Lou Brzezinski

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy on the basis that the landlord required the unit in good faith for her daughter's residential occupation.

The tenant argued the Board erred by finding good faith without hearing testimony from the landlord, by refusing to join the tenant's maintenance applications, and by relying on a non-compliant statutory declaration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory requirement for the landlord to testify, no breach of procedural fairness in the Board controlling its own procedure, and that the daughter's declaration substantially complied with the statutory requirements.

The Licensed Insolvency Trustee of the Estate of the late Robert Simpson, a convicted child sexual abuser, moved for a court order to impose a claims bar date for the filing of Proofs of Claim.

The Trustee sought this to bring certainty to the Estate's liabilities and facilitate distributions to existing creditors, primarily the victims.

The court, while acknowledging the Trustee's efforts and the deserving nature of the claimants, declined to grant the order based on its inherent jurisdiction.

The court found that the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) provides a comprehensive statutory framework (sections 148-154) for managing dividends and claims, which substantially achieves the Trustee's objectives.

The court directed the Trustee to proceed under these BIA provisions, ensuring notice to potential claimants and allowing for timely distribution to known creditors, while clarifying that late claims would not be extinguished but would be limited to any remaining funds without disturbing prior distributions.

This decision addresses an application for oppression remedies under the Canada Business Corporations Act, brought by majority shareholders against minority shareholders, alleging fraud and prejudicial conduct related to a property acquisition.

The applicants sought declarations of wrongdoing, removal of directors, and cancellation of shares.

The court found material facts in dispute, including the applicants' knowledge of a "finder's fee" or "flip" profit, and serious allegations of threats.

Given the complexity, credibility issues, and the significant value of the shares at stake, the court converted the application into an action for a full trial with viva voce evidence, reserving costs to the trial judge.

The court-appointed receiver, KSV Restructuring Inc., moved to quash an appeal by the debtor, 30 Roe Investments Corp., from orders approving the sale of two condominium units. 30 Roe argued the units should be sold en bloc, not individually, and that the sales diminished the "Enterprise" value.

The Court of Appeal found no appeal as of right under BIA s. 193(a)-(c) as the appeal did not involve future rights, did not directly involve property value loss (as the sales were at market price and the en bloc argument was a collateral attack on prior unappealed orders), and was not likely to affect other similar cases.

The court also denied leave to appeal under BIA s. 193(e), finding the issue not of general importance, not prima facie meritorious, and unduly hindering the receivership.

The appeal was quashed, and leave to appeal denied.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy brought a motion for the payout of its 50% share of proceeds from the sale of a property, which had been vested in the Trustee following a finding of fraudulent conveyance.

The bankrupt's spouse brought a cross-motion claiming deductions from the Trustee's share for carrying costs, improvements, and a line of credit debt.

The court granted the Trustee's motion and dismissed the cross-motion, finding that the parties' prior agreement did not provide for such deductions, the expenses did not increase the property's capital value, and the equitable claims were barred by cause of action estoppel.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff cross-moved for leave to amend its claim to include causes of action under the Trademarks Act and for intentional interference with economic relations, abandoning its initial defamation claim.

The court struck the original statement of claim due to the plaintiff's lack of standing to sue on behalf of its members.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, finding that the proposed amended claim failed to plead essential elements for both the Trademark Act claim (lack of pleaded intellectual property ownership) and the intentional interference claim (failure to clearly plead its own economic interests and how they were harmed).

However, the court granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a new draft amended statement of claim by a specified date, emphasizing that further attempts without proper pleading might be deemed abusive.

Costs of $25,000 were awarded to the defendant, payable before any new draft statement of claim is delivered.

The defendant/plaintiff by counterclaim, Dr. Eric Owens, brought a motion seeking leave to amend his amended statement of defence and counterclaim to include claims for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and increased damages of $8 million.

