Lisa La Horey

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The applicants, comprising 118 limited partnerships, sought judicial review of the Minister of Energy's directions to the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) to change the Feed-In Tariff (FIT) Program rules.

The applicants had submitted numerous applications under the original FIT Rules 1.0 and argued that the new FIT Rules 2.0 were applied retroactively, breached their legitimate expectations, and interfered with vested rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's policy directions were subject to a reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that the applicants had no vested rights or legitimate expectations that the program rules would remain unchanged, as the FIT Program was a discretionary government policy initiative subject to modification.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a proposed class action arising from explosions at a propane facility in Toronto that allegedly caused personal injury, property damage, and evacuation of nearby residents.

The court considered the certification requirements under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

It held that the pleadings against certain landlord defendants failed to disclose a viable cause of action because the allegations relying on agency, single‑group enterprise, and alter‑ego theories lacked material facts capable of piercing the corporate veil.

Those pleadings were struck with leave to amend and the certification motion against those defendants was adjourned.

The proceeding was otherwise certified as a class action against the remaining defendants, with common issues approved and representative plaintiffs appointed.

The applicant, a director of a bankrupt Nova Scotia corporation operating in Ontario, sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision upholding an Order to Pay unpaid wages to Ontario employees.

The applicant argued she was exempt under s. 80(4) of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, asserting the provision should be read disjunctively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's conjunctive interpretation of s. 80(4) was reasonable and consistent with the remedial purpose of the Act, despite brief contrary pronouncements in prior civil court decisions.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, brought an action in Ontario alleging a conspiracy by the defendants to use fraudulent bankruptcy proceedings in Quebec to defeat the process of the Ontario courts.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the action on jurisdictional grounds, and the trustee in bankruptcy moved for a stay because the plaintiff failed to obtain leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter and was not forum non conveniens.

However, the Court allowed the trustee's appeal in part, holding that the action against the trustee must be stayed until the plaintiff obtains leave from the Quebec Superior Court.

The appellant was duped into mortgaging his father's properties and the funds disappeared.

The respondent lenders sued, obtained a Mareva injunction, and $250,000 of the appellant's lottery winnings were paid into court.

The respondents obtained default judgment.

The appellant moved for payment out of court of the frozen funds to pay for legal and living expenses, including defending related criminal charges.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that once default judgment was granted, the Mareva injunction was spent and the funds were subject to the Creditors' Relief Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that without a motion to set aside the default judgment demonstrating a meritorious defence, there is no principled basis to allow a defendant to deplete funds available to judgment creditors.

The plaintiff sued for damages after a crane it purchased was destroyed in a fire.

The plaintiff mistakenly named the Canadian distributor instead of the Austrian manufacturer.

After the limitation period expired, the plaintiff successfully moved before a Master to correct the misnomer and substitute the manufacturer as a defendant.

The manufacturer and the Canadian distributor appealed the Master's order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonably open to the Master to conclude that the 'litigating finger' pointed at the manufacturer and that there was no prejudice in allowing the correction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the hearing of two appeals.

The Van Breda respondents and the Charron respondents were each awarded costs fixed at $45,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondents Hola Sun Holidays Limited and Bel Air Travel Group Ltd. were each awarded costs fixed at $10,000.

No costs were ordered for or against the interveners.

The appellants, out-of-province resort operators, appealed decisions dismissing their motions to stay or dismiss personal injury actions for want of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal convened a five-judge panel to reconsider the Muscutt test for assumed jurisdiction.

The Court modified the Muscutt test by elevating the weight given to Rule 17.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, creating a presumption of a real and substantial connection for most of its subrules.

The Court also collapsed the fairness factors and clarified the distinction between jurisdiction simpliciter and forum non conveniens.

Applying the revised test, the Court found a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the appellants in both cases and upheld the motion judges' decisions that Ontario was the appropriate forum.

Following the dismissal of 42 consolidated motions for leave to appeal costs awards in 37 class actions, the respondent insurers sought costs totalling $345,349.36.

The Court of Appeal assessed the bills of costs submitted by various law firms representing the insurers.

Applying the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable rather than a strict mathematical calculation of hours times rates, the Court reduced the amounts claimed, noting that the complexity was procedural rather than legal or factual.

The Court fixed the total costs payable to the insurers at $141,645.26.

Following the dismissal of several class actions against automobile insurers, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs, who had relied on a previous Court of Appeal decision that was subsequently reversed, sought their costs despite being unsuccessful, citing disastrous financial consequences for their contingency-fee counsel.

The successful insurers sought their costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to either side.

The court held that the Class Proceedings Act was not intended to insulate unsuccessful plaintiffs from costs, but also found that the insurers should not receive costs because the litigation constituted a test case and the plaintiffs had reasonably relied on the court's own prior jurisprudence.

The appellants and the Law Foundation of Ontario sought leave to appeal costs orders made by the case management judge following the dismissal of several proposed class actions against automobile insurers.

The motion judge had awarded costs to the successful insurers, including substantial indemnity costs where the plaintiffs persisted with unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and deceit to overcome limitation periods.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding entitlement or scale of costs.

The plaintiff, a 62-year-old long-term employee, was summarily dismissed and arrested for theft after being confused with another employee by a private investigation firm retained by his employer.

The plaintiff sued the employer, its parent company, the investigation firm, and the police for various torts including negligent investigation and intentional infliction of mental distress.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing several claims.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reinstated the negligent investigation claim against the private investigation firm, recognizing that private investigators may owe a duty of care to suspects.

The court also reinstated the intentional infliction of mental distress claims against the investigation firm, the parent company, and the human resources manager.

The dismissal of the claims for inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations was upheld.

The appellant sued the respondent bottled water supplier for psychiatric injury after finding dead flies in an unopened replacement bottle of water.

The trial judge awarded damages, but the Court of Appeal overturned the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the respondent owed a duty of care and breached it, the damage was too remote.

The Court established that for psychiatric injury to be compensable in negligence, it must be reasonably foreseeable that a person of ordinary fortitude would suffer serious injury from the breach.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action based on a release executed in a prior action.

The appellant argued the release did not cover the current claims or protect respondents who were not parties to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the release was unambiguous and barred the action, as the appellant knew the essential elements of the claims when he signed it.

The Court also agreed that the release protected the non-party respondents because it applied to agents and the claims shared the same factual underpinnings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following the release of the appeal decision, counsel requested clarification regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal clarified its previous ruling, ordering that the respondent pay the costs of the action at trial, to be fixed by the trial judge, if demanded.

The plaintiff suffered a major depressive disorder and phobia after seeing a dead fly in an unopened bottle of water supplied by the defendant.

The trial judge awarded damages for psychiatric injury, finding the plaintiff's extreme reaction was due to his particular cultural background and sensibilities.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendant's appeal and dismissed the action.

The Court held that in tort, psychiatric harm must be reasonably foreseeable in a person of normal fortitude and robustness.

The plaintiff's highly unusual reaction did not meet this objective test.

The Court also dismissed the contract claim, finding that psychiatric harm was not in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was formed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding an enforceable agreement to pay a success fee and assessing damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in finding an agreement and that her assessment of damages, based on factors such as amounts typically paid to investment bankers, time spent, and value added, was reasonable.

The appellants, automobile insurers, appealed the dismissal of their motions to dismiss class proceedings brought by the respondent insureds.

The insureds claimed that the insurers breached statutory condition 6(7) by reducing their actual cash value payments by the policy deductible when taking title to the salvage in total loss claims.

The motion judge, bound by the Court of Appeal's previous decision in McNaughton, dismissed the insurers' motions.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal held that McNaughton was wrongly decided, as statutory condition 6(7) does not quantify the insurer's payment obligation but merely gives the option to acquire salvage.

The Court overruled McNaughton, allowed the appeals, and dismissed the insureds' actions.