Leslie Dizgun

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claims for recovery under a contingency retainer agreement.

The corporate appellant abandoned its appeal.

The individual appellant's appeal was dismissed because he had failed to respond to a Request to Admit, resulting in deemed admissions that nothing was owed by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal devoid of merit and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the individual appellant.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for refusing to attend an interview with a Society investigator.

The appellant argued that the Law Society Act only authorized the Society to require the provision of information, not attendance at an oral interview.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Society's broad duty to protect the public interest required effective investigation powers, including the authority to compel oral interviews.

The appellants, who were discharged bankrupts, sought to appeal a declaration validating mortgages on their properties.

The respondent mortgagee brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellants lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the properties remained vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.

Although the trustee took no position on the appeal and consented to the appellants proceeding, it had not abandoned its interest in the properties under section 40(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision finding that the union engaged in bad faith bargaining and imposing a remedy that affected the applicant's 'Me Too' collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determined the standard of review was patent unreasonableness, and found that the OLRB had ample evidence and authority to fashion the remedy.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Following the release of the appeal decision, the parties disagreed on the settlement of the formal order regarding whether it should specify the date of termination of the commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal held that the omission of the termination date could be rectified under Rule 59.06 and determined by the remaining justices under s. 123(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court declared the lease was effectively terminated on November 19, 2001, noting this does not inhibit the trial judge's discretion on relief from forfeiture.

The landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a commercial lease was terminated because the tenant sublet the premises without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord's prior consents to subleases did not authorize the new sublease.

The Court held that section 20(7) of the Commercial Tenancies Act does not preclude resort to the court's equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The issue of whether the tenant was entitled to relief from forfeiture was referred for trial.

The appellant appealed an order made under the Canada Business Corporations Act to the Divisional Court.

The court held that under s. 249 of the Act, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, not the Divisional Court.

The appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

A group of psychiatric nurses challenged the pay equity plan negotiated between their union (OPSEU) and the employer (Management Board Secretariat), alleging it contravened the Pay Equity Act.

The plan utilized a policy-capturing methodology involving factor analysis and multiple regression to determine job values and select male comparators.

The applicants argued that the methodology, specifically the modification of factors and the presence of negative regression coefficients, failed to adequately measure and positively value female work, thereby leaving gender bias in the system.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, preferring the statistical evidence of the respondents' experts, and found that the applicants failed to demonstrate that the decisions of the working group were unreasonable or that the plan contravened the Act.

The Tribunal received letters from counsel and agreed to cancel scheduled hearing days.

The Tribunal declined to add the Group of Employees at Brockville Psychiatric Hospital to the complaint, despite the respondents' qualified consent, because the employees had not raised their complaint at Review Services, depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction.

The applicants sought to withdraw their pay equity complaint against their bargaining agent, OPSEU, and proceed solely against their employer, the Crown.

The Tribunal denied the motion, holding that under section 32(1) of the Pay Equity Act, the bargaining agent is a necessary party to a complaint regarding a pay equity plan that relates to a bargaining unit.

The Tribunal also consolidated another similar complaint into the present application.

In a reconsideration hearing before the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, the applicant employees argued the matter should be decided on legal argument alone regarding their standing to challenge a deemed approved pay equity plan under s. 22(1) of the Pay Equity Act.

The respondent union and employer argued the complex legal issues should be considered in the context of evidence.

The Tribunal ruled that while a member of a bargaining unit can complain under s. 22(1), the more complex issue of challenging a deemed approved plan is better analyzed in an evidentiary context.

The Tribunal directed that evidence on the merits be heard prior to considering the legal arguments.

A group of unionized nursing employees filed a complaint alleging that the pay equity plan negotiated between their union and the employer contravened the Pay Equity Act by failing to accurately capture and value their job content.

The employer and union raised a preliminary objection that individual unionized employees lack standing to challenge a deemed approved plan.

The majority of the Tribunal held that while employees lack standing to complain under sections 12 and 14, which confer rights exclusively on the bargaining agent, they do have standing under section 7 to allege that the compensation practices fail to provide for pay equity.

However, applying a high threshold of review, the majority found that the application did not disclose an unreasonable exclusion of job information and dismissed the complaint.

The Vice-Chair dissented, arguing for a lower prima facie threshold.