The plaintiff/defendant by counterclaim, Navigator Limited, opposed, arguing that the proposed amendments introduced new causes of action after the expiry of the applicable limitation period and that the increased damages claim was not tenable in law due to contractual limitation clauses.

The court granted Dr. Owens leave to amend, finding that the proposed claims arose from the same factual matrix as the original pleadings and were clarifications or alternative remedies, not new causes of action.

The court also determined that the applicability and effect of the contractual limitation of liability clauses should be assessed at a hearing on the merits, not at the pleadings stage.

The defendants appealed an Associate Judge's order that required the net proceeds from the sale of two properties to be held in trust or paid into court upon the discharge of certificates of pending litigation (CPLs).

The defendants argued the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure on the initial ex parte motion for the CPLs and that the Associate Judge failed to properly apply the test to vacate a CPL.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error or error in law in the Associate Judge's assessment of material disclosure, balancing of equities, or exercise of discretion to require security.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from a summary judgment that set aside two transactions by a bankrupt: the transfer of his 50% interest in his residence to his wife as an undervalue transfer and fraudulent conveyance, and the transfer of shares in a corporation to a non-arms length creditor as an improper preference.

The appellants argued the claims were time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and constituted an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, confirming that the limitation period for the Trustee's claims began upon the Trustee's appointment and that the amended statement of claim did not introduce a new cause of action.

The court also rejected the abuse of process argument as speculative.

A cross-appeal on costs by the Trustee, seeking substantial indemnity, was also dismissed, with the court deferring to the motion judge's assessment of partial indemnity costs.

Following a successful summary judgment motion setting aside transfers at undervalue, the Trustee in Bankruptcy sought substantial indemnity costs, including pre-litigation costs, and a vesting order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, declining to award pre-litigation costs or substantial indemnity costs as the defendants' conduct was not reprehensible.

The court also approved the inclusion of a vesting order in the judgment, finding it to be a natural corollary to the order setting aside the transfers under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiffs, an osteopathic federation and its president, sued the defendant insurer for defamation after the insurer delisted their services.

The court applied the five-factor test from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children and found that the complexity of the issues, the need for expert evidence, the need for discovery, and the general importance of the matter favoured a transfer.

The court also noted the plaintiffs sought mandatory orders beyond the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy brought a summary judgment motion to set aside two transactions made by the bankrupt prior to bankruptcy: the transfer of his half-interest in a residence to his spouse, and the transfer of preferred shares to a family-owned company.

The court found both transactions were transfers at undervalue and made with the intent to defeat creditors, constituting fraudulent conveyances and preferences under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The defendants' cross-motion arguing the claims were statute-barred was dismissed, as the limitation period commenced upon the Trustee's appointment.

The Applicants (Green Growth Brands Inc. et al.) sought an Amended and Restated Initial Order and approval of a Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) and a Stalking Horse Agreement under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).

Mr. Michael D. Horvitz, an investor, opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion seeking to set aside the Initial Order, adjourn the comeback motion for discovery, and direct the Monitor to investigate certain transactions.

The court dismissed Mr. Horvitz's cross-motion, finding his complaints largely constituted inter-creditor disputes outside the scope of CCAA proceedings.

The court approved the Applicants' requested orders, finding the SISP and Stalking Horse Agreement reasonable and compliant with CCAA criteria, despite Mr. Horvitz's objections regarding fairness, break fees, and the treatment of the GAOC Note.

The debtors, Eureka 93 Inc. and its subsidiaries, sought administrative consolidation of four related notices of intention to make a proposal, an extension of time to file proposals, and approval for interim priority financing (DIP financing) under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion was opposed by Dominion Capital LLC, representing a group of noteholders, who argued there was no viable business to rehabilitate.

The Proposal Trustee supported the plan.

The court granted the motion, finding that immediate liquidation would have dire effects, while the extension and interim financing offered a prospect of increased value and a successful proposal, despite inherent risks in the cannabis industry.

The court imposed bi-weekly reporting requirements.

The plaintiff, AstraZeneca Canada Inc., applied for a Mareva injunction against the defendants, alleging a sophisticated fraud scheme involving duplicate claims and inflated drug reimbursements under AstraZeneca's patient programs.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud based on multiple suspicious factors, including a significant presence of duplicate claims, a large spike in reimbursement volumes, unusual drug claim patterns, lack of corresponding drug purchases, and frustrated audit attempts.

Applying the five requirements for a Mareva injunction, the court found full and frank disclosure, fulsome particulars of the claim, sufficient assets in Ontario, and a serious risk of asset dissipation due to the defendants' evasive actions (e.g., avoiding audits, sudden business closure, sale of an expensive car, and travel).

The balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, and there was a risk of irreparable harm without the injunction.

A worldwide injunction was granted against the individual defendants and most corporate defendants, with Shepherd RX Pharmacy Inc. temporarily excluded due to insufficient evidence at this stage.

The Applicants, under CCAA protection, brought a motion seeking an order to authorize and approve the Revised Fourth DIP Amendment.

The motion was opposed by the USW and GIP.

The court granted the motion, finding that the DIP solicitation process was competitive, robust, and fair, and that the Revised Fourth DIP Amendment was the best available proposal.

The amendment addressed previous concerns by providing a maturity date past the winter build period, a sufficient commitment amount, and minimal conditions on covenants.

The Applicants, a group of Essar Steel Algoma entities, brought two motions in their CCAA proceedings: (i) for approval of a DIP extension agreement with existing DIP lenders, and (ii) for the appointment of a restructuring committee.

The DIP extension was opposed by various stakeholders including the USW, retirees, and GIP Primus, LP, who argued against the short term and potential leverage of the existing DIP lenders who were also Term Lenders.

The court dismissed the DIP extension motion, finding it would not enhance the prospects of a viable restructuring outcome, citing concerns about the alignment of interests between DIP and Term Lenders and the short-term nature of the proposed extension.

The motion for a restructuring committee was also dismissed, as the court found it would create unnecessary overlap with the existing Chief Restructuring Advisor and would not effectively address the core issues preventing restructuring, primarily labour negotiations.

The plaintiffs in two related actions brought motions for the production of information by the corporate defendants under the Business Corporations Act.

The parties settled the motions 'except for costs' and filed written costs submissions.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motions were unnecessary as the defendants ultimately consented to the relief sought.

The court declined to award costs, holding that costs generally should not be awarded when parties settle 'except for costs.' The court reasoned that determining costs in such circumstances would require a hypothetical adjudication of the merits, which is an inefficient use of judicial resources and runs counter to the principle that costs are an incident of the determination of rights, not the subject matter of the dispute itself.

Essar Capital Limited and USW Local 2251 brought motions within a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

Essar Capital sought to re-open the Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) and compel the disclosure of information to Essar Global for a potential bid.

Local 2251 sought court advice on engaging in discussions with Ontario Steel Investments Ltd. regarding potential transactions.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no basis to interfere with the established SISP, noting Essar Global's prior failure to demonstrate financial capability and the lack of a formal bid from Ontario Steel.

The court emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of the court-ordered process and avoid delays detrimental to the restructuring.

The applicants, a group of Essar Steel Algoma entities under CCAA protection, moved for court approval of a Term Sheet with Cliffs Mining Company for the supply of iron ore pellets.

The motion was opposed by USW Locals and Algoma retirees, who sought disclosure of commercial terms and objected to provisions preventing disclaimer of the agreement and allowing Cliffs to terminate if an Essar Global entity acquired Algoma.

The court approved the Term Sheet, finding it beneficial for Algoma's restructuring by ensuring a stable and technically suitable iron ore supply.

The court dismissed the objections, emphasizing the urgency of approval, the confidentiality of pricing, and that the Term Sheet's provisions did not unlawfully fetter judicial discretion under CCAA section 32 or unduly prejudice stakeholders.