W. S. Martin

The appellant challenged federal jurisdiction over proposed natural gas gathering pipeline and processing plant expansions in British Columbia, arguing the facilities remained provincial works despite their connection to an interprovincial transmission pipeline.

The majority held that the facilities, together with the existing gathering, processing, and transmission system, formed a single federal transportation undertaking under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867 because they were functionally integrated and subject to common management, control and direction.

The Court further held that s. 92A did not derogate from Parliament’s pre-existing jurisdiction over interprovincial transportation undertakings.

It also concluded that the processing plants fell within the definition of “pipeline” in s. 2 of the National Energy Board Act.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent holding the facilities retained their distinct provincial character.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.

The appellant sought to recover taxes paid under the allegedly unconstitutional Gasoline Tax Act.

For claims arising before August 1974, the appellant was required to proceed by petition of right, which necessitated a fiat from the Lieutenant Governor.

The Attorney General advised the Lieutenant Governor to refuse the fiat, effectively blocking the appellant's claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown cannot use the executive discretion to refuse a fiat to retain monies obtained under an unconstitutional statute.

The Court issued an order in the nature of mandamus compelling the Attorney General to advise the Lieutenant Governor to grant the fiat.

The Law Society of British Columbia disciplined a lawyer, Donald Jabour, for advertising his legal services.

Jabour and the federal Director of Investigation and Research challenged the Law Society's actions, arguing they violated the Combines Investigation Act and freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act does not apply to regulatory schemes validly established by provincial legislation.

The Court also affirmed that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, despite the Federal Court Act.

Finally, the Court held that the Law Society's advertising restrictions, authorized by valid provincial law, did not unlawfully infringe freedom of speech.