail Khan were dismissed.

The court also found a purported settlement agreement between the plaintiff and ET Zone unenforceable due to bad faith and contractual bars.

Judgment was granted for $210,000 plus interest against Qureshi, Mansoor Ahmed Khan, and Bama Inc.

Following a trial in a commercial lease dispute where the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendant landlord's counterclaim was allowed, the court determined the issue of costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on the terms of the commercial lease.

The court found that the lease established a contractual entitlement to recovery of legal costs on a solicitor-client scale.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments to limit costs to the Small Claims Court scale, noting the plaintiffs chose to commence a Superior Court action.

Costs were fixed at $65,000.00 on a substantial indemnity scale.

The defendant, Tiffany Skye Johnson, was charged with three drug offences: possession of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possession of Methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

She pleaded guilty to the Methamphetamine and proceeds charges.

The trial proceeded solely on the Fentanyl trafficking charge.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis to the defendant's testimony.

Despite expert evidence suggesting trafficking intent based on the quantity of Fentanyl and associated paraphernalia, the court found the defendant's explanation for personal use, bulk purchase for cost efficiency, and necessity to carry drugs due to homelessness and distrust to be plausible and credible.

This created a reasonable doubt regarding the intent to traffick Fentanyl.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of possession of Fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking but convicted of the lesser included offence of simple possession of Fentanyl.

The plaintiff sought to enforce a Vermont trial judgment against the defendant for services rendered.

The defendant opposed, alleging fraud, denial of natural justice, and public policy contravention.

The court granted summary judgment, finding a real and substantial connection to Vermont and dismissing all of the defendant's defences.

The plaintiff tenants brought an action against their former landlord for breach of contract and wrongful distress after the landlord issued a Notice of Distress for unpaid rent.

The tenants claimed that a maintenance employee of the landlord had signed a 'letter of forgiveness' and a short-form lease that eliminated their past debts.

The court found that the employee had no actual or apparent authority to bind the landlord, and the landlord's subsequent administrative actions did not constitute acceptance of the unsigned lease.

The court held that the landlord was entitled to distrain the tenants' goods due to significant rent arrears, and the distress was not excessive.

The tenants' action was dismissed, and the landlord's counterclaim for unpaid rent and other charges was allowed.

The parties in a family law application resolved disclosure motions by consent, agreeing that orders would issue and either party could seek costs on written submissions.

The court declined to make a costs award, citing that the motion was not heard on the merits, making it difficult to determine success or inappropriate behaviour.

The court also emphasized the disproportionate allocation of judicial resources required to review extensive cost submissions for a matter settled by consent, and the principle that parties are best positioned to determine costs at settlement.

A trial judge declared a mistrial during jury selection for a sexual assault and sexual interference case.

A prospective juror, during a *Parks* challenge, revealed a personal history of sexual assault and stated she could not be impartial.

Despite the triers finding her acceptable and Crown counsel being content, the judge intervened and deferred the juror.

Concerned about potential reversible error in the jury selection process, particularly regarding the court's jurisdiction to excuse the juror at that stage and the impact on already seated jurors, the judge invited submissions on a mistrial.

Defence counsel requested a mistrial, citing the risk to a fair trial.

The judge granted the mistrial, emphasizing the importance of a fair trial and avoiding a successful appeal based on procedural errors in jury selection.

The Crown brought an application under section 486.1(2) of the Criminal Code to permit a complainant witness to have a support dog present while testifying in a serious sexual offence trial.

The defence opposed, arguing the witness, now 21, did not "need" the dog, despite being 16 at the time of the offence.

The court, interpreting the amended statutory threshold of "facilitate" rather than "necessary" considered factors including the witness's age at the time of the offence, the nature of the offence, reported mental health issues (anxiety and depression), and observed distress during preparation.

The court also determined that the human handler of the support dog qualified as a "support person of the witness' choice." Finding that the support dog would likely facilitate the witness in giving a full and candid account, the application was granted.

The applicant sought to legally end his second and third marriages.

He entered into his second marriage while still married to his first wife, making the second marriage void ab initio.

He later divorced his first wife and entered into a third marriage.

The court found the third marriage was valid because the first marriage had been dissolved and the second marriage never legally existed.

The court granted a divorce for the third marriage but adjourned the annulment application for the second marriage to ensure proper service on the second wife.

The appellant parents appealed a trial decision making their two children Crown wards without access.

The parents had previously been convicted of manslaughter in the death of their middle child due to malnutrition.

On appeal, the parents argued the trial judge made numerous errors, including finding the youngest child in need of protection, excluding the reasons for sentence from their criminal trial, and terminating access.

They also sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued they received ineffective assistance from their trial counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The court also held that the fresh evidence would not have changed the outcome and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both moot and unfounded.

The applicant, a municipal councillor charged with assaulting the deputy mayor, sought to vary his bail conditions to permit him to attend town council meetings.

His original bail conditions included a no-contact order with the victim and witnesses, and prohibited him from attending the town hall.

The applicant argued that his inability to attend meetings for three successive months would result in the loss of his council seat under the Municipal Act.

The court found that his unrestricted attendance posed an unacceptable risk to the victim and witnesses.

However, to prevent the automatic loss of his seat, the court granted a limited variation allowing him to attend one specific meeting for the sole purpose of registering his attendance, provided he is accompanied by a police officer at his own expense.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a pre-trial interpretation of Section 267.5 of the Insurance Act, specifically the phrase "without regard to" in s. 267.5(7)(1), to require the trial judge to inform the jury about statutory deductibles applicable to general damages awards in motor vehicle accident actions.

The motion, brought under Rules 21 and 22 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The court found that the issue of jury knowledge of deductibles was not a matter of law in the pleadings that would dispose of the action, substantially shorten the trial, or result in significant cost savings, nor was there an agreed-upon special case under Rule 22.

Following a 20-year relationship, the applicant wife sought spousal support, while the respondent husband, who had custody of their three children, sought spousal support and section 7 expenses.

The court found the respondent intentionally unemployed and imputed his income at $115,000.

The applicant was awarded compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support due to her 11-year absence from the workforce to care for the children.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $1,150 per month in ongoing spousal support, which included a $200 monthly deduction representing the applicant's contribution to the children's section 7 sports and post-secondary expenses.

The respondent's claims for spousal support and debt contribution were dismissed.

The defendants and third parties brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, who resides in Connecticut and has no assets in Ontario.

The plaintiff, who was rendered paraplegic in a snowmobile accident, sought $15 million in damages.

The court found the threshold for security for costs was met and the plaintiff failed to show that an order would be unjust.

The court ordered the plaintiff to post $60,000 in security for costs, payable in three stages, taking into account his costs insurance policy and the need to avoid preventing him from advancing his litigation.

The applicant and respondent separated in 2012 and have two children.

The applicant sought ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The respondent, a skilled carpenter, lost his job in 2015 and claimed to be unable to work due to mental health issues, but failed to provide court-ordered medical or financial disclosure.

The court applied the framework from Drygala v. Pauli and imputed an annual income of $60,000 to the respondent, finding he was capable of earning a full-time carpenter's salary.

The court ordered the respondent to pay table child support and his proportionate share of section 7 expenses based on the imputed income, and awarded costs to the applicant